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ABSTRACT  
The Relational Phenomenological Pneumatology of James E. Loder: 
Providing New Frameworks for the Christian Life
The theological writings of James E. Loder, Jr. (1931 -2001) require a wider audience. For more 
than forty years he developed and exercised an interdisciplinary methodology that identified patterns of 
correlation in the fields of fields of psychology, educational theory, phenomenology, epistemology, and 
physics producing a powerful theological vision that centers around the person and work of the Holy 
Spirit engaging and transforming human life. At his untimely death in November, 2001, Loder was the 
Mary D. Synnott Professor of the Philosophy of Christian Education at the Princeton Theological 
Seminaiy, Princeton, New Jersey (U. S. A.), where he lectured primarily in the areas of human 
development and the philosophy of education. If Loder is loiown at all, he is recognized for his work 
in the area of practical theology, especially among church educators. Even in the discipline of practical 
theology his work is largely unknown and has yet to receive the recognition it deserves from systematic 
theologians, biblical scholars, as well as clergy and laity. It is my hope to help change this.
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce and examine, explore and decipher the complexity of 
Loder's thought in order to make it more accessible to a wider public. This important task is done in 
service to the broader goal of demonstrating that Loder’s work, particularly his pneumatology,, is of 
inestimable value to the discipline of theology and theology’s service to the work of the church. At the 
core of Loder’s work is an epistemological, psycho-spiritual framework that I characterize as a 
relational phenomenological pneumatology. The Christian life is preeminently relational, distinguished 
by a relationship with God constituted by Jesus Christ, and sustained by the Holy Spirit. The relation, 
Loder claims, takes place in and through the life of the Holy Spirit who operates within a complementary 
relationship with the human spirit, in what he describes as the analogia spiritus: an intimate,
transfoiTnational interrelation of the Holy Spirit and the human spirit. The Holy Spirit, intimately 
connected to the person and work of Christ, takes up and extends the work begun in the incarnation by 
enfieshing the presence of Clirist in the life of an individual in ways that are transformationally 
Christomorphic. What makes Loder’s work unique is the way he articulates a theology of the Holy Spirit 
that incorporates a firm grasp of the way the self participates in and comes to have a knowledge of itself, 
the world, and God. It is precisely the logic of this dynamic, I would argue, that has extraordinary 
implications for the way we articulate the Christian experience. My thesis, therefore, is that Loder’s 
relational phenomenological pneumatology contains rich and principally unrecognized resources for 
providing new frameworks for the Chi'istian life.
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INTRODUCTION
The theological writings of James E. Loder, Jr. (1931-2001) require a wider audience. For more 
than forty years he developed and exercised an interdisciplinary methodology that identified patterns of 
coiTelation in the fields of fields of psychology, educational theory, phenomenology, epistemology, and 
physics producing a powerful theological vision that centers around the person and work of the Holy 
Spirit engaging and transforming human life. At his untimely death in November, 2001, Loder was the 
Mary D. Synnott Professor of the Philosophy of Christian Education at the Princeton Theological 
Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey (U. S. A.), where he lectured primarily in the areas of human 
development and the philosophy of education. If Loder is loiown at all, he is recognized for his work 
in the area of practical theology, especially among church educators. Even in the discipline of practical 
theology his work is largely unloiown and has yet to receive the recognition it deserves from systematic 
theologians, biblical scholars, as well as clergy and laity. It is ray hope to help change this.
The puipose of this thesis is to introduce and examine, explore and decipher the complexity of 
Loder’s thought in order to make it more accessible to a wider public. This important task is done in 
service to the broader goal of demonstrating that Loder’s work, particularly his pneumatology, is of 
inestimable value to the discipline of theology and theology’s service to the work of the church. At the 
core of Loder’s work is what I characterize as a relational phenomenological pneumatology. The 
Christian life is preeminently relational, distinguished by a relationship with God constituted by Jesus 
Christ, and sustained by the Holy Spirit. The relation, Loder claims, takes place in and through the life 
of the Holy Spirit who operates within a complementary relationship with the human spirit, in what he 
describes as the analogia spiritus: an intimate, transformational interrelation of the Holy Spirit and the 
human spirit. The Holy Spirit, intimately connected to the person and work of Christ, takes up and 
extends the work begun in the incarnation by enfieshing the presence of Christ in the life of an 
individual in ways that are transformationally Christomorphic. What makes Loder’s work unique is the 
way he articulates a theology of the Holy Spirit that incorporates a firm grasp of the way the self 
participates in and comes to have a knowledge of itself, the world, and God. It is precisely the logic of 
this dynamic, I would argue, that has extraordinary implications for the way we articulate the Chi'istian 
experience. My thesis, therefore, is that Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology contains 
rich and principally unrecognized resources for providing new frameworks for the Cliristian life.
Loder asserts that intrinsic to the Christian life are experiences of metanoia. These are moments 
of conviction, moments of transformation, “sometimes of a revolutionary proportions,” when a new 
knowledge '‘'comes upon us,” arriving from beyond the limited confines of the knower, when knowing 
itself yields to “a higher intelligibility” as mediated by the Holy Spirit.' A particular Augenbl^i or ^  
“moment” can be experienced as swiftly as the blinking of the eye; or the duration of the moment can 
be stretched over the length of one’s lifetime, which when compared to the age of the universe is equally
'T7M2, p. 216. Italics in the text.
Î
..
swift. Either way, the Holy Spirit actively engages the human spirit, and through an interpersonal 
experience that operates deeper than the defensive structures of the ego, graciously ti'ansfigures reality 
in a process that Loder calls “intensification,” whereby reality itself is reconstituted by the Spirit who 
is the bearer of all truth (John 16:13). A convictional encounter with the Spirit of Christ always yields 
a higher order of knowing.^ By “higher,” Loder does not mean “up and out,” for such knowledge does 
not take us out of the world. Instead, he refers to the way the Spirit reframes the way we view ourselves 
and our reality and puts us into reality in completely new ways. Because the pattern is incamational, it 
puts us down and into the world, as it is being revealed to us anew by the Spirit. The Spirit embeds us 
into space-time and grants us a more profound engagement with the world and a deeper apprehension 
of the meaning and importance of human life in the eyes of God, meaning an individual could never 
construct on her or her own.
More specifically, Loder’s elemental premise is that the Christian message is first and foremost 
about healing, restoration, renewal, in a word - transformation. Those who encountered Jesus Christ 
experienced personal transformation in moments of conviction which radically altered their 
understanding of God, themselves and others, gave them new life and put them in a new social 
relationship with the world. The early church was called out from ordinary life to witness, to testify to 
what it saw and heard, and in its preaching invited women and men to participate in that new reality, to 
live into the ongoing life of the Holy Spirit transforming individuals and societies after the pattern of 
Christ, What was true then can be and is still true in the present. Loder’s goal is to help people in any 
age to be open to the ways the Holy Spirit continues to transform human life, to know that the “Spiritual 
Presence of God in Jesus Christ [is] at work to restore an anguished creation to its Creator.”  ^ His 
writings attempt to articulate the how of conviction. “Convictional experiences do not belong only to 
those who have them,” Loder contends, “but to anyone who is willing to wrestle through to a dawning 
of the new sense of reality they disclose.”* He holds out the possibility of conviction to anyone willing 
to open themselves up to the work of the Holy Spirit.
To suggest that Loder’s theology provides new frameworks for the Christian life obviously 
assumes that there are already frameworks in place. But to speak of new ones is also to say something 
about their inadequacy, another way of saying that there is something wrong with the present state of 
affairs. There is. There is a crisis of meaning within the Christian experience; and there is something 
desperately wrong with the church, especially in Europe and North America. The church is in trouble, 
with membership, attendance, and involvement declining every year. I would argue that the church is
pp. 213-215.
^TTM2, p. 219. 
"T7M2, p. 219.
in trouble because its people are in trouble and the church is powerless to help. For too long the church 
has exerted its efforts at self-preservation, at the expense of the people. The church and its theologians 
have failed to speak a compelling word of hope and healing to the existential crises of the human 
condition and so people have left.
But how can there be a new understanding of the Christian life two thousand years after Jesus?
Loder is not trying to rework the Christian faith to make it palatable to the masses in order to grow the 
church. He is not trying to defend the faith. He is not trying to “prove” Christian truth claims. Neither 
is he trying to discern what can be rationally retained and then given intellectual sophistication. He is 
concerned with the “how” of the Christian life, more than the “what.” His frameworks are new in the 
sense that what he offers are things that have been forgotten, ignored, or distorted by philosophical and 
theological frameworks over the last two thousand years of the church. The Christian life is not another 
life set apart from ordinaiy life, but the renewing of ordinary life by Christ himself. It is the 
eschatological recreation of the creature overcoming its inherent alienation from the Creator (2 
Corinthians 5:19) Loder reminds us that the “how” of the Christian life entails a relationship of profound 
intimacy between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit and in that relationship one comes to have a new 
understanding of what life looks like for the human being claimed by Christ. His theology calls us to 
a renewed appreciation for the ascriptive worth of human beings wrestling throughout their lives with 
two fundamental questions: “What is a lifetime?” and “Why do I live it?” These are questions of the 
human spirit struggling to find meaning and love in a world that often appears devoid of both. If 
Christian theology and the church that it serves are going to speak to the contemporary crisis within 
Western Chiistianity, then it needs to speak directly to these integral questions of human life. This is 
the value of Loder’s work, by helping us to see that the Holy Spirit is at work in human life, addressing 
the human spirit with the presence of Christ at precisely the point of greatest need.
The task at hand is to open the eyes of the blind. Elizabeth Nordquist has identified the “seeming 
lack of awareness that many church members have about the presence and the power of the Spirit in their 
own lives.”® To correct this becomes a monumental task, given the fact that the contemporary church
is not unlike the church in Ephesus which said to Paul, “We have never even heard that there is a Holy i
!Spirit. (Acts 19:2)” It is a telling indicator of the present state of things that in a recent volume |
exploring the future of Refoimed theology (the tradition out of which Loder writes), not one chapter or 
essay is dedicated to a discussion of pneumatology.® This is why Loder’s thought needs to be
^Elizabeth Nordquist, “The Holy Spirit and Spiritual Formation,” in Joseph D. Small, Editor, 
Fire and Wind: The Holy Spirit in the Church Today (Louisville, KY: Geneva Press, 2002), p. 122.
®David Willis and Michael Welker, Editors, Toward the Future o f Reformed Theology:
Tasks, Topics, Traditions, With Special Collaboration with Matthias Gockel (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1999). Jürgen Moltmann points to the leading principle of the church and its theology 
reformed according to God’s Word: ecclesia reformata et semper reformanda, and therefore also
acloiowledged in the life and work of the church. I believe that his pneumatology has the ability to speak 
a new and creative word of hope to the ti oubling state of the church in the West.
Summary o f the Chapters
An examination of Loder’s thought cannot be divorced from a detailed exploration of his life. 
In the first chapter I will provide an oveiwiew of his life, survey his early writings and identify the 
significant influences upon his thought. The propelling power behind everything he wrote was his need 
to come to terms with two intensely powerful religious experiences that changed his life. Loder firmly 
believed that before theological statements are articulated in dogmatic declarations or confessional 
statements they are first experienced within the existential conflict, struggle, and resolution that come 
when an individual encounters the holiness of God - the Convictor. Failing to connect with the 
generative source of theological claims is not only detrimental to the discipline of theology, but also 
disastrous for the church and any vision of the Christian life. Loder’s theology cannot be fully 
appreciated or fathomed without a knowledge of his own personal, existential struggle. To sever his 
theology from his life would seriously distort the meaning and significance of his work.
Loder’s academic contributions, beginning with his doctoral dissertation, emanate from the need 
to make sense of these two convictional experiences, which opened the question of his reality, and 
redefined his life. They compelled him to question his own preconceived notions of what is real and 
possible, obliged him to reform his theological perspectives, and shaped his understanding of what it 
means to be a disciple of Jesus Christ. Loder’s lifework can be viewed as an exercise offaithfulness, 
that is, being faithful to what he had come to know. He wrote from within his experience; yet, what he 
offered was more than just his own subjectivist musings. Therefore, this chapter will look at key episodes 
in his life in order to see how they aroused his theological imagination up through 1970.
In chapter two we turn to the heart of Loder’s work with a detailed examination of themes that 
cluster around what I have termed a relational phenomenological pneumatology. This chapter will focus 
upon his publications from 1970 through 2002. Instead of going through them in order of appearance, 
I prefer to look at these themes as a whole, thereby highlighting the generative center of Loder’s thought 
and its wider applications. The year 1970 marks a major turning in his life as he takes up 
pneumatological considerations after a near-fatal car accident and another major experience of 
conviction. He begins to construct a theology of the Holy Spirit that is gr ounded in the Reformed 
theological tradition, yet informed by insights into the dynamics of human transformation and 
experiences of conviction. During this period we see Loder becoming a theologian of conviction. For 
more than thirty years he developed and creatively employed a unique psycho-spiritual, epistemological
theologia reformata et semper reformanda, (p. 121) ” If the Holy Spirit is in service to the Word (as 
the church has claimed), then how can there be reform without the Floly Spirit?
framework that articulates a vision of the Christian life as primarily an experience of conviction by the 
Spiritual Presence of Christ.
All the major themes and terms of Loder’s convictional theology are addressed in this one 
chapter. We will focus primarily on writings that come after 1970; however, these do not arrive in a 
vacuum. They flow out of the insights and ideas which originated initially at Princeton and Harvard. 
After an overview of the principal publications of this period -  The Transforming Moment (1981, 
1989); The Knight’s Move: The Relational Logic o f the Spirit in Theology and Science (1992, co­
authored with the late physicist, W. Jim Neidhardt); and The Logic in the Spirit: Human Developmetit 
in Theological Perspective (1998) -  we will turn to a critical analysis of the main components of and 
influences upon Loder’s thought. His writings have been critiqued for being congenitally taxing. As an 
interdisciplinarian pulling fi'om a wide range of disciplines and sources with adeptness and fluidity, his 
works have been notoriously difficult to fathom. Categorizing the center of his thought as a relational 
phenomenological pneumatology provides an interpretative framework to gain better access to Loder’s 
thought. It also provides further insight into the way his theology has something profound to say about 
the nature of the Christian life. Because one of the purposes of this dissertation is to provide Loder a 
wider audience, I have been generous in the number of quotations to his work (in this chapter and all 
chapters). His prose is complex, but also inherently rich. Language is pushed to its extremes to 
articulate the inarticulable.
Chapter three takes up themes implicit to Loder’s theology, but have never before been made 
formally explicit. He is interested in the nature of reality and the way realities are constructed by the 
human knower. His ultimate concern, however, is not reality itself, but the degree to which the 
construction of reality allows for a present connection or intimacy to form with the person Jesus Christ. 
The paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould (d. 2002), observed, “The more important the subject and the 
closer it cuts to the bone of our hopes and needs, the more we are likely to eiT in establishing a 
framework for analysis.”’ For the Christian, there is no more important subject that cuts to the bone of 
humanity’s hopes and needs than the person Jesus Christ. The ways we have theologically construed 
“history” have not served the church because they have failed to help us make this connection. If we 
take up Loder’s epistemological, psycho-spiritual interpretative framework and bring it to bear upon the 
ways we theologically approach questions regarding history and faith, we see that life in the Spirit 
radically reorients reality and our relationship in and with the structures of space and time (or more 
correctly in a post-Einsteinian world, space-time). The Christian life is grounded in the pneumatological 
mediation of Christ which is not limited to the past, but a present reality. Loder brings us to a theological 
consideration of the nature of historical existence as a relational reality. The present becomes a relational
’Stephen Jay Gould, Full House: The Spread o f Excellence from Plato to Darwin (New 
York: Harmony Books, 1996), p. 30.
field of encounter created by the Holy Spirit who is continually at work in the redemption of people 
through the power of Christ.
Finally, in chapter four we come to see the life of the Christian in the field of encounter as an 
openness to the world. The convictional theology explored in chapter two, combined with our 
consideration of historical existence as a relational reality in chapter three, leads us to a fuller 
appreciation of Loder’s understanding of the Holy Spirit’s at work in the world. If the Spirit of Christ 
is engaging the human spirit, then what is the Spirit trying to realize in us and through us for the world? 
How do we know when the Spirit of Christ is at work in our lives? What are the characteristics or style 
of the Holy Spirit? How can we discern this Christomorphic pattern? In seeking to grasp the 
significance of his own convictional experiences, Loder’s work conveys the important point that what 
God did in his life is no different from what the Creator Spirit can do and is doing with and for every 
human life willing to risk intimacy with the Holy. Loder believed that what he experienced was neither 
unique nor rare. He holds out the promise that any one can encounter the God he encountered. He used 
his life as a framework through which one might come to discern the movement of the Spirit of Christ 
in their own life. The tiansfbrmational pattern of the Spirit is at work in people’s lives -  both in and 
beyond the church -  whether they loiow it or not. This is what the church needs to relearn, so that the 
church can help individuals discern what God is doing in their lives, to help them know that God has 
reached out to them in Christ and reaches now through Christ’s Spirit with extraordinaiy love.
It is in this context that we see Loder’s biting critique of the institutional church. Indeed, what 
he offers is considerably threatening to those who see ministry as primarily service to and preservation 
of a traditional institution, approaches to ministry that have been deadly for those sitting in the pew (if 
they are still in the pew). In this chapter, I offer my own interpretation of Loder’s theology and state 
what I see as the considerable implications of this theology for the way we view the Cluistian life. As 
such, I see a radical and even subversive element within Loder’s thought. It is edgy and uncomfortable 
with present ecclesiastical restrictions that appear to hinder the work of the Holy Spirit. This is the work 
of the church - to preach, to teach, to enflesh this message in the lives of individuals - personally, 
relationally - which for him is the summary of the Gospel. The Spirit is not in service to the church, but 
in service to the Word who through the Spirit is continuing the work of the incarnation by enfieshing 
human life with the Spirit of God. This has revolutionary ramifications for the church and the world. 
The Spirit has no respect for the past or for traditions per se, no respect for the institution, but only for 
the redemption of human lives and how redeemed lives live within what Loder prefers to call the 
koinonia. Trusting in the movement of the Holy Spirit thus frees the church to be as revolutionary and 
as radical as the Gospel message itself. Released to be authentically, creatively present, kinetically 
moving thr ough space-time under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the church will then be free to be 
present to the age and thus free to speak a creative word of healing in such a way that is contextual, that
7
is meaningful to the age. One of the motivating factors in Loder’s decision to write The Transforming 
Moment was his belief that what happened to him and what he learned from it were “for the church.”  ^
Despite his aims, for all intent and purposes his work is still largely unknown in the parish and 
inaccessible to both theologians and clergy alike. It is my hope that this thesis will help remedy this 
situation.
One personal note before we proceed. As we move through the themes of these chapters, I 
would like to envision myself as a pastoral theologian. By doing so, I am responding to Ellen T, 
Charry’s call “to revive the pastoral function of theology,” which “requires theologians to think of 
themselves as pastors helping people to find their identity in God.”  ^ In writing as a pastoral theologian, 
I wish to extend Loder’s work by identifying its radical implication for the conduct of ministry. This 
will be most evident in chapter four. As a Minister of Word and Sacrament in the Presbyterian Church 
(U. S. A.), I have served congregations in both Scotland and the United States over the last twelve years. 
While wrestling with many of the ideas discussed throughout this thesis, I also tested them out in very 
well-educated, sophisticated faith communities, primarily tlirough sermons, seminars, and in pastoral 
counseling situations with astonishing results. Both my research and parish experience have confirmed 
my belief that the church is in a state of crisis and requires new frameworks for talking about both the 
“how” and the “what” of the Christian life. Loder’s convictional theology offers such a framework. But 
Loder needs to be translated - rendered first for theologians and then for ministers engaged in the flesh 
and blood issues of human existence. Let us proceed to a fuller explication of his vision for the Christian 
life.
®From an interview with James E. Loder, conducted by Dr. Dana R. Wright in Princeton 
(April, 2000). Recorded, transcribed and held by Wright in Princeton.
^Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing o f Your Minds: The Pastoral Function o f Christian 
Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 238-239. She notes that, “This is 
challenging, for not only does it require a change in thinking, it also means that theologians must 
think of themselves as spiritual directors.”
CHAPTER ONE
Encounter with the Convictor: Explorations Through a Christian Life
" ‘What is a lifetime? ' and ‘Why do I  live it? ' ”
-James E. Loder IThis chapter will introduce and provide an overview of the interdisciplinary work of James j
Edwin Loder, Jr. We will survey his early writings, identify the significant influences upon his 
thought, and flesh out the dominant themes that inform the rest of his oeuvre. His thoughts offer a :
vision that has far reaching implications for the way we grasp the nature of human life, particularly I
when that life is brought into a relationship with what Soren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855) called I
the God-man, the “Absolute Paradox” -  Jesus Christ.' The driving force behind every intellectual |
pursuit, both personally as a Christian and scholar (which he held together in a creative tension), was IILoder’s need to come to terms with his own encounter with the God-man, specifically two pivotal j
religious, or more correctly, “convictional” experiences that changed his life. Loder firmly believed t
before theological statements are articulated in dogmatic declarations or confessional statements they j1are first experienced within the existential conflict, struggle, and resolution that come when an I
individual encounters the Holiness of God - the Convictor. Failing to coimect with the generative
source of theological claims is not only detrimental to the discipline of theology, but disastious for
the church and any vision of the Christian life. Loder’s theology cannot be fully appreciated or |
fathomed without a knowledge of his own personal, existential struggle. To sever his theology from 1
his life would seriously distort the meaning and significance of his work. Therefore, this chapter will Iilook at key episodes in his life in order to see how they aroused his theological imagination. j
Briefly, conviction, as Loder came to define it, is an experience that involves the Convictor, j
the convicted person, and “the endurance through time of the convictional relationship between |
them.”  ^ In this relationship, the “convicted person is compelled to reopen the question of reality in |i
light of the presumed nature of the Convictor and the convictional relationship.” The Convictor j
opens up reality for the convicted and calls for new interpretations of reality. These experiences |
leave the convicted with two options; One can either choose to live from the new reality revealed in I
and through conviction, being faithful to the experience or one can deny it and live without integrity. I
Depending on how one chooses will shape the way reality is configured. One approach seeks to live !
in the truth, seeking to be faithful to the experience while the other is living in illusion. We tend to j
function with predetermined pictures of reality and with it, make assumptions about what is or is not i
realistically possible. This is because we are processing reality by way of analogy with what we |
'Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/ Johannes Climacus, Edited and Translated with 
Introduction and Notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985), pp. 37ff.
^TTM2, pp. 14, 93ff.
have experienced in the past and thus, delimiting what could or could not be in the moment, prizing 
consistency and continuity. Convictional experiences disturb consistency, introduce discontinuity, 
expose these assumptions, and shatter them. A way to theologically approach these experiences is 
needed because they stand at the center of the Biblical tradition and are needed in our attempt to 
articulate a contemporaiy understanding of the Christian experience. The “experiences we want to 
eventually understand in Christian terms are precisely those that reopen the question of reality 
because the subject of the experience has been convicted by a Spiritual Presence far greater than the 
subject him- or herself.”®
While we will explore Loder’s convictional theology more fully in the next chapter, what 
concerns us here is the emergence of a dynamic hermeneutic that pervades Loder’s life and work. 
One needs to pay close attention to the way conviction is defined; for in the definition we are given 
insight into what I would argue is Loder’s most significant claim for the Christian life: The primacy 
o f relationality. In his definition of conviction as an exchange between two parties - the Convictor 
and the convicted - we see what is most important to Loder and thus, given a glimpse into what I 
think is the heart of his thinking. Conviction is not a relationship between equals. One party is active 
(the Convictor); the other is passive (the convicted). But this in no way precludes the possibility that 
an interaction is possible. It is precisely the asymmetiy of the relationship that not only sustains the 
experience, but makes it redemptive.
It is “the endurance through time of the convictional experience” that shapes one’s life and 
thus defines reality. To borrow a term from Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), which Loder enjoyed 
using, one must “indwell” the relationship over time. To “indwell . . . phenomenon,” Loder means, 
“allowing it to disclose its inner intelligibility vis-à-vis the frame of reference involved. Ultimately, 
only the object of knowledge can yield up the truth about itself.”* So one lives in and through the 
experience over time. It is not a one time event because the relationship endures. In fact, the 
relationship takes on a life of its own. This is what Loder means by ’’relationality.” It is not 
synonymous with relationship. “A connection that is maintained by two polarities is a relationship; 
when that relationship takes on a life of its own, defining and sustaining the polarities - not the other
® m /2, p. 14.
'^TKM, p. 89. See also Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy (London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1983), pp. 195-202. “The indwelling of the Christian 
worshipper is . . .  a continued attempt at breaking out, at casting off the condition of man, even while 
humbly acloiowledging its inescapability. Such indwelling is fulfilled most completely when it increases 
this effort to the utmost. It resembles not the dwelling within a great theory of which we enjoy the 
complete understanding, nor an immersion in the pattern of a musical masterpiece, but the heuristic 
upsurge which strives to break through the accepted frameworks of thought, guided by the intimations 
of discoveries still beyond our horizon (pp. 198-200).”
■ ...
10
way around - then we will speak of a relationality.”® Understanding the structure of this relationship 
participating in a large relationality permeates everything Loder wrote and believed.
This chapter will explore the early origins of this thought, which led him to these 
conclusions. Loder’s academic contributions, beginning with his doctoral dissertation, emanate from 
a time of “indwelling” convictional experiences, which reopened the question of [his] reality, 
allowing them to define his life. They compelled him to question his own preconceived notions of 
what is real and possible, obliged him to reform his theological perspectives, and shaped his 
understanding of what it means to a disciple of Jesus Christ. Loder’s life-work can be viewed as an 
exercise of faithfulness, that is, being faithful to what he had come to know. He wrote from within 
his experience; yet, what he offered was more than just his own subjectivist musings. My purpose is 
not to write biography - although theology cannot be divorced from biography because the knower 
must be included in what is known. But analyzing the way we know also tells us something about 
the very structure of the universe. Loder notes, “The universe we have got our heads into is in some 
respects already in our heads to begin with.”® Therefore, it would be inappropriate and intellectually 
misleading to divorce personality from thought (something that Loder would never do). The point 
needs to be sti'essed that one cannot begin to fathom Loder’s thought without seeing how it is 
grounded in the reality disclosed to him through the Spiritual Presence of Clirist. In order to 
appreciate this, we will first look at his own entré into the Christian life and see how he lived it.
I. Early Life and Princeton
James Edwin Loder was born on the 5*'' December 1931 in Nebraska (United States of 
America), where his father, Edwin, was a primary school principal. His mother, Frances, had an 
interest in drama and theater and late in life taught speech and drama at the University of Texas- 
Austin. Edwin and Frances were not people of faith and did not go to church. However, around the 
age of eight or nine James began to attend church on his own, with the full support of his parents.
From an early age he had a precocious curiosity about almost everything. His kindergarten teacher |
told his mother, “Every day we read a story, and after the story is over, Jimmy gets up and wants to i
Îtell us what the story means.” It is not surprising, given his sensitivities and desire to grasp human j
experience with depth, that after graduation from secondary school he took up the study of J
philosophy at Carlton College, located in Northfield, Minnesota (USA).’ j
^LS, p. 16, 7n.
p. 8.
’Freda Gardner,“James Edwin Loder, Jr.: A Tribute,” delivered before the Princeton Seminary 
faculty on 13"' February 2002, published in The Princeton Seminary Bulletin XXIII(2002): 188-194; 
Tamara (Loder) Tiss, “James Loder: Our Christlike Father and Gracious Friend.” The Princeton
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In 1954, Loder entered the Bachelor of Divinity program at the Princeton Theological
Seminary, located in Princeton, New Jersey (USA). The three-year course of study offered the
foundational training experience for those seeking to serve the church, although we do not know if
he had any desire to enter parish ministry at that time. Loder said when he anived in Princeton as a
philosophy student, he spent most of his time thinking instead of praying."
During his first term, he was called home to the “long siege” of tending to his father who was
recently diagnosed with brain cancer. Watching his father die a slow death for nine months threw
James into a deep depression that lasted for another nine months. Sick in bed with a glandular
infection, Loder recounted, “The sense of void was all-pervasive.” Everything that belonged to his
father was “still and useless” and so was the state of Loder’s world, in which he “tried to compose
meaning. Everything had turned to cardboard, flat and empty; every day was the same dull
experience regardless of whom I saw or what occurred.”'* A “rupture” of his reality had occun ed that
could not be healed or repaired through his own efforts. He was unable to compose any meaning in
his reality. In bed, he began to pray, even though there was “seemingly nothing to pray to.” He
decided to write out his prayers. This did not help, either. Then one morning, in a state of extreme
frustration, Loder said, “I got so angiy I threw down my pencil, smashed my fist into the pillow, and
shouted at God, “If you’re there, do something!” Then:
[God] did something, but it was not what the philosophy major wanted. It was 
instead a warm life, like gentle electricity, that started at the bottom of my feet and 
rushed through my entire body, filling me with such strength and vitality that it 
almost threw me out of bed. I leaped up singing what no good philosophy major 
should sing, “Blessed assurance, Jesus Is Mine!” In my excitement, I picked up Emil 
Bmnner’s little book, The Scandal o f Christianity, and I think I must have read it in 
ten minutes. It was as if I had suddenly entered into the cential intuition out of 
which the book had been written. So I recognized, more than I read, eveiything that 
was being said.'"
Seminary Bulletin, XIII (2002), p. 72.
"7M7, p. 86
'^TTM, p. 86. The reference to “the void,” has a specific Loderian meaning. We will explore his 
definition in the next chapter. For now let it be understood that the void is “nothingness, or the negation 
of being,” experienced not beyond being, but within it. “Void is the ultimate aim of all proximate forms 
of nothingness; the implicit aim of conflict, absence, loneliness, and death is void.” TTM, p. 79; TTM2, 
pp 80ff.
'"T7W, pp. 86-87. “Blessed Assurance, Jesus is Mine!” was composed by the blind American 
hymn-writer and poetess, Frances Jane “Fanny” Crosby (1820-1915). Writer of more than 9,000 hymns 
and known as the “Hymn Queen,” Crosby’s hymns were extremely personal in nature and expressed the 
intimacies of her relationship with God. The text of “Blessed Assurance” was written in 1873, based on 
Hebrews 10:21 -22. The hymn-tune was wi’itten by Phoebe Palmer Knapp (1839-1908). It is interesting 
that Loder “chose” this hymn to sing in praise because, in many ways, it foreshadows and highlights 
themes and images that are later amplified in Loder’s theology. Loder does not say if he sang all of the
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Loder confessed that this was “the first time I had experienced the presence of God’s Spirit in any 
palpable sense.” He was “delighted” by the way “the magnificent Presence of that One” enabled him 
to recompose his life with a “richness, depth, and excitement I had never known before,”" 
Recollecting years later, Loder said “this experience of Christ after [my] father’s death ‘scandalized’ 
the despair [I] felt, ruined it, and placed it in the service of the Presence of Christ.” '^  In this 
experience, Loder started to recognize the logic or sequence of transformation, the pattern by which 
an individual life is transformed in the Presence of Christ. It is a pattern, as we shall see, that 
preoccupied Loder for the rest of his life.
It was immensely significant that in this first transforming experience, Loder the philosopher 
turned to Emil Brunner’s (1889-1966) Scandal and was absorbed by it. Instead of reading the text, 
the text read him. Even as it provided comfort and a language to “make sense” of his experience, one 
can well imagine that Loder was thrown into an enormous existential conflict, dismantling any notion 
that he could intellectually recompose his world, destroying any possibility of philosophically 
reasoning his way into a knowledge or relationship with God, thus smashing any hope that the kind 
of despair he suffered could be overcome by his own volition. “The God of the philosophers,” 
Brunner made clear, “is not the triune God of Christian faith.” Here Brunner echoes the knowledge of 
God given to Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) after his own convictional experience, the well-known vision 
of 1654: “Dieu d ’Abraham d'Isaac et de Jacob non des philosophes. ”'® For the “God of philosophy 
is, by definition, an idea acquired by man’s own thinking,” Brunner sti'esses.
verse, but it is likely that he would have been familiar with them. Stanza 1 : “Blessed assurance, Jesus 
is mine!/ O what a foretaste of glory divine! Heir of salvation, purchase of God, Bom of his Spirit, 
washed in his blood. Refrain: This is my story, this is my song./ Praising my Savior all the day long./ 
This is my story, this is my song./ Praising my Savior all the day long. Stanza 2: “Perfect submission, 
perfect delight,/ Visions of rapture not burst on my sight./ Angels descending bring from above/ Echoes 
of mercy, whispers of love.” Stanza 3: “Perfect submission, all is at rest./1 in my Savior am happy and 
blest,/ Watching and waiting looking above/ filled with his goodness, lost in his love.”
"TTM, p. 87.
'®Dana R. Wright, “Ruination Unto Redemption in the Spirit: A Short Biography of a Refonned 
‘Wise Guy,”’ The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, XXII (2002), pp. 77-78.
"Emil Brunner, The Scandal o f Christianity^ The Gospel as Stumbling Block to Modern Man 
(Atlanta, G A: Jolin Knox Press, 1978), p. 32. “In the year of Grace, 1654, On Monday, 23“’" of 
November, Feast of St. Clement, Pope and Martyr, and of others in the Martyrology, Vigil of Saint 
Chrysogonus, martyr and others. From bout half past ten in the evening until about half past twelve 
FIRE God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob not of the philosophers and scholars. Certitude. 
Certitude. Feeling. Joy. Peace. God of Jesus Christ.” Complete account cited in Donald W. 
McCullough, The Trivialization o f God: The Dangerous Illusion o f Manageable Deity (Colorado 
Springs, CO: NavPress, 1995), p. 77.
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[T]his God is not a living God in the sense of biblical testimony, that is in the sense 
of a personal reality intervening in the course of human history. It is not a Thou 
addressing man: T am the Lord Thy God.’ It is the movement of man’s own 
thought, which, so to say, in its end reached God. The initiative, the movement 
leading toward knowledge, lies entirely on the side of the human mind, not on the 
side of God. It is a God whom to reach lies within the possibilities of human 
thinking. It is not a God who, from outside human capacities, enters by his own 
movement and by his own initiative into the thought-world of men and, so to say, 
bursts open the closed globe of human thought."
Because the triune God is “the one who revealed himself in Jesus Christ,” through and in a historical 
person, faith for the Christian is understood relationally, regarded as “a real encounter in which 
something happens that cannot happen within man’s own thought-life.”'®
The convictional experience, combined with Brunner’s text, were direct attacks upon the 
foundations of his being, mortal blows, what Loder would call “positive aggressions” of God’s Spirit 
dismantling his reality (not unlike the gracious crippling of Jacob in Genesis 32), forcing Loder to 
reconfigure the meaning of his life.'® The process of reconfiguration required plumbing the depths of 
his being and yielding his life to the work of God’s Spirit. Brunner reminds those who claim to be 
wise “that all the treasures of wisdom are hid in Christ.” Yet the message of Christ demands “hard 
and deep thinking” done to the glory of God and to honor God’s wisdom. “At the present time, when 
man is filled with his own wisdom, the gospel truth will hardly seize man’s heart without forcing 
upon him some hard thinking.”'’
The hard thinking began when Loder returned to Princeton Seminary and set out to work 
through the full implications of his experience, both theologically and psychologically. Before him 
was the challenge to remain faithful to his encounter with Chr ist without trying to account for it only 
in psychological terms. The transformation was more than psychological, more than just the healing 
of the depression. “It was much too transcendent and the reality into which I was put wasn’t 
anything like what could be conveyed to me by a therapist. . . .It was outside the realm of 
psychological adjustment.”'" Finding it difficult to find people at Princeton who could resonate with
‘‘'Brunner, p. 35.
'®Brunner, p. 36. Emphasis added. See also Brunner’s discussion of the“personal 
correspondence” between God and humanity in The Divine-Human Encounter, trans. Amandus W. Loos 
(London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1944), pp. 5Off.
'®Loder’s reference to “positive aggression,” in Wright, p. 77.
'’Brunner, pp. 114-115.
'"Taken from the transcription of an eight-hour, audio-tape interview of Loder by Dana Wright 
on 6"' April 2001. Recorded, transcribed, and held by Wright in Princeton. I am grateful to Dana Wright
for allowing me to make copies of these transcriptions.
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his experience, he eventually told his story to a visiting professor of theology from Switzerland, Hans 
Hofmann (1923- ?). Hofmann listened with a serious and sympathetic ear, without dismissing it or 
explaining it away, which had a profound impact upon the direction Loder’s life would take." He 
proposed that Loder read the works of Kierkegaard in order to find a framework to think 
theologically and philosophically about the transformation that took place in his life.®" Loder 
devoured Kierkegaard, providing, as he put it, a “language for my head.” Dana Wright refers to this 
connection with Kierkegaard as “monumental,” offering a language that preoccupied Loder 
throughout his life that never ceased “to challenge his own faith-seeking- understanding.”®'
Before leaving Princeton Seminary, we can see the convictional experience starting to shape 
his academic studies in significant ways. During his final year (of a three-year program), Loder and 
several other students refused to take a course in Christian education taught by D. Campbell 
Wyckoff, one of the leading Christian educational theorists in the United States at the time, because 
in his view “it supposedly lacked philosophical depth at the foundational disciplines level.” Here we 
note a shift from an interest in philosophy to the philosophy of Christian education. Wyckoff gave 
them permission to create their own course at a depth that would satisfy both themselves and 
academic requirements. “In a powerful way,” Wright observes, “this effort to put together an ad hoc 
course initiated Dr. Loder into what would become his lifelong quest - to critique the conceptual 
inadequacies of the field of Christian at the metatheoretical level and to reconstruct them according
It is reasonable to assume that Hofmann is still alive, but I can find no indication whether this 
is true or not. Harvard University informed me that they have no information on him in their 
biogiaphical catalogue. My guess is that he is dead. In the Wright transcription, Loder expressed his 
indebtedness to Hans Hofmann and the instrumental role he played in introducing him to Kierkegaard. 
Loder reflects upon that period of his life, saying, “I knew that transformation had occurred to me at my 
father’s death, and that it was not, could not be explained psychologically. It wasn’t like psychotherapy. 
And Hofmann was impressed with that. He kind of took me under his wing, and it’s under his tutelage 
that I started to study Kierkegaard. And I studied the understanding of the self in [Carl] Jung [1875- 
1961].” 6"' April 2001 in Princeton.
®"lnthemid-1950's, American theologians did not possess the same familiarity with Kierkegaard 
which was common in Europe due to their translation from Danish into German early in the last century. 
Philosophical Fragments, translated by D. F. Swenson, was the first English rendering of Kierkegaard 
to appear in the United States (Princeton, 1936). D. F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie’s translations from 
the late 1930's through the mid-1940's opened Americans to Kierkegaard’s thought. Illustrative of this 
fact is that even though Loder was a philosophy major, he only came to Kierkegaard as a result of 
Hofmann’s suggestion. Hofmann’s familiarity with Kierkegaard was due to his theological education 
in Europe, no doubt influenced by the Kierkegaardian influences in the work of his mentor, Emil 
Brunner. Also, see the Stone Lectures of 1936 given at Princeton Seminary. Cf. Eduard Geisman (1871- 
1939), Lectures on the Religious Thought o f Soren Kierkegaard, Introduction by David F. Swenson 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Press, 1937) which refers to a general skepticism, an assumed “demonic 
element” within the human idealism expressed in Kierkegaard’s writings (vii).
®'Wright, “Ruination Unto Redemption,” p. 78.
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to the integrity and coherence of what Kierkegaard called ‘the Positive Absurd’ or what Paul 
Lehmann [1904- 1994] described as the God-man stiucture of reality.” Swayed by both Kierkegaard 
and Hofmann, Loder decided his life vocation would be spent “deepening the theoretical self- 
understanding of Cliristian education as an interdisciplinary fonn of practical theology.”®® After 
graduation, Loder followed Hofmann to the Harvard Divinity School of Harvard University located 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA), personally picked by Hofmann to participate in a year-long 
immersion in interdisciplinary studies.
A question often left unaddressed regarding Loder, but one that needs to be asked before we 
move into the next period of his life, is why did Kierkegaard have such an appeal? What was it about 
Kierkegaard that proved so appealing? We know Kierkegaard was a source of tremendous 
generativity for Loder, He tells us that when he was a doctoral student at Harvard he listened to Paul 
Tillich’s (1886-1965) lectures on the third volume of his systematics and they appeared to be 
“cribbed right out of Kierkegaard.” Loder was hearing what Wright calls “Kierkegaardian echoes in 
all he learned.”®® Anyone familiar with Loder’s work knows his life-long fascination' with 
Kierkegaard.®*' But no one, as far as I know, has asked why Loder was so transfixed by Kierkegaard? 
What in Kierkegaard’s thought and life resonated so profoundly in Loder’s psyche or spirit, 
especially with regards to his experience of transformation? We pose these questions, not to 
psychoanalyze his drives and thus reductionistically rationalize them away. Loder never explicitly 
explains why Kierkegaard provided a “language for [his] head,” yet the study of Kierkegaard 
remained a preoccupation for the rest of his life.®®
It is beyond the scope this dissertation to consider all the Kierkegaardian influences upon 
Loder’s thought, but I would suggest and hope to show throughout this dissertation, that one of the 
major themes running tlirough Loder’s writings is the need to embrace what he called the “the human
®®Wright, p. 78. See also Loder’s entry, “Interdisciplinary Studies,” Harper’s Encyclopedia o f  
Religious Education. Iris V. Cully & Kendig Brubaker Cully, general editors (San Francisco; Harper & 
Row, 1990), p. 327-328.
®®Wright, p. 78.
®‘*Loder periodically taught an advanced seminar on Kierkegaard with enrollment limited to about 
ten students. After retirement, he hoped to write a book on Kierkegaard and practical theology, based 
on these lectures. After his death his Kierkegaard papers and seminar lectures were placed in a safe at 
Speer Library, Princeton Theological Seminary, considered valuable contributions to Kierkegaard 
scholarship. They will probably be placed in the Loder archives recently established by Princeton, with 
the possibility of publication at a later date.
®®This is most pronounced, as we shall see, in The Knight’s Move. But also see his reviews of 
Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self in Theology Today 54( 1997): 130-134 
and Murray A. Rae, Kierkegaard’s Vision o f the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed in Theology Today 
56 (2000): 638-639.
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factor” of all knowledge/^ This, not unlike Polanyi’s claim that the knower must be included in what 
is known, he learned from Kierkegaard.^’ The “I” must be preserved and respected in every 
epistemological action. A space must be preserved for the Icnower - meaning the self, or the person - 
that will free the “I” to choose and thereby to live in freedom - the freedom to be authentic, honest, 
and faithful, the freedom to choose a life of communion with God, a life that God has already freely 
chosen to give through Christ, even in our estrangement. Ultimately, this space can only be granted 
by One who not only creates in freedom, but also grants freedom to His creation. Coder’s interest in 
Kierkegaard is more than an intellectual curiosity, however; Kierkegaard is important because of the 
way he articulates Coder’s experience of Christ. Coder discovered that in his experiences of the 
Spirit his sense of self was neither obliterated nor enslaved, but heightened and even liberated. Cike 
Paul, Coder knew that, “For freedom, Christ has set us free (Galatians 5:1a).” This freedom can be 
found only within the relationship with God, a “Thou” who defines and helps to create the “I.” The 
“I” can “either have established itself,” Kierkegaard observed, “or have been established by another.” 
The attempt to establish oneself, however, is a “misrelation,’ ultimately leading to despair 
Relationally grounded in God, as we shall see, leads to freedom for the “I.” Similarly, Coder could 
intuitively relate to Paul’s articulation of the Christian life when he said “I, yet, not-I, but 
Christ.(Galatians 3:20)” As we will see, this “I/not-I” formula stands at the heart of convictional 
experiences that shapes the Christian life. This becomes more prominent in Coder’s work after 1970, 
but it is found in embryonic fonn early in his writings.^^ We might say that Coder makes space in the
^^Matthew J. Frawley even makes the significant claim that “Coder has understood and applied 
Kierkegaard’s Christian point of view better than anyone one,” in “Coder on Kierkegaard,” The 
Princeton Theological Review, VII (2000): 9. Coder was Frawley’s doctoral advisor. His dissertation 
is entitled, “Soren Kierkegaard’s Christian Anthropology and the Relation Between his Pseudonymous 
and Religious Writings,” Princeton Theological Seminary (2001). James E. Coder, “The Place of Science 
in Practical Theology: The Human Factor,” International Journal of Practical Theology, 4 (2000); 22-41. 
“Doing practical theology requires a keen sensitivity to the human factor, its irreducible importance as 
a locus of God’s action, its creative potential, its pervasive ethical influence and its uniqueness in an 
otherwise reductionist culture that has yet to realize the enlightenment is over. At the core of practical 
theology there should be the recognition, preservation, and fullest possible expression of the human 
factor, (p. 23)”
’^Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Condon: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1983). See also Parker J. Palmer, To Know As fVe Are Known: A Spirituality o f Education 
( San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983).
’^Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for 
Upbuilding and Awakening, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), pp. 13-15.
29cf_ YTM2, pp. 75-80; James E. Coder, “The Fashioning of Power: A Christian Perspective on 
the Cife-Style Phenomenon,” The Context o f Contemporary Theology: Essay in Honor o f Paul Lehmann, 
ed. Alexander J. McKelway and E. David Willis (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1974), p. 194-195.
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Clnistian experience for the “I,” because of the way Christ made a space for him, affirmed his 
uniqueness and particularity, and addressed him personally, relationally. Therefore, answers to the 
questions raised here with regard to Kierkegaard and Loder might be found by paying close attention 
to the foundational themes of relationality and the value of the individual, thus paving the way for 
what Loder beautifully summarized later in his life, “Relationality [is] ontologically prior to 
rationality.”^^
Excursus
Before we proceed, it is necessary for us to take a look at the development of theological 
ideas and particular theologians whose thinking had a significant effect upon Coder’s thought and life 
- influences of both an direct and indirect nature. This background information will be invaluable as 
we further examine Coder’s writings.
A. The Influence of Hans Hofmaii
While Coder’s connection with Kierkegaard was decisive in the unfolding of his thought, we 
cannot underestimate Hofmann’s impact upon his thinking. Coder mentions him only in passing with 
a quotation in his doctoral dissertation and two footnotes in later works.^' This is remarkable given 
the formidable influence Hofmann had upon him. Before we move to an examination of Coder’s 
doctoral thesis, it would be helpful to take a closer look at Hofmann’s intellectual provenance and 
some of his writings in which we can identify ideas and concerns that emerge within Coder’s life 
work, placing his writings in a wider theological context.
Hans Fritz Hofmann was bom on 12“’ April 1923 in Basel, Switzerland. He studied theology 
at the University of Basel (1940-1943) and the University of Zurich (1943-1947, 1950), before 
attending Princeton Theological Seminary as a special student in 1951-1952. He went back to Zürich 
in 1952 to complete his doctorate in systematic theology, graduating in 1953 with Emil Brunner as 
his Doktorvator^^ His dissertation offered a systematic analysis of Reinhold Niebuhr’s (1892-1971) 
anthropology and was published the next year entitled. Die Theologie Reinhold Niebuhr: Im Licht
^^LS, p. 8. We will explore this sentence in the next chapter. Also, “. . .  relationality supercedes 
rationality both ontologically and developmentally.” “The Place of Science in Practical Theology: The 
Human Factor,” p. 37,
^^NRC, p. 1; Footnotes in RPCF, p. 246 and LS, p. 279. The latter note refers to Hofmann’s 
collection of case studies, one of which was written by Coder who was Flofmann’s research assistant at 
Harvard. See Flans Hofmann, Religion and Mental Health (New York: Harper, 1961), chapter 37.
^^Biographical Catalogue o f Princeton Theological Seminary^, published by the Seminary, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1978, p. 1952.
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seiner Lehre von der Siinde^^ Hofmann was ordained in the Evangelical Reformed Church of 
Switzerland on 3’“ October 1950. He served as an assistant pastor in Zürich and later as an assistant 
chaplain at the university there. In 1953, he returned to Princeton Seminary where he served until 
1957, first as assistant and then as associate professor. Even though he was trained as a theologian, 
Hofmann had a fascination with the psychoanalytic theories of Carl Jung (1875-1961) and was asked 
to teach pastoral care at P r i n c e t o n . I t  is not suiprising, given his interest in a theological 
understanding of humanity, that after 1953 he extended his academic interest towards a 
philosophical, psychiatric, and social scientific understanding of human personality. In 1957, he was 
appointed Director of the University Project on Religion and Mental Health and Associate Professor 
of Theology at Harvard Divinity School.^^
Just as Hofmann was entering his teenage years, Europe was enthralled in a cataclysmic 
crisis of its own. In the late 1930's Hofmann read what he called “the fresh and revolutionary” 
writings of the early Karl Barth (1886-1968), which gave expression to the struggle of his life. He 
recalls how they “described most accurately the misery of man that I felt so strongly during my 
adolescence.” ®^ Hofmann’s concentration in theological anthropology, together with his later interest 
in psychology, were put to service in an attempt to understand the nature of human suffering and 
provide ways of alleviating “the misery of man.” He believed that Christian faith contained the 
resources to address this concern, primarily through the ministry of the church. But the church is in 
crisis and the root of the problem has to do with the nature of the ministry. “The crucial point is 
whether we have been slow in recognizing the real potency of our faith and hence inefficient in our 
ministry.” ’^ This is the core issue for Hofmann. He seems to be saying that the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ is a demonstration of the power of God, containing a strength that sometimes terrorizes the 
one called to ministry. There is a fundamental disconnection between the power of God available to 
the believer and an inability to translate and communicate this power in an effective way that
^Published in Zürich by Zwingli-Verlag in 1954. It was never translated into English.
'^*Loder described Hofmann as “veiy colorful.” He prided himself on lecturing without notes and 
some of his colleagues complained about him because he was attracting all of their students. From the 
interview with Wright, 6*“ April 2001.
^®The Project on Religion and Mental Health was established through a grant from the National 
Institute of Mental Health to experiment in relating the insights of the social sciences, specifically 
psychiatry, to theological education.
“^Hofmann’s contribution to the series, “How Barth Has Influence Me,” Edited by Edwin Lewis, 
Theology Today, 23 (1956): 358-375, 369.
’^Hans Hofmann, Editor, Making the Ministry Relevant (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1960), p. vii. The assumption of the book is that ministry, in his estimation, had become irrelevant.
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transforms human life. The power of God is blocked in the church and the minister must take 
responsibility for this.
Ministry, he writes, is service to God and the primary way ministers serve God is by serving 
humanity. The task of the minister, indeed the task of the Christian life (whether ordained or not), is 
to help people grasp what it means to be human and the meaning of their lives as human.^^ This 
viewpoint has a deep affinity with Coder’s own antliropological concerns, especially his mention of 
the “human factor.”
In several volumes. Making the Ministry Relevant (which Hofmann edited and provided an 
introductory chapter). Religion and Mental Health (a collection of case studies and questions for 
group analysis), and Discovery o f Freedom (an exposition on the nature of freedom in the Christian 
life) we see Hofmann as the advocate for humanity in a world becoming increasingly dehumanized.^^ 
“Every human being has the innate and irrepressible urge to make sense of life and to have this sense 
expressed through the unique character of his own personality and in the precise context in which he 
lives and works. To serve people in the name of God requires that we be able to recognize and'under 
this urge.”'*® The question remains, however, “Are we able to live in our world and organize our 
living together so that we can survive on human terms? In a highly impersonal, mechanized, and 
demanding civilization, are the inner human resources both adequate and also sufficiently mobilized 
for the attainment of a creative common life?”'*' Judaism and Clrristianity need to regain a sense of 
the place and significance of the human being in the world.
Hofmann appreciated the insights from existentialism and its impact upon psychotherapy as 
providing a way to a new humanism. He identified three features common to them both. They are 
“the human ability to choose and decide - into which a person can throw himself and hence discover 
his true nature; the freedom to step courageously into the openness of interpersonal relationships, 
thereby revealing himself as he truly his, and encountering and accepting others on the same ground; 
finally, and most important, the recognition of the universe as primarily a human place to be
Hofmann, p. viii.
^^Religion and Mental Health: A Casebook with Commentary and An Essay on Pertinent 
Literature (New York: Harper and Brother, 1961); Editor, Making the Ministry Relevant (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960); Discovery o f  Freedom  (Boston; Beacon Press, 1969)
'‘“Hofmann, Making the Ministry Relevant, p. viii.
'"Hofmann, p. ix. In my estimation, this is the same concern that Loder had throughout his life. 
How do we preserve humanity in the face of the dehumanizing forces of the impersonal consumerist, 
technological culture of the West? These are still pertinent questions.
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constantly recreated in the light of man’s understanding of himself.” Like Loder, we find Hofmann 
calling for the inclusion of a “human factor” in gi asping the nature and meaning of human life.'*^
The value of human life is embedded in the Judaic-Christian tradition and yet it is precisely 
the traditions of religion, particularly the church, that Hofmann sees as guilty of not serving the needs 
of humanity. The church has the resources to rehunianize humanity through the proclamation and 
living out of the Gospel. Instead, the church withholds its service to humanity by trying to meet their 
psychological needs rather than of opening people up to the wider meaning of their lives seen within 
the light of God. In a biting attack upon the American church of 1960's suburbia that has sold its soul 
to psychoanalysis and pop-psychology masking as theology (even more apropos today), Hofmann 
wrote:
[T]he church has sheepishly followed the withdrawal of the human being from 
critical leadership in commerce and industry into a suburban escape where it can 
soothe its painful loss of self-confidence. The sermons and the counseling sessions 
of our contemporary pastors are full of petty frivialities which have to be blown up 
into disproportionate problems because we are neither willing to face our real 
problems, nor have we felt the presence of any resources to deal with our 
profoundest predicament. The minister, lacking such resources, turns in his 
bankruptcy to psychologically phrased sermons and psychologized counseling 
techniques. It is disastrous that the Christian church should so enviously have 
borrowed - and without any critical judgment - the psychiatric and psychological 
insights and methods which, in themselves, are merely the result of our inability to 
tackle our problem in the broader context in which they have arisen. Because of 
their immoderate dependence on psychiatry and psychology, the churches have been 
driven to consider the individual instead of the community as a whole, the latter 
being, in fact their proper function. The human being, therefore, finds nothing but 
his irreversible dependence, without knowing what he can depend on in order to 
regain his dignity and active forcefulness in dealing with his life situation.'*^
There needs to be a change in “outlook,” the title Hofmann gives to this chapter, by encouraging 
ministers to give up the notion that they are “religious caretakers, priests or teachers . . . pretend[ing] 
to have the answer to the riddles of human life.” Instead, their “task is to be critical and to sharpen 
the doubts of their parishioners on everything they have automatically accepted on the word of the 
church.”'*'*
The task of the clergy is to throw their congregations into conflict, creating a healthy tension 
whereby the people will be forced to think through and realize for themselves the particular resources
'‘^ Hofmann, p. 7. Given his interest in existentialism and psychology, it is not surprising that 
Hofmann was familiar with Kierkegaard and would have guided Loder towards him.
'‘^ Hofmann, p. 9. This assault is reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s Attack Upon ‘‘Christendo?n, ” 
(1854-1855), Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie; New Translation by Howard
A. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.)
'*‘*Hofmann, p. 11.
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available to them directly from God. Ministers need to crack open the lives of their parishioners, 
help them become aware of their drives, and irrepressible urges. “Human life awareness begins with 
the elemental questions of ‘why’ and ‘what for.’ The very asking of these is the breath of human 
dignity.”'*®
It is at this point that Hofmann offers his understanding of the Christian faith, of how it
defines and speaks to the human situation. Christian faith:
States, arrogantly enough, that there is a creative force behind all life which may be 
conceived as personal and as God and which realizes itself through the very human 
beings who ask questions about the direction and purpose of their lives. It is said to 
be a self-revealing force, which does not float freely and unobtainably in the blue 
sky, nor does it rest forever untapped in the depths of the earth. Thr ough the flesh 
and blood of average citizens, who have no claim to fame, and to whom Nietzsche 
referred as those ‘much too many,’ this force will break through into an organizing 
factor which will finally defy all the self-appointed military, political and business 
empires of this world.'*®
This force is the “force of life,” which is also the “force of love, that restructures and reorganizes 
human life, the very life of which humanity intentionally tries to organize out of existence, a force 
“which powerfully enters the human life and takes man by surprise, but so vehemently that he is 
compelled to abandon his well-guarded self-protection and, in this way, becomes valuable to others, 
who, in turn, can afford to respond.”'*’ He believed that the God was actively present in the lives of 
women and men and doing something significant in and with their lives. We discover this through 
“communion” or relationship with God, in the act of breathing itself. “Life, since it is always 
relation and relationship to the source of life (whether this relationship is consciously accepted or 
denied), depends on being rooted in a life which is lasting.”'*®
'*®Hofmann, p. 12. “But what good does it do to ask a question to which there is no immediate |
answer? It must not be forgotten that the real drive for discovery, which has made science and 
technology so great in the immediate past, was always in the search for the unknown. Curiosity and not |
security is the clue to a better future. Even though there is no absolute answer, it is only the straight- j
forward desire to find out those things which are not yet within the orbit of our manipulation that will j
further our progress. What gives us the confidence to explore the unknown? (p. 12)” |
'*®Hofmann, p. 12. I
‘*’Hofmann, p. 13.
'*®Hofmann here foreshadows Loder’s analogia spiritus, the inter-relationality of the Christian i
life constituted by the Holy Spirit’s relationship with the human spirit. “Communion is the event in j
which God’s own breath of life makes man recognize that the bare fact of his being alive is significant S
in itself and is based on the other fact that God not only gives life but lives in him. This recognition, j
arising from God’s intervention in man’s own life through the Holy Spirit, is not merely chaotic or t
instinctual upheaval in man’s self-awareness, but is rather his confrontation with the precise intention j
of God’s own life-giving,” This intention is demonstrated exhaustively in the “life, death, and I
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ literally personifies the life intention of God.” Hofmann alludes i
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This force is democratic in that is moves through the world freely and indiscriminately, but 
also with extreme particularity. Christian faith for the individual does not entail simply uncritically 
adopting the doctrines and confessions of the past as a whole. The individual must pose the question 
“why” and “what for.” Because when these questions are asked of God, the force of God’s love 
might come with an answer that requires the abandonment of his or her “well-guarded self- 
protection.”'*^ The expressions or individual responses to that love-experience will be particular, in 
that they take into account the unique personality of the individual. “Most certainly life is always 
fore-given.” Hofmann writes. “But it is not our life until we take its mystery and promise more 
seriously and abandon the old ideas and illusions we may have had about it. Any religion which 
promotes an old-fashioned imagery and doctrinal concepts for their own sake is a disgrace, but 
Christianity, which does it directly contrary to the wish of its own founder who himself had to fight 
religious complacence, defensiveness and exclusiveness, is doubly disgiaced.”®“
Reform of the pastorate must begin with theological education. Here the connection 
between Hofmann and Loder is obvious. In many ways, Loder’s career at Princeton Seminary in 
practical or pastoral theology can be seen as an extension of some of Hofmann’s concern to reform 
the way we understand the nature of Christian theology, ministry, and discipleship. It is fitting to 
close this section on Hofmann with a look at his critique of both theological education and education 
within the church, viewpoints that will be later shared by Loder.
We, the theological educators ourselves, lack the imagination to explore life on its 
own terms or even to compare religious attitudes of the past with contemporary 
Christianity. We ourselves do not believe in the immediacy and effectiveness of our 
faith and therefore hide behind the ruins of our doctrinal systems, liturgical customs 
and ecclesiastical offices. We do not have the courage to be as empty-handed and 
unpretentious as our colleagues in science are and evidently can afford to be. We 
robe ourselves in the assumed authority of God, and constantly confuse innate 
human respect for the sovereignty of real life with an idol that merely promotes our 
own theological presuppositions and religious bias.
to John 5:24: “Truly, truly, I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has 
eternal life; he does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life.” See “Immortality or 
Life,” Theology Today 15 (1958): 242.
'‘“Hofmann wanted to explore human experiences that were “true to life.” The Christian 
experience touches the core of human life and within the Christian tradition there is “the power of the 
Holy Spirit to regenerate people through merciful judgment and a loving challenge to grow through 
suffering into a stronger and deeper faith.” Religion and Mental Health, p. 15.
®“Hofmann, p. 14. “Every single parishioner in this sense,” Hofmann continues, “potentially re­
creates the Christian faith in his search for and discoveiy of meaning. The minister is the leader of this 
movement. He channels the forces against their hopeless resignation in the face of a situation which 
seems too overpowering to overcome. And it is precisely here that the hypothesis of the Christian faith 
can be supremely tested. This is the task of pastoral theology, (p. 14)”
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Theological education must center in and be justified by a pastoral theology which 
represent the challenge of contemporary life to religious tradition. Instead of turning 
ourselves into irrelevant scholars of a faith which never pretended to be academic 
and which cannot survive such academic self-consciousness, we should enlist young 
men to join us in finding out where that God, of whom we speak so all to frequently, 
is at work today. If he is, as we say, sovereign and free, he will always take us by 
surprise by being more human than we dare to be or expect him to be.®'
While Loder’s goal was to bring academic sophistication and rigor to the philosophy of Christian 
education, it was all done for the sake of the individual to come to grips for oneself with the “height, 
and breadth, and depth” of the Christian Gospel, to crack open the ego, and allow it to anticipate the 
transforming work of the Spiritual Presence of Christ, as Loder did.
B. The Personalist Tradition
Hofmann’s anthropological considerations, his critique of the institutional church, his 
openness to the power and presence of God in the world engaging, critiquing, encountering, and 
redeeming human existence in many ways reflect the Christian personalist theology of his mentor 
Emil Bmnner. The Hofmann-Brunner connection opens up themes and patterns that help to put 
Loder’s work in a larger historical perspective. But I would also push this analogy further by 
suggesting that Loder’s thought can be placed within the wider theological perspective of themes 
associated with the Christian personalist movement in theology. Doing so provides a helpful rubric 
for the appropriation and interpretation of his oeuvre. We know that Loder read Brunner at 
Princeton.®  ^ Beyond the reference to The Scandal o f Christianity, mentioned above, there is no 
explicit connection with Brunner, but implicit in Loder’s work is a personalism that echoes Biunner, 
no doubt reinforced and mediated through Hofmann. What is important to note here is that Loder’s 
emphasis upon the relational dynamic of the Christian life, a relationality that creates a space for the 
“I,” plants him firmly in the personalist tradition. A tradition that runs back through Brunner and 
through him to Kierkegaard. Let us briefly unpack this connection.
Personalism as a philosophical and theological perspective blossomed in the early twentieth 
century, from seeds firmly planted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In an 
extensive history of this movement, The Philosophy o f Personalism (1927), Albert C. Knudson 
identifies Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) as perhaps the first to use the term (Personalismus) 
in 1799 as a synonym for theism, in contradistinction to pantheism. J. Goethe (1749-1832) referred
®'Hofmann, pp. 14-15. ■
®’Brunner was the most widely read theologian at Princeton in the 1950's. Today, Barth has a j
commanding presence at the seminary. i
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to the celebrated theist, Friedrich Heinrich H. Jacobi (1743-1819), as a “personalist.”®® Apart from
these early references, the term did not emerge in English usage until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. The word did not enter into common usage until after 1900.®'*
In the natural sciences, the promotion of scientific materialism as advanced by evolutionary
theory, combined with the dehumanizing effects of industrial and technological “progress” witnessed
throughout the nineteenth century, posed considerable threats to the identity and function of the
individual in society. The emergence of these ideas threatened human dignity. In the History o f
European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, written near the turn of the last century, J. T. Merz saw
“the problem of Personality” as the most significant philosophical concern of his age. Taking up
Mertz’ claim, Clement C. J. Webb (1865-1954) sought to tackle this problem in God and
Personality, the Gifford Lectures of 1918 and 1919;
Whether we are exploring the nature of the world of objects in the presence of which 
we stand or tracing to its origin our consciousness of that world, we shall meet at last 
confronting us in our path this mystery of Personality. For, on the one hand, it is 
only through Personality - through our intercourse with persons quickening in us a - 
personal response - th a t. .  .we gain in the earliest period of our earthly existence that 
entry into a world of Reality, which enables us to distinguish our self from a not-self; 
and, on the other hand, [citing Merz], “Personality always impresses us as the most 
powerful instance of individual existence.”®®
Seemingly heeding Merz’ request, within the first five years of the last century three works 
appeared in France, Germany, and the United States which took up this idea as its theme. In 1903, 
the French philosopher, Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) published Le Personnalisme', William Stem 
(1871-1938) published the first volume of what he called “Critical Personalism,” entitled Person und 
Sache: System der philosophischen Weltanschaunng {Person and Thing) in 1906 (the second volume 
appeared in 1918, the third in 1924); the American, Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910) summarized 
thirty years of philosophical reflection on this subject in his work. Personalism (1908).®®
®®Used in Schleiermacher’s On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (1799), cited in 
Albert C. Knudson, The Philosophy o f Personalism: A Study in the Metaphysics o f Religion (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1927), p. 17.
®'*For example, John Oman’s (1860-1939) translation of Schleiermacher’s Speeches ini 893 did 
not render the German “Personalismus ” into English. See Knudson, pp. 17-18. Cf. Oman’s personalist 
relationalism in Grace and Personality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), pp.80-90.
®®J. T. Merz, History o f European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh, 1896-1914), 
quoted in Clement C. J. Webb, God and Personality (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1918), pp. 
22-23.
®®Knudson, p. 18-19. Cf. Stem’s, General Psychology from a Personalist Standpoint (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University Microfilms Intemational, 1979).
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German theology, as seen in the work of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and Ernst Troeltsch 
(1865-1923), responded to this crisis of the person by explaining that spirit and matter are two 
distinct realities. The reality of spirit was valued over matter because spirit was the realm of 
freedom, and freedom is constitutive of what it means to be human. At the University of Heidelberg 
in the summer semester of 1912 and the winter semester of 1912-1913, Troeltsch lectured on 
Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre {The Christian Faith) and suggested that one of the unique 
historical contributions of Christianity in the development of religion was “the Christian principle.” 
“We define the Cliristian principle -  which will serve as the basis for all subsequent discussion -  in 
this way: Christianity is the general, decisive breakthrough in principle to a religion of personality, 
opposed to all naturalistic and anti-personalistic understandings of God.”®’ Whether or not Troeltsch 
was correct in his reading of Schleiermacher is debatable. Such a reading probably says more about 
the historical and philosophical concerns of Troeltsch.®® The annihilation of Western optimism in 
human potential and the dehumanizing experiences in the trenches of the Great War (1914-1918) 
forced theologians to reconsider the question of anthropology. The post-war period witnessed an 
explosion of interest in a theological exploration of what it means to be a person, as evidenced most 
noticeably by Webb’s God and Personality, the Gifford Lectures of 1918 and 1919.®“
From the viewpoint of the personalist, the idea of the person is “ontological ultimate and for 
which personality is thus the fundamental explanatory principle.”®® Apart from the atheistic 
personalism associated with J. M. E. McTaggart (1866-1925), the majority of thinkers writing in this
®’Ernst Troeltsch, The Christian Faith, trans. Garrett E. Paul (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), '
p. 63. The lectures were published posthumously by Marta Troeltsch in 1925. On determining the I
“essence of Christianity” within a context of historical development see Troeltsch’s response to Adolf \
von Flamack’s (1851-1930), What is Christianity?^ 1900], “What Does ‘Essence of Christianity’ |
Mean?” [ 1903 & 1913] in Robert Morgan and Michael Pye, eds., Ernst Troeltsch: Writings on Theology |
and Religion (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977), pp. 124-181. j
®®See Bruce L. McCormack, “What Has Basel to Do with Berlin? Continuities in the Theologies i
of Barth And Schleiermacher,” The Princeton Seminaiy Bulletin, XXXIII (2002), pp. 162-163. î
®“Webb writes: “If before [the Great War] there was no proof of the existence of a personal God j
who can hear our prayers, no reasonable probability that consciousness survives bodily death, the I
intensity of our private sorrows and the recrudescence of ancient habits cannot alter the laws of evidence. Ï
But I am not now concerned to defend the change of attitude towards the problem of Personality of j
which the was has been the occasion; only to note it as an additional reason for attempting at this time I
to make up our minds what we ought to think about that problem itself (p. 30).” See also John #
Macmurray’s (1891-1960) ,The Self as Agent (Volume I of The Form o f the Personal) Introduction by |
Stanley M. Harrison (London: Faber and Faber, 1995) !
Î
John H. Lavey in The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, Volume 5 (New York: Macmillan I
Publishing & The Free Press, 1967), pp. 107ff. j
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tradition were theistic, specifically Christian.®' Indeed, during the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth centuries, the word “personalism” had become for many a synonym for theism. Knudson 
deemed, “Personalism is in a pre-eminent sense the philosophy of religion of our day. It may indeed 
be said to be the most thoroughgoing philosophical expression that Christianity has yet received.”®^
Personalism emerges from within a Christian context due to the significance given to the 
person in Christian thought. Knudson writes, “Christianity concentrated upon the distinctively 
personal element in God and the human soul as had not been done before.”®® Webb makes the point 
that it “is so often taken for granted . . .that the Personality of God is a principal tenet of Christianity 
that it is not without surprise that we find this expression not only entirely absent from the historical 
creeds and confessions of the Christian Church, but even, until quite modern times, in the estimation 
of all but the minority of Chr istians who reject the doctrine of the Trinity, regarded as unorthodox.” 
Yet, any consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity makes abundantly clear that the words “person” 
and “personality” came to refer to the nature of God.®'* This personal. Divine Being, exists in a 
unique relation with humanity, with persons. The analogy of person-to-person relating served as a 
framework by which one might understand the relationship between humanity and God, “The 
mutual relation of persons,” writes Webb, “seems to be that which bears by far the closest 
resemblance to the relation of the personal Soul to the Supreme Reality which we call Religion.”®®
Personalism can be characterized as a “vital awareness,” an intense awareness of one’s 
experience of life in all of its complexity. It is a form of “protest against being treated as a cog in a 
wheel or an object to be exploited.” Subjectivity is preferred over objectivity. Subjectivity is 
discovered through a relation or encounter with an other within the context of love and mutual 
intimacy. Personalism values the experience of the self as he/she engages reality and in that
®'*Webb, p. 61. See also John D. Zizioulas (b. 1931), Being As Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993), pp. 27-65. “The 
person both as a concept and as a living reality is purely the product of patristic thought. Without this, 
the deepest meaning of personhood can neither be grasped nor justified/ (p. 27)”
®®Clement C. J. Webb, Divine Personality and Human Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1920), p. 192.
®'Cf. McTaggavt’s Studies inHegelian Cosmology {\9Q\) acad. Some Dogmas o f Religion (1906).
®^Knudson, pp. 21, 247. “This does not , however, mean that every Christian must be a |
personalist in philosophy, (p. 247)” j
I
®®Knudson, p. 21. Thus making “the central idea of personalism, the unique significance of j
personality, [owing] its origin to Christian influence (p. 21).” The idea of the person was not lacking in !
Greek philosophy, but took on greater meaning in Christian thought as the church wrestled theologically j
with the Trinitarian nature of God. Yet, given Knudson’s tribute to Christian thought as providing the f
philosophical foundation for personalism, he does not attribute the influences of personalism within {
Christian theology. !
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engagement with reality, which includes an encounter with God, one comes to affirm the value of 
human experience, affirms the value and worth of the person.®®
C. The Personalist-Relationallsm of Hamann, Kierkegaard, Ebner & Brunner
The theological personalism that we find in Brunner (and echoed in both Hofmann and 
Loder), has its origins in the consideration of personality with the added dimension of relationality. 
The value of the person is affirmed, but the being of a person is understood relationally instead of 
statically. One’s identity is granted through a relationship with an other. In 1812, the largely 
unknown Swedish thinker, E. G. Geiger (?-?) made the remarkably prescient insight that, “There is 
no personality, except it be in and through another, no thou, no I. Therefore the highest antithesis is 
by no means I and non-I, but I and another I - I and thou.”®’ Before Geiger, we find in the writings of 
Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) one who sought to explore his identity, his existence in light of 
his own encounter with the presence of God.
Hamann is pivotal in the emergence of Christian personalism. Although he was a.^  close 
friend to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and fellow native of Konigsberg, Hamann made a decisive 
break with Kant after a religious experience in London while traveling on business. The experience 
lasted over several hours. One evening as he was reading through scripture, the characters of the 
Bible became real for him, he found himself within the narrative and beyond the narrative, before the 
presence of God, a presence who lovingly encountered him, even as the nature of his existence was 
radically called into question. Instead of losing himself, in what Loder would describe as a 
convictional experience, he found his being affirmed and valued. Hamann described this experience 
as “a dynamic assertion of my own existence as lived in the presence of God’s Word.”®® This 
“dynamic assertion” persisted throughout his life and came to define every aspect of his life. “Man 
by himself is a question needing an answer,” wrote Hamann, “an emptiness waiting to be filled.” 
Alone, humanity cannot answer the question. It must be found outside the self, but experienced in 
and thi'ough the self. The answer is found by an intensive questioning, a turning inward, a “descent
®®Knudson, pp. 17ff, 247ff; John Baillie, Our Knowledge o f God (New York: Charles Scribem’s ]
Sons, 1959), especially Chapter V, “The Other Who Is Most Near,” pp. 219ff Bernard Haring, The j
Christian Existentialist: The Philosophy and Theology o f Self-Fulfillment in Modern Society (New York: |
New York University Press, 1968), pp. 2-30. }
®’Paul K. Jewett, “Ebnerian Personalism and Its Influence Upon Brunner’s Theology,” \
Westminster Theological Journal, 14 (1951-1952): 115. i
®®Quoted in Ronald Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann (1730-1788): A Study in Christian Existence ]
with Selections from His Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 41. |
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into hell, the hell of self-knowledge. . . which is the only way to being one with God.”®“ Knowledge 
about the world, God, and one’s self cannot be attained through rationalism alone. One cannot think 
one’s way into a relationship with God. In a letter to Johann Gotthelf Linder (1729-1766), Hamann 
wrote, “I have no aptitude for truths, principles, systems; but for crumbs, fragments, fancies, sudden 
inspirations.”’® Instead, Hamann believe the Christian life entails “the encounter of the whole man 
through self-knowledge with the living truth of the Spirit.”’*
Hamann’s thought had a profound influence upon Kierkegaard. In fact, R. G. Smith sees in 
“embryonic or sibylline form at least, all the major concerns” that Kierkegaard addressed in his 
lifetime.’® A direct line can be made from Kierkegaard to Brunner, which combined with the 
influence of Ferdinand Ebner (1882-1931), produced a unique expression of Christian personalism.
Brunner’s personalism was a strong response to the influence of critical idealism upon 
theological considerations pervasive in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an idealism 
that left no room for the self.’® In Der Mittler {The Mediator), written in 1927, Brunner presents a 
biting critique of the Christologies offered by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Adolf von 
Hamack, and Albrecht Ritschl, who saw little need of a mediator to offer salvation because sin and 
guilt were removed from an understanding of the human condition.’'* The pervasive rationalism and 
moralism in these Christologies distorted the personal element of Jesus. Jesus was not the 
embodiment of an eternal idea, nor was he some kind of super hero to emulate. “When a man’s real 
belief in Christ consists in regarding Him as leader, hero, the primus inter pares, the highest point in 
the histoiy of religion, the loftiest peak in the moral and religious history of humanity,” Brunner 
forcefully avers, “he would do better, for the sake of simplicity and truth, to renounce the use of the 
terms Chiist, Son of God, Redeemer, Mediator, Reconciler, for all these terms mean something quite
Hamann in Smith, p. 41.
’®Hamann’s letter of 12* October 1759 quoted in Smith, p. 22. “System is itself a hindrance to 
the truth (p. 23).”
’'Hamann quoted in Smith, p. 53. See also Gwen Griffith Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann *s 
Relational Metacriticism (Berlin: Walter deGruyter, 1995). Hamaan’s statement could also serve as a 
fitting summary of Loder’s understanding of the Christian life.
’®Smith,p. 18.
’® Alistair E. McGrath, The Making o f Modern German Christology, 1750-1990, second edition 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994), p. 145.
’'*Emil Brunner, The Mediator: A Study o f the Central Doctrine o f the Christian Faith, Translated 
by Olive Wyon (New York: Macmillan Company, 1942), pp. 46-71; McGrath, p. 145.
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different.”’® Neither are appeals to ethical stringency salvific, because the struggle to be moral is 
merely a futile attempt of the isolated self to achieve what can only be given through Jesus Christ. 
Thus, “even morality is only intercourse with oneself, Icheinsamkeit (solitude of the self),” quoting 
Ferdinand Ebner. “It is self-love, self-regard. Nothing save a real relation to a real "Thou ” can 
dispel this solitude of the soul; only a real conversation, in which we are actually addressed by 
another person, can make us responsible [i. e. - morally responsible]; this alone would be absolutely 
timely, personal, and therefore wholly serious.”’® Jesus is a person, a Thou, who addresses the self 
and calls the self into redemptive being.
For Brunner the Christian life involves an encounter (Begegnung) with the Living God 
revealed in the face of Jesus Christ.”  The encounter is a “personal correspondence,” person to 
Person.’® What we learn thiough the dialog with God is not ideas about God, instead we are 
confronted with God Himself in Jesus Christ. We are given what Paul called, “the loiowledge of God 
in the face of Jesus Christ (2 Corinthian 3).”
Brunner’s personalism was significantly shaped by the work of Ferdinand Ebner, who can 
take the claim of being the founder of the “I-Thou” philosophy. “I-Thou” personalist philosophy is 
primarily assicuated with Martin Buber’s (1878-1965) well-known Ich und Du (I and Thou) 
published in 1923.’“ However, it was Ebner’s Das Wort und die geistigen Realitaten, 
Pneurnatologische Fragmente {The Word and Spiritual Realities: Pneumatological Fragments)
’®Brunner, p. 79.
’®Brunner, pp. 208-209.
” Cf. Brunner’s lectures of 1938, Wahrheit als Begegnung {Truth as Encounter/ The Divine- 
Human Encounter), a slim volume, but containing some of Brunner’s most creative proposals and 
applications of a personalist theology.
’®McGrath, p. 147. In his “Intellectual Autobiogiaphy,” Brunner wrote that “above all, the 
Cliristian concept of tiuth, truth as encounter, revelation conceived as God’s self-communication 
dominates and permeates the treatment of every single theological topic.” I. Jolin Hesselink, who studied 
under Brunner, also notes the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1869-1938) as also being a source 
of Brunner ’ s personalism. “Emil Brunner: A Centeniall Perspective,” Christian Century, (13* December 
1989), p. 1171.
’“/ and Thou (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag) appeared two years after Ebner’s work. A notation towards 
the end explains that a sketch of the work was first made in 1916, followed by a first draft in the fall of 
1919, with the final composition completed in the spring of 1922. See also his stress upon a concrete, 
individual human being over “humanity” in general in Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), The Star o f 
Redemption, Translated by William W. Hallow (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1985). Written 
between 1918 and 1919, and although critical of Buber’s understanding of Judaism, Rosenzweig also 
stands in the personalist tradition, influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt and the dialectic of Ludwig 
Feuerbach (1804-1872). Feuerbach said that true dialectics “is not a monologue between a lonely thinker 
and himself but a dialogue between I and Thou.(p. xiv-xv)”
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published in 1921, and thus predating Buber, that articulated a Christian personalist view that had 
such a profound impact upon Brunner’s thinking.®® Before we turn to Brunner, let us briefly consider 
Ebner.
Ebner makes the fundamental claim that human personality “always consists in the existence
of the I in relation to the Thou.”®' His personalist, “I-Thou” philosophy was primarily influenced by
the writings of Kierkegaard and fully acknowledges his debt to him. Ebner was also shaped by
explorations in the philosophy of language as advanced by Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788),
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), and J. Grimm’s (1785-1863) Deutsche Mythologie (1844).®®
In Das Wort, Ebner summarizes his primary thesis in this way:
Presupposed that human existence in its kernel has a spiritual significance, viz., a 
significance which is not exhausted in its natural manifestation in the course of a 
world event; presupposed that one may speak of something spiritual in man 
otherwise than in the sense of a fiction of a poetic or metaphoric nature, or of a 
fiction demanded on “social” grounds; then this spiritual something is essentially 
defined thereby that it is fundamentally connected with something spiritual outside 
of it, through which and in which it exists. An evidence, and indeed an ‘objectively’ 
tangible evidence, of this connection with a relation of such a sort and one that is 
therefore accessible to objective knowledge is to be found in the fact that man is a 
speaking being, that he has the ‘Word.’ He does not, however, have the word on a 
natural or social basis. Society, in the human sense, is not the presupposition of 
speech, but rather itself has this as the presupposition of its existence, the word 
lodged in man. If then, in order to have a word for it, we call this spiritual entity in 
man. I, and that which is outside of him, in relationship to which the ‘I ’ exists, thou, 
we must remember that this I and this thou are given to us precisely through the 
word and in it, in its ‘inwardness’; not, however, as empty words in which dwell no 
relationship to reality - as they naturally appear in their abstract, substantive and 
substantialized usage; but rather as a word that ‘reduplicates’ its content and real 
form in the concreteness and actuality of its being pronounced in and through the 
situation created by speech.®®
®°Ebner sees in Hamann’s view of the interaction between the believer and the Word as a kind 
of Christian personalism. See Smith, p. 18. Brunner relates that it was the work of Friderich Gogarten 
(1887-1967) who first had an appreciation for Ebner, and sparked his own interest in the personal 
dimension of Christian experience. He also credits Eberhard Grisebach’s (1880-1945) Die Grenzen des 
Erziehers, and especially his Gegenwart, eine kritische Ethik which he called “bahnbrechend 
[pioneering].” See Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (Tübingen: Verlang von J. c. b. Molir, 1932), 
p. 571, note 12 cited in Jewett, p. 119.
®'Da5 Wort und die geistigen Realitaten, Pneurnatologische Fragmente, (Innsbruck: Brenner 
Verlag, 1921), p. 36 cited in Baillie, p. 208.
1
®®John W. Flart, Karl Bar/vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution o f a Theological 
Alliance, 1916-1936 (New York; Beter Lang, 2001), pp. 39-40.
®®Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitaten, Pneurnatologische Fragmente 
(Innsbruck: Brenner Verlag), p. 12 cited in Jewett, pp. 115-116. Theologian Karl Heim (1874-1958) 
called Ebner’s Das Wort a “Copemican act.” See J. Cullberg, Das Du und die Wirklichkeit (Uppsala, 
Universitets Ai'sskrift, 1933), p. 39, cited in Jewett, p. 115. Regarding Ebner, Jewett writes, “For none
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Let us unpack this statement.
Three critical observations can be made. First, human existence for Ebner is spiritual 
existence. Not a spiritual identity divorced from material form, but spiritual in the sense that human 
existence becomes truly a human existence through humanity’s relationship with some “thing” 
outside of it. This spiritual identity of humanity he calls, /. There can be no sense of identity, no “I,” 
no grasp of existence detached from that which is outside of it. Spiritual existence is “directed 
fundamentally to a relationship with something spiritual outside of it, through which and in which it 
exists (emphasis added).” Human existence is spiritual because it has the capacity to be in a 
dialogical relationship with that which is not human. Second, as an other, this spiritual identity 
outside of humanity Ebner calls thou. The relationship with the thou is primary and fundamental 
because the I  possesses a relationship to itself only through its relationship with thou. Finally, the 
ground or bearer of this relationship, the means by which the dialog between I and thou occur is 
tlu'ough the spoken word or speech. In Ebner’s Logosophy, the dialog conveys a Word, but the Word 
is not something, but a person^^ In the dialogical exchange, through speech, I and thou relate.®® 
Speech creates the relationship and the relationship exists between the I and thou, in the space created 
between the dialog partners, through the exchange. In the relationship with thou, the I is maintained 
and defined, without becoming enmeshed in the other. The uniqueness and particularity of the I is 
sustained even as it is being shaped by the other.
Thus, Ebner suggests that God is not an idea realized through speculation. God is known 
relationally. He argues that, “Either God has a personal existence, or he does not exist at all. One 
cannot grasp his personality, however, in a speculative way, but only thereby, that one relate oneself 
to him personally - which is the requirement of man’s spiritual life and of God - ,  viz. that one makes 
him the Thou of his I, and at that point all speculation and all theological metaphysical profundity 
have eo ipso ceased.”®® What is offered in the experience is not ideas about God, but a personal 
confrontation by God. As we shall see, these are themes that stand at the heart of Loder’s thinking.
Ebner’s work is in many ways an extension of Kierkegaard’s desire to affirm the value of the 
individual. In the face of Hegelian idealism where the individual was lost in the supra-individual, the 
absolute Self, Kierkegaard insisted that the human ich cannot be confused with the divine Ich.
other, with the exception of Kierkegaard, does Brunner express such unstinted appreciation, (p. 115)” 
®'*See Hart, pp. 39-40.
®®According to Ebner it was J. G. Hamann and Wilhelm von Humboldt, who giasped the 
significanace of speech in its spiritual roots as having divine origin. Das Wort, p. 16 cited in Jewett, p. 
116.
^^Das Wort, p. 168 cited in Jewett, p. 121.
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Kierkegaard’s work sought to sustain concrete human existence. The human ich engages the world 
subjectively and realizes the objective thinking, who knows the whole world, but loses himself. The 
relationality or fellowship {Gemeinschaft) inherent in Ebner would appear to be at odds with 
Kierkegaard’s stress upon the Individual, hence the value of Existenz, Yet, the Individual, as Jewett 
conectly points out, is never an “epistemologically autonomous, metaphysically independent being.” 
The Individual who exists in space and time is addressed by God in the moment. “Never is he more 
alone, more the Individual, than in that moment, but never is he less alone than when so alone with 
God.”®’ The Kierkegaardian view of the Individual becomes in Brunner, as mediated through Ebner, 
a Person confronted by the divine Thou. Jewett helpfully summarizes this connection in noting that 
the “mediation of time and eternity in the individual in the passionate decision of the moment 
(Kierkegaard) . . .furnishes the fundamental structure for Brunner’s divine-human encounter. The 
constant appropriation of which Kierkegaard speaks, his emphasis on subjective truth {Existenz), in 
distinction to objective truth, becomes for Brunner, following Ebner, a fellowship-founding, personal 
encounter. It-truth {Es- Wahrheit) and thou-fruth {Du-Wahrheit) or truth as encounter {Wahrheit als 
Begegnung)’" are all themes, as we shall see, which flow from Kierkegaard, “the source of this new 
thinking,” notes Brunner, “the gi'eatest Christian thinker of modem times.”®®
Thus, we find in Brunner a relational personalism. The Christian faith is understood as a 
personal coivespondence between the divine Du and the human Ich. The Bible gives an account of 
this relationship between God and humanity, about this "indissoluble two-sided, yet never 
interchangeable and in a specific sense one-sided, relation between them.”^  ^ Certainly not a 
relationship between equals because, “God is always and inconvertibly the first, man always and 
inconvertibly the second in this relation,” yet there is a reciprocity.®® Thus rejecting Anicius 
Boethius’s (480- 524) well-known definition of the person as an individual substance of a rational 
nature {Persona est naturae rationablis individua substantia), Brunner unabashedly affirmed, “All
87Jewett, p. 120. Cf. NRC in which Loder suggests that “Kierkegaard’s individualism is set in
the context of his concern to speak to organized and institutionalized Clrristianity. This puts his analysis J
of individual experience in the perspective of his concern for all Christendom which he said constituted î
the background for the extensive self-analysis in which he engaged (p. 24).” i
1
®®Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 57. Cf. Brunner’s tribute to Kierkegaard, as well |
as Hamann in Dogmatics, Volume I: The Christian Doctrine o f God, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: i
Westminster Press, 1950), p. 100, 7. ;
®“Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 33. Italics in the text. I
Î
“®Brunner, p. 33. I
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personality is a being in relationship,”®' Humanity is “God’s counterpart, face to face with himself,”
created for fellowship with God.®^  Apart from this face-to-face interaction, humanity is lost in that it
receives no mirroring reflection. The individual cannot see oneself, because one has lost the face of
encounter. Thus, faith in the New Testament, as Brunner understands it “is that total self-giving, that
complete renunciation of one’s own security, that utter dependence, which is only possible face to
face with one whose being and acts are such that face to face with im one can afford to renounce his
own security.” He continues:
Man stays concealed in his secure hiding place, secreted behind the walls of his I- 
castle; and nothing can really entice him out until one meets him who overcomes all 
the mistrust and anxiety about his very existence which drives him into self- security 
and there imprisons him. Man remains imprisoned in himself until the one meets 
him who can free him, who can break down his system of defences, so that he can 
surrender himself, and in this surrender of self receive what he needs to enable him 
to abandon his securities; that is to say, until that one comes who gives man the life 
for which he was created. Only unconditional love, which brings man to self- 
fulfillment, and therewith gives him true selfhood and eternal life, can call out in him 
complete, unconditional love.®®
The one who meets man and draws him out of his “I-castle” is God in the face of the person, Jesus 
Christ.
Brunner’s relational personalism becomes the heuristic device through which the entire Bible 
may be interpreted, thus defining the Christian life, “God is thus the God who approached man and 
man is the man who comes from God, in order that God’s will may fulfill itself in man’s knowing 
and voluntary loving and that man’s true life may be realized in his voluntarily acknowledging and 
affirming the divine acting and will. This two-sided but unambiguous relation, this state of 
dependent-independent creature - to be face to face with God according to His Will - is the 
fundamental category of the Bible; and in relation to it everything said in the Bible is said and must 
be understood.”®'*
'^ ^Der Mensch im Widerspruch, p. 222 cited in Jewett, p. 127. See Boethius’ Contra Eutzychen I
et Nestorium quoted in Webb, p. 47.
®®Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 33. ;
®®Brunner, p. 51.
“‘'Brunner, p. 46. Cf. also Brunner, The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics, trans. |
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1932), pp. 191 ff and 302ff. “God does not only will our I
personalities, He does not only desire to have our personality for Himself, in a personal manner; but he 1
also wants us in such a way as to possess our personal life, our life in relation to society. For only the î
life which is related organically to society, only the life with the ‘Thou,’ is personal life. I cannot live I
personally with ‘things.’ The ‘T cannot be personal over against an ‘it,’ but only when it is confronted 1
by the ‘Thou.’ To live personally means: to live in responsibility and love. This eliminates the absfract, !
impersonal element from ethics altogether. There are no Ends, Ideas, Goods, Values, no abstract entities, Î
neither Culture, nor the Sate, nor ‘sphere of Spirit’ to which the human personal life can be subordinated. |
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Foremost, the Christian experience is primarily an encounter between God and humanity. 
The divine Word addresses humanity and calls for a response with our lives. But the address is 
always to the individual. “It thus happens,” Brunner writes, “ that . . .  a Word of God proclaimed to 
all the world becomes a Word which encounters me, and that, in that it encounters me, converts me 
and recreates me. How the Word of God moves from a Word to me to a Word in me: that is the 
theme of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.”®® Tliis is a “realized dimension,” that is the “Holy Spirit, 
the pledge of new life, is a present, creative reality” for the believer.®® Thus we move to a brief 
discussion of Brunner’s pneumatology, one that possess a remarkable affinity with what we will find 
later in Loder’s thought.
In a recent study of the relationship between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, John W. Hart 
convincingly argues that the dissolution of their friendship had less to do with their disagreement 
over natural theology than the direction Brunner’s thought was taking due to his contact with the 
Oxford Group Movement. The Oxford Group Movement (OGM) was founded and led by the 
American, Frank N. D. Buchman (1878-1961). He grew up in a pietistic Swiss-German Lutheran 
family in eastern Pennsylvania (USA) and was ordained in the Lutheran church in 1902. He went to 
England in 1907 and attended the Keswick conference at which he experienced a “profound 
awakening.” He returned to the United States and became evangelist, preaching on university 
campuses, most significantly in Princeton. The OGM described itself as “A First Century Christian 
Fellowship.” It hoped to renew the church, to evangelize the non-Christians through personal 
contacts, and to realize a “new world order through changed lives.” As Buchman defined it, “The 
Oxford Group is a revolution of God-control where God really guides you and your nation.”®’ 
Brunner first encountered the OGM on a lecture tour in Princeton in 1928, again in Great Britain, and
There is only one self-end in the sphere of possible experience and it is this: personal life, or community 
between persons. This is the ethical meaning of the Incarnation, as it is the ethical meaning of the fact 
that man is made in the image of God. (p. 191)”
®®Fom Werk des Heiligen Geistes (On the Work o f the Holy Spirit), p. 8-9 cited in Hart, p. 198,
note 61.
®®Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 73.
“’Frank N. D. Buchman, Remaking the World (London: Blanford, 1947), p. 46, cited in Hart, p. 
178. Buchman preferred to make contact leaders and notable personalities. Some of the people who 
came under his sway were J. Ross Stevenson (1866-1939), president of Princeton Theological Seminary, 
Eric Liddell (1902-1945), the Scottish Olympian and missionary, Paul Toumier (1891-1986), the Swiss 
psychologist, Carl J. Hambro, president of the Norwegian Parliament, and the actress Mae West (1892- 
1980). Hart, p. 193. For a detailed study of the Oxford Group Movement see, Martin Smith and Francis 
Underhill, The Gr'oup Movement, (London: SPCK, 1934); Walter H. Clark, The Oxford Group (New 
York: BooTKMan Associates, 1951); and Geoffrey Williamson, Inside Buchmanism (London: Watts & 
Company, 1954). Cf. Toumier’s, The Meaning o f Persons (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
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a third time in Zurich where he had a lengthy conversation with Buchman, experiencing a renewal of
his own faith.®® Writing in his “Spiritual Autobiography,” Brunner confesses that:
The Oxford Group . . .made me aware, for the first time, of the close connection 
between spiritual reality and fellowship or communion. . . . The I-thou philosophy 
gave the philosophical, intellectual explanation or interpretation of this extra­
intellectual fact. Now, I could see that and why in the New Testament there is such a 
close connection, if not identity, between communion or fellowship in Christ and the 
gift of the Holy Spirit, in the ecclesia. Fellowship was no more a mere ethical 
attitude but a reality - the reality of God’s Holy Spirit among and in men . . . .
This was, at bottom, the same thing which Soren Kierkegaard meant by the word 
existential. You cannot understand the Gospel unless you let yourself be personally 
engaged, which is the same as being challenged by the Thou which you encounter.
This has become since 1938, the lodestar of my theological thinking, first expressed 
in the little book [Truth as Encounter] . . .  in 1938. I think it was this which, at 
bottom, Kutter and Ragaz had in mind when they spoke of a religious socialism. It 
certainly is what the two Blumhardts had discovered and experienced as the reality 
of the Holy Spirit as the element of ecclesia.®®
The renewal that Brunner experienced in the OGM was credited not to new philosophical 
insights or the formation of new theological method, but to the work of the Holy Spirit providing a 
breath of fresh air through the OGM which was making the Gospel alive for modern people, 
desperately needed for the institutional European church plagued by a defunct creedalism.'®® “It was 
not [Kutter and Blumhardt’s] thought,” Brunner contends, “it was the power of the Holy Spirit 
manifested in their lives and words which attracted so many and which through Kutter impressed us 
as the reality of God in our midst. The origin o f the so-called dialectical theology is not theological 
or philosophical thought, but the wondrous reality o f the Holy S p i r i t . The OGM provided a
®®Hart, p. 178, 180. Writing years later, Brunner candidly described seeing a sandwich-board |
man advertising a restaurant, but who looked like he had not eaten in weeks. “I have been that sandwich- î
board man. I was advertising a good meal, but I hadn’t eaten the meal myself until I met the Oxford |
Group.” Quoted in Hart, p. 195, note 15. i
““Quoted in Hart, p. 183. Italics in the text. Hermann Kutter ( 1869-1931), along with Leonhard I
Ragaz (1868-1948) were proponents of religious socialism. Ragaz was a pastor and professor in Basel |
before resigning and devoting himself to social work in industiial areas and peace work. Kutter’s Î
dialectic theology influenced Ragaz, which impressed itself upon the work of Karl Barth. The pietism I
of both Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805-1880) and his son, Christian Blumhardt (1842-1919) shaped 
dialectial theology. See Eberhard Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, translated by Garrett E.
Paul (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), pp. 3Off.
'®®See Brunner’s, The Church and the Oxford Group, trans. by David Cairns (London: Hodder I
& Stoughton, 1937, pp. 106-108. “Meine Begegnung mit der Oxfbrder Gruppenbewegung” (“Encounter j
with the Oxford Group Movement”) is also another account of Brunner’s experience in and with the î
OGM. II
'“‘From Brunner’s “Spiritual Autobiography,” quoted in Hart, p. 196, note 39. |
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means to convey dialectical theology to a wider public, to the non-theologian, especially to the
person not found in the pew.
It is striking that as a theologian, Brunner would be so critical of the discipline of theology,
particularly its inability to speak to the church. A close examination of Brunner’s correspondence
with Barth in the early 1930's reveals that behind their disagreement over natural theology was a
deeper clash over the role of theology and the relationship between the theologian and his/lier
openness to the presence of the Holy Spirit. Barth was troubled and deeply concerned by Brunner’s
involvement with the OGM. In a letter to Barth, from October, 1933, Brunner held out the hope and
expressed quite candidly that, “Perhaps there will come a time when you will once more have an ear
for that which the Group wants - if you understand that we are not blessed through our theology, but
only through being-in-Christ. The Groups have brought me closer to this than I have ever been.”'®^
Uppermost in Brunner’s concern is the renewal of faith in the church and in the world, but the way
towards that goal is not tlrrough theological explorations alone. The Christian was to witness to the
presence of Christ actively present in the world today, a witness done more effectively and
consistently by the OGM. In fact, Brunner reminds Barth that witnessing is even more important
than theology. With brutal honesty and humility Brunner testifies to Barth:
I come again and again to the conviction that our theological work is indeed 
something very necessary and good (yours and mine!), but that the Church is not 
renewed through it. The renewal of the Church will just as little happen through 
theology as the growth of the Church did in the time of the Apostles or afterwards.
Both proceed on the much simpler way of “establishing the obedience of faith” . . .  in i
some way similar to the way it happens in the Groups.'®® [
Under the sway of the OGM, Bmnner wrote Vom Werk des Heiligen Geistes {On the Work o f |
the Holy Spirit), a pamphlet published in 1935 which explores the activity of the Holy Spirit in the I
Christian life since Pentecost. In addition to Barth’s "Nein!” to Brunner’s Nature and Grace, |
Brunner’s pneumatology, influenced by the OGM, was also another “significant factor,” Hart argues, j
in the firm rejection of Brunner.'®'* In Vom Werk des Heiligen Geistes, Bmnner gives an account of j
moments that witnessed intense manifestations of the Spirit, which were consequently quenched by 4
what he describes as Church law and theological intellectualism. Brunner sees dialectical theology I
guilty of similar forms of suppression: ji
io2“News has constantly reached me of your co-operation with the Group-Movement (which I 
have always viewed so thoroughly unsympathetically).. .from which I see once more that you apparently 
find yourself in a rapid movement whose Spirit and direction have always been strange to me.” Barth 
to Brunner, 1934. See Hart, p. 177.
'°®Hart, p. 185. 
‘°'*Hart, pp. 183ff.
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The doctrine of the Holy Spirit has also been an embarrassment to it up to now, or it 
has attempted to go the way of orthodoxy once more by identifying the Word and 
Spirit. No wonder! For it is always proved in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit how 
much the reality of faith stands behind theological reflection. This doctrine will 
always bring to our awareness our own poverty of Spirit. It is the question whether 
we stand fast in the judgment or whether, through an objectivistic falsification of the 
New Testament witness [read: Barth], we want to hid our nakedness. It is the 
excellence precisely of this theological theme that it establishes the point-of-contact 
[Beriihrungspunkt] of divine revelation and the personal experience of faith.'®®
The point-of-contact is the “place” where God is made present and experienced in the Christian life.
It is the place of encounter, the point of address, the moment when through engagement with the
presence of God, one is “fundamentally changed.” Significantly, Brunner observes that the Holy
Spirit is determined to bring change and renewal in such a way that these moments of transformation
do “not cancel the structure of human being, but orders it completely anew.”®^ A new order is
experienced which defines the nature of the Christian life, primarily through faith, hope and love. As
we shall see, it is here where Loder’s pneumatology can be seen as providing gieater support for
Brunner’s theological claim for the “place” of contact.
The point-of-contact question, identifying where and how God and humanity, as it were,
touch or relate became a bone of contention between Barth and other dialectical theologians,
specifically Brunner. Barth was extremely skeptical of the direction Brunner’s thinking was taking
him. Barth felt that placing too much emphasis upon the human reception of God’s Word was guilty
of mistakes that he saw in Schleiermacher’s influence upon the liberal theology of Troeltsch and
others. There can be no “interpenetration” [Ineinander] between the divine spirit of God and the
human spirit.'®® A critical space must be maintained to keep them apart. Theology must begin with
God as revealed in Jesus Christ and not through an analysis of human experiences of God.'®’ In
Romans (1919), Barth identified fascination with “personality” as the “idol of the century.”'®® As a
result, he believed theology cannot be a tool for furthering the development of personality.'®®
'®®Fbm Werk, p. 8, quoted in Hart, p. 186
‘°®Mc Cormack, pp. 163-165.
'“’McCormack sees Barth’s theology “born of an effort to overcome historicism and 
psychologism in theology, (p. 165)”
'°®Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyn (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1980).
'®®Echoing Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten also attacked Barth’s position. In “The Problem of a 
Theological Anthropology,” (1929), Gogarten challenged the theological community to address seriously 
its understanding of what it means to be human. Gogarten writes: I am convinced that one may not 
follow Schleiermacher on his way for even a single step... But today, one cannot avoid a very explicit 
discussion of the problem of anthropology. Yes, and more than that, I am of the opinion that it is not
possible today to do real theology. . . .in any other way than by placing the problem of anthropology in 
the center of attention. Only when that happens will a theology be created which really achieves that 
which it is there for, namely to be an aid to the living and public proclamation of God’s Word. Friedrich 
Gogarten, “Das Problem einer theologischen Anthropologie,” Zwischen den Zeiten, 1 (1929), p. 505, 
cited in Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realitic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 405-406.
"“Hart, p. 186.
" ‘Fbm Werk, pp. 14-15, quoted in Hart, pp. 186-187.
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By contrast, the personalism in Brunner’s thought with its strong Kiekegaardian influence, is 
brought to bear upon the way he sees the Holy Spirit at work in his life and the way he puts forth a 
vision of the Christian life. He makes a way for preservation of the “F’ who is addressed by the Holy 
and experienced. Hart, too, points to the Brunner’s personalism in observing that this pamphlet 
“stresses the importance of the individual/existential/subjective/human T’ in the act of faith.”"®
Brunner writes:
The Holy Spirit does not confess Jesus as the Clirist, as the Lord. . .The confession is 
my confession. And the Holy Spirit does not know the Lord; for the Holy Spirit has 
no Lord to recognize. But: that /  myself, no one other than I, know and confess the 
Lord as my Lord - that happens because God Himself says to me that He is my Lord, 1
in Christ through the Holy Spirit. My subjectness is not “replaced” - that would be |
mysticism - but Christ gives himself to me as the Lord, he makes him Lord to me j
myself, he restores me myself, without any grounding other than the certainty that I |
can confess that he is my Lord."' !
To be “in Christ,” one does lose a sense of “subjectness,” there is no dissolution of or melding of the 
I  in the presence of God. The Holy Spirit presents Christ and in one’s relationship with Christ, the 
subject, as it were, is freed to be relationship with God. The self is restored through fellowship with 4
Christ. This restoration, this renewal is the gift of the Holy Spirit given to all those who are “in i
Christ.” j
This excursus through Hoffmann and Brunner might appear to be a detour from our main |
concern, but just the opposite is the case. This discussion establishes an inteipretative framework i
through which we can view the way Loder’s understands the life of a Christian. The personalist- î
relational themes that surface and develop beginning with Kierkegaard will come to have a formative |
impact upon Loder. I would place Loder’s work in the theological tradition that begins with j
Kierkegaard (and beyond him to Hamann), and extends through Ebner, Brunner, Hofmann, and ;
eventually to Loder.
A good case can be made for seeing Loder’s work as a form of Christian existentialism, i
especially given the importance of Kierkegaard upon his thought. Indeed, it might appear that |
Loder’s work is really only an elaborate extension of Kierkegaard’s thought. There is no doubt, as 
we shall see, that Loder relies heavily upon Kierkegaard. However, he does so because he sees
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Kierkegaard’s understanding of human existence as providing a rich, generative source for 
apprehending reality and God, Loder goes well beyond Kierkegaard, particularly in his ability to 
articulate how the God-man encounters the individual. Loder takes the inherent relational patterns in 
Kierkegaard’s thought and brings them to bear upon the way we view every level of creation 
relationally. This is why I am reluctant to identify Loder with the existentialist tradition, primarily 
because of its tendency to advocate an individualism or subjectivism which is not in keeping with the 
Christian experience. To see Kierkegaard as an individualist or subjectivist is to misinterpret him."® 
I would suggest that this misreading of Kierkegaard has hindered the reception and apprehension of 
Loder’s work. By identifying himself so closely with Kierkegaard, it is easy to assume that Loder’s 
theology is equally individualistic. Loder wants to affirm the importance of the individual (here the 
existentialist influence is obvious). But the value of the individual can only be given within the 
context of a wider relationship that has the power to define and affirm the individual."® Kierkegaard 
and others stressed this point and they did so because it was fundamental to their experience as 
Christians. This is why I prefer to think of Loder’s work within the relational-personalist tradition, 
certainly informed by Kierkegaard’s so-called existentialism, but not synonymous with it.""
For Loder, the Christian life consists of a relationship between the Floly Spirit and human 
spirit, Spirit-to-spirit, Subject-to-subject, Person-to-person, Freedom-to-freedom. Agreeing with 
George Hendry (b.l904), Loder believed that “God does not dehumanize humanity or ‘un-man’ 
humanity in order to relate to humans. . . .God does not overrule human freedom but engages it in 
order that the I-Thou of the God-human relationship not be reduced to the I-it order.”"® The
’ '®Soren Kierkegaard, The Prayers o f Kierkegaard, Edited and with a New Interpretation of His 
Life and Thought by Perry D. LeFevre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 164. See 
LeFevre’s critical examination of Kierkegaard’s life and thought. Truth as subjectivity, as Kierkegaard 
claimed, is not subjectivism because the object under consideration, the ti'uth after which one 
passionately seeks, is not found within. Subjectivity is the passionate, personal engagement with reality, 
but it is not merely a mirror image of the self. Harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique o f 
Modernity: Soren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 155-157; David 
J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 43- 
43; J. Hey wood Thomas, Philosophy o f Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1994), p. 47-81; David Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993)
"®See Arnold B. Come’s assertion that Kierkegaard is primarily a humanist theologian. 
Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My 5"e/f(BufIalo, NY : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995).
""See Loder’s entry “Existentialism,” in Harper’s Encyclopedia o f Religious Education. Iris V. 
Cully & Kendig Brubaker Cully, general editors (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 242. “The 
significance of corporate reality for the existentialist must be found -  if it is to be found at all -  in 
religious or theological reality, as in Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship, (p. 241)”
"®The reference is to George Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, Revised and 
Enlarged Edition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965). See LS, p. 35
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Bmnnerian echoes are evident. The Christian life is not a mystical union with Christ, as this would 
cloud the I-Thou relationship where the boundaries and particularities of I and Thou are maintained; 
instead, the Christian life consists of a fellowship - a koinonia - a fellowship that makes present the 
Spiritual Presence of Christ. To encounter the Spiritual Presence of Christ means to undergo 
transformation. Beginning with his doctoral dissertation at Harvard, Loder begins to unpack the how 
and the what of transformation as he himself experienced it. It is this scrutiny that will preoccupy 
Loder for the rest of his life: An analysis of the deep structure of transformation.
II. The Harvard Years: Freud & Kierkegaard
Loder left Princeton and followed Hofmann to Harvard University where began developing a 
methodology for interdisciplinary studies. After receiving a masters of theology degree in 1958, he 
graduated with his doctorate in practical theology in 1962. Loder finished writing his dissertation as 
a Danforth Scholar which brought him to the Menninger Psychiatiic Clinic in Topeka, Kansas 
(USA)."® Loder’s years at Harvard brought him into contact with the leading intellectuals of his day 
shaping American theology and culture. He studied with sociologists Talcott Parsons (1902- 1979) 
and Robert Bellah (b. 1927), theologians Paul Tillich, Harvey Cox (b. 1929), Richard R. Niebuhr (?- 
?), and James Luther Adams (b.l901); the historian Arthur Darby Nock (1902-1963); the 
psychologist, David McClelland (1917- 1998), noted for his research on achievement motivation, 
with interests in personality and consciousness; and Seward Hiltner (b.l908), a leading scholar 
exploring the interconnection between psychology and theology."’
That Loder would engage in an analysis of the relationship between religion and psychiatry 
is not suiprising given his experience up to this time. At Princeton, under the guidance of Hofmann 
and the writings of Kierkegaard, Loder struggled to make sense of his convictional experience in a 
way that was psychologically informed. But there was also an aspect of the experience that could not 
be “explained” psychologically, that is without doing damage to the theological insights which 
changed his life and deepened his commitment to Jesus Christ. Loder took his familiarity with 
Kierkegaard and brought it into dialog with the psychoanalytic tradition of Sigmund Freud (1856-
‘ '®The Menninger Psychiati'ic Clinic (located in Topeka, Kanasa, USA) was founded in 1920 by 
Charles Menninger (1862-1953) and his two sons Karl Augustus Menninger (1893-1990) and William 
Claire Menninger (1899-1966), with the intent to humanize the treatment of the mentally ill beyond 
asylum care, became one of the largest psychiatric training programs in the world after the Second World 
War. William and especially Karl were authors whose work helped to interpret psychoanalytic concepts 
for the American public and were particularly helpful to Protestant clergy in the 1950's and 1960's. See 
William Menninger’s Psychiatry in a Troubled World (1946) and Psychiatrist fo r  a Troubled World 
(1967); and Karl Menninger’s, The Vital Balance (1963) and his widely popular. Whatever Became o f 
(1973).
" ’From the Wright interview with Loder, printed in “Ruination Unto Redemption,” p. 78.
.'H!
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1939), in order to explore the way both thinkers understood the character of religious consciousness. 
The dissertation was entitled, “The Nature of Religious Consciousness in the Writings of Sigmund 
Freud and Soren Kierkegaard: A Theoretical Study in the Correlation of Religious and Psychiatric 
Concepts.”"* The majors ideas of the thesis were later re-worked and published as Religious 
Pathology and Christian Faith in 1966. Although Loder never refers to his convictional experience 
in either the dissertation or Religious Pathology, it stands in the shadow, implicit to the discussion, 
informing his explorations and conclusions. These two works demonstrate Coder’s proficiency in 
and adaptation of the psychoanalytic tradition; his analysis of Freud’s work, especially his work on 
the psychotherapeutic value of dreams and fantasies, is then brought to bear upon the way we 
apprehend the Clii'istian experience. Of particular concern to us here is observing the way Loder 
engages Freudian theories and theologically critiques them even as he absorbs these same theories 
into his theology.
Before we proceed, let us define some key Freudian terms and ideas. Freud developed his
theories treating neurotic behavior, from which he came to believe that neurosis was goal-oriented.
Until the purpose of the neurotic is identified, the behavior would continue. The drive of the neurotic
is hidden within the unconscious, an unobservable, theoretical entity that allow continuity between
early childhood and adulthood. When the self experiences a trauma, usually too painful to be
remembered and “held,” then it is placed within the unconscious. By repressing what is felt as a
threat to the self, the ego defends against the disorganization of the self."^ The threats to the self
come from two domains of influence: The id and the superego. The id imposes certain instinctual
and biological demands (such as pleasure and survival) while the superego impose the socially
desired internalization of parental control. The ego becomes the center of activity which “observes”
and “controls” the self and its reality against the potentially destructive forces of the id and the
superego, even as it is observed and controlled by this external reality. As a result, Freud said:
The ego is the actual seat of anxiety. Threatened by dangers . . . , it develops the 
flight-reflex by withdrawing its own cathexis from the menacing perception or the 
similarly regarded process in the id, and emitting it as anxiety . . . .  What it is that 
ego fears from the external and libidinal danger cannot be specified; we know that
"*Uis dissertation committee consisted of Hans Hofmann, David C. McClelland and Richard R. 
Niebuhr. The scholarly community at Harvard appeared to be a setting that was uniquely established 
for the exploration of experiential religion. Cf. Richard R. Niebuhr’s, Experiential Religion (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972).
‘ ‘^ Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms o f Defense (Madison, CT : International Universities 
Press, 1966), pp. 5. See also Sigmund Freud’s, Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the Ego (1921) 
and The Ego and the Id  (1927). For a helpful summary see “Sigmund Freud,” in The Encyclopedia o f 
Philosophy, Vol. Ill (New York: Macmillan, 1967).
^^^RPCF, p. 57.
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the fear is of being overwhelmed or annihilated, but it cannot be grasped 
analytically.
Neurosis, therefore, is a crisis of volition or the inability to choose freely for a reality that is not 
determined by these potential threats.
The theme of relationality stands at the center of Loder’s interest in the correlation between a 
theological understanding of religious consciousness and the way the psychoanalytic tradition has 
approached the consciousness of the person who claims to be religious. Loder’s goal “is to work 
toward a sounder integration between theoretical points of view in the fields of religion and 
psychiatry.”’^ * He credits an observation by Hofmann as the impetus to his own work. “[In] the 
study of the interplay between religion and mental health . . . new inquiries must be as diligent as 
possible. Half-truths, undue generalizations and pre-mature syntheses have already confused the 
picture all too much. They lead only to further hiding from real issues.”’*'’ By integration of the 
fields of religion and psychiatry Loder does not mean synthesis. He is not trying to create a new 
field by reducing one field of theory into another, or absorbing theoretical frameworks, posing the 
threat of reductionism. Suggestive of the personalist tradition, Loder sees the connection between 
two distinct fields as occurring in between them, when the two fields remain intact and are engaged 
or encountered in a dialectic that maintains the integrity if each. Throughout the thesis Loder 
develops a methodology that paves the way for later interdisciplinary work, producing a bi-polar 
structure that maintains the “consistent distinctions”of disparate fields which yields the mutual 
edification of each. He is not simply interested in comparisons or correlations, but seeking a 
methodology with the following conditions: “Avoidance of the reductionist approach; maintenance 
of the integrity of concepts as they are employed in both disciplines; establishment of a continuity of 
meaning across the boundaries of the respective disciplines; [and a] mutual deepening of insight in
’*’Sigmund Freud, The Future o f an Illusion. Translated by James Strachey (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1961) cited inRPCF, p. 65. Freud identified three forms of anxiety: reality anxiety, 
instinctual anxiety, and moral anxiety. Each one is produced by a crisis of choice, the inability of the ego 
make decisions with freedom.
’** “Analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patient’s 
ego freedom to decide one way or the other.” Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, cited in RPCF, pp. 58- 
59.
’**ARC, p. 1. “This thesis assumes on the one hand that in the last half-century psychiatric theory 
has achieved such pre-eminence that every serious theoretical study of human nature must take its 
insights into account. On the other hand, any sophisticated and profound system of human psychology 
has much to learn from an examination of religious self-understanding.”
p. 1.
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both disciplines as a result of the new continuities of meaning.”'** Even though attempts have been 
made to bridge these fields, very often perspectives that claim to value the integrity of religious 
experience actually reduce religious experience simply to one of many experiences intrinsic to 
human experience.'*^ This is particularly true when it comes to a psychological interpretations of 
religious experiences. While psychiatry sees as its goal as “the objectification of subjective 
knowledge,” understanding “private” religious experiences through a universal formula applicable to 
every individual is problematic.'** “Thus a scientific psychiatric understanding of religion incites the 
distrust of a believer because his religious self-understanding is thereby relegated to a level of 
thought which for him is totally inappropriate.”'** In the only review of RPCF, one commentator 
questioned this methodology, whether clinical observations could ever be used to evaluate “religious 
facts.”'*^  But this is a misreading of Loder’s intent.
Loder identifies a specific area of common concern to both Kierkegaard and Freud in the 
question of religious pathology. Pathology ensues from the failure to experience what Loder calls 
the “criterion consciousness,” a consciousness that both Kierkegaard and Freud understood as the 
sign of “health,” namely a state of “limited freedom,” specifically the freedom to choose to be one’s 
self. It is found to be “descriptive of consciousness in the states of ‘blessedness’ (Kierkegaard) and 
descriptive of consciousness in the ‘goal of psychoanalysis’ (Freud).” Which means for both Freud 
and Kierkegaard, pathological religion is found in a consciousness “in which [one’s] freedom is not
'**It is a problem of “maintaining a consistent distinction between the levels of understanding 
within each discipline as it bears upon the material to be studied,” of finding “levels of understanding 
in the respective fields which can be correlated without introducing ambiguities in conceptualization or 
terminology on either side.” NRC, pp. 6, 2.
'*®Loder sees reductionism at work in theorists who claim to value the authority of religious 
experience, but really do not. Cf. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (1947), and Psychoanalysis and 
Religion (1950), Otto Rank, The Myth o f the Birth o f the Hero (1952) and Theodore Reik, Mystery on 
the Mountain (1959) for approaches to religion within a Freudian or neo-Freudian understanding of 
human nature. Loder also puts Carl Jung’s work in this category, “Though he is careful to qualify his 
religious viewpoints, acknowledging that psychic reality may not be able fully to exhaust religious 
reality,” Loder claims, “he nevertheless undertakes to construct an archetypal system which so 
completely accounts for the origins of religious experience that religious realities are left with almost 
nothing to explain and very little intiinsic worth {NRC, p. 8 note).” Cf. Jung’s, Aion: Researches into 
the Phenomenology o f the Self trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1959] 1979), 
Psychology and Religion ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) and Answer to Job, trans. R. F. C. 
Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1958] 1973).
'**M(C, p. 12.
'**mC, p. 13.
'*''Jean-Piene Deconchy, Archives de Sociologie des Religions, 13 (1968): 211-212. Deconchy 
refers to RRPCF as a “brilliant and striking book.”
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able to be realized.” When viewed from the perspective of the criterional consciousness, both 
Kierkegaard and Freud “agree that a great portion of religious consciousness is in fact 
pathological.”'*® It is pathological, even toxic, because it hinders the ability to embrace reality in all 
its brutality and beauty. Religious experiences were deemed neurotic by Freud because they lead to 
“an avoidance of external reality” and serve as “substitute for reality.”'*' The Christian faith is a 
“neurotic formation” because it “both avoids reality and substitutes a phantasy in its place.”'** In his 
estimation, it is the church that most profoundly contributes to this “neurotic formation” because it 
hinders freedom.
In The Future o f an Illusion, Freud categorically considered all religion as neurotic.'** 
Drawing upon the anthropological and evolutionary theory of his time, combined with his 
understanding of neurosis, Freud surmised that “religion could offer no phenomenon, express no 
idea, advocate no point of view, without being placed in the framework of [his] views of the origins 
and manifestations of neurosis.”'*'' Freud put forth his theories on the neurotic origins of religious 
experience in two essays, “Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices” and “Leonardo Da Vinci and 
Memory of His Childhood,” as well as Totem and Taboo, Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the 
Ego, The Future o f an Illusion, and Moses and Monotheism
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud affords his analysis of the Christian religion as a neurotic 
alleviation of guilt. Freud saw a sense of guilt as deriving from an overbearing super-ego working 
out its Oedipal drives. The super ego was given the personal form of the Father God. Demands 




'**Freud, Future o f an Illusion: “Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of 
humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it rose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the 
relation to the father. If this view is right, it is to be supposed that a tuming-away from religion is bound
to occur with the fatal inevitability of a process of growth (p. 43)” “Thus we call a belief an illusion
when a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations 
to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification (p. 31).” Freud understood his work as 
a fierce critique of Christianity. See Adam Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored: 
Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 
117-118. On Freud’s contributions to a more critical appreciation of religion see Philip Rieff, The 
Triumph o f the Therapeutic: Use o f Faith After Freud (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
'*"mC, p. 399.
'**0n Freud and his relation with his Jewish roots see David Bakan, Sigmund Freud and the 
Jewish Mystical Tradition (London: Free Association Books, 1990).
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obsessional neurotic.”'*® The believer lives before an Evaluative image, namely a projected image of
God. Religious experience finds it origin in an overbearing super-ego making demands impossible to
realize, thus always living with the fear and guilt that comes with not pleasing God. Freud sees in
Paul of Tarsus, for example, as one weighed down by neurotic guilt, which can be traced back to its
primeval source, which he termed “original sin.” It was a crime against God that could only be
expiated through death. Freud writes:
In reality this crime, deserving of death, could have been the murder of the Father 
who later was deified. The murderous deed itself, however, was not remembered, in 
its place stood the phantasy of expiation and that is why this phantasy could be 
welcomed in the form of a gospel of salvation (evangel). A Son of God, innocent 
himself, had sacrificed himself, and had thereby taken over the guilt of the world. It 
had to be a Son, for the sin had been murder of the Father.'**
One is “made a Christian,” writes Loder, “as a result of his inherited primal history which is 
reactivated in his unconscious phantasy life, expressed in his own Oedipal situation, and projected 
tlirough appropriate images by the forces of the primary process into a religious interpretation of his 
conscious experience.”'** Thus, Freud writes, “The Mosaic religion had been a Father religion; 
Christianity became a Son religion. The Old God, the Father, took second place; Christ, the son, 
stood in His stead, just as in those dark times every son had longed to do.”'*®
The neurotic religious experience is reinforced by the religious communities. The demands 
of the Father God are strengthened by “group religious behavior,” thus “corporate support tends to 
entrench the neurotic pattern of religious behavior by giving it a socially acceptable status.” The 
believer’s neurosis can thus be sanctioned by society, like the church, hindering one’s ability to be 
“educated to reality.” '''®
Although both Freud and Kierkegaard identified pathology (in varying degrees) in all 
religious experiences, Kierkegaard nevertheless saw the tension caused by pathological expressions 
as a means towards which the criterion can be reached.'*" Loder sees a correlation between 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of psychological illness and Freud’s understanding of religious
136'ARC, p. 393.
137i*ARC, pp. 395-400. Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 109-110.
'**ARC, p. 401. 
**®Freud, p. 111. 
'''®ARC, p. 394. 
''"ARC, pp. 4-5.
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pathology in “a clear-cut functional analogy between Kierkegaard’s understanding of dread and 
despair and Freud’s understanding of neurosis.”’''*
Kierkegaard understood dread and despair as distortions of consciousness. “Dread” is the 
English translation of the German Angst, the same word that Freud defined as “anxiety.” Dread or 
anxiety, says Kierkegaard, is “the characteristic ambiguity of psychology.” This “anxiety is really 
the discrimen (ambiguity) of subjectivity.” It is a “sweet feeling of apprehension” that extends, 
deepens, and darkens in the development of personality.’''* Dread or anxiety is experienced in 
periods of tension, either momentary or prolonged, “between the image of the spirit and the denial of 
the spirit.” By “spirit” Kierkegaard means personality or the self.’'''' “In itself,” Loder writes, “dread 
does not represent a disorganization of the personality or a disassembling of the elements of freedom. 
Rather, it is the state of ambiguity that precedes, and perhaps hastens, but does not persist in 
disorganization of the spirit and the downfall of freedom. It is, in essence, indicative that the spirit 
cannot be itself.”''* Thus, “all dread is deficient freedom.” And yet one cannot be free until one 
realizes one’s own state of guilt. “Guilt has an ultimacy in that it vividly exposes the mayhem of 
radical freedom and eliminates escapism,” because awareness of guilt is known through one’s 
relationship with God. The spirit cannot be itself until it comes to see itself relationally. Until that 
point one remains in despair.
There are two kinds of despair and one form that is not appropriately called “despair.” The 
last form Kierkegaard describes is the despair as “not being conscious of having a self.” This is the 
life of the Aesthetic individual, living “without being thoroughly conscious that they are spiritual 
beings.”’''® And the possibility of freedom is remote because one cannot be free separated from one’s 
self. Thus, Kierkegaard believes despair is “not willing to be oneself.” It is a willful denial and 
refusal to be a self or desiring to be other than oneself. The self is alienated from itself. The 
strongest form of despair is when the self is openly defiant in its determination to be a self unto itself. 
“The self,” writes Kierkegaard, “wants to enjoy the entire satisfaction of making itself into itself, of
'''*ARC, p. 418.
'‘'*S0ren Kierkegaard, The ConceptofAnxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation 
on the Dogmatic Issue ofHereditary Sin, Edited and Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Reidar 
Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 14ff, 197; and The Sickness Unto Death: A 
Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, Edited and Translated by Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); NRC, pp. 419ff. RPCF, pp. 
37ff.
'‘'''r/îe Sickness Unto Death, p. 13. 
p. 39.
146Sickness Unto Death, p. 23.
i
Sickness Unto Death, pp. 49-67.
"^Despair is “a disrelation in a relation which relates itself to its own self and is constituted by 
another, so that the dis-relationship in that self-relationship reflect itself infinitely in the relation to the 





developing itself, of being itself; it wants to have the honor of this poetical, this masterly plan 
according to which it has understood itself. And yet in the last resort it is a riddle how it understands 
itself; just when it seems to be nearest to having the fabric finished it can arbitrarily resolve the 
whole thing into nothing.” This is the despair of weakness.’*'*
Consequently, all forms of despair find their origins in the disrelation of the self.’*'* The self |
cannot be itself through persistence, determination, and stifling self-reflection. This, too, leads to \
despair. When the self cannot find a power at its foundation to define itself and maintain a sense of I
identity over time, the self continually re-imagines itself infinitely, “devastating old self images and j
arbitrarily conjuring up new ones.”’*'® These images perceived through infinite self-reflection as j
products of the self ungrounded produces further despairs, steals the possibility of freedom, and j
results in living in a false reality, a state of denial not unlike Freud’s description of the neurotic. |
Both Kierkegaard and Freud point to a dynamic within the self, a “compulsion to self-destruction” 
driven by an ego that is bent on strategies of avoidance - avoiding itself (including a consciousness of 
one’s self-destructive capacities), the nature of the world and one’s relationship to it, and for 
Kierkegaard, avoiding the experience of God in Jesus Christ who alone has the power to relationally 
ground the self.’*® According to Freud, all religious experiences are manifestations of the “sickness 
unto death,” even as for Kierkegaard are most forms of existence, including some religious 
expressions.’*’ For Freud, a pathological consciousness hinders one’s ability to live criterionally.
For Kierkegaard, criterional consciousness could be achieved by deepening the severity of the 
pathology, by entering and suffering through the despair, encountering one’s alienation within the 
disrelation even as the self is redefined through the relationship with the God-man, Jesus Christ. So 
that by entering into the delusion, by heightening the inherent tension or conflict within the self, one 
can actually move closer to freedom. That is, providing the One in whose presence the tension is 
experienced is the One who is the embodiment of freedom, namely the God-man,
For Kierkegaard, “the resolution of pathological religiousness. . .centers around the 
imposition of the image of the God-man.” This is a “delusion of the infinite,” but only thiough the 
delusion can one aspire to encounter the God-Man. There are many interpretations of the God-man
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theme in Kierkegaard, but “none of them,” Loder suggests, “brings the God-man into line with
Kierkegaard’s central concern, which was to understand the ‘how’ of the proclamation, and with his
basic epistemological points of view.”'** Kierkegaard wrote:
. . .my thesis is not that what is . . .proclaimed in official Christianity ought not to be 
regarded as Christian. No, my thesis is that proclamation in itself is not Christianity.
What I am concerned about is the “how,” that personal enforcement of the 
proclamation: Without that Christianity is not Christianity.'**
Only through an encounter with - not an understanding o f - the God-man, the Absolute Paradox, can
one move thi ough the pathology and personally know the “how” of the Chi'istian experience. Given
in a “Moment,” the God-man is bestowed. “He ceases to be what the understanding took Him to be;
He ceases to be merely an obsessive thought and becomes significant for the individual himself.”'**'
Kierkegaard explains the encounter in this way:
There is something which makes it impossible for one to desist from looking -  and 
lo! while one looks, one sees as in a mirror, one gets to see oneself, or He, the sign 
of contradiction, sees into the depths of one’s heart while one is gazing into the ■ 
contradiction. A contradiction placed directly in front of a man -  if only one can get 
him to look upon it -  is a mirror; while he is judging, what dwells within him must 
be revealed.'**
The encounter with the Paradox heightens the tension of the self and exposes the disrelation within 
itself and its own alienation from the Paradox. The Moment is a time of contradiction in which one 
“sees” the Paradox and through the reflection of one’s self in relation to the Paradox, one’s whole 
being is called into question even as it is liberated.
What is bestowed in the moment is a self free from guilt and free to be authentically oneself 
in and through the relationship with the Paradox. There is joy and there is relief from the despair of 
the misrelation within itself. “The individual emerges from the Moment,” Loder explains, “in the 
conviction that the God-man is a sign of contradiction, but a sign which has very special meaning for
'**ARC, p. 433.
'**ARC, p. 18. The quotation comes from Kierkegaard’s Papirer, x.2, translated in Heimann 
Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic o f Existence, trans. H. Knight (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. 
145.
'**'ARC, p. 435. For reference to “the Moment” see Seren Kierkegaard, Philosophical 
Fragments! Johannes Climacus, Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna FI. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 14-15, 20-22, 51-52.
'**NRC, p. 436. Philosophical Fragments.
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him. . . .The result of this bestowal of the image of the God-man is freedom; the Knight of Faith is 
free by virtue of the Paradox.”’*®
Of primary concern to Loder is understanding the change that takes place in the religious 
personality, when “one’s consciousness is transformed from a pathological state into a criterional 
one.”’** Drawing upon Herbert Silberer’s (1882-1922) work on the power of images to integrate and 
reorder reality through what he called hypnagogic phenomena, Loder shows that there is a 
“hypnagogic paradigm” at work in individuals who have experienced transformation.'** Silberer’s 
work established how an image has the ability to reorder reality, most notably during dream states or 
in the somnolent state just prior to sleep. He identified an independent psychic process whereby the 
contents of consciousness can be symbolically modified during sleep. Relying upon Silberer’s 
phenomenology, Loder speaks of “the power of an image to integrate forces and create a primary 
locus of reality.” One’s consciousness of reality or “reality consciousness” is contingent upon one’s 
relationship to an image, the “artificer of consciousness.” Silberer has taken such a moment and 
described a sequence, as if in “slow motion,” a general pattern of the paradigm moving through a 
five-step sequence: “endopsychic conflict; a moment of belief in an ‘image;’ resolution of the |
conflict; bestowal of the criterional state of consciousness; anagogic analysis of the image |
present.”’*® According to Loder, this sequence describes Kierkegaard’s account of his conversion by |
the God-man, as well as the “reconstructive and converting phantasies” that Freud explored in his 
writings.’®® Freud also drew upon Silberer’s research and knew the power of the hypnagogic J
’*®ARC, p. 440. The knight of faith reference is from Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. “For 
consciousness to attain a belief in the God-man, which is based upon an imaginary representation and 
which at the same time effects the ‘condition’ of the individual, the God-man must be a composite image 
combining conflictual elements in a resolution of intellectual conflict and simultaneously releasing the 
tension of the conflict between modes.(p. 441)”
’**ARC, pp. 30-31
’**Herbert Silberer was a Viennese psychoanalyst who had a profound impact upon Freud. The 
hypnagogic paradigm is explored in “Report Regarding a Method That Allows Provoking and Observing 
Certain Manifestations of Symbolical Hallucinations,” (1909) and Der Traum: Einjuhrung in die 
Traumpsychologie (Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, 1919). In The Problems o f Mysticism and Its 
Symbolism (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1917), Silberer sought to make a correspondence 
between psychoanalysis and alchemy, a work that shaped Jung’s interest in alchemy and the dynamics 
of psychic change.
’*®ARC, p. 5; RPCF, pp. 178ff. As we will see, Loder’s use of this sequence foreshadows his 
theory of “convictional knowing,” which he begins to explore more fully after 1970 and emerges with 




paradigm (operating through visions, dreams, phantasies) as “capable of transforming consciousness
and restoring it to a criterional status.”'®'
Loder uses Freud’s analysis of “Little Hans,” as a case in point.'®* In this well-known study,
a young neurotic boy was able to formulate fantasies to free him from his neurosis. However, Freud
never viewed these psychic experiences as being specifically religious. The paradigms had the
potential to yield freedom for the neurotic sufferer. Both Kierkegaard’s encounter with the image of
the God-man and the fantasies of Little Hans have a striking similarity in their ability to produce
freedom. Freud’s presumptions about religion hindered him from realizing the correlation. Yet the
power of the paradigm to reorient reality and pave the way for sanity and health, producing a
consciousness that could be described as a “new birth” is explicitly religious and exactly the kind of
experience one encounters in the Christian life, namely transformation.'®* In The Future o f an
Illusion, we see Freud’s objective to provide an “education to reality” as an alternative to the ill-
effects of religious training - ill, because religious education leads to a distortion of reality. C.
Daniel Batson correctly see Loder’s objective is to correct this by, “attempting to explore creative
religious thought which is also ‘education to reality’ in a more profound but no less pragmatic sense
than Freud’s realist assumption can recognize.”'®"’
In Loder’s estimation, correlations can be made between theology and psychiatiy and those
connections can be made in the most unlikely places. He, thus, draws these important conclusions:
In line with Kierkegaard’s interests in discovering the “how” of the proclamation, it 
is very probable that Freud, in calling attention to the transforming power of the 
phantasy according to the hypnagogic paradigm, has made a significant contribution 
to Kierkegaard’s desire to know “how” the proclamation is appropriated. The
importance of this particular contribution for Kierkegaard is that it names and
describes the particular psychic process which is involved in making the image of the 
God-man the object of faith. That is, Freud’s insights here extend Kierkegaard’s 
own understanding of the “how” of the proclamation, and they do so in a fashion 
which is completely in accordance with the criterion of human fi eedom upon which 
Freud and Kierkegaard both agree. Thus, on this point Freud is able to make a non­
reductionist contribution to the Kierkegaardian understanding of Christianity at the 
very crucial point of the transformation of consciousness into “freedom.”
On the other hand, Kierkegaard, by his very astute analysis of the phenomena of 
consciousness as it is altered by the image of the God-man, has described the
'®'ARC, p. 444; RPCF, p. 178ff. In The Interpretation o f Dreams, Freud relies heavily upon 
Silberer’s work. See especially, “Regard for Representability,” Chapter 6 (Part 2).
'®*Cf. Freud’s “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy” (1909).
'®*ARC, p. 34.
'®"'C. Daniel Batson, “Creativity and Religious Development: Toward a Structural/Functional 
Psychology of Religion,” Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, 1971, p. 85.
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especially religious significance of the composite image which conforms to the 
hypnagogic paradigm. Thus Kierkegaard has indicated that one of the most 
religiously significant insights of Freud has nothing explicitly to do with religion in 
Freud’s own writings. This insight is his understanding of how criterional 
consciousness may be restored by phantasy -  or perhaps even delusion or 
hallucination. This transformation process is “religious” on two accounts: (a) by 
virtue of how it may be used to convey to the individual the significance of the God- 
man, and (b) by virtue of its outcome which is to restore a criterional consciousness 
which may be given a distinctively religious interpretation, as in the wiitings of 
Kierkegaard.'®*
Loder thus brings his interest in “how” one becomes a Christian into dialogue with Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theories that account for change in such a way that does not reduce Chiistian 
experience to simply a work of the psyche under duress and strain.
The “how” is most important and at the center of the “how” is his firm belief, grounded in 
Loder’s own convictional experience, that, “When Christianity becomes a lived fact, it becomes a 
matter of psychic change and interpersonal engagement involving both language and thought.”'®® 
Part of the “how” is discerning the way human participation (as opposed to divine) participates in 
religious experience. Krister Stendahl sees the significance of Loder’s thesis in the way it 
“contributes to the fuller understanding of the extent of human participation in religious 
experience.”'®’ In the tradition of the personalists making a space to preserve the value of the self, of 
keeping human life human, Loder’s passion rests in his desire to grasp how human transformation 
occurs and the need to convey this to the wider Christian community. “If it were not for this power 
to change human life,” Loder asks, “surely the Christian faith and all its theological bastions would 
be little more than a shared fantasy which is compulsively rationalized century after century.”'®* His 
dissertation marks the beginning of a life-long desire “to penetiate more deeply into the nature of 
human change in the Christian experience.”'®® The insights he offers into the nature of human
'®*ARC, pp. 446-447.
'®®RPCF, p. 21. Anticipating the Pelagian charge, Loder writes, “As long as there is no necessary 
causal connection between what is done on a human level to reveal man to himself (at any stage in his 
development) and the action of Divine Grace, Pelagianism is not a problem, (p. 21)”
'®’Krister Stendahl, “Summaries of Doctoral Dissertations,” Harvard Theological Review, 57 
(1963): 89.
'®*RPCF, p. 20. “It would not even be a ‘healthy’ utopianism, since it would not fall on the near 
side of the horizon of ‘normalcy.’ As an illustration of the importance of structural change, note that it 
was precisely because of Freud’s success in changing the structure of psychic functioning through 
psychoanalytic tecliniqiies that he could denounce other methods which claimed the same ability and, 
in particular, deride the Christian church for perpetuating a ‘mass neurosis’, (p. 20)”
'®®RPCF, p. 24.
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change are tremendously significant in shaping the way we theologically reflect upon the Christian 
life, as well as the way we approach the entire discipline of theology. Thus we conclude this section 
with Loder’s powerfully discerning statement that summarizes where we have been and establishes a 
horizon toward which we must now move:
If the concrete claim that Christianity makes for human society is the ability to 
change human life, it is not the integrity of theology that needs further elaboration, 
but rather it is the integrity of human change that needs closer scrutiny and more 
penetrating insight. It cannot merely be said that the kind of change which is 
uniquely Christian is that which enables one to assert and maintain the tenets of 
Christian theology. This would be to say that the integrity of Christian change lies in 
the verbal assertions that were made after the change took place, which is to place 
the entire burden for defining the integrity of the change upon the integrity of 
theology. But theology cannot bear this burden because the integiity of theology 
itself is sui generis, and as such it has no autonomy different from any other 
elaborate rationalization of a belief or shared opinion that is held and defended a 
priori. It must, rather, be maintained that theological assertions are expressive of 
psychological events just as definitely - though in a different way - as they are 
descriptive of the nature of the Godhead and supernatural events. One is able to 
make theological affirmations because of changes that have been wi'ought in the 
, structure of his personality. Affinnations of any sort - theological included - are 
expressions primarily of the personality; only secondarily do they express the 
supernatural truth which in theological circles sets everyone’s curiosity at rest."®
III. Return to Princeton; Conflict and Transformation
After graduating from Harvard University, Loder was called to Princeton Theological 
Seminary in 1962 to teach the core courses in Christian education - psychology, philosophy of 
education, and socio-cultural foundations of education. When Loder told Hofmann that he was 
going into the field of Christian education, he replied, “Well, you can do something for that field.”" ' 
Teaching Christian education had a tremendous appeal because it allowed Loder to teach almost 
“anything and everything in the seminary.” “It takes in the whole thing,” he said, because “education 
requires you to come from all these different perspectives - theological, philosophical, psychological, 
social, cultural.” Christian education was “a wonderful place to be having been trained in 
interdisciplinary studies.” When he arrived, not much had changed in the philosophy of Cliristian 
education from when he first entered Princeton. It was still very “sloppy” as he put it, “They dealt 
with analogies or some kind of vague similarities, and that really bothered me intellectually.”"* A 
philosophy of Christian education had to be firmly grounded in the wider context of practical 
theology and practical theology must be very clear about what he later called “the generative core
'*®RPCF, pp. 20-21.
'"Wright transcription, April 2001. 
'"Wright transcription, April 2001.
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issue of the discipline.”"* For almost forty years, Loder unfolded a practical theology, as Wright
describes and I would concur, “of extraordinary interdisciplinary breadth and convictional depth.”'"
By “the whole thing,” Loder meant comprehending the totality of human experience
encountering and responding to the totality of the Gospel. This is the generative core discipline of
practical theology. Issues relating to “pastoral practices, educational programs, organizational
dynamics or how to conduct the spiritual life of congregations,” are often identified as basic areas of
concern, but not for Loder. These issues can only be addressed:
...out of the core problematic that underlies them and indicates in ultimate terms why 
these proximate issues persistently reappear with perennial regularity. The core 
problematic is that such issues require that two ontologically distinct realities, the 
divine and the human, be brought together in a unified form o f action that preserves 
the integrity o f both and yet gives rise to coherent behavior. This paradoxical 
problematic implies that God’s action and human action, although ontologically 
distinct, are not ultimately dichotomous. Moreover, it implies that anyone 
fonnulating such a coherence for practical theology must at the same time find that 
coherence to be profoundly self-involving.'’*
Although this summary of the problematic was written towards the end of his professional career, his 
methodology is analogous to that used in his doctoral dissertation. Loder’s project is an extension 
and a deepening of the problematic that Brunner faced with Barth."® God’s actions and humanity’s 
actions must remain ontologically distinct. Yet, that there is a connection must be affirmed. The 
task at hand is finding the methodological framework or conceptualization that is able to apprehend
‘’*Loder, “The Place of Science in Practical Theology: The Human Factor,” p. 22. See also his 
entry, “Praktisch-theologisch,” in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwortenbuch fiir 
Theologie und Religionwissenschaft. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bemd Janowski, Eberhard 
Jüngel, editors. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), pp. 498-499.
"''Wright, “Ruination Unto Redemption,” p. 79.
"*Loder, p. 22-23. Italics in the text. See also Loder, “Normativity and Context in Practical 
Theology: ‘The Interdisciplinary Issue,”’ Friedrich Schweitzer and Johannes A. Van der Ven, editors. 
Practical Theology: International Perspectives. New York: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 359ff.
'’®In modern theology the problematic goes back to Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre, second 
edition, trans. H. R. Mackintosh (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976). Schleieimacher was the first to 
develop a “theology of the subject,” a practical theology, in contrast to dogmatics, and helped establish 
a Protestant chair in the field at the University of Berlin in 1821. The first practical theologian was C. 
I. Nitzsch (1787-1868), a student of Schleiermacher, defined practical theology as “the theory of the 
church’s practice of Chiistianity.” See Ray S. Anderson, The Shape o f Practical Theology: Empowering 
Ministry with Theological Praxis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), pp. 24ff. 
Schleiermacher’s proposals were never implemented. Practical theology became increasingly a 
functional discipline for training persons in the techniques required for the pastoral office. James W. 
Fowler, “Practical Theology and Theological Education: Some Models and Questions,” Theology Today, 
42 (1985): 43-45.
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(not fully comprehend) the relation between the two. Thus, it can be said that practical theology is 
primarily a theology of action.
How does one account for the change that occurs in the Christian experience? The dynamics 
of transformation as identified in Freud and Kierkegaard are brought into sharp relief with the 
prevailing sociological theories of human action. One of the most comprehensive attempts to 
apprehend human agency was put forth by the American sociologist, Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), 
whose writings continue to have a commanding hold over social theorists. Beginning at Harvard and 
continuing throughout his years at Princeton, Loder developed what he called a “neo-Parsonian 
action theory,” based on a dialectical relation of transformation and socialization. This theoi-y, 
informed by Kierkegaard, acted as a kind of continuo throughout Loder’s oeuvre, a kind of 
foundational principle that eventually culminates, as we shall see, in his understanding of the 
analogia spiritus that stands at the heart of practical theology and the Christian life."’ We will 
explore the more mature expression of this theory of the analogia spiritus in the next chapter, but the 
groundwork for that discussion needs to be offered here.
Talcott Parsons was a child of the manse who was both fascinated and troubled by the 
dominance religion can have over one’s life. His father, Edward Smith Parsons (1863-1943) was an 
“active predestinarian,” a Congregationalist minister with a social-gospel orientation who understood 
the Christian faith as having a lead role in the improvement of society. Yet, he believed that the 
church as a human institution was “shackled by the inherent conservatism of human nature,” and an 
obstructive force in the path of human progress. He hoped for a day when the church would be “the 
inspirer of all life,” rather than “the controller of life.”"* Talcott was bom in a later phase of his 
father’s intellectual life in which he moved from, using a Niebuhrian model, a Christ the Transformer 
of Culture approach to a Christ of Culture, a move that was contra-sectarian and individualistic to a 
more secular, cultural expression of the Christian faith."® To be a Christian means to be a follower 
of Jesus’ teachings, living out principles that can be taught and applied at the personal, familial, and 
national levels.'*® Taking a more accommodative approach, the church and its teachings exist to 
seiwe society.
From Edward S. Parsons, “A Christian Critique of Socialism,” Andover Review, XI (1889) 
quoted in Bruce C. Werner, The Theory and Scholarship o f Talcott Parsons to 1951: A Critical 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 12ff.
'’®H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1951).
'*®Cf. Edward Smith Parsons, The Social Message o f Jesus (1912) cited in Werner, pp. 16ff.
" ’Wright, “Ruination Unto Redemption,” p. 78. ■
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It is from this religious framework that Talcott began to explore the way human societies are 
ordered and maintained. Parsons read the institutional economist Walton Hamilton, studied with the 
social anthropologist Bromislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) at the London School of Economics. At 
the University of Heidelberg, he came under the influence of Max Weber (1864-1920), whom he 
viewed primarily as a social theorist (as seen in Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f 
Capitalism) and he weighed the economic theories of Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) and Vilfredo 
Pareto (1846-1923. All of these influences converged in the publication of The Structure o f Social 
Action (1937), that put forth a theory of socioeconomic order which sought to explain how capitalism 
and free enterprise functioned in the modem world. The organizing structures endemic to his 
socioeconomic theory, he believed, could be transposed to all systems that seek to control, regulate 
and maintain action, an extension that eventually led to the publication of Toward a General Theory 
o f Action (1951). Both of these volumes shaped sociological theorizing for decades.'*' Indeed, John 
Milbank detects most contemporary leaders in the field of the sociology of religion, for example 
Clifford Geertz, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Robert Bellah, and Niklas Luhmann are 
fundamentally followers of Parsons, even when that connection is denied.'**
A follower of Parsons sees the wisdom of understanding all systems through the filter of his 
“sti'uctural-functional theory.” He identified structural components inherent to various organizing 
systems of society. All living systems - from the micro to the macro, from the biological to cultural 
systems - organize themselves in order maintain intrinsic levels of functioning and to meet 
adaptational needs provided by the larger organizing structure. In all system actors move toward the 
realization of specifics and that movement is reinforced through feedback given by the wider 
organizing system seeking to integrate the actor into its scheme. Assimilation, accommodation, 
habit, adaption are patterns of socialization. Similar to Freud’s understanding of the Id as being pure 
energy which needs to be control by the ego. Super Ego and conscience. Parsons and other social 
theorists like him maintain, as Milbank puts it, a “management of force.” The primary goal of 
socialization is stabilization.
When applied to the way religious ideas and communities function, religion is understood as 
“components of the protected human sphere.” Religion and religious systems are human constructs
^^^Toward a General Theory o f Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951); Social 
Systems and the Evolution o f Action Theory (New York: Free Press, 1977).
'**John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990), p. 106. Forty years before Milbank, Loder was writing about the dangers of socialization and 
offering a critique of social theories with regard to theological reflection. Loder’s critique was basically 
ignored and went unheeded. For example, an utilitarian approach to religion can be seen in the titles of 
Luhmann’s works, Funktion der Religion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977) and Religiose Dogmatik 
und gesellschaftliche Funktion (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1984). See also Karl Wilhelm Dahm, 
Religion System und Sozialisation (Luchterhand, 1972).
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that are useful to society as a whole because of the way they reinforce social norms, “legitimizing
and sacralizing common conventions.”'** For example, in Human Society, Kingsley Davis quite
explicitly defines the value of religion in functional terms:
Religion, then, does four things that help to maintain the dominance of sentiment 
over organic desire, or group ends over private interest. First it offers, though its 
system of supernatural belief, an explanation of primary group ends and a 
justification of their primacy. Second it provides, through its collective ritual, a 
means for the constant renewal of common sentiments. Third it furnishes, through its 
sacred objects, a concrete reference for the values and a rallying point for all persons 
who share the same values. Fourth it provides an unlimited and in superable source 
of rewards for good conduct, punishments for bad. In these ways religion makes a 
unique and indispensable contribution to social integration.'"
This statement is a perfect example of the kind of reductionistic approach common in psychological
and sociological circles, the kind of response that Loder wants to resists at all costs. Just about
everything within the Parsonian action theory is understood and its value judged based upon its
functionality.
Recently, Milbank has vehemently critiqued this approach when its comes to grasping and 
evaluating theological claims and church practice, proposing that a sociologist might say, “A 
function of the Eucharist is to bind together the disparate elements of the Christian community.”'**
This is ti'ue -  to an extent because it does not exhaust what occurs in the Eucharist. Further 
explicating Milbank’s example, Loder writes, “ . .  .since this explains a phenomenon in terms of what 
it is and does, it not only verges on tautology, but it reduces an essentially theological reality to a 
universalizing abstraction doing violence to the intrinsic significance of the event.” '*® Milbank 
would like to free all theological considerations from its often uncritical influence from and reliance 
upon sociocultural theories. Loder prefers to take a different approach. He respects the work of 
Parsons and aclaiowledges the invaluable insights into the dynamics of human nature provided by 
social science theorists. Given his interdisciplinary methodc#y, Loder brings his own understanding /  
of the way transformations occur in human life (particularly of a religious nature) and brings them 
into a creative tension with Parsons’ theories. “Theological reflection needs, then, to negate this 
negation [i. e. - reductionistic approaches negating or “doing violence” to the intrinsic value of 
religious events and experiences], and reappropriate functionalist insights so they can contribute to
'**Millbank, pp. 3ff, 108.
'*‘'Kingsley David, Human Society (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 529 quoted 
in James E. Loder, “Sociocultural Foundations for Christian Education,” in Marvin J. Taylor, ed.. An 
Introduction to Christian Education (Nashville; Abingdon Press, 1966), p. 79.
'**Milbank, p. 108.
‘*®Loder, “Normativity and Context in Practical Theology,” p. 377, note 12.
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the communion creating presence of Jesus Christ, whereby, the Eucharistie bond created is
preeminently in the Eucharist, and only secondarily in the sociology of the situation. Theology
retains an asymmeti'ical bipolar relation to relevant social science understandings as transformed for
an interpretation of the Eucharist.”'*’
From Coder’s viewpoint, the “overall aim of the [Parsonian] system is tension-reduction and
pattera-maintenance.” He continues;
Thus, for any intentional act the system as a whole impinging implicitly upon that 
act will work to incorporate what is done into the overall inertial system. As the 
system moves through time, it develops cracks and ruptures which have to be 
repaired. Problem-solving repairs but does not alter the fundamental forces at work 
to preserve the system or the inevitable decline and death of the system as a whole.'**
'*’Loder, p. 377, note 12. 
'**Loder, p. 379, Appendix I.
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p. 381
See Appendix 2 in “Variations on a Theme or Transformation in Multiple Contexts,” Loder,
An overemphasis upon the drive of socialization ignores the fact that reality is so much larger than 
any systemic attempt to define it. At all levels of life, “cracks and ruptures,” appear within the 
system. In order to preserve itself, the system uses its resources to repair and heal, even as it 
anticipates and fights off potential threats. Yet, all the problem-solving in the world, all the energy 
expeiided to hold the system together is not strong enough to prevent breakdowns within the system 
or more significantly from a theological perspective, cannot withstand an inbreaking from outside 
the system.
Coder’s Neo-Parsonian model acknowledges the formative influence of socialization But it is 
not the only influence. Socialization as a natural force cannot be denied; but socialization cannot 
serve as a substitute for what he sees as a “counterforce” to socialization, namely transformation. |
The process of socialization has to be recognized for what it is and what it is not. He emphasizes |
transformation not in sharp contrast with socialization, in order to demonstrate that socialization is I
not the only action theory. “Transformation takes places in all basic spheres of action,” Loder j
argued, “and it exposes the evidence that a deeper intelligibility underlies the system, but it is not j
usually released except through a transformational process.” Just as Parsons and others have I
described socialization occurring at all levels of reality - biology, personality, society, culture - so, |
too, Loder maintains, there are patterns of transformation at work.'*® I
When does transformation occur? “Whenever, within a given frame of reference or 
experience, hidden orders of coherence and meaning emerge to replace or alter the axioms of the
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given frame and reorder its elements accordingly.”'®® A sociocultural approach to reality might be 
helpful in articulating the “how” on other levels of action, but the same theories cannot completely 
account for the “how” of religious experience, particularly the Christian experience^ that gives 
witness to the action of God through Jesus Christ.'®' The reason why this needs to be stressed is 
because, and this is a key point, transformation ’‘within the field o f human action prefigure and 
point toward the work and mission o f the Holy Spirit which is to transform the field o f human action 
as a whole. ”'®* A sociocultural understanding of religion hinders the theological community and the 
worshiping community from embracing the core, constitutive component of the Christian life, 
namely fransformation.
Starting in the 1960's, the transfoiTnational paradigm was brought to bear upon a discipline 
that had been heavily and inordinately influenced by theories of socialization - Christian education. 
This preoccupied Coder’s thinking for most of the decade. In “Conflict Resolution in Christian 
Education,” and “Sociocultural Foundations for Christian Education,” Loder provides an analysis 
and a critique of the prevailing methodologies and foundational approaches used in teaching the 
faith.'®* In these two pieces, we find Loder beginning to form a theory of education that both 
incorporates his reading of Kierkegaard and explores the implications of the transformational pattern. 
Loder wants to move our understanding of religion away from the sociocultural perspective, which 
has been studied primarily through institutions which are, as systems, generally understood as 
“tension-reducing, pattern-maintaining” communities.'®"' He wants to get beyond Kingsley Davis’ 
functional understanding of religion by raising the question; “to what extent is religion an 
imaginative creation of corporate man functioning to meet only the tension-reduction needs of the 
sociocultural systems at large and to what extent is it actually formative of the core value system of a
'®®Loder, p. 380.
'®'“Conviction cannot finally be translated into public knowledge, and public knowledge, as such, 
cannot convict; or, as [Carol] Zaleski puts it, ‘a revelation is binging only if it binds.’” See Loder’s 
review of Zaleski’s, Otherworld Journeys: Accounts ofNear-Death Experience in Medieval and Modern 
Times (Oxford, 1987) in Theology Today 44 (1988); 528-529.
'®*Loder, p. 380. Emphasis added. These quotations come from a piece written in the late 
1990's, but the themes contained therein occupied Loder’s thinking more than thirty years earlier. Here 
we have the fullest articulation of these ideas. We will explore the transformational pattern more fully 
in the next chapter.
'®*Loder, “Conflict Resolution in Christian Faith,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LVII (1964), 
pp. 19-36; and “Sociocultural Foundations for Christian Education,” cf. footnote 171.
'®"'“Sociocultural Foundations for Christian Education,” p. 79.
59
given social order?”'®* Given all that we have seen within Loder’s writings, it is obvious that he does 
not want to limit the value of religion to its function. In fact, he suggests that the church “is not an 
effective socialization institution;” yet so often that is precisely how it chooses to operate, especially 
with regard to Christian education. The socializing goals of secular education cannot be applied to 
education in the church. When this occurs, as it has for the last fifty years or more in the American 
church, the results are disastrous. Loder writes:
. .  .the church educates as if it were a closed society within the social system at large, 
when in fact it is not. Persons are brought up through the church’s “school” and 
“promoted” into adult society where they “commune” on equal terms alongside 
adults. The series of actions concerned with communicant education amounts to a 
“rite of passage” which is empty because it usually does not, in any way that is 
significant to the young person, pass him from one status to another. The real rite of 
passage for the young person is his graduation from high school or college, his 
movement out of his family of origin, and his assumptions of adult social 
responsibility. The charade of education for upcoming communicants in the church 
is self-destructive because it does not move young persons out of the family of origin 
but rather into a different form of dependence upon the family, namely, upon the ' 
“family of God” and upon an institution which in turn is dependent upon family 
structures. 196
Loder is not suggesting that the “school” in the church be abandoned, but that the nature of Christian 
education be rethought in terms other than reinforcing patterns of socialization. In fact, this critique 
of socialization raises the question whether or not one can actually teach the Christian faith. “Surely 
. . .  the Christian faith is not something that can be learned, nor can it be induced through the process 
of redirecting the drives of a natural man as takes place in psychoanalytic practice. Faith is received 
by grace, and grace not only is not man’s to administer but it conforms man to that faith which is not 
of himself; it shapes him into the basic form of humanity, which is the man Jesus.” Which means 
that perhaps “the only valid education, then, is enrichment of the faith that has already been 
delivered.”'®’ But how is Cliristian faith delivered?
Alternatively, an educational theory that incorporates a transformational paradigm pays close 
attention to the cracks, ruptures, and breaks in human knowing because they contain the means 
through which a deeper intelligibility can be discerned, and thereby are potentially more significant 
in the way they encourage new creative expressions in all forms of knowledge, leading to 
experiences of profound conviction. “Educationally, creativity is generally fostered by placing a
'®*Loder, pp. 80-81. 
'®®Loder, pp. 82-81. 
'®’RPCF,p. 19.
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positive value upon stress and conflict,” Loder points out.'®* The continuous challenge of Christian 
education is “to bring the learner into confrontation with the existential dichotomies of human life for 
the sake of Christian conviction.”'®® A person is most fully alive and authentically oneself when 
thrown into moments of heightened being and tension, when the dichotomies are most pronounced. 
That is the moment when education can be most fruitful and where the Christian faith can be 
“learned,” or more correctly, experienced. This means that, in a way that reflects Hofmann (above), 
Loder believes “no community of believers should tolerate the assumption that ‘pattern maintenance’ 
is their raison d ’etre. The Christian solutions a man achieves for the crucial struggles of his personal 
life need to be repeatedly called into question.”*®® The church plays a crucial role of either cutting 
its people off from conflict or being comfortable with the level of existential confusion and doubt 
necessary for Christian faith and practice.
Conflict plays a pivotal role in Loder’s theology. If socialization involves a strategy of 
conflict-avoidance, then transformation cracks open the system in moments of conflict. When the 
church views itself as a socializing entity, which avoids conflicts and prefers “pattern maintenance,” 
then it runs the risk of not only devitalizing the church, but actually standing in the way of an 
individual’s appropriation of the faith. Loder asserts that, “Periodically the procedures of Christian 
education tend to obscure the persons who are trying to grow up within the ranks of the Church. The 
eiTor is that the very vitality of the human being which pushes him endlessly in search of new 
problems and novel solutions is scarcely ever considered as foundational to the Christian education 
enterprise.”*®' Christian education is more than just passing on information about Jesus, that is 
providing factual knowledge about the Christian life which enables one to function as a Christian in a 
worshiping community. The believer does not want to accumulate knowledge, but appropriate it.
'®*JamesE. Loder, inADictionary o f Religious Education.lohrxNl. Sutcliff, editor
(London: SCM Press, 1984), p. 102. This is done “by affmning that the inner life of fantasy and feeling 
may be a source of truth, by working in a context where there is no absolute human authority, by 
emphasizing complexity rather than simplicity except when simplicity genuinely masters a wide range 
of complexity (E=MC2), and finally by recognizing and accepting personal differences. The unique 
value of creativity for Christian education lies in its inherent potential for reflecting in human terms the 
nature and purpose of the on-going creative work of Christ’s Spirit, (p. 102)”
'®®James E. Loder, “Existentialism,” in Harper’s Encyclopedia o f Religious Education. Iris V. 
Cully & Kendig Brubaker Cully, general editors,(San Francisco: Haiper & Row, 1990), p. 242. “He 
becomes the One who first convicts by driving superficial human dilemmas to their depths in alienation 
from God, and then at the point of uttermost alienation he redeems the individual with a grace that 
transforms all human distortions into expressions of reconciling nature, (p. 242)”
*®°Loder, “Conflict Resolution in Chiistian Education,” p. 34.
*®'Loder, p. 19. See also Loder’s, “The Medium for the Message,” in John H. Westerhoff III, 
ed. A Colloquy on Christian Education (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1972), pp. 71-78. We will return 
to this in the last chapter.
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incorporate it into one’s life even as it define the nature of one’s life. Thus, Loder contends, that
those working in Christian education have;
with the best of misguided intentions, led the Christian man into attempts at growth 
which only strangle the true inclinations of his vitality. Ironically, we have done this 
like perverted lovers; in seeking to preserve and perpetuate, we have instead 
radically devitalized. To deepen the irony we have taken the crowning outgrowth of 
Christianity’s vitality - his willingness to work out the implications of his faith - and, 
tlii'ough gimmicks and stereotypes, made it the instrument for stifling his interest in 
the educational enterprise of the Church.*®*
To remedy this situation, Loder turns to his interdisciplinary work in the area of psychodynamics and 
theology, one of the first educational theorists to do so.
Drawing upon the work of Jesse Ziegler, Loder contends that “learning takes place through 
the resolution of conflict.”*®* Phenomenologically speaking, conflict can be experienced in different 
modalities (subjective, empirical, interpretative, moral), but Loder’s interest in Ziegler is not to 
explore the way conflict functions, but to explore the dynamics of conflict and resolution within an 
individual. The different modalities correspond to modalities of psychoanalytic theory. The Id 
would be predominate in the subjective; the Ego in its desire to test reality would be empirical; the 
Ego in self-observation predominates in the interpretative mode; and the Super-ego or Ego-ideal 
would predominate in the moral. Because, the “Id abhors a conflict in the way that nature abhors a 
vacuum,” the Id will push towards a resolution of the conflict. The drive towards resolution of the 
conflict is also dominant in the self. Conflicts that arise in any of these modalities continually seek 
resolution in one’s life. Sometimes the resolution to these conflicts are found in the Christian life, 
thiough Christian doctrine, apologetics, sermons, liturgy, even the writings of Scripture itself. But 
all resolutions to conflict, Loder argues, are tentative.
The task of the educator is to continually crack open the resolution and allow the conflict to 
push one to deeper levels of intelligibility. Another way of saying what Loder is proposing is to 
ensure that we live within the conflict and not be too quick to seek a resolution. “The teacher is 
engaged with whoever may be the learner - under whatever circumstances - in a deadly serious and 
sensitive business of pressing the Christian man to re-examine through all the modes of 
consciousness the resolution to conflict that his faith represents.”*®"' The Christian life, echoing 
Kierkegaard, consists of crisis and conflict, and that “from crisis to crisis a man’s relationship with
*®*Loder, p. 19.
*®*Loder, p. 20. See Jesse H. Ziegler, Psychology and the Teaching Church (New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1962).
*®"Loder, p. 36. By educator, Loder would include church school teachers, clergy, and seminary 
or divinity school professors.
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God must grow.” There can be no sense of arrival. “Arrival in faith is as illusory as arrival in 
maturity, . . . .”*®* Christian faith and the life that it expresses are not functional resolutions to 
existential and religious conflicts. The Cliristian life is a life of conflict that is continually being 
questioned through one’s encounter with truth as experienced in the presence of God. To encounter 
the Living God is to be thrown into conflict. “Sometimes,” Loder conjectured, “one must be thrown 
into such a confrontation. . . .”*°®
Loder argued the truth of this claim both intellectually and personally. Indeed, as I have 
argued, he made these intellectual claims because he first knew them personally. They flowed from 
his own experience of the conflictual element of the Chiistian life. We began with this chapter with 
his first convictional experience and so it seems fitting to end with the second one.
In the thirty-eighth year of Loder’s life he was thrown into an even greater conflict, more 
intense than the one he suffered as a student at Princeton. What he underwent that day and later 
came to realize from that experience shaped everything that Loder wrote for the rest of his life. It 
questioned the very core of his identity - his understanding of the Christian life, the power of God, 
what it means to be a professor of practical theology. One cannot begin to fathom the generative 
source of Loder’s output without grasping the significance of these convictional moments. The 1970 
event had an even more profound effect upon him. Therefore let us recount what happened.
On the 2"® September 1970, Loder left Princeton, New Jersey with his family on a trip to 
Quebec, Canada. As they were traveling north on the New York Thruway near Kingston, New York, 
they noticed a middle-aged woman standing near a disabled car, waving a white glove, looking for
*®*Loder, p. 34. Loder gives this example: “Let us suppose that for a certain person the Christian 
language and imagery may present a challenging fantasy in which he is able to see the resolution to the 
inner struggle of his life at his particular age. In the morning worship service he may be able to relax 
his ego boundaries for a calculated period of time and have pleasant mythical, musical, liturgical 
fantasies. Such a person in the early middle years may be momentarily strengthened in his sense of unity, 
and he may step out on Main Street [or “in the High Street”in the United Kingdom] in the sunlight of 
a Sunday noon in the happy belief that the Church community has renewed its consensual validation of 
his personal version of the Cliristian faith. The Church which permits this man to continue in his 
assumption fails him utterly. This good man will not have to go to hell to discover that he has been 
deceived. It will dawn upon him in the later middle years of his life when the weird system he has 
established between his personal effectiveness and the action of Christ in his life falls apart either in his 
work or in his love - or both. If in the face of the responsibilities of generativity with its threatening 
undertow, he can rush to the congregation of believers and be told that what he always assumed is still 
valid, he has not been helped but merely told the unholy lie that as a Chiistian man he can stop growing.
If he is told that he can presume upon some sort of Christian ‘arrival’ which enables him to slip into 




help. Loder turned off the road and noticed that she had a puncture.*®’ He got out his jack and 
proceeded to change the tire. Kneeling in front of the front fender he heard an “ear-splitting screech 
of brakes.” On the Thruway, a sixty-four-old-man had fallen asleep at the wheel, veered off the road 
and rammed into the back of the car Loder was fixing, which then teetered of the jack onto his chest. 
The force of the impact pushed Loder and the car that was on top of him, pinning him under the car. 
He screamed for help and the only person available to do anything was his wife, Arlene. A slight 
woman, Arlene placed her hands under the bumper and prayed, “In the name of Jesus Christ, in the 
name of Jesus Christ. . . .” She lost partial consciousness as she lifted the car enough for Loder to 
remove himself. She broke a vertebrae doing so but was not conscious of it at the time. His right 
thumb has been torn off at the first joint, five ribs were broken, and the left lung was bleeding
As Loder came up from under the car, he recounts, “a steady surge of life was rushing 
through me, carrying with it two solid assurances.” The first was an awareness of how much he 
loved all those around him, especially his family. The second was the knowledge that “this disaster 
had a purpose. He reassuringly repeated to his wife and children, “Don’t worry; this has a purpose.” 
Walking from the car to the side of the road, Loder tells us, “I never felt more conscious of the life 
that poured through me, nor more aware that this life was not my own. My well-being came from 
beyond my natural strength, . . .” Even though he was full of anger toward the driver that fell asleep 
at the wheel, “the most significant and memorable effect was not the pain, nor the anger, but the 
gracious nature of the life I was experiencing. . . .  To me, life was never in doubt because I was being 
lived, it seemed, by a life not my own. I was veiy much in my body, but life was pouring into me 
from a gracious source beyond the power of that accident to damage or destroy me.”*®*
At the hospital, it was the crucifixes in the lobby and the patients’ rooms that provided the 
greater source of strength and even as they helped to articulate his condition. The images became 
images that mirrored a sense of the agony of his condition, but also the presence of God’s love in the 
midst of the pain. “In that cruciform image of Christ,” Loder writes, “the combination of physical 
pain and the assurance of a life greater than death gave objective expression and meaning to the sense 
of promise and transcendence that lived within the midst of my suffering.” Here the image of Christ 
served as a hypnagogic vision or mirror that reoriented Loder’s reality and reconfigured the way he 
“understood” what he was facing. As he entered surgery to mend a bleeding lung, he said he “knew 
that the power of life from beyond me once again rushed into my body.” In the midst of his pain.
*®’For a full account see TTM, pp. Iff and TTM2, pp. 9ff. In a footnote Loder writes, “The 
Kingston paper carried a story about the following accident, calling me a ‘good Samaritan’ but I was 
quite unaccustomed to stopping, because in my view standardized procedures for getting help were 
already a differentiated version of the good Samaritan. Thus I started on this venture more out of alann 
and duty than out of any special compassion. (TTM2, p. 9)”
*®*T7M2, p. 11.
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Loder remembers and characterizes the nature of this power pouring through him. A significant 
awareness and insight very much in keeping with everything Loder had come to know about the Holy 
up to this point. He recalls, “..  .my sense was that the power was not impersonal, but was emanating 
from the center of Another’s awareness - an awareness that positively, even joyfully, intended my 
well-being. Even as I entertained that intuition, the physical pain decreased.”*®® Loder knew he was 
going to be alright and assured the hospital staff that this would be the case. He started to sing the 
hymn, “Fairest Lord Jesus.”*'® Slowly, his bluish skin started to turn pink, the bleeding in his lung 
has ceased. Skin grafts scheduled to repair the tears in his back were cancelled. The head surgeon 
said to him,” A good surgeon knows when to get out of the way and let God do the healing.”*"
Loder returned to Princeton, thrown into a conflict of immense proportions. For almost two 
years, he wrestled with what he experienced and tiled to make sense of it, both personally and 
intellectually. Part of him that wanted to forget everything that transpired. But that was difficult 
since daily he was reminded that he was missing a thumb. Loder knew that he had to be faithful to 
what he can come to know. This would not be easy.
This episode, in fact, raised countless new questions, disturbed several personal 
relationships, and forced me to reenvision the spiritual center of my vocation -  not 
an easy matter when one is already teaching in a theological seminary. It 
undoubtedly presented me with the reality to which I have had to be true and from 
which I have departed only with a keen sense of having violated my own soul. I had 
been and am convicted.*'*
His wife, Arlene, also pushed him to take the event seriously.*'* One early response was that he “had
to act on the growing internal necessity to identify myself with the ministry of the church.” For
reasons unknown he resisted ordination, but completed the process and was ordained in the
*®®r7M2, p. 12.
*‘®A hymn traced back to 1662 associated with the Jesuits of Münster. Stanza 1 : “Fairest Lord 
Jesus, Ruler of all nature, O Thou of God and man the Son, Thee will I cherish. Thee will I honor, Thou, 
my soul’s Glory, Joy, and Crown.” Stanza 2: “Fair are the meadows. Fairer still the woodlands. Robed 
in the blooming garb of spring: Jesus is fairer, Jesus is purer. Who makes th woeful heart to sing.” 
Stanza 3: “Fair is the sunshine, Fairer still the moonlight, And all the twinkling, starry host: Jesus shines 
brighter, Jesus shines purer. Than all the angels heaven can boast.” The words are usually sung to the 
tune CRUSADERS ’ HYTvlN, an old Westphalian folk song first mentioned in the Schlesische Volkslieder 
(Leipzig, 1842).
*"77M 2,p. 12. 
*'*77M 2,p. 13.
*'*Wright interview, April 2001.
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Presbyterian Church (U. S. A,).*" But ordination could not be a functional resolution to the conflict.
From an intellectual perspective, this experience was profoundly generative and remained so 
until his death. Above we identified the responsibility of the educator to continually crack open all 
previous resolutions to conflict, so that the conflict can push one to deeper levels of intelligibility. 
After 1970, Loder realized more than ever before that the true Teacher, as he would often say, was 
and is the Holy Spirit, who is “engaged with whoever may be the learner - under whatever 
circumstance - in a deadly serious and sensitive business of pressing the Christian . . .  to re-examine 
through all the modes of consciousness the resolution to conflict that his faith represents.” This 
convictional experience of the presence of Christ forced him to re-examine his own convictions and 
moved him to a deeper intelligibility into the “how” of the Christian life, specifically the 
identification of the Holy Spirit as convictor and the means by which the Holy Spirit interacts with 
the human spirit.
In 1973, Loder begins to push his analysis of human transformation and conflict even deeper 
than before. Bringing his prodigious knowledge of psychodynamics and his personalist 
anthropological leanings, Loder starts to explore the structure of Christian religious experience in 
order to determine authenticity and pathology. He posed the question in a research request extended 
to the Princeton Seminary community and the readership of The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, asking, 
“Can authenticity in mystical experiences rest to any degree upon something fundamentally 
behavioral such that these experiences can be engendered by subduing normal ego-functioning and 
heightening (whether by bio-chemical or social technique) certain organic processes? Or does 
authenticity depend irreducibly upon a person-to-person encounter with the holy God whose presence 
is at least as objective as our own?”*'* Loder had a bias towards the latter option, but he wanted to be 
able to account for this intellectually. Nevertheless, in the research request Loder was clear about his 
proposal and what he was trying to articulate for the theological and worshiping communities. 
Almost tliree years after the episode in New York, he could define what such authenticity looks like:
In authenticating Christian experience there is both a critical distinction and a 
positive relation between Divine otherness and human objectivity. Both are of 
crucial importance in the authentication of Christian experience. It is the distinction 
which must be made - regardless of how “fantastic” the unity, transcendence, and 
general excitement of the synthetic religious experience may seem - if one is to
*'"'0n ordination, he writes, “This became a matter of conscience, not derived from any moral 
sense of obligation or abstract principles, but in the sense of knowing within oneself the necessary 
direction of one’s integrity.” TTM2, p. 13.
*'* James E. Loder and Mark Laaser, “Authenticating Christian Experience: A Research Request,” 
The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, Volume 66 (1973): 121. Laaser shared this initial research project with 
Loder. Loder and Laaser asked that individuals write out their religious experiences and forward them 
to the seminary. At the time of the article’s publication, they had already received three hundred 
responses.
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separate those experiences which are creative of a person in his relation to God from 
those which are simply expansions of psychic potential and which, as is well known, 
can often turn into a “bad trip.” It is in fact the integrity of the otherness of God that 
allows him to enter the “bad trip” where feeling states defy the realization of Divine 
otherness, where the synthetic god of fantastic feelings states could never be and 
there to do what God has always done to bring order out of chaos.
If, on the other hand, we now stress the positive relationship between “otherness” 
and human objectivity, then we suggest that there is a unique relationship between 
what is felt or sensed and what is declared when one encounters the otherness of 
God. This relationship which rests on the side of human objectivity is not bound to 
particular feeling states or self-perceptions, but is instead a pattern of interaction 
between what is felt and what is declared, between subject and object, between self 
and world. This relational pattern is an essential conformity with the major aspect of 
the creative process, and it is a pattern which distinguishes creativity from 
neurosis.^’*"
Loder proposes that in the Cluistian experience, the “human personality undergoes a creative act in 
the hands of God.” In addition to the creative response is the awareness of one has been encountered 
by an otherness, the otherness of God.^*’
One’s encounter with the presence of Christ is understood as a humanizing experience which 
yields a heightened and not a diminished sense of subjectivity. This enhanced awareness of one’s 
own historical concreteness is grounded in God’s address to the individual. This is an “incamational 
significance.” He explains that “there is in this experience a clear-cut claim to an encounter with the 
sacred such that the otherness of God gives rise to a heightened capacity to deal objectively with 
one’s own situation. It is an incamational concept to assert that the Divine otherness confirms the 
historical objectivity of man.” It is thiough the dialogical exchanged, in the Divine-human 
encounter, that “God creates human nature in and for history.” In this exchange one become 
conscious of one’s individuality. In other words, “in creating the individual the process historicizes 
him by heightening his capacity to deal with the objective realities of his present situation and by 
opening him in an enuring way to the future.” '^®
Thi oughout the 1970's, Loder enters into a season of scanning through the psychological and 
theological literature, as well as a plumbing the depths of his own experience in order to give voice to 
what he encountered.^'^ This period of struggle lasting almost ten years culminates in 1981 with the 
publication of The Transforming Moment: Understanding Convictional Experiences (and a second
"^’Loder, pp. 121-122. This distinction between creativity and neurosis comes from the work 
of Harold Rugg (1886-1960), Imagination (New York: Harpers, 1963), especially Chapter 15.
^'’Loder, p. 123.
‘^®Loder, p. 124.
219We will explore the influences upon this thinking in the next chapter.
"""Volney P. Gay, Living Light, 18(1981): 276-277.
'Loder recounts: “.. .before 19701 was doing all my teaching [in Christian education] within 
a basic psychoanalytic model, that conflict learning is basic to psychoanalysis. So I was upgrading 
psychoanalysis a little bit. But that was the basic shape of my understanding. After 1970 I realized it 
was the Spirit of God who creates the problem and guides us into truth.” Interview with Wright, IS* 
April 2001.
^^^TTM, p. 13. The what/how distinction here is an extension and continuation of the concerns 
raised above by Kierkegaard and echoed by Loder in his doctoral dissertation..
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edition in 1989), presenting what one commentator has correctly identified as “a general 
epistemology that will account for all moments of transformation.”^^® While I think this is an 
accurate assessment, such a reading misses the deeper concern of the work. As we shall see, Loder 
turns to epistemological considerations in order to grasp what he would call the logic of 
transformation. But even patterns of transformation in the human experience (typical in acts of 
discovery and in the work of the imagination) need to be transformed in order for them to yield a 
knowledge of God.
The Transforming Moment is a seminal work and marks a turning point in the unfolding of 
Loder’s thought. Before his experience in 1970, he was preoccupied with the role of conflict in 
Chi'istian education and how this conflict is played out throughout the states of human development.
After 1970, with the publication of The Transforming Moment, Loder’s work is taken up, as it were, 
into the larger and more significant framework of discerning the way the Holy Spirit encounters an 
individual. Psychological constructs of transfomiation are not sufficient to “explain” the change that 
occurs in the life of one encountered by Jesus Christ in a moment of conviction.^^' Theological 
reflection upon the “how” of the Holy Spirit is required - an area of discussion painfully lacking |
within theological circles. At the beginning of The Transforming Moment, Loder establishes his I
agenda: j
Theology, in contrast to the human sciences, has concentrated on what to believe ;
and it has paid relatively less attention to how one comes to believe what is j
theologically sound. Most of the theological answers to how have been either subtly i
turned into questions of what or they have been relegated to the Holy Spirit. Î
However, of all doctrines central to Christianity, that one is most ill-defined, fraught I
with mystery, and lost in confusion. How the Holy Spirit teaches, comforts, afflicts, |
and leads into “all tioith” [John 16:13] is largely a theological blank. Yet, notice - it î
has substance enough to be threatening. If one claims to have had an experience of 
the Holy Spirit, he or she is immediately suspected of becoming theologically 
unsound. This sort of tlireat and suspicion is a case of ignorance controlling 
orthodoxy and indicates a state of affairs that ought not to continue.^^^
Beginning with The Transforming Moment and continuing through his death in 2002, his life work 
can best be understood when it is viewed as being consumed with a passionate desire to take up this 
challenge: to fill this theological blank or void by offering a pneumatology that accounts for the
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“how” of human experience.^^^ The publication of The Knight's Move: The Relational Logic o f the 
Spirit in Theology and Science (with physicist, W. Jim Neidhardt) in 1992 and The Logic o f the 
Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective in 1998 further contribute to this vision/ '^* In 
the next chapter will we analyze these three works, as well as articles written over the last thirty 
years which give voice to what I would summarize and characterize as Loder’s relational 
phenomenological pneumatology.
On Monday, the 5* November 2001, Loder had a massive stroke in a setting far removed 
from the world most familiar with this thought - the lobby of a bank. Laying on the floor and just 
before entering into a coma from which he never recovered, Loder cried out to the strangers seeking 
his welfare, “Please pray for me.” After four days on life-support, he died in Princeton on the 9“' 
November at the age of 69, On the morning of 14®' November, he was interred in the Princeton 
Seminaiy cemetery plot of Nassau Presbyterian Church, Princeton, New Jersey. Later that afternoon, 
at the Service of Witness to the Resurrection held in the Miller Chapel of Princeton Theological 
Seminary, president Thomas W. Gillespie gave tribute to the great themes of his life, of Loder’s 
central affirmations that “the void is trumped by the holy. Rather than a nothing, there is someone. 
Instead of absence, there is presence, the presence of the one who said to Martha and to us, “I am the 
resurrection and the life (John 11:25)”^^^
^^^Reflecting Loder’s critique of the socializing force of the human sciences, he also sees the 
discipline of theology being hindered by such assumptions. “Surely the human sciences are not designed 
to deal with extraordinary experience in terms that make it convincing to the experiencer. They are 
designed to exorcize the demons of the extraordinary for the sake of sustaining and controlling day-to- 
day life. Yet often theology, which should be the language of conviction, has also had trouble with such 
experiences. They are too subjective for those preoccupied with rigorous demands for theological I
thinking, and more unique and particularlized than can be coped with by highly generalized theological 1
systems.” TTM, p. 11. i1
^ '^'On the Friday before he died, Loder sent to his publisher the final draft of another work in this 1
undertaking. Educational Ministry in the Logic o f the Spirit, to be published in 2002, articulating Loder’s |
theory of Christian education in the Spirit based on his lectures given at Princeton spanning almost forty .
years. Wright, “Ruination Unto Redemption,” p. 84. In a conversation with me several weeks before j
he died, Loder conveyed that after the publication of Educational Ministry and in retirement, he planned 1
to write a book on Kierkegaard and practical theology, an introductory volume to practical theology for 
students, and a commentary on the Gospel of John. Dana Wright is editing the Festschrift offered in ;
Loder ’ s honor and will be entitled Redemptive Transformation in Practical Theology (Eerdmans, 2003). |




“What is a lifetime?” and “Why do I live it?”^^® The Logic o f the Spirit is built upon these
two fundamental, yet related existential questions. These questions absorbed Loder throughout his
life. Here and elsewhere he challenges the reader to endure the conflict such questions inevitably
generate. They are questions that the human spirit, through the stages of life, will stiuggle to answer
both consciously and unconsciously. Connected with the answer is humanity’s inexorable search for
meaning, even in the face of death. This drive of the human spirit is illustrated by Miguel de
Unamuno’s (1864-1936) idea that what distinguishes human beings from other creatures is that
humans bury their dead. Reflecting upon Unamuno’s observation, Loder observes:
We speak our words over the dead body. We will not let death have the last word.
This is a mark of the human spirit that something in us knows we can overcome this 
thing. Death stops the heartbeat but does not quench the human spirit; its inherent 
logic tells us that there is a way to transcend and tiansfonn death. Even when the 
spirit itself chooses death, whether in suicide or baptism, it is in hope of a better life.
Even in the pathetic cry of the abused child, “If I die, then will you love me?” there 
is transcendence that wants to make use of death to achieve another higher end. •“
What is a lifetime, and why do I live it? This cry arises out of the human spirit, 
sometimes in anguish, sometimes in awe-struck silence, but always a call to someone 
or some place beyond the self.^ ’^
The question remains whether the human spirit will answer these questions from within the limited 
scope of the self, or look beyond itself to another, to a Thou - a Convictor - who has the power to 
constitute, define, affirm, and ultimately love the “I” in a way one could never do on one’s own. It is 
to Loder’s understanding of the logic of the Spirit, his effort to articulate the logic of the Thou, that 
we now turn.
pp. 3ff.
“ ’i s ,  p. 4. Cf. Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense o f Life, trans. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1954.
C h ap ter T w o  
A  T h eo logy  o f  C onviction : L o d er’s R ela tion al P h en om en olog ica l P n eu m ato logy
“Perhaps the mutual enhancement o f mind and Spirit will yield up new ways o f 
conceiving the life o f God in our midst, so that the communion o f saints may again - as 
at its Pentecostal inception - be ultimately defined by no other reality than the Spiritual 





Although Loder began his academic career at Princeton teaching the philosophy of Christian 
education and retained this preoccupation through his life, 1970 marks a momentous shift in his thinking, 
a turn to an examination of the Holy Spirit as educator, specifically how the Holy Spirit educates a life 
in the way of Jesus Christ. As we saw at the end of the last chapter, Loder avers, “How the Holy Spirit 
teaches, comforts, afflicts, and leads into “all truth” [John 16:13] is largely a theological blank.”' 
Beginning with the publication of The Transforming Moment: Understanding Convictional Experiences, 
Loder responds to the challenge by filling the blank, constructing a theology of the Holy Spirit that is 
grounded in the Refoi*med theological tradition, yet infoimed by insights into the dynamics of human 
transformation and experiences of conviction. Loder believed that theology “should be the language 
of conviction.”  ^ That is, theology must be conceived as the language of one convicted, an articulation 
of life as mediated by, in, and through the Holy Spirit and for  the glory of God. For thirty years Loder 
developed and creatively employed a unique psycho-spiritual, epistemological framework that articulates 
a vision of the Christian life as primarily an experience of conviction by the Spiritual Presence of Christ. 
As we shall see in this chapter, Loder’s work offers theologians a new framework for talking about 
“how” the Holy Spirit transforms human life.
Instead of examining Loder’s thought in the order of publication, I would prefer to discuss his 
work between 1970 and 2002 as a whole, identifying themes that cluster around what I have termed a 
relational phenomenological pneumatology. The drawback of such an approach does not allow one to 
see the development of Loder’s thought over time. While this is important, it is not my primary concern. 
Alternatively, what is more important is articulating the generative core of Loder’s thought and seeing 
the wider implications of his contribution.
'7TM ,p. 13 
" rZ M ,p . 11.
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I. An Overview of Loder’s M ajor Contributions
Before we proceed, a brief overview of the major publication to occupy our discussion is 
warranted. The Tranforming Moment: Understanding Convictional Experiences (1981/1989), The 
Knight‘s Move: The Relational Logic o f the Spirit in Theology and Science, co-authored with physicist, 
W. Jim Neidhardt, (1992) and The Logic o f the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective 
(1998), together form Loder’s three major contributions to the field of practical theology. Let us 
consider them in order.
As we saw in the previous chapter, The Transforming Moment is Loder’s attempt to give voice 
to his experiences of conviction. The eleven years spanning 1970 to 1981, concluding with the 
publication of TTM, was a period of extraordinary intellectual searching, yielding the insights usually 
associated with Loder’s oeuvre. Thrown into a conflict of immense proportions, he turned to many 
sources to help make sense of what he experienced, eventually producing a new theoi*y of knowing. He 
turned to Michael Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension, Regin Prenter’s Spiritiis Creator, George Hendry’s 
A Theology o f the Holy Spirit. From the title we know his primary influence is Kierkegaard, who spoke 
at length about “the Moment” as the “fullness of time,” the time of “rebirth” when one becomes a “new 
person” through the encounter with the Absolute Paradox.^ Dana Wright explains that, “What the 
accident made available to him was the convictional courage to recognize and act upon the Church’s 
confession that our human participation in the work of the Holy Spirit, not the transformational 
capacities of the human spirit alone, finally makes human transformation itself transformational.”^
The Transforming Moment is the fruit of almost ten years of enonnous intellectual and personal 
struggle. It was written for the theologian; as such it is a rigorous intellectual reply to the Princeton 
Seminaiy faculty, many of whom were extremely skeptical and highly critical of his approach to 
theology in general, and his depiction of the Christian experience in particular after 1970.  ^ Their unease 
was rooted in the fact that Loder’s experientially-based theology was at appeared to be at odds with the 
Reformed tradition and the general approach to theology at Princeton. We get an indication of this 
struggle in a handwritten prayer that was found after Loder’s death in a desk draw in his Hodge House
^Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments/ Johannes Climacus, ed.and trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 15-19ff.
‘'From the biographical essay Dana Wright is preparing for the Loder Festschrift.
^Princeton Seminary gave Loder tenure just prior to the 1970 accident. The Transforming 
Moment “had to be written,” Loder explains, “to tell them [Princeton Seminary ] what they hired was 
still here.. . . ” Wright interview, April 2001. As a bastion of Reformed/ Presbyterian thought, Loder’s 
Princeton colleagues considered his approach to be more “Methodist,” than Reformed. He believes, 
however, that there is an intentional act of repression at work in his own denomination, the Presbyterian 
Church (U. S. A.). Studies have shown that 80 percent of Presbyterian clergy and more than half of the 
laity have had convictional experiences. But they are not discussed or shared within the worshiping 
community and “much of modem theology to discredit convictional experiences.. .is partly responsible 
for this repression...  .{TTM, p. 11).”
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study:
This is who I am. This is who I must be. The one who was convicted on the thruway 
and thus renewed [by] his “convictor” of several years before. If teaching this way is 
destructive to my fellows or classes who want something else, if this means I lose [my] 
job and esteem, then at least I do not lose my Lord. I do not by this expect to stop my 
intellectual work. But I do hereby stop, in the name of Jesus Christ, any effort to say 
that I can exhaustively deprive myself by my own efforts. Thou art holding me fast, and 
I am so grateful I will be obedient to the heavenly vision, as Paul said, and not fall away 
(Heb. 6; 4-7).®
To not be faithful to the experience and to himself would thus be to deny the work of the Holy Spirit and 
thus, as the authors to the Hebrews explains, “commit apostasy.”
Due to the nature of his audience, TTM is an exceptionally difficult book to comprehend and 
not easily accessible - even to the most erudite scholar. It is very technical, containing complex moves 
through many disciplines - psychology, theology, epistemology, existentialist philosophy, and 
phenomenology. The difficulty is due, in part, to its methodology. Loder’s command of psychological 
and theological concepts and the way he dialectically weaves them together to form a new conceptual 
framework can easily alienate and frustrate the reader who is not willing to enter intuitively into his 
logic. In the second edition he provides a glossaiy of terms. But even the glossary needs a glossary.’ 
One commentator began his review with this caution, “It will take more than a month to absorb the 
impact of this book,” and another states oufright that this is a “tough, mind-stretching volume.”® Many 
reviewers note that TTM is for the “serious reader” and “deserves serious attention.”® Because of these
®I am grateful to Dana Wright for a copy of this prayer. The scriptural reference is particularly 
poignant: “For it is impossible to restore again to repentance those who have once been enlightened, who 
have tasted the heavenly gift, and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the goodness 
of the word of God and the powers of the age to come, if they then commit apostasy, since they crucify 
the Son of God on their own account and hold him up to contempt (Hebrews 6:4-7).” Loder lived in the 
house that was built on the seminary grounds by Charles Hodge (1797-1878), the most influential 
American theologian of the nineteenth century.
’Frank Rogers, Jr., makes a similar point in Religious Education 86(1991): 323-325. Despite 
the difficulty of the text and the glossary, “the person who is willing to dialogue with it will find 
themselves in the midst of a book that articulates a compelling vision, (p. 325)” If one who is able to 
attend to Loder’s argument and enter into his world, one reviewer believes, then what Loder has offered 
might have the potential to “help us grasp a truly new world.” John E. McKenna, Perspectives on 
Science and Faith 43 (1991): 201.
®John E. McKenna, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 43( 1991): 199; Richard A. 
Hunt, Pastoral Psychology, 30 (1982): 194. James W. Fowler says TTM has a kind of “enchantment,” 
he writes, “I could tell you in two pages what the book is about,. But to really do it justice, in the subtlety 
and richness of its argument, I would need much more space . . , James E. Loder & James W. Fowler, 
“Conversations on Fowler’s Stages o f Faith and Loder’s The Transforming Moment/' Religious 
Education, 77 (1982): 140,143.
®Rogers, Jr.; 323-324; John F. Russell, Theological Studies, 43 (1982): 185.
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obstacles it has not received the attention it deserves.
The complexity of the TTM has rendered it inaccessible to many theologians, as well as the 
average reader. Approximately twelve reviews of both editions all favorably applaud Loder for his 
conti'ibution to the study of religious experiences. It is generally assumed that Loder is writing for 
clinical psychologists whose patients have experienced transformation or for clergy working in the 
parish.'® This is a fair assessment. Loder is writing for the practioner, but he is first and foremost 
writing for the theologian - and not only for the practical theologian. It is perhaps this confusion of 
pmpose that Loder’s work has been relatively ignored by practical theologians and dogmatic theologians 
alike. Loder is writing primarily as a kind of theologian-theorist who seeks to provide an interpretative 
framework tlirough which one can identify the work of the Holy Spirit in the world. I would argue that 
a more accurate reading would be to see Loder as a theologian of conviction. His aim is to get the 
attention of theologians, insisting that an understanding of convictional knowing must be incoiporated 
into the way we think theologically about the work of the Holy Spirit.
Furthermore, the difficulty of Loder’s thought and writing-style suggest that he is pushing 
language and ideas in order to be as expansive as the knowledge of God received in moments of 
conviction. Loder observed that Paul Lehmann “has often been criticized for the polymorphous 
complexity of his prose.” It is a critique that could equally be applied to Loder. “However, it seems to 
me,” Loder continues speaking of Lehmann, “that one rarely makes such a criticism without at the same 
time acloiowledging that something important is going on when he speaks and wiites.” Loder sees 
Lehmann’s style as “convictional,” in that “it reflects his patient struggle to weave language around the 
structure of conviction so as to have it finally emerge as an expression of - and expansion upon - the 
elements of that conviction.”" All of the above serves as an apt description of Loder’s style, possessing 
a polymorphous complexity that seeks to articulate the inarticulable.
The complexity is significantly heightened with the publication of The Knight’s Move. Co­
authored with W. Jim Neidhardt (who was, before his untimely death in 1992, Associate Professor of 
Physics at the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark, New Jersey), this challenging work is an 
exercise in the interdisciplinary study of theology and science. The approach that Loder used in his 
doctoral dissertation on the relationship between theology and psychology is applied toward the 
theology/science dialogue. Their aim is to find patterns of correlation that do not reduce one field to the 
other, nor create a third field through amalgamation. Loder’s move toward scientific epistemology might 
appear to be a strange move, an aberrant interest within his wider concerns. However, this is more than 
a simple curiosity about contemporary scientific theories. His turn towards science is to reinforce the
p. 187.
‘®Tom Brownell, Epiphany, 3 (1982): 90; Volney P. Gay, Living Light 18 (1981): 277. 




"We will explore this more fully later in the chapter.
"Although Loder and Neidhardt address epistemological concerns, they never bring them into 
dialogue with contemporary epistemological theorists, such as Richard Roity or Paul Ricouer. Dana 
R. Wright suggests that TKM “may lose some of the force of its argument because it is not situated 
specifically in the current debate on epistemology.” Koinonia IV(1992): 276.
"He makes reference to the knight of faith in NRC, pp. 442ff; RPCF, pp. 145-146, 177-178; 
TKM, 104-105ff, andZiS, pp. 334-336. Kierkegaard explains that the knight of faith, “. . .takes delight 
in everything, and whenever one sees him taking part in a particular pleasure, he does it with the 
persistence which is the mark of the earthly man whose soul is absorbed in such things.. . .  Yet he does 
not do the least thing except by virtue of the absurd [the God-man received in faith].” Fear and 
Trembling, p . .
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inherent relationality of human existence. Loder demonstrates proficient knowledge of the history of 
science and is fully conversant with Einsteinian and post-Einsteinian physics. Tlie study of theology and 
science are not “incompatible;” they are “complementary.” The identification of complementarity means 
that underneath the interdisciplinary dialogue is a deeper concern: to illustrate and “to stress the 
relational nature of reality.”"
The constitutional structure of reality and the way we come to a knowledge of reality are 
inherently relational. His interest in relationality, informed by Kierkegaard, had preoccupied Loder for 
quite some time. Here, Loder turns to a consideration of Chalcedonian christology and suggests where 
we see relationality most powerfully at work is revealed to us definitely in the inner nature of Jesus 
Christ. This theological claim is then used as the rubric through which Loder comes to view reality as 
constructed by the Spiritual Presence of Christ and through whom all knowledge is modeled. “In 
Christ’s nature as fully God and fully human, we have the definition of relationship tlirough which all 
other expressions of personal, social, and cultural relatedness can be viewed.” In such a model, “the 
inner nature of Jesus Christ ultimately defines the scope and limits of the relational model; not the |
reverse.” Their purpose is to “reveal the illuminative and explanatory significance of viewing all 1
creation through the eyes of faith in Jesus Christ.”" The Illuminator and Explainer is the Holy Spirit, {
who, participating in and with Jesus Chi ist, reveals the relational structure of reality to the human spirit 
and draws the human spirit into relationship with Christ. The movement of the Holy Spirit is relational - 
Spirit to spirit." This is an act of creativity in which reality and knowledge of the self are oriented after 
the movement of Christ."
The title of the book refers to the move of the knight in the game of chess, as well as to 
Kierkegaard’s portiayal of the Christian life as the “knight of faith.”"  In chess, “the knight’s move is 
unique because it alone goes around corners. . . .This meaningful combination of continuity [of a set
J
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sequence] and discontinuity [an unpredictable turn] in an otherwise linear set of possibilities has led
some to refer to the creative act of discovery in any field of research as a ‘knight’s move’ in
intelligence.”"  Loder sees this continuity and discontinuity in the Christian life, in the “knight of faith.”
So that “Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’ undertake [s] a unique move within the rules of the human game,
but faith transposes the whole idea of a ‘knight’s move’ into the mind of the Chess Master Himself.”"
He further presses the metaphor:
[C]hess is a game of multiple possibilities and interlocking sti'ategies, so a chess master 
must combine the continuity represented by the whole complex of the game with the 
unpredictable decisions he must make every time it is his turn. A master chess player, 
then, does not merely follow the rules; in him the game becomes a construct of 
consciousness. The better the player the more fully the game comes into its own as a 
creation of human intelligence. Similarly, for Kierkegaard, the knight of faith is a 
unique figure in human existence. The knight shows how, by existing in faith as a 
creative act of Chiist’s Spirit, human existence comes into its own as an expression of 
the mind of Christ. Thus, the ultimate form of a “Icnight’s move” is a creative act raised 
to the nth power by Spiritus Creator, but it still partakes fully in the concrete pieces and 
patterns that comprise the nature of the human game and the game of nature."
Thus one becomes a knight of faith when human intelligence is “taken up,” as it were, into the mind of 
Christ. But this is not absorption or annihilation of human intelligence (or individual identity), it is a 
mind that has been expanded through the encounter with Christ, an identity that has become heightened 
and “more real” through and in the corresponding relationship with Christ.
Like The Transforming Moment, The Knight’s Move is very abstract and has suffered the same 
kind of fate in its receptivity. Reviewers, both theologians and physicists alike, have praised Loder and 
Neidhardt’s contribution to the science and theology debate, describing the book as “ambitious, 
worthwhile, unique,.. .[a book] which one must read again (and perhaps again),” It has been seen as 
“imaginative,” exuding the “creative enthusiasm of the writers,”’® Most notably, Christopher B. Kaiser, 
who has wiitten widely on science and theology, has acknowledged the magnitude of their contribution 
and their accuracy in fathoming the theological implications of complementarity.’ ' Reviews have also 





’®Richard Carlson, Zygon, 31 (1994): 731 ; Mike Alsford, Science and Christian Belief, 6 (1994):
’’Cliristopher B. Kaiser, “Quantum Complementarity and Cliristological Dialectic,” W. Mark 
Richardson & Wesley J. Wildman, Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 291-298.
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the book, one reviewer commented that after many sentences he found himself thinking of Augustine’s 
(354-430) confession, “My soul is restless until it rests in Thee.””  Nevertheless, it is clear that The 
Knight's Move, “makes a very important contribution,” to the theology and science dialogue, but it has 
“yet to be fully appreciated by scholars working in this area.””
That The Knight‘s Move opens with a foreword by the theologian, Thomas F. Torrance signifies 
Loder’s indebtedness to Torrance’s thought and a testimony of their close friendship. What Loder found 
so appealing is the centrality of relationality in Torrance’s theology.”  Torrance remarks that TKM is 
“charged with real therapeutic power, as well as heuristic force, in the way it deepens and carries forward 
what the great Michael Polanyi called ‘personal knowledge’, without yielding either to the subjectivism 
or the obj ectivism upon which contemporary thinking so often founders, and thereby provides our human 
and spiritual culture with the healing vision of wholeness which it needs so desperately.””  Loder and 
Neidhart offer a relational view of reality, “a potentially redemptive way of restiucturing our thinking,” 
to help heal the “problems of dualism and fragmentation that seem so endemic to our scientific 
culture.””  The reason why dualism and fragmentation have been so desfructive, and the diive behind 
Loder’s stress upon relationality, is because they have led to a distortion of human existence. Cornel 
West talks about “the normative gaze” of a technological understanding of science which favors a 
neutrality of observation. This “detached mentality,” as Loder calls it, “is responsible for all ‘neutral’ 
classificatory schemes which produce all the ‘isms’ - from individualism to sexism to classism, as well
’’Richard H. Bube, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 45 (1993); 271. Michael 
Palmer wrote the most critical review, stating that although TKM is “provocative,” it “is also disorienting 
and confusing at numerous points in the discussion, somewhat uncertain of its audience, and ultimately 
unsatisfying in the details of the argument.” The TKM, “is worth read, though doing so represents a 
considerable commitment of intellectual energy for a modest return.” Paraclete 28 (1994): 31-32. 
Besides style and complexity, he offers no substantive critique of the text.
” W. Mark Richardson, The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 16 (1995): 347.
’"TKM is firmly rooted in the Barthian/Torrance/Polanyi tradition with its emphasis upon the 
relational or the perichoretic. Alsford suggests that there is an over-emphasis on bi-polarity in Loder’s 
understanding of relationality. . perhaps an engagement with Derridian reconstruction of binary 
opposition as manifestations of enforced hierarchy and a metaphysic of presence might shed some light 
on this matter,..  . .” Science and Christian Belief, 6(1994): 134.
’^TKM, p. xii. The foreword is printed verbatim as a review in Scottish Journal o f Theology 48 
(1995): 139-140. Torrance enthusiastically endorses this work as “the most exciting and uplifting book 
of its kind that I have read in recent years. It is a work to read again and again until its creative and 
liberating insights soak into one’s being and spirit and open the imagination and the mind to new 
horizons of possibility in human enterprise, (p. 140)”
” 7KM,p. 15.
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as racism.””  But the detachment is dangerous precisely because it depersonalizes the self. It leads to
a bifurcation of reality.
This view distorts not only human existence but nature itself. It leads to using 
prestructured conceptions in an attempt to manipulate an infinitely rich and variegated 
natural order and to control intrinsically open-ended events. Its obscures the inner and 
often unique order of natuie, and eliminates meaning and purpose for persons and 
relationships - even as it ignores the significance of persons themselves. Not only is the 
long-range significance of this dualistic distortion evident in the widely descried 
fragmentation of nature, society, culture, and personality, but cuiTent optimism about 
“science and technology” promises to make the distortion worse.’®
But Loder does not want to critique culture. Instead, he wants to engage in “an interdisciplinary search 
for ways, models, and patterns by which we can approach the inherent order of creation and facilitate 
some reintegration of the fragmented fields of study in our culture.”’® The “real therapeutic power” of 
this relational heuristic is identifying the action or power of God, of, “What God is doing to make and 
keep human life human.””  This leads us to a consideration of Loder’s last major work
The Logic o f the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective appeared in 1998 and 
is a reworking of his lectures on human development given at Princeton Seminary for more than twenty 
years. In many ways this work (and to a lesser degree TTM) is a response to and a critique of what is 
known as models of “faith development,” typified by the work of James Fowler.’' Loder sees the human 
spirit possessing a logic of its own that cannot be neatly explained in developmental categories. To show 
this, once again Loder turns to Kierkegaard. Instead of forcing Kierkegaard’s stages of existence - 
Aesthetic, Ethical, Religiousness A, and Religiousness B - into a diachronic pattern of human 
development, Loder sees the stages as “aspects of a more fundamental argument embracing the whole 
of existence” that are experienced at all stages of human development.”  Here we find themes that Loder 
has amplified throughout his life.
7.
’Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982) cited in TKM, p.
p. 7. 
p. 7.
’®This is what Paul Lehmann has referred to as “the politics of God,” Cf. Paul Lehmann, The 
Transfiguration o f Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1975) and Ethics in Christian Context (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 123. Cited in Loder, “The Fashioning of Power,” p. 201.
’'James Fowler, Stages o f Faith: The Psychology o f Human Development and the Quest for  
Meaning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981); Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian: Adult 
Development and Christian Faith (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984); Craig Dyksti'a & Sharon Parks, 
eds. Faith Development and Fowler (Bimiingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1986).
p. ix.
”26", pp. xii-xiii. 
p. xiii.
” Z:9,P. X. 
p. X.
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. . .the human spirit is the uninvited guest in every study conducted in the human 
sciences. It is inherently relational, ti'ansformational, self-tianscending, and the 
dynamic basis of choice; it is the dynamism that drives human development forward.
Yet it is regularly ignored in favor of more empirical considerations. To be sure, it is 
always within the matrix of the physical, natural, and material order where the human 
spirit can and must be understood. But if we ask which way is “forward’ in the course 
of human development, then we must have a theological frame of reference that grounds 
and guides the human spirit without reducing its dynamism to simplistic notions of 
adaptation.”
Adaptation, or processes of socialization, cannot provide for the deepest desires of the human spirit in 
its drive for meaning and puipose. This need can only be realized when the human spirit is, to quote 
Kierkegaard, “transparently grounded in the power that posits it,” grounded in the Holy Spirit.”
Loder sees Kierkegaard’s understanding of human existence placed between “two absurds: the 
negative absurd, which points to the tragic futility and ultimate meaningless of existence, which he 
terms, ‘despair’; and the positive absurd, that human nature is redeemed by God who enters his own |
creation as fully divine and fully human, Kierkegaard’s ‘God-man’ of faith.” We must choose by which |I
absurd to live. To not choose is by default a choice for the negative, a choice for death. By contrast, “a I
choice for the positive absurd puts death in the context of the Creator of the universe, who, by entering j
redemptively into the midst of human history, established the ultimate meaning of creation, including i
the death that pervades it. This Spirit of God transforms human existence for the appropriation of eternal Î
life through faith in Jesus Christ.”’  ^ But, it needs to be stressed, this is not just an abstract choice to j
iponder, nor is it an intellectual game one can play. It “is a critical and constructive way to look at the i
stuff and substance of the whole life span and its place in creation.”’® It is a matter of life and death. I
An interdisciplinary model is developed whereby “a Christian theological interpretation must ;
be allowed to influence our studies of human development.””  The means of fathoming human nature |
from a theological perspective comes “through an understanding of the human spirit in the context of :Ia Christian theology of the Holy Spirit.” Even in this study, one can see that Loder is trying to make a j
space for the person actively engaged with the world. He writes that, “It should be noticed that the |
functionalism, structuralism, and empiricism toward which the human sciences are inclined keep them |
in a dualistic Newtonian world, where the person of the investigator is bracketed for the sake of l
objectifying the findings and meeting the canons of an empirical test.” These objectifying patterns ♦
37LS, p. xi.
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actually limit an understanding of reality. Loder wants to “move toward a post-Newtonian, scientifically 
postmodern view of reality, which,” in his estimation, “has always been the character and prerogative 
of the Holy Spirit in Christian theology.”’® Loder wants to search for a full understanding of reality that 
is subjectively appropriated by the self and takes into consideration the knower’s involvement and 
participation in what is known.
Like his earlier pieces. The Logic o f the Spirit has been critically acclaimed as an “important” 
and “challenging” work, welcomed as a needed conective to reductionistic, non-theological 
considerations of human development and will most likely become a standard text in theological 
education.’® Also, like his other works, this is not an easy text to summarize or fathom and requires 
repeated readings.”  One reviewer clearly identifies that “Loder’s knowledge and experience are wide 
ranging, and his methodology demanding.” This is not due to the obscurity or complexity of this 
thought, but because our present frameworks of loiowledge will be “consistently challenged by coming 
to terms with Loder’s argument.”"* The highest praise for Loder’s approach comes from Torrance; 
“What strikes me, perhaps above all is the depth of Loder’s compassion, which informs all his analytical 
and therapeutical thought about the relationality between the human spirit and the divine Spirit. No 
writer or thinker, to my knowledge, has penetrated so deeply, illuminatingly, lovingly, and convincingly 
into the often tortured tangles of the human spirit, at different stages of its development, and brought to 
bear upon it the creative and healing presence of the divine that characterizes the logic of the Spirit.”"’
Two fundamental, existential questions concern Loder in The Logic o f the Spirit, questions which 
he also sees within the Kierkegaardian authorship: “What is a lifetime?” and “Why do I live it?” For 
an answer to the first question, Loder turns to the human sciences. To reply to the second, he develops 
a theology of human existence. But they cannot be separated."’ Instead, he utilizes a relational 
methodology and holds them in creative tension. The perspective of the human sciences, the “view from 
the below” is brought into dialog and conected by the “view from above,” a theological consideration
’®ZS, p. xiii.
’®Steven S. Ivy, Journal o f Pastoral Care 53 (1999): 495.
"®Eric G. Flett, Christian Scholar's Review, XXI (2000): 622-623. Flett writes, “Those who are 
willing to commit themselves to repeated readings will be rewarded and taken into a deeper 
understanding of human personhood and divine grace (p. 623).”
"'Flett, p. 623.
"’Thomas F. Torrance, The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 20 (1999): 317. Torrance claims, “This 
is one of the most remarkable books I have ever read in the interdisciplinary fields of human, natural, 
and theological science (p. 316).”
"’Z6",p. X .
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of the human spirit as defined in and through its relationship with the Holy Spirit. It is worth quoting 
Loder’s summary argument at length, because I would argue that it also captures the motivation behind 
The Transforming Moment and The Knight’s Move, which is why I prefer to consider these works as a 
whole.
My argument.. .is not primarily one for the existence of God; it is for the human spirit 
itself: for its reality, its legitimacy, its remarkable genius, its genuine but blind longing 
for the Spirit of God - and its tragic end when that longing is not satisfied. We need to 
find in our theological understanding of what it means to be human the divine response 
to the outcry of the human spirit.
Because the abyss between the human and the divine is humanly unfathomable, it 
must be crossed by the act of God; but the argument from above is that this has already 
been done in the paradox of God’s becoming human while remaining fully God in Jesus 
Christ. What remains for us is the awakening to this reality and to all that it implies for 
the conviction, illumination, and sanctification of the development of persons. This,.
. .takes place centrally Spirit-to-spirit.”
Which means that the answer to these questions “must finally be bestowed by the Creator Spirit.”"
With this initial overview of the primary objectives in each work, we can move to a more 
detailed consideration of Loder’s theology, with special attention to some of the formative influences 
upon his thought. This analysis will be further supplemented by articles written during this period in 
which Loder sketches out ideas that are later incorporated into these three major works.
II. Convictional Knowing
After his New York Thruway experience, Loder needed a way to talk about the actuality of 
religious experiences which were both objectively real, yet could not be subjectively appropriated 
through cognition. For this he turned to the philosopher of religion, Willem F. Zuurdeeg."® Beginning 
with the conventional distinction between cognitive and motive language used by theologians, Zuurdeeg 
adds a third type, the convictional. Convictional language is not simply the language of emotion, 
subjectivist considerations of reality. It is a language that points beyond words, which has its origins
*^LS, p. 12. Lucy Bregman helpfully summarizes Loder’s intentions: “Loder’s theological 
perspective attempts to place human development within the wider sphere of the Holy Spirit’s creative 
activity and to locate and describe how the human spirit acts and respond to the divine Spirit through all 
the phases of the lifespan.” The Journal o f Religion, 80 (2000)
p. 14.
"®Zuurdeeg was initially associated with the logical positivists of the Vienna School. Cf. Allan 
Janik & Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Touchstone, 1973).
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within the situation of the person and the community that uses such language."’ Zuurdeeg sees 
convictional language as striking a balance between purely cognitive, abstract thinking (the common 
parlance of the Western theological tradition) and the private, individualistic language of existentialism, 
with its preoccupation with private experience, as well as pietism’s penchant for the expression of 
feelings. He claims that the logical positivists have not adequately discerned the metaphysical aspect 
of language. He equally attacks the metaphysicians as failing to realize that very often metaphysics is 
a human construct, an effort of insecure thinkers trying to overcome their anxieties."®
Zuurdeeg claimed that the language of conviction has a particular structure which could only be 
disclosed by a type of “situational analysis,” which does not abstract language from the one who is 
speaking."® Without being reductionist, he descriptively suggests that the language of conviction is 
grounded within the structures of the personality. The convictional worldview is “a being-related-to the
world which involves a person’s existential character It is connected with the deepest layers of
personality, i. e., to who we really are.””  He sees language and philosophical systems as being informed 
by “tacit convictional presuppositions,” that are related to the “powerful dread of the merely relative.”®' 
Zuurdeeg contends that the language of philosophy, even a philosophy of religion, is a “muffled cry 
against the threat of chaos.”®’ “Philosophy is bom in a cry.”®’
Loder adopts Zuurdeeg’s language, but goes well beyond him. In the TTM, Loder credits 
Zuurdeeg’s An Analytical Philosophy o f Religion, but his “emphasis is more upon the experience 
designated by the word than on the placing of conviction as a term in the philosophy of religion.”®" 
Zuurdeeg’s definition appears far too functional for Loder. However, seeing conviction as an existential 
response to the deep desires of the self, as having something to do with the stmctures of the personality, 
has some affinity with what Loder later suggests.
"’See Roger L. Shinn’s review of Willem F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy o f Religion 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958) in Theology Today, 16 (1959): 272-272.
"®Shinn, p. 272.
"®Willem F. Zuurdeeg, Foreword by B. A. Gerrish, Man Before Chaos: Philosophy Is Born in 
a Cry (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968), pp.6.
®® Willem F. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy o f Religion (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958), 
p. I l l  and Chapter 3.
®'Zuurdeeg, Man Before Chaos, p. 7.
®’Gerrish’s comment in Man Before Chaos, p. 7.
®’This the overall theme of Zuurdeeg’s Man Before Chaos.
®"T7M, p. 28n.
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As we noted briefly in the first chapter, Loder offers a phenomenology of convictional 
experience as consisting of “three axes: the Convictor, the convicted person, and the endurance through 
time of the convictional relationship.” The word “convict,” and its cognates from the Latin convinco, 
implies, “to overcome, to conquer, to refute.”®® In such an experience, the convicted person “is 
compelled to reopen the question of reality in light of the presumed nature of the Convictor and the 
convictional relationship.” When this happens, a new reality is offered that could never have been 
discovered or cognitively achieved on one ’ s own. “The way in which ‘ convictional experience ’ discloses 
reality and calls for new interpretations is the focus” of The Transforming Moment. For Loder, the life 
of the Christian, as “convicted person,” inevitably involves a reorientation to reality, because in the 
Christian experience the self become a subject convicted “by a Spiritual Presence far greater than the 
subject him- or herself.”®® What Loder is pushing for is a “conviction beyond reason,” without falling 
into a realm of irrationality.®’
With Loder’s contribution to the Festschrift in honor of Paul Lehmann, we begin to the first 
consideration of the Christian life in terms of conviction. Written within the larger context of his critique 
of socialization, “The Fashioning of Power: A Christian Perspective on the Life-Style Phenomenon,” 
fleshes out in sharp relief the difference between the person whose Christian faith is primarily understood 
as a tool to realize personal goals and the Cliristian whose life is defined not by socially contrived 
structures, but mediated by the Presence of Christ. Loder was one of the first to identify the terribly 
destructive drives of achievement-oriented personality, whose aspirations for success at all costs he 
considered catastrophic for the human spirit and antithetical to the way of Christ. The A-type personality 
operates from a value system, rooted in the Protestant reformation and deeply embedded in American 
culture. “It is celebrated and entrenched wherever there is simple self-denial, devotion to duty, and the 
pious expectation that worldly benefits will come to reward the economically ‘righteous’ man.” 
Although Americans (and they are not alone in this) celebrate this lifestyle, usually reinforced by the 
church (both in its theology and practice), it cannot be adopted uncritically. This is because, as Loder 
explains, “self-destruction (destruction of the self-potential) is the ultimate outcome of a repressive, 
planned, purposeful existence at the center of achievement-orientation.”®® The reason why this way of 
being has the potential of being so deadly is because the “central tendency of the achievement-orientation
®®T7M, p. 6.
®®7TM, pp. 6-7 
®’T7M, pp. 6-27.
®®James E. Loder, “The Fashioning of Power: A Christian Perspective on the Life-Style 
Phenomenon,” Alexander J. McKelway and E. David Willis, editors. Context o f Contemporary Theology: 
Essays in Honor o f Paul Lehmann (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974), p. 191.
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is repressive of a deep human cry for assurance of ascriptive (not achieved) worth. The outcome is 
aggression, tension, domineering control, and cruelty.”®® It is most destructive because it “repressively 
belittles the achiever’s latent wish for ascriptive worth, forcing him into self-justifying behavior.”®® The 
tendency of socialization systems described in the last chapter thus only reinforces the self-destruction 
because an individual is searching for identity and inherent worth, instead of worth granted based upon 
one’s ability to function in terms of the way a society deems valuable.
When transposed into the Christian context, these same drives hinder one’s ability to hear the 
gospel and prevent one from venturing out in faith, living a life that will probably be deemed 
unacceptable by the wider society. When the church “tries to educate the achiever.. .without actually 
confronting his style of life,” it produces extraordinary confusion for the believer. The result is that the 
“achiever will take only ‘appropriate’ and therefore probably only ‘successful’ educational risks, leam 
the ‘winning’ answers, interpret them to justify his style and assume - perhaps not erroneously - that the 
church is celebrating his way of life. It is poignantly evident that if the educational work of the church, 
from its education of the public to the education of its professionals, cannot deal with the solidarity and 
pervasiveness of such a style, then it cannot teach in any way which is commensurate with the claims 
of the gospel it teaches.”®'
Loder deplores the way the theological culture of the church (primarily Protestantism) “serves
®®Loder, p. 191. Cf. the work of one of Loder’s doctoral advisors, David C. McClelland, who 
was a pioneer in understanding the drives of the achievement-oriented personality. The Achieving 
Society (1961), The Roots o f Consciousness (1962), Power: The Inner Experience (1975), and The 
Achievement Motive (1953, with Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell).
®°Loder, p. 192. “If it fails, it leaves him with nothing but his aggression, tension, domineering 
tendencies and cruelty. If it succeeds, it creates an environment in which those around him are not only 
enabled but feel compelled to make the affirmations he has denied himself. This leaves his ‘asceticism’ 
unappreciated, and his ‘sociological hugs and kisses’ may only stand to condemn rather than reward him. 
(p. 192)”
®'Loder, p. 192. These are the general themes Loder takes up in Religion and the Public Schools 
(New York: Association Press, 1965). I have chosen not to focus on this work because Loder wrote it 
to reflect the viewpoints of many educators and religious professional addressing these issues in the 
1960's. It is not a dependable source for discerning Loder’s viewpoints and Loder regretted that it was 
published under his name (from a conversation with Dana Wright). Loder’s personalism, however, 
comes through in the closing remarks in which me makes the point that “persons are more important than 
particular doctrines,” . . .  “The unique worth of the human personality and moral responsibility are the 
elemental values which pertain respectively to the individual and corporate domains.” “Religion is not 
fundamentally sectarian but fundamentally human. His distrust of institutions is also evident, 
“Institutions such as the public schools, however vital to society, must be the servants of personal 
fulfillment, and the agents and arenas of responsible moral action. This principle stands in opposition 
to the dehumanizing trends in a differentiated and highly industrialized society such as the present-day 
United States.” Finally, “the supreme human fulfillment is spiritual in character, and it is achieved 
through participation in the devotional activity of the community of the faithful, (pp. 122-125)” For the 
only review of this volume see John R. Green, The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 59 (1966): 66-67.
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to sacralize a distinctively self-destructive pattern.”®’ This is because the Christian experience strikes 
at the heart of one ’ s personality, changing one ’ s perspective of God, self, world and thus shaping the way 
a life is lived out. “To speak of the Christian life is not simply to speak of a particular symbol system 
which may be cast like a sacred canopy over a variety of dynamic patterns. Rather it is to point to a 
particular alteration of the core structure which changes the total pattern.”®’ To be a Christian does not 
mean that one is completely free from the socially-constructed drives which shape identity. However, 
socially-constructed expectations smother the ability to choose from the strength of the “I.” Through 
conviction one is given “autonomy” over these drives. This is because the “Christian life-style is 
grounded in a conviction not ultimately reducible to a socially-constructed web of values and 
behavior.”®" The believer becomes aware of these drives and increasingly is given the ability to either 
choose for or against them. Eventually, one comes to see this drive as an addiction. But, as Loder notes, 
“Christian conviction is more than awareness.” It is not simply self-knowledge. The conviction of God, 
because it involved a psychic change, bestows freedom - the freedom to choose for or against self- 
destruction. Conviction is therefore “the act of God which does not alter achieving potential so-much 
as it restores the freedom to choose for or against achieving. In Christian conversion, the achieving ego 
does not collapse, but latent patterns such as those demanding achievement lose their compulsive 
tendency and their power to suppress choice.”®® Conviction allows for greater freedom of choice.
Loder’s understanding of conviction is an incoi-poration of themes developed in his doctoral 
dissertation and a further explication of what I see as the relational-personalist influence upon his work. 
An encounter with God does not result in the annihilation of the ego’s drive for achievement. Instead, 
the Convictor engages the convicted person and extends the freedom to redirect the drives of the ego in 
a potentially life-affirming way. This leads him to identify “the definitive core of the Christian style [as] 
conviction,” a conviction he structurally defines as an “antithesis-in-synthesis.” The formula he uses for 
this, +(I/not-I)+ will be further expounded and expanded upon in The Transforming Moment and later 
works, becoming one of the principal tenets of his theology. Let us examine this insight.
The formula of conviction represents two parties, an “I” (represented by I) and a Thou 
(represented by, +). The “I” is the “subjective source of choice” and the “socially constructed patterns 
which have given shape to the self throughout the individual’s history.”®® Here we come to see Loder’s
®’Loder, p. 194. 
®’Loder, p. 194. 
®"Loder, p. 194. 
®®Loder, p. 195.
®Such as “the functionally autonomous, achievement-oriented ego” discussed earlier, p. 195.
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application of Freudian psychodynamics, specifically the drives of the ego.®’ The “not-F’ speaks to the
self-destructive drive of the ego, concealed within ego. It is “the primal sense o f . .. absence.” The “not-
I” is formed by what Loder calls a “reaction formation dynamic.” It is the “severe pain of recognizing
the unyielding silence and emptiness of ‘absence’ which seals the individual into whatever personal
presence may be available and on whatever terms that presence demands.”®® It begins at birth and
continues throughout the stages of human development. We will explore the psychodynamics more fully
later on, but here in this essay we find Loder fleshing how his theory of ego-formation. A child:
. . .  has to accept “absence” as the price of his own real presence in the world. But he 
will accept as little “absence” as possible because from the beginning it is associated 
with intense pain. This is his condition as an emerging self, an “I.” All his choices, by 
what they negate as well as by what they confirm, serve to remind him that his emerging 
identity in any form presupposes “absence.”
The “I” naturally stiuggles against “absence” as if it were a mortal enemy. It becomes 
narcissistic, omnipotent, and omniscient, popular, feared, manipulative, “well-adjusted,”
“grizzly realistic,” etc. in order to fill the “absence” with some fantastic extension of 
itself.®®
The I/not-I remains in constant tension and is never resolved.
Loder sees this ego dynamic as a universal human condition, regardless of cultures. He does not 
attempt to prove this, but relies heavily upon his reading of Freud. Fowler raises the important question, 
which he does not answer, as to how “universal the radical defensiveness and self-assertiveness of ego 
as the principle motive of development really is.” Does the experience of Freud or Kierkegaard speak 
for everyone? Did Jesus see human nature in this way?’® Loder proceeds based upon the assumption
®’Freud’s early work stressed the “pleasure principle,” the libidinal drive of the ego defined 
primarily by sexuality. Later in his life, Freud reevaluated his theories and identified a deeper drive at 
work, what he called the “death instinct.” He came to call this “a dual drive theory of motivation.” There 
is the drive of the “life instinct,” libido and the drive of the “death instinct,” destrudo. See LS, p. 21. 
Loder stresses the theological significance of usually neglected aspects of Freud’s death instinct (p. 21). 
Cf. Sigm\mâ.VxQ\xà, Beyond the Pleasure Principle {Loriàom International Psychoanalytic Press, 1922).
®®Loder, p. 195.
®®Loder, p. 196. “The ‘I’ and its extensions are relentlessly pursued by the ‘not-L’ This is the 
binary structure of being and knowing. Speaking of the ‘not-F rather than of absence also stresses a 
crucial aspect of conviction. Namely, negation is not ultimately prior to being; it exists as Sartre [1905- 
1980] says ‘on the surface of being.’ The ‘Not-F is ultimately derivative from the ‘I,’ but proximately 
it remains in an incessant tension with the being of the ‘I.’ (p. 196)”
’®Fowler & Loder, p. 147. Ajit Prasadam, a doctoral student at Princeton Seminary who began 
his studies under Loder, is writing a Christian education curriculum using Loder’s transformational 
narrative for Christians in India. This pattern is not restricted to Western anthropology. See also Heije 
Faber’s comparison of Joachim Scharfenberg and Horst Kampfer’s Leben mit Symbolen and Loder’s 
TTM, in which he identifies a difference in understanding religious experience based upon their 
respective European and American contexts. “Zicht op de stuctuur van de godsdienstige ervaring: twee 
boeken,” Nederlands Theologische Tijdschrift 36 (1982): 311-331.
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that the ego drives are universal. But it is important to note that Loder is not trying to reduce the 
importance of the ego, but to free the ego to choose beyond its defense mechanisms which fundamentally 
are reactions to absence, or more specifically to death itself as death is universal.’*
Continuing, in conviction “the T’ stripped of its narcissism, omnipotence, etc., accepts itself as 
a carrier of ‘absence.’” In other words, conviction heightens or deepens one’s awareness of the I/not-I 
tension as constitutive of personal existence where the acceptance of this condition becomes “the very 
ground of our authenticity as human beings.” To live convictionally, “the ‘I/not-I’ tension is 
inescapable. Hence, conviction is without illusions.””  Thus, it can be said that conviction produces a 
greater degree of realism.
But this authenticity cannot be achieved thiough the efforts of the “I,” because it cannot 
constitute itself before the presence of its negation. “The establishment of the priority of being human 
over against its negation is beyond the power of the ‘ I. ”’ Therefore, authenticity is granted in and through 
the Convictor (+), who brackets and sustains the tension with affirmation and even enables the tension, |
including the power of negation (not-I), “to choose authentically for oneself and at the same time i
preserves contingency upon the Convictor for any such choices.””  Grateful for Alfred Whitehead’s (
1861-1947 ) observation that “style is the fashioning of power,” Loder attests that the Christian style 
is the fashioning of God’s power at work in the world, engaged in the work of conviction, “and that by 
such a convictional structure the Spirit of God is given human formation.”’" jiiIII. The Logic of Conviction and the Grammar of Transformation I
In the discussion of Loder’s doctoral dissertation in the first chapter, I referred to Herbert I
ISilberer’s study of the “hypnagogic vision.” We will take this up now. In his research exploring the j
Itransfonnative nature of visions and fantasies, Silberer identified a general pattern in all experiences, a !iparadigm consisting of a five-step sequence: “Endopsychic conflict; a moment of belief in an ‘image;’ |
resolution of the conflict; bestowal of the criterional state of consciousness; anagogic analysis of the
’‘Loder relies heavily here upon the writings of Freud’s daughter, Anna Freud, The Ego and The j
Mechanisms o f Defense (Madison, CT: International Universities Press, 1993). “Defense,” as Sigmund i
Freud defined it in 1894 (“The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence”), is “the ego’s struggle against painful or !
unendurable ideas or affects.” In Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) Freud defined defense as i
“the general designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead !
to a neurosis,. . . ” Anna Freud, pp. 42ff. i
’’Loder, p. 197. ;
’’Loder, p. 197. !
74Loder, p. 198.
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image present.””  Although he never quotes Silberer in TTM, this sequence serves as the foundation out 
of which Loder will establish his own hypnagogic paradigm and eventually a “convictional knowing 
event.” Loder develops a way to talk about all forms of knowing that yield new insight and new 
understandings of reality. In TTM, Loder argues that a “logic of transformation” can be identified in all 
major forms of knowing - scientific knowing, esthetic knowing (as in the arts), therapeutic knowing (as 
in psychotherapy). The logic “tiansposes from context to context, generating a multiplicity of personal, 
social, and cultural expressions.” Transformational “knowing events” occur in all expressions of human 
intellectual endeavor as a counter-force to the process of socialization.’® Transformation is thus viewed 
as “a deep structure of experience that generates a multiplicity of personal, social and cultural 
expressions.””  We will look at the mature expression of this paradigm as seen in TTM.
A “knowing event,” as Loder calls it, consists of five steps that “intertwines novelty and
continuity” and correspond to Silberer’s sequence: (1) conflict: (2) an interlude for scanning; (3) |7 iconstructive act of the imagination; (4) release; (5) interpretation. Loder was continually searching for j
the best way to express the five steps in a simple manner. In his inaugural address at Princeton, for !
example, the sequence is described in this fashion: “( 1 ) a conflict bourne with persistence; (2) interlude i
and scanning; (3) insight felt with intuitive force; (4) release and redirection of the psychic energy bound 
up with the original conflict; and (5) interpretation which tests the insight for coherence with the terms 
of the conflict and for correspondence with the public context of the original context.”’® In my I
’®WKC, p. 5; RPCF, pp. 178ff.
’®Elizabeth Frykberg, “Karl Barth’s Theological Anthropology: An Analogical Critique 
Regarding Gender Relations,” Studies in Reformed Theology andHistoiy, I (1993): 12. This essay is an 
elaboration of her doctoral dissertation which incorporated some of Loder’s ideas. “Spiritual 
Transfoimation and the Creation of Humankind in the Image of God, Male and Female: A Study of Karl 
Barth’s Understanding of the ^analogia relationis ' Correlated with Psychosexual and Psychosocial 
Development Theory,” Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, NJ (1989) TTM, pp. 44-63.
’’James E, Loder, “Transformation in Christian Education,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 
III (1980): 14. This is Loder’s inaugural address to the seminary community upon appointment as the 
Mary D. Synnott Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Christian Education given in Miller Chapel, 
12“' December 1979. This structure of transformation “appears in virtually all the major disciplines 
foundational to Christian education” and serves a methodological rubric to engage in interdisciplinary 
studies(p. 14).
’®rrM2, pp. 37ff.
’®Loder, “Transformation in Christian Education,” pp. 14-15. Italics in the text. In “Creativity 
in and beyond Human Development,” Gloria Durka & Joanmarie Smith, Aethestic Dimensions o f 
Religious Education (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), Loder applies the structure of transformation to 
an understanding of the creative process. This creative act has five steps, he argues: (1) disturbance of 
equilibrium; (2) interlude or the scanning of possibilities; (3) the moment of insight; (4) release of 
energy; (5) summary and interpretation (p. 220).
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estimation, the latter overview does a better job of describing the sti'ucture of transformation, especially 
when this pattern is applied to experiences of conviction. Silberer’s work provides Loder with a 
framework to talk about his own convictional experiences discussed in the last chapter. They followed 
the same general sequence, hence the appeal. Our consideration will be supplemented by an 
unpublished paper in which Loder further modifies the paradigm.®® Let us look at each step.
All knowing events occur within a given context or frame of reference. They are “situated” and 
“depend initially on assumptions about and within their situations for the meaning of the knowing act.”®' 
The first step, conflict, begins with a “rupture in the knowing context,” which questions the assumptive 
context. It is primarily “a fundamental psychic conflict, engrossing one to the point where his thought
cannot escape the boundaries set by some emotional disposition or inclination ”®’ Before the conflict
can be creatively addressed it must be brought to consciousness.®’ There are varying degrees of conflict, 
but “the more one cares about the conflict the more power will be the knowing event.” This is because, 
“In fact,” as Loder wisely observes, “one cannot come to know what one does not care about.”®" The 
greater the conflict, the greater must it be “bourne with persistence.” This requires care and even love 
to undergo the “rupture” caused by the conflict.®’
The logic of the sequence pushes one from conflict to an interlude for scanning. This is “a 
moment’s hesitation... in the effort to sustain the conflict.”®® The scanning stage was added by Loder 
after the publication of RPCF. After a further analysis of Kierkegaard’s stages of faith in which, notes 
Batson, “reason is frustrated against the Paradox and must relax its hold on consciousness.”®’ In the 
TTM, Loder pulls from Polanyi ’ s work and sees this as a time of “indwelling the conflicted situation with
®®C. Daniel Batson’s doctoral dissertation, “Creativity and Religious Development: Toward a 
Structural/Functional Psychology of Religion,” (Princeton Theological Seminary, 1971), makes use of 
this paper. The paper was written in 1966 and was at the time (1971) the fullest explication of the 
paradigm. Batson was Loder’s first doctoral student at Princeton.
®'7TM2, p. 37.
®’Loder paper, p. 7 cited in Batson, p. 89.
®’Batson, p. 89.
®"Here, Loder appears to be drawing from Michael Polanyi’s discussion of the essential 
component of “commitment” required in every individual’s attempt to solve a problem. “The structure 
of commitment, which serves as a logical matrix to the personal, is most clearly exemplified by the act 
of consciously solving a problem.” Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 301.
®®r7M2, p. 37.
®®Loder paper, p. 11 cited in Batson, p. 90.
®’Cf. Philosophical Fragments, Batson, p. 90.
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empathy for the problem and its parts.” This is a period of both conscious and unconscious searching 
for a resolution to the conflict, testing ideas and proposing hypotheses. Scanning requires a diversion 
which comes through a moment of relaxation."’ It cannot obsessively focus upon the problem at hand 
nor can it be forced. Depending on the size of conflict, scanning can take a few seconds or it can take 
a number of years."® The empathie dimensions of the interlude are important to note because “it takes 
an investment of caring energy to hold the problem, partial solutions, and the whole state of irresolution 
together. . . . This is the step of waiting, wondering, following hunches, and exhausting the 
possibilities.”"®
The third step in a knowing event is the constructive act o f the imagination. This is the moment 
of insight or intuition. Here the image, vision, or fantasy “appears on the border between the conscious 
and the unconscious, usually with convincing force, and conveys in a form readily available to 
consciousness the essence of the resolution.”'"® For a further explication of this step, Loder draws upon 
Bernard Lonergan’s (1904-1985) Insight, Harold Rugg’s (1886-1960) Imagination, Aiihur Koestler’s 
(1905-1983) analysis of human creativity in The Creative Act. It is Koestler’s discussion of 
“bisociation” that he finds most helpful. The image is an experience of insight, which “contains the 
elements of the conflict but it represents a resolution to the conflict in a simple, more manageable form; 
it is an ‘easier way to think’ the same material that could not be thought in the state of conflict, step 
one.”'"' As Loder defines it, “it is two habitually incompatible frames of reference converging, usually
'’’Loder sees this equivalent to an experience of “free association” often used in psychoanalysis, I
“which attempts to allow one to make ‘creative’ responses to [one’s] personal history through relaxation |
of the cognitive control of the present.” Batson, p. 90. Î
'’®rrM2, p. 37. Such as “when one stares out the window briefly to recall a telephone number 
or, . . . as when one labors inwardly to resolve piece by piece some of the deep psychological hurts of 
childhood.(p. 37)” |
.j'’®“It is this step in the forming of the knowing event that leads into the fuller or more I
comprehensive implications of the conflict and accordingly searches out a solution in the most universal I
terms (p. 38).” On “indwelling” see Polanyi, pp. 195-202. On the relationship between indwelling and j
commitment in problem solving see Polanyi, pp. 64, 321. I
i
'"®T7M2, p. 38. Cf. Susanne Johnson, “Religious Experience as Creative, Revelatoiy and 
Transforming Event: The Implications of Intense Christian Experience for the Christian Education 
Process,” p. 21. Doctoral dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary (1983). Loder was her doctoral 
advisor. {
'"'Loder paper, p. 11-12 cited in Batson, p. 91. See also Carol Lakey Hess’ evocative article,
“Abomination and Creativity: Shaking the Order of the Cosmos,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 15 
( 1994): 28-43, in which she identifies the creativity with moral revulsion within the Jewish and Christian |
traditions. “The biblical understanding of grace often threatens our understanding of the order of things. |
(p. 37)” Hess was one of Loder’s doctoral students. Her dissertation was “Educating in the Spirit,” ;
Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey (1990).
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with surprising suddenness, to compose a meaningful unity.”" ’ It is “the smallest unit necessary to an 
imaginative resolution and reconstruction of the problematic situation, but on the other hand, its inherent 
complexity maybe almost infinite.”
Theologically, imagination is elevated to an even more prominent place in faith and theological 
reflection when the Holy Spirit engages the human spirit and establishes new frameworks of meaning. 
The imagination, while formative and creative, still needs to be guided by the transforming work of the 
Holy Spirit. It was Kierkegaard who said that “the elder Fichte quite correctly assumed, that even in 
relation to knowledge, that imagination is the origin of the categories,” they derive from the imagination 
-  the productive Einbildungskraft (power o f the imagination). Kierkegaard claimed “imagination . . .  
is not a capacity [i. e., faculty], as are the others..., it is the capacity instar omnium [for all faculties]. 
When all is said and done, whatever feeling, knowing, and willing a person has depends upon what 
imagination he has, upon how that person reflects himself - that is, upon imagination.”"’ The time when 
the Holy Spirit most profoundly acts in the transfoimation of the human spirit is when the imagination 
is put at the service of the ongoing working of Christ in the world. Imagination is the creative work of 
the human spirit that needs to be transformed by the Christomorphic presence of the Holy Spirit.""
It is important to stress here that Loder makes a distinction between imaginative and imaginary. 
Resolution comes through an imaginative act and not an imaginary one, because an imaginative act has 
the power to resolve a problem by reconstructing the way in which a particular context is framed; 
whereas an imaginary act only leads to further illusion. This is why the “construction of insight [through 
the imaginative faculties of the knower] sensed with convincing force, that constitutes the turning point 
of the knowing event. It is by this central act that the elements of the ruptured situation are transformed, 
and a new perception, perspective, or world view is bestowed on the knower.”"® Here, especially we 
see the creative nature of consciousness.
The reason that consciousness is not merely epiphenomenal is that it is always a creative
"’See Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York: Philosophical Library, 1970), pp.3ff; Harold Rugg,
Imagination (New York: Harpers, 1963); Arthur Koestler, The Creative Act (New York: Macmillan 
Press, 1967), pp. 105ff. Cf. Lonergan’s framework for understanding creativity in Method in Theology 
(New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 57. Lonergan provides framework for creativity in which 
“meaning is embodied or carried in human intersubjectivity, in art, in symbols, in language, and in the 
lives and deeds of persons, (p. 57)”
" ’Referring to Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) who emphasized the “productive power of I
the imagination” in Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre cited in Soren Kierkegaard, J
The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, Edited |
and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), |
p. 175,30-31. j
""TKM, pp. 240-264. |I
"®T7M2, p. 38. Italics in the text. |
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event. It is new, an intrinsically novel synthesis of the factors which give rise to it and 
with respect to which it is utterly indigenous. For all its embeddedness in the matrix of 
experience it is incalculable, immersed in its context yet wholly serendipitous.
The fourth step has two dimensions that can be described as release and opening. First, there 
is the release of energy bound up in sustaining the conflict. “The release of energy is a response of the 
unconscious to the resolution and the evidence that one’s personal investment in the event has reached 
a conclusion; the conflict is over.”’'*^ This leads to an experience of opening, “opening of the knower 
to him- or herself and the contextual situation.” It is an awareness of being freed from  the conflict and 
freed for  a sense of self-transcendence. This is the moment of “Aha! ” or “My Lord and my God! (John 
20:28)” It is the moment of praise, the moment of joy. Without this release and a heightened self- 
awareness, the resolution is not sufficiently resolved. The unconscious will continue to scan for a 
resolution. When the resolution comes, new associations will be made with the original conflict not 
previously noticed, with implications beyond the framework of the original conflict, “thereby immersing 
the knower more richly and deeply than ever in his or her assumptional world.”’'*®
The freedom gained and experienced in the moment(s) of release and opening does not eliminate 
conflict. The debilitating effects of the conflict are dealt with, but this leads to another form of conflict 
that comes with the tension caused between the insight the implications of living out the resolution 
within a broader context or environment. Resolution is not synonymous with the reduction of tension. 
Loder’s desire is “to emphasize the increased encounter and therefore sustenance of tension (although 
of a voluntary rather than oppressive sort) to which this process leads.
Loder identifies the fifth step as interpretation, which entails “the imaginative solution into the 
behavioral and/or symbolically constructed world of the original context.” The interpretation has two 
movements. Moving backward, Loder calls this congruence, which “makes explicit, congruent 
connections from the essential stixictures of the imaginative construct back from the original conditions
p. 130. 
pp. 38-39.
’'*®rrM2, p. 39. 
p. 39.
’^ “Batson, p. 92. We know from Batson’s use of the Loder paper that Loder was reading 
Merlau-Ponty during this period. Loder wi'ites: “Phenomenoligically speaking (Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology o f Perception) relative freedom from perceptual distortion minimizes the sense of 
mystery and doubt which surrounds the dichotomy between a percept and belief in the object perceived; 
when this mystery -  which is persistently baffling -  is dissolved, an immensely increased appreciation 
of “the outer scene” follows together with a new capacity for objectivity. (By “objectivity” I mean that 
objects are less autistically distorted and therefore a viable corrective to subjective distortion is now 
operative in the thinking of the subject.)” Loder paper, p. 16 cited in Batson, p. 92.
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. Moving forward is a process of correspondence, which “makes apparent congruence public and 
a matter of consensus. Thus, the imaginative construct is examined for its correspondence to a 
consensual view of the world."’^ ’ The image or insight “moves beyond immediacy into verbal symbols 
and into c o m m u n i t y . T h i s  is not simply conformity to the wider view of reality. Instead, the 
imaginative constiuct provides a better, more accurate way of interpreting reality. Congruence or 
“coherence” means the resolution is equal to the conflict as rendered by the insight. “Negative insight” 
results when the insight is a response to an inaccurate understanding of the original conflict. When this
occurs the conflict is either dismissed or redefined and the sequence begins all over a g a i n . !i
It is important to note that for Loder, unlike Silberer, that the sequence is synchronic and not 
diachronic. One can enter into the gi'ammar of transformation at any point. It is not unidirectional or s
linear. But because the sequence of transformation has a logic and force of its own, once one enters into 
the pattern the underlying grammar will move towards the resolution of the conflict, “to resolve conflict 
through the creation of new knowledge. This is similar, says Loder, to Frank Kermode’s “sense of
an ending,” found in the grammar of most n a r r a t i v e s . A  parallel can be made with music. The ear 
demands a resolution to the tension contained in a unresolved chord.Anything that appears unfinished 
demands an ending, and humanity will go to great lengths “to satisfy the urge toward completion.”’”
Whether one enters the sequence before or after a moment of insight, the logic of the grammar will move 
one through all five steps. One can work either forward or backward along the sequence, with relation 
to insight.
’” rrM 2, p. 39.
p. 194.
’” Loder, “Transformation in Christian Education,” p. 15. 
p. 41.
’” Frank Kermode, The Sense o f An Ending (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); TTM2, p.
41.
‘^ ^Cf. Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), pp. 39ff, 11 Iff.
’” 77M2, p. 41.
’^ *7TM2, 41. “Transformation in Christian Education,” p. 15. Loder notes, for example, that 
sometimes we have answers before we know what the questions are. This is not intellectual “sloppiness, 
it was Einstein’s procedure for discovery. He knew intuitively that there was something wrong with the 
Newtonian world view and that he had the answer somewhere in himself when he first read Newton’s 
[ 1642-1727] Principia Mathematica. If one enters the process in the middle, transformational grammar 
would call for one to work backward into the latent conflict resolved by the insight and forward again 
into interpretation.” Sometimes the conflict can be latent, but an individual searches for the ability to
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Earlier, we noted that a knowing event contains both continuity and novelty. Continuity is 
insured by the internal logic of transformational grammars. Novelty results from “the opposing force 
of discontinuity,” from the “power of a mediating image, insight, intuition, or vision.”'”  It is the 
presence of this power, or more correctly this “mystery,” Loder suggests, that makes it impossible to 
reproduce or force the sequence toward its completion. “No matter how one searches with penetrating 
conscious analyses to make logically tight connections, the insightful resolution to conflict is always a 
gift that takes awareness by surprise.”'”  The mediation is literally a new way that is given from “a realm 
of reality beyond the consciousness itself.” And when the resolution is given, Loder explains, in a way 
that once again reinforces the relational-personalist themes in this thought, that “self-transcendence ..
. springs into being spontaneously like a still heart suddenly resuscitated.” By self-transcendence Loder 
means “conscious of being conscious,” an awakening, and in that consciousness one is given the freedom 
to choose.'^' In this sense, the convictional sequence is not neurotic if the result gives one the ability to 
choose freely for reality as mediated by the image. “The imaginative mediator liberates the “I,” impels 
the knower toward new explorations of his or her world and towards those choices that promises to 
exercise transcendence and hold open the future. Discontinuity effected by an imaginative construct is 
the key and center of the knowing event; indeed, it is just this discontinuity that makes transformation 
possible,”'”
As stated previously, the logic of transformation can be found in all forms of knowing and 
situations of human existence. Loder claims it is “anchored in the very marrow of existence.” But this 
is not to say, avoiding all reductionisms, that transformations that have a distinctively religious quality
articulate the conflict and seeks its resolution. This is the style of “seekers” or “wonderers.” Others still, 
may awake from a dream feeling refreshed and energized and then be thrown into the sequence to 
recover, if possible, the dynamics of the dream which addressed the conflict and provided a resolution 
(p. 15).
'” 7TM2, p. 4L This insight both echoes and extends Loder’s doctoral dissertation. In this way 
J. Steve Rhodes’ contention that “Loder’s very emphasis on radical discontinuity seems to be made at 
the expense of continuity,” is a deficient reading of TTM. See “Conversion as Crisis and Process: A 
Comparison of Two Models,” Journal o f Psychology and Christianity, 5 (1986): 21-22. Rliodes fails to 
appreciate, like Fowler (see below) the power of negation that seeks to undo whatever gains are made 
by the developing self. Continuity is never denied in Loder’s understanding of transformation. His point 
is that continuity is given by something other than the ego, namely the Holy Spirit who sustains and 
reforms the human spirit to choose life.
p. 41.
' '^ TTM2, p. 41. In a knowing event, “stress is placed on the power of the insight to generate new 
loiowledge from reality beyond the immediate boundaries of consciousness (p. 225).”
'” 7TM2, p .41. The freedom to choose is constitutive of a “criterional consciousness” as we saw 
in the previous chapter.
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are merely the product of transformational patterns built into existence. Instead, Loder claims that 
“central to the Christian faith is that human transformations must themselves be transformed.”'”  What 
is more, Loder contends that it is precisely this logic of transformation which resonates most profoundly 
with the way one experiences the presence of God. The logic of transformation in all forms of human 
knowing corresponds to the logic of transformation inherent to the Spirit of God. “The likeness is 
established by the logic of transformation.”'”  This is not a simple one-to-one relationship. While there 
is a likeness, there is also a difference because transformational logic is “transposed from one level to 
the other, making the human spirit conformable to the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit intelligible to the 
human.” However, the difference rests in the fact that “on the human level, the ungrounded self is seen 
as the origin and destiny of the human spirit, but on the divine level human transformations are 
transformed and the origin and destiny of the Holy Spirit is the Holy One.”'”  This is the basic premise 
behind what Loder has come to call the analogis spiritus. Before moving to a discussion of the divine- 
human relationship, let us further explore the drives of the human spirit.
IV. The Human Spirit’s Drive Toward Meaning
We take up here Loder’s understanding of the human spirit. By the human spirit, Loder wants 
to distance himself from a uniquely expressivist understanding, that is the human spirit conveyed through 
“arts, music, literature, sculpture, painting, drama, dance, and the like.” He wants to be more specific 
by saying that the human spirit is an exocentric, self-relationality. By exocenti'ic, Loder draws from 
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s (b. 1928) use of the phenomenology of Max Scheler (1874-1928). In M an’s 
Place in Society, Scheler’s phenomenological consideration of humanity, influenced by the personalism 
of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), led him to believe that what makes humanity unique is its “openness 
to the world,” in that “the spiritual being is . . .  no longer subject to its drives and environment.”'^ " This 
spirit “transcends what we call Tife’ in the most general sense.”'”  Loder adapts Pannenberg’s use of 
the word “exocentricity” to describe “human openness to the world and self-transcendence; . .  .in this
‘"^7TM2, p. 64. “From the standpoint of Christian conviction, all of the preceding 
transformations [in scientific, esthetic, and therapeutic knowing], transposed from context to context, 
are forms of knowing that reflect, in respect to the character of each context, that decisive transformation 
by which we come to know Christ, (p. 64)”
'” T7M2, p. 94. Italics in the text. 
'” T7M2, p. 94.
!66i"Wolfhart Pannenberg,^«fArqpo/ogy in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J, O’Connell 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), p. 35. See also, LS, p. 5.
'"’Max Scheler’s Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Man's Place in the Cosmos, 1928), 
cited in Pannenberg, p. 36.
95
one word [Pannenberg] designates human spirit."'”
By self-relationality, I refer to Loder’s use of Kierkegaard, but it also points to his reliance upon
the research of neurologist. Wilder Penfield. Penfield’s studies are used extensively in The Transforming
Moment, The Knight’s Move and The Logic o f the Spirit, In one study, Penfield describes work he did
with epileptic patients, placing extremely sensitive electrical probes in the brain during open skull
surgery while the patients remained conscious under a local anesthetic, The results of the study helped
to locate the functional capacity of various sections of the brain. When Penfield touched a section of the
cortex, a patient would move his arm or hear music. But each time the patient would say to Penfield,
''You did that, /d id n ’t.’’ Penfield could not “locate the “I” who said, “I didn’t.” This led him to the
conclusion that there are “two essences.” “[0]ne would be the brain, its structures, and programmed
patterns of behavior; the other would be the “I” who had the capacity to enter into the program and ‘blaze
new trails through the neuronal structure,’ create new programs, and redirect previously programmed
behavior. Tliis is the source of choice, meaning, and belief.”'’" This is not “proof’ of a Cartesian
dualism, but what Loder calls the “strange loop in the brain,” a self-relatedness.
Self-relatedness is a strange loop because the statement of the patient is invariably made 
in his own language and formulated as a clear idea, recognizable to all who speak his 
language. That is, it is within a preprogrammed system of language and thought that the 
transcendence of the “I” appears, and yet it expresses itself as being in some other 
respect outside that system of language and thought. This meaningful combination of 
continuity and contradiction makes this a strange loop, which resides at the very core 
of what we take to be distinctively human; our powers of self-transcendence and self- 
relatedness in choice, meaning and belief.'’'
Self-relatedness, combined with the an exocentric openness to the world, endows the human spirit with 
the capacity to be creative, to compose a world. “Mind, then, is the making of meaning, the creator of 
objects, concepts, myths.
p. 5. It was H. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (1928) who preferred |
the word “exocentricity” to speak of this “openness to the world.” Pannenberg, p. 34.
'” 77M, pp. 75-77; TKM, pp. 43-44; LS, p. 5. Cf. Wilder Penfield, The Mystery o f the Mind \
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). ;
'’"Z/S, p. 6. Penfield was criticized for establishing this hypothesis. The double-essence theory 
challenges the prevailing positions of neurological science. Loder values Penfield’s study and makes 
considerable use of it precisely because it is non-reductionistic, questioning the assumption that “all I
mental processes will be brought under the analysis and description of neurological findings.” Loder i
suggests that since this form of reduction is not viable in quantum mechanics, which is inherently |
relational, “it is much less likely to be viable for the study of human behavior where subjectivity is the 1
essence of the ‘object’ investigated just as it is of the investigator himself {TKM, p. 44). '
T
'’'Z^, p. 6. I
'’^TYM, p. 76. ^
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Thus, we see that Loder is interested in the way the human spirit is at work in every knowing
event, striving for deeper meaning and integrated wholeness. This is the work of the human spirit across
the span of one’s life. By “meaning,” we mean a subjective experience, a “psychological state which
can affirm life.””'' The developmental psychologist, Robert Kegan, sees human being as a:
. . . meaning-making organism. . .and what a human organism organizes is meaning.
Thus it is not that a person makes meaning, as much as that the activity of being a 
person is the activity of meaning-making. ‘Percept without concept is blind, ’ Kant said.
‘Experience is not what happens to you,’ Aldous Huxley [1894-1963] said, ‘it’s what 
you do with what happens to you.’ And the most fundamental thing we do with what 
happens to us is organize it. We literally make sense. Human being is the composing 
of meaning, including, of course, the occasional inability to compose meaning, which 
we often experience as the loss of our own composure.”'*
Consciously or unconsciously, the human spirit labors intensely to construct a world of meaning.
Phenomenologically speaking, Loder proposes a constructivist understanding of reality. Reality
is a human construction. This point has been made most notably by Alfred North Whitehead, Alfred ISchütz (1899-1959), Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (1907-1961) , all of whom advance the constructed j
nature of reality.”" This is not to say that we can make reality into anything we want it to be. Neither f|
'’"Edward F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype: Individuation and the Religious Function o f the 
Psyche (New York; Penguin Books,1987), p. 108. It does not convey “abstract meaning, at least not 
primarily, but rather living meaning which, laden with affect, relates us organically to life as a whole, 
(p. 108)”
”'*Robert Kegan, The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 11
’’"Alfred North Whitehead: “Nature gets credit which in truth should be reserved for ourselves, 
the rose for its scent, the nightingale of his song, and the sun for its radiance. The poets are entirely 
mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves and should turn them into odes of self- 
congratulations on the excellence of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, 
colorless, merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.” Cited in C. Daniel Batson; Patricia 
Schoenrade; W. Larry Ventis, Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 89. Alfred Schütz: “All our knowledge of the world in 
common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i. e. - a set of abstractions, 
generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. 
Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts 
selected from a universal context by the activities of our minds. They are, therefore, always interpreted 
facts, either facts looked at as detached from their context by an artificial abstraction or facts considered 
in their particular setting. In either case, they caiTy along their interpretational inner and outer horizon. 
This does not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality of the world. It just 
means that we grasp merely certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant to us either for 
carrying on our business of living or from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of procedures 
of thinking called the method of science.” Alfred Schütz, Collected Papers, Volume 1 : The Problem o f  
Social Reality. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 5. See also Alfred Schütz, The Phenomenology o f the 
Social World, Translated by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert, Introduction by George Walsh 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Edmund Husserl, The Crisis o f European Science 
and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Translation and
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does this view suggest that reality is an illusion, that it has no objectivity. The point is that “the meaning 
that we attach to our experience is what gives it the structure and stability of ‘reality.’ This meaning is 
very much a human creation.’’”"
Among psychologists, the Gestalt school has also advocated this viewpoint. A German word, 
Gestalt, means “form” and refers to the way we form or create experience into meaningful objects and 
relations. We construct reality based on our cognitive structures. Max Wertheimer (1880-1943) saw the 
shift from one from to another the source of creative thinking, “the processing of destroying one Gestalt 
in favor of a better one.””’ This extends the work of Jean Piaget (1896-1980) who analyzed the various 
ways children think at different stages of development. “Cognitive structures are conceptual dimensions 
on which we scale our experience; they allow us to compare one experience with another. This ability 
to classify and differentiate experiences enables us to construct a reality.” This means that our cognitive 
structures are, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, “the framework on which reality is woven.””® Shifts in 
gestalts are required in the creative act and in moments of transfonnation. When new gestalts appear, 
reality is reorganized. So that creative thought and moments of transformation may be defined ‘%s the 
process whereby one’s cognitive structures are changed toward greater flexibility and adaptability 
through greater differentiation and integration. With the emergence through creativity of new organizing 
principles, new realities are bom that allow the individual to think constructively about previously 
insoluble problems.. . .’’”®
The compositional drive is similar to what Kierkegaard called the "generative dunamis" of the 
human spirit. Loder observes that this:
Introduction by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970); Maurice Merleau- !
Ponty, The Primacy o f Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy i
o f Art, History and Politics, ed., trans. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, I
1964). Î
’’"Batson, Schoenrade, Ventis, Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective, |
p. 89. I
’’’The Gestalt school has its origins in the work of Max Wertheimer’s reflections of 1912 on the 
invention of movies. Still images are projected upon a screen in sequence and rapidity to create the 
impression that we “see” motion. “He reasoned that if we can so easily construct a movie reality from 
the experience of a series of still shots, then our power to create reality must be great indeed.” Baston, i
Schoenrade, Ventis, p. 89.
!
”®Batson, Schoenrade, Ventis, p. 90. i
Î
”®Batson, Schoenrade, Ventis, p. 94, They refer to Loder’s work only in a footnote. Yet, this i
definition of creativity is similar to the one he offers in his doctoral dissertation, “a trans-rational or 
trans-logical imaginai restructuring of one’s concept of an existential conflict allowing for increased 
encounter with one’s environment and the conflicts generated by such encounter.” This definition builds 
upon Loder’s work with the hypnagogic paradigm in RPCF. Batson, “Creativity and Religious 
Development: Toward a Structural/Functional Psychology of Religion,” p. 82.
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. . .  dynamic can be characterized as a coherent pattern of knowing which draws into a 
differentiated whole the many splintered ways we are taught to think. Although this 
pattern does not emphasize cognitive behavior, its power to shape cognition is familiar 
to us in acts of creativity and scientific discovery. It is not predominantly a passionate, 
Dionysian way of knowing, but is profoundly evident in the intuitive and affective ways 
we know each other in acts of love and compassion. It does not stress either the 
transcendent self or the immanent self at the expense of the other, but tends to 
accentuate the dual unity of the self by holding transcendence and immanence together 
and apart at the same time.
Essential to the spirit's nature is its wind-like quality; it often takes us by surprise and 
leads us where we would not otherwise go. Its deeper characteristic, however, is its 
integrity in driving toward meaning and wholeness in every complex and variegated 
context.’®"
The human spirit is at work in all knowing events. It seeks out resolution and explanation. It is 
concerned for the truth and knows that it finds the tinth when it sees it. It knows, that it knows, that it 
knows. Its determination is relentless. It will work hard, throughout a lifetime, to solve the deepest 
conflicts engendered by human existence. It will pour extraordinary amounts of energy into this task, 
using every problem solving tool at its disposal, especially reason and logic. When the resolution comes 
we know it, almost intuitively. We spontaneously respond with shouts of "Eureka" or “Hosanna - verbal 
expressions of a deeply existential awareness.
But there are limits or restrictions in the human spirit's ability to know. There are times when 
the human spirit cannot compose a world of meaning, when we are unable to see the image that can 
reorient reality. As we move away from some of the epistemological arrogance of the eighteenth 
century, with its trust in the capacity of human reason as the ultimate guide toward tiuth, we are 
regaining a renewed sense of the restrictions in all areas of knowledge, and this is especially true for 
theology. Incorporating the work of Polanyi, Torrance and Kierkegaard, Loder asserts that reason's 
participation in a knowing event, "unequivocally depends upon the image and its cognates to draw 
together an integrated picture, to put things in a new perspective, or to construct a new world view."’®’ 
However, there comes a time in every knowing event when a “rationalistic eclipse of the image 
eventually cuts off reason from its substance - indeed, from the truth it seeks to order and communicate.” 
Loder calls this a new theory of error, an “‘eikonic eclipse’: a theory of error in which rationalistic 




’®^rrM2, pp. 27,223. Torrance, Thomas F. Editor. Belief in Science and in Christian Life: The 
Relevance ofMichael Polanyi’s Thought for Christian Faith and Life (Edinburgh: The Handsel Press, 
1980); T. Torrance, The Christian Frame o f Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology 
andNatural Science. Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 1989. Transformation & Convergence
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He explains that “in knowing anything, we respond more subliminally and thus more totally than
is fully recognized. ‘We know more than we can tell,”’ as Polanyi has said.’®" That is, “objects”
encroach upon us in ways we cannot always recognize, and question the result of assumed rational
processes. These objects come upon us in experiences that we cannot always articulate in linguistic and
conceptual forms. The knower searches for a vocabulary and conceptual framework to “make sense”
of what is experienced. In the area of scientific inquiry, Loder emphasizes the point that “theory creates
the facts or the presumably indisputable aspects of knowledge.” Such theories come as “contradiction
forces the subjective mind of the theoretician to explore tacitly held theories, assumptions, and opinions,
many of which are vague or beyond the periphery of consciousness__ ”’®'* How the objects of our world
get “inside,”Loder notes, raises considerable philosophical problems. But drawing upon relational or
interactionist perspectives of human development, he recognizes a pattern typical in scientific reasoning. |
Infants first indwell the objects of their world, turning them over and over, putting them \
in their mouths, in their ears, dropping them and so on until they have incorporated the |
objects or grasped a sense of their totality. What this exploration does physically, they I
eventually learn to do mentally, turning things over in their minds instead of in their 
hands. It is on the basis of previous bodily experience that has been internalized that the i
tacit basis for the more abstract mental operations of intelligence is constructed. A i
particularly striking and familiar example is that learning to crawl as an infant is j
fundamental to the coordination and organization of the mental operations involved in I
later learning to read. This is all to say that subjective involvement is not arbitrary, nor |
is it a matter of choice. It is inevitable in the knowledge of any and all objects.’®" I
Loder echoes Polanyi and Torrance who argue that the human knower is involved in what he/she
knows.’®" Not that it is a conscious choice, but that it is merely the way we come to know the world.
in the Frame ofKnowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations o f Scientific and Theological Enterprise 
(BelfastiChristian Journals, Ltd., 1984).
’®"TT2M2, p. 30; M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 4.
’®'*rrM2,pp. 30-31.
’®"7TM2, p. 31. Cf. James Allen, As a Man Thinketh (Bountiful, UT: MindArt, 1988), p. 83. 
“The within is ceaselessly becoming the without.” “From the state of a man’s heart proceed the 
conditions of his life; his thoughts blossom into deeds, and his deeds bear the fruitage of character and 
destiny.”
’®"Cf. Polanyi’s “personal coefficient” in Personal Knowledge. Here, Loder also reflects the 
thought of John Macmurray (1891-1960) firom a more philosophical approach in his identification of 
action (involvement) toward what is known. The “Self is a person, and that personal existence is 
constituted by the relation of persons.” The Self as Agent (Volume I of The Form o f the Personal) 
Introduction by Stanley M. Harrison (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 11-12. “The disinterested 
pursuit of the truth may be, and, I am convinced, is in fact, a condition of the practical efficacy of 
reflection. The inner life of the spirit is not merely technological: it is not condemned to a servitude to 
practical ends which are set for it without its loiowledge or consent. The essential reference of 
theoretical to practical activities does not involve the control of theory by practice. It consists even more 
significantly in the control of practice by theory; in the determination, through reflection, of the ends of
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The objects of our world or our mind are “out there,” says Loder, because they are in some “latent sense 
first ‘in here.’”
The implications are clear. “‘Objectivity’ is not only an impossible goal in knowledge but 
striving for it may actually be destructive of knowledge.” This is the deep danger of the eikonic eclipse. 
“To bring all that is subjectively entertained or tacitly held out into the presumably lucid light of 
‘objective knowledge’ may dissipate or destroy what is known.” What Loder means by this is that 
contained in any knowing event is a “blind-spot” which requires an imaginative leap.’®’ This leap cannot 
be contained by that which is reasonable. To not make this leap relegates the knower to a limited 
“world.”
Loder is not arguing that complete knowledge is available simply by making such a leap. He
is stressing the point that inherent in all knowing there is a gap, a lacuna, or blind-spot, which means we
are dependent ultimately upon larger frameworks for loiowledge of a higher intelligibility to
provide the meaning and integrated wholeness for which we are looking.
Loder puts it this way:
We all have two blind spots, one in each field of vision. Although they go unnoticed 
in everyday visual life, they are inescapable because they are the points at which the 
eyeball connects to the optic nerve and so to the brain. Cut that nerve, and the eye is 
blind.
The analogy between this and the “mind's I” is instructive. In the exercise of reason 
there is always a self doing the reasoning - but that self is blind, even to self-awareness.
The observing self will always elude the attempt at self-observation, but that blind spot 
is where reason connects to the selfhood or the thinker. Cut that nerve, and reason is 
blind.
This is not merely an analogy imposed from perception upon reason, but it is indicative 
of reason's own solution to one of its deepest dilemmas. When in any given frame of 
loiowledge reason reaches its intrinsic limit, not just for this or that problem but the limit 
in itself with respect to its object of investigation, it is not just a matter of too little 
infonnation or insufficient technology. It is finally because reason has ignored the 
reasoner. When this is accounted for, then a wider frame of knowing must be conceived 
which includes both reason and the reasoner in a relationality that is pertinent to the
action (p. 23).”
187'The educational theorist, Parker Palmer, makes a similar point. The search for objective I
knowledge “puts us in an adversary relationship with each other and our world. We seek knowledge in 
order to resist chaos, to rearrange reality, or to alter the constructions others have made. We value 
knowledge that enables us to coerce the world into meeting our needs - no matter how much violence 
we must do. . . . Objective knowledge has unwittingly fulfilled its root meaning: it has made us 
adversaries of ourselves.” To Know As We Are Known: A Spirituality o f Education (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1983), p. 23; see also Fergus Ken-, Theology After Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), pp. 23-27,187-190, Loder p. 32, "A rationalistic eclipse of the image [known] not only invites 
the fallacies implicit in an uncritical reliance on reason, but it also forfeits the truth that may be 
disclosed, even thrust on us, by an imaginative construct, integration, or vision of things."
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field of inquiry.
The results of such a reconstruction are not merely a more inclusive understanding of 
what pertains at the outer boundaries of the field of inquiiy, but a much deeper grasp of 
what was hidden at the center.
[Thus] for epistemology, this observation raises the question, Why does reason have to 
be pushed to its limits to construct a way of thinking that includes the thinker, when in 
fact the thinker has been there all along? It cannot be that such an approach is less 
sound or productive, since,...just the opposite is true. Why not recognize, in keeping 
with Michael Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge, that some degree of 
anthropocentrism is inevitable? Our aim cannot be to eliminate how we are implicated 
in what we know, but only to make anthropocentrism more inclusive and intelligible and 
to make knowledge more inclusive of it and its source and ground.’®®
Loder provides several examples of this type of thinking. In theoretical physics, Niels Bohr
(1885-1962) established a frame of “relationality called ‘complementarity’ in order to understand
quantum phenomena and the limit their behavior imposed on reason.” In the area of human nature,
Kierkegaard constructed the “Absolute Paradox,” a “frame of reference designed to focus decisively the
intractable dichotomies of our despairing human nature and its transformation by the leap of faith.” In
an attempt to explain the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the “Chalcedonian (451) theologians by faith
conceptually constructed the two natures (God and humanity) and one substance {hypostasis) creedal
formulation.” Loder says when “reason encounters its own ‘invincible ignorance,’ as physicist A. B.
Pippard [b. 1920] puts its, it reconstructs the ground of intelligibility in a frame of reference that
ultimately must be comprehensive enough to include the knower.”’®®
We turn now to the knower and the knower's relationship to what is known. We move to the
“in here,” which becomes known “out there,” that is how the self seeks out these larger frames of
knowledge and what hinders this process as well. Here we take into account a more inclusive
anthropocentrism, in order to understand the person and his/her world.
V. Four-Dimensionality and the Drive Toward Meaning
Here we take up a discussion of Loder’s multi-dimensional phenomenology. For those who have 
engaged Loder’s work, it is usually his understanding of convictional knowing that many have found 
most appealing. However, the transformative narrative of conviction cannot be apprehended without a 
consideration of Loder’s phenomenology. This point has been largely ignored by readers, maybe 




negative.’®" But this realism is also its strength and belies the wisdom of his vision. By referring to 
multi-dimensionality as a phenomenology is not a designation that Loder might have used, but I think 
it is an accurate one, given the influence of Merleau-Ponty on his thought. Loder is not saying that we 
gain theological tiiith through a phenomenological investigation of reality, but that through the creative, 
interacting movements of the human spirit we are shaping the very phenomena we experience and live 
in, even as the Spirit bestows a new way of experience phenomena in Christ.
At its core humanity participates in being. We cannot think, know, doubt, or deny without 
presuming that our thinking, knowing, doubting, or denying is. “Being” is the “implicit assumption 
behind everything that is and occurs.”’®’ At its roots, being is vital and constantly increasing itself in life. 
Taking his cue from the existentialist theology of John Macquarrie (b. 1919), Loder wants to make being 
the condition on which all beings exist; hence being is that which “lets be.” “Letting be” should not be 
understood laconically, as the mildly depressed motto “Live and let live” suggests; it is, rather, “Let 
flourish!” It is not difficult to see how this translates into the creative and loving activity of God, once 
“faith” has recognized that what phenomenological reason calls being has revealed itself as God in 
Christ.’®'^  To be human means to be open to being itself and this openness takes place within a context.
From this premise, Loder goes onto describe what being entails. He sets up four categories or 
what he calls dimensions, that human beings encounter and participate in. These are extremely important 
in grasping Loder’s phenomenology because they provide a framework for apprehending the work of 
the Holy Spirit in human life.
“Being human entails environment, selfhood, the possibility of not being, and the possibility of 
new being.”'®" These four dimensions of being can be summarized as the lived world, the self, the void, 
and the Holy. All four are important. To ignore or deny the power and presence of any one or 
combination would be extremely detrimental to being. Y et, Loder will argue, most knowing events tend 
to take place in two of these dimensions, particularly the lived world and self, at the exclusion of the void 
and the Holy, or in three dimensions where the void, the self and world ignore the presence of the Holy. 
To speak of convictional knowing is always an articulation of four-dimensionality. This four­
dimensional knowing can only be experienced through the work of the Convictor, namely the Holy
’®"F. LeRon Shults makes the same claim in ‘“ One Spirit’ with the Lord: Insights from James 
Loder’s Theological Anthropology,” The Princeton Theological Review, VII (2000): 26.
191 TM2, p. 67.
’®^ John Macquarrie's Principles o f Christian Theology (New York: Scribner’s, 1977). Loder 
recognizes his indebetedness to Macquarrie, TTM2, p. 68. Loder spent a year of research at Oxford 
University in the late 1970's and worked closely with Macquarrie. Macquarrie was one of the first to 
read the first full manuscript of The Transforming Moment. TTM, p. ix.
193 TM2, p. 69.
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Spirit, working in an analogical relationship with the human spirit's generative dunamis, pushing the 
human spirit toward and granting a deeper framework of meaning that the human spirit could never 
achieve alone. As Loder defines it, “Convictional knowing, is the patterned process by which the Holy 
Spirit transforms all transformations of the human spirit. This is a four-dimensional knowing event 
initiated, mediated, and concluded by Christ.”’®'* Let us examine the way Loder describes each 
dimension drawing upon various thinkers.
A. The Lived World
The first dimension of being is the environment or lived world. By reference to a “lived world,” 
Loder derived his description of this dimension from the phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
specifically his discussion of le monde vécu ( the life-world) in Phénoménlogy de la perception 
{Phenomenology o f Perception). ’®" For Merleau-Ponty the perceived life-world is the “primary reality,” 
and that “the perceived world comprises relations.”’®" While Loder’s schema might be derived from 
Merleau-Ponty, it seems to have more in common with Husserl’s discussion of the life-world {die 
Lebenswelt) in The Crisis o f European Science and Transcendental Philosophy. Merleau-Ponty held to 
the primacy of lived-world. “The perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all 
rationality, all value and all existence.”’®’ Whereas Husserl viewed the lived-world as constituted by 
a larger cultural horizon.’®® For Loder, the lived world, “designates the universal human tendency to 
create and compose the external realities of one’s existence - other selves, social and institutional 
realities, symbolic constructions of culture, and the physical order, including one’s body - into a 
coherent, workable, and livable whole. Since these factors do not spontaneously generate such a
’®‘*7’IM2, p. 93. Tliis is the most succinct definition of convictional knowing that Loder provides.
‘®"Curiously, Merleau-Ponty was also influenced by the psychoanalytic movement and began 
his teaching career at the Sorbonne in 1949 where he was appointed the chair of child psychology.
’®"Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy o f Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological 
Psychology, the Philosophy o f Art, History and Politics, ed., trans. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), 13. That Loder turned to Merleau-Ponty is not surprising given 
his interest in religious phenomena. Edie suggests that “it was Merleau-Ponty’s intention to lay down 
a solid basis for phenomenological research which would take him forward from the phenomenology of 
perception to studies on imagination, language, culture, reason, and on aesthetic, ethical, political and 
even religious experience (p. xv).”
’®’Merleau-Ponty, p. 13.
’®®See M. C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, second edition (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), p. 87. Dillon says Husserl’s understanding of the lived-world was untenable 
for Merleau-Ponty because “the primordial sociality of the Lebenswelt cannot be generated from within 
the standpoint of the solipsistic sphere of ownness {Eigensphare) of Husserl’s transcendental ego (p. 
87).”
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coherent whole, the self - out of, and in interaction with, its physical, psychological, social and cultural 
resources - constructs and maintains a world. In the absence or collapse of the horizon of one’s world, 
pathological behavior may result.””®
Before proceeding, we need to be aware of the various ways Loder uses the word, “world.” It 
has three meanings: “world” (in quotations) refers to a particular, live composition; the term world 
(without quotations) refers to all possible composed “worlds” taken collectively; and World means God's 
recomposition of the world.'^"" These designations will be used throughout.
The human being views itself from within a particular world, from within a pre-composed 
situation. It “has a world” or “belongs to a world,” to quote Merleau-Ponty.^"' A human being is not a 
disembodied spirit, separated from one's environment, isolated in one's subjectivity. “Embodiment in 
a composed environment is the first essential dimension of being human.”'^ "^  As a result, the Christian 
experience cannot be “spiritualized” at the expense of ignoring the physical.^"" “In the beginning is the 
body, the only entity we know from the inside and outside simultaneously and spontaneously.” It is 
through our experience of both being a body and having a body that we come to know, and compose the 
“world.” Loder would agree with Merleau-Ponty that “the perceiving mind is an incarnated mind.” "^'* 
Loder maintains, drawing from his work with the cognitive developmentalist, Jean Piaget, “Nothing is 
in our “worlds" that is not somehow rooted and grounded in the body.” "^" Like the changes and moments
'®®7TM2, p. 230.
200TTM2, p. 69.
^"'Merleau-Ponty, Phenomonelogy o f Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological 
Psychology, the Philosophy o f  Art, History and Politics, ed., trans. James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964); Francis Ryan, The Body as Symbol: Merleau-Ponty & 
Incarnational Theology (Washington, D.C.: Coipus Books, 1970); Mary Rose Barrai, The Body in 
Interpersonal Relations: Merleau-Ponty (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984); See also 
Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), p. 191.
"""rrM2, p. 69.
"^"“In a service of worship,” Loder writes, speaking about the Lord’s Supper, “ we tend to shed 
the integument of the flesh for the course of events involved and we produce a highly spiritualized 
version of wholeness which might be considered ‘holier than usual.’ .. .spiritualized worship leaves the 
flesh -  Christ’s and our own -  sterile; it makes worship not a celebration but a retreat for ascetics.” 
“Dimensions of Real Presence,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 59(1966): 29.
"^'‘Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy o f Perception, p. 3.
"^"Cf. Jean Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, trans. Anita Tenzer, intro. David Elkind (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 8ff. In the 1970's, Loder did postdoctoral work at Piaget’s Insitut des 
Sciences de l’Education in Geneva. His connection with Piaget will be discussed briefly later in the 
chapter.
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of our body, this composition of our “worlds” is not fixed. It can appear to shrink (as in psychological 
depression) or it can appear to expand (as in love). Therefore, to speak of reality is to speak of a 
provisional, tentative experience. Our perceptions of reality are contingent upon our ability to embrace 
what is going on internally. What is “out there” - reality - is first composed in the “in here” of the 
knower. As a result:
. . .  we see that the “worlds” which live in and through us and on which we build our 
notions of reality are not in themselves fixed entities or established places with 
immovable boundaries. In fact, the everyday assumption that we are “in here” and the 
world is a fixed reality “out there” is another instance of the eikonic eclipse, implicitly 
severing the personality from itself and its environment. Actually we do not know any 
reality separate from our composition of it; nor could we live in a world that was merely 
fixed outside us and for which we had no internal, embodied analogue. We compose 
"worlds" and reflectively set them “out there;” they in turn feed back and "compose" us; 
but, whether moving out or moving in, what we ordinarily call reality is included in and 
sustained by our spontaneous competence to compose a “world,” "^"
This makes possible the joy and inherent terror of existence. We can be free to compose new worlds, 
be creative, and be flexible. Additionally, we also know just how fragile reality can be. This is what 
occurs in insanity; the human spirit becomes stuck in a world that cannot be recomposed through 
adaptation and creative reflection.^"’
Not only do we compose a lived world, we also choose what world that might be. And we 
compose the world “so as to eliminate the blind spot. We live not in a strictly physical environment but 
in a “world” our minds compose out of physical input.” This final point is key: “The inherent 
compositional capacity is always at work to create, integrate, equilibriate a “world” that will be livable 
in terms of the body we have been given.”'^ "®
B. The Self
Who is doing the composition? The self.^ "® What is the self? Spirit, Here, Loder relies heavily
^""rrM2, p. 72. The “In” and “Ouf’discussion is also indebted to Merleau-Ponty. See Galen A. 
Johnson, “Inside and Outside: Ontological Considerations,” in Dorothea Olkowski and James Morley, 
eds. Merleau-Ponty, Interiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World (Albany, NY: State 
University Press of New York, 1999), pp. 25 ff.
p. 72. This also occurs when we lose more than seventy-two hours of sleep or 
prolonged sensory deprivation.
2o^ TTM2, p. 73.
"^®In talking about the self, I am fully aware we are treading on slippery ground, particularly in 
light of recent studies and trends in philosophy. I am thinking particularly of Charles Taylor, Sources 
o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity (Harvard, 1989). An especial danger is the notion that the 
self is somehow disengaged from itself, and the world around it; an entity unto itself. Neither Loder, nor 
myself, wish to affirm this. The individual is a self, and has a self, just as, to quote Loder, we are a body
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upon Kierkegaard's well-known, even mind-numbing definition of the self in The Sickness Unto Death.
Because he builds on Kierkegaard’s insights it is important to quote the definition:
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The 
self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating to itself in the 
relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself. A human 
being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. 
Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self.
In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two 
relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of 
the psychical the relation between the psychical and physical is a relation. If, however, 
the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third, and this is the self.
Such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have established itself or 
have been established by another.^”
For Loder, as for Kierkegaard, the self:
. . .  is not an entity but a relationship entirely unique in relation to its “worlds.” Were " 
it not for the self, it might be correct to say that given the bodily anchorage of the ‘lived 
world, ’ we know nothing that we have not somehow first experienced through the body. 
However, the self is one aspect of human being that, although it becomes embodied, is 
not created through any extension of the body."”
It has a body and is a body. Yet where is the relationship? The relational element is found in unpacking 
the “I” of the self. By this, Loder means that the “I” of the self has components. “The culturally 
embodied ‘I’, the look of self-reflection, is not the self.” That is not the authentic self, although it may 
look to be. This “self-reflection” has to be “broken open,” and exposed for what it is. Very often the 
culturally embodied self is mistaken for all of the self. The fact that the self has a body allows the self
and have a body. Loder's goal is to show how the self, quoting Kierkegaard, through the mediation of 
Christ, becomes spirit, or, as Loder would put it, becomes fully oneself. The transfoimed self, so 
transformed tlirough convictional knowing, is a self that is embodied, engaged, subjectively involved.
’^"Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for  
Upbuilding and Awakening, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 13. Kierkegaard stresses 
the fluidity of human experience which is related to what Matthew J. Frawley sees as the “inherently 
dynamic nature of the human spirit” in Kierkegaard’s anthropology. “Loder on Kierkegaard,” The 
Princeton Theological Review, VIII(2000): 10. Frawley’s interpretation of the Danish is particularly 
insightful. The “English translation of [the] verb “relate,” Forholder sig, is consistent with the tense of 
the Danish: present indicative. By using this tense, Kierkegaard emphasizes that we are always relating 
to ourselves; it is an ongoing activity that is happening right now in you and me. It is not an activity that 
we begin later in life when ethical issues become important, nor is it an activity that we should initiate 
because we can. Rather we are always relating to ourselves, even when we are not aware of this activity. 
This dynamic activity within us defines us as spirit. We do not at some later point in life become 
“religious,” spiritual, or single individuals. We are spirit from the start, (p. 10)” Italics in the text.
211 TTM2, p. 77.
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to become composer and creator of new worlds. This is what Loder calls self-relatedness, where the
relationship between the two becomes a "positive third term" (again pulling from Kierkegaard).
The identification of this relational aspect of the self is essential, despite the fact that this is not
the way we usually think of ourselves. The self-relatedness of the self simultaneously grants the
privilege of engaging the world, without being defined by the world. But in order for this to occur, one
must choose. As Loder makes clear:
The self as positive relationship - “a relation that relates itself to itself’ as Kierkegaard 
put it - is “conscience” in the generic sense. It is knowing within and together with 
oneself (scientia and con-). This is the self that has chosen itself and in that choice 
determined to be itself, in, but not of, its “worlds,” in, but not of, its embodiment; 
“having” but not “being had.” This represents a choice against the endless mirrors of 
self-reflection, against socially constructed selves and the superego, against world- 
denying mysticism and against absorption in a world of kindly “thous.” The self as 
conscience is generated by the power to choose. One must choose to choose the self, 
otherwise all choices will be consumed in self-reflection and “world” composition,"”
But we cannot maintain or forever choose this relationship with the self. The place where we
continue to remain or become authentically self is in the Source of our being, which is what Kierkegaard
meant when he said we must be “transparently grounded in the power that posits it.”"” “The self is itself
when it expresses the nature of being-itself,” Loder says, “as that which 'lets be”’ or ‘lets flourish. ’ ” This
is the way of love, and once grounded in the love of the One Who “lets be,” the self is free to compose
the “world” in a new way, which becomes World. “Thus, the self free to be itself loves the World and
so lets it flourish with the same integrity, freedom, and love with which T’ came into being.” This,
according to Loder, is “a transformation of the self-reflected self into a self that reflects its groundedness
in being-itself.”"” When the self is transparently grounded in the Power that posits it, then it can be said
that the self is spirit. This is why Loder prefers to stress the idea of the human spirit in its relationship
with the Holy Spirit. For the relationship is Spirit to spirit, thus allowing a complementaiy
interconnection. Given Loder’s emphasis upon the importance of the personal in all knowing, the term
“person” could also be substituted for spirit. When a person is grounded in the Power that truly
possesses the ability to grant personality to a person, then it can be said that self is truly person, truly




"’"C. Stephen Evans, Seren Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology: Insight for Counseling and 
Pastoral Care (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1990), p. 48. Evans uses the terms 
“pre-self’ and “self’ for the distinction. “. . .the pre-self is not a self in the decisive sense because it 
lacks a relation to God. Genuine selfhood requires that I stand before God, accepting the self I am as 
a gift from God and the self I should become as a task God has set for me.” This idea has striking
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see, the Personhood of the Holy Spirit connects the human person within the person Jesus Christ. What 
is important to stress is that the goal is intimacy, whether seen as Spirit/spirit or Person/person. We will 
be returning to this theme later in the last chapter.
C. The Void
The third part of being for Loder is the void. He develops this idea from a reading of Martin
Heidegger’s (1889-1976), Being and Time. Loder is quick to note that any discussion of the “void” is
“semantic anomaly,” in that it seems to speak “of nothing as if it were presence; nonbeing as if it were
being.” Here Loder is more helpful than other philosophers and theologians who are currently exploring
“limiting” or “boundary” experiences, and encounters with the other."'" They depict experiences in
which one is brought to the edge of reality, as if one can cross from one area into the next, after point
“P,” there would be void, a place “East of Eden,” as it were. Because it is perceived as being “over
there,” beyond a particular horizon, because the possible danger lurks at the frontier, the edge of the
world, the void takes on characteristics of being kept at a distance. Loder disagrees:
I prefer to speak of void with the implication that nothingness, or negation of being, is 
not beyond experience; indeed, it is part of the uniqueness of human being that negation 
is meaningfully included in the composition of our "lived worlds" and in our sense of 
“self.” Many people live not only on the near side of the limit, but in a real sense 
beyond it as they choose to enact self-destructive patterns of behavior. We will be 
concerned to describe not only extreme behavior but also the pervasive nature of 
nothingness in ordinary experience; the implicit aim of conflict, absence, loneliness, and 
death is void."'"
parallels with Eberhard Jiingel who makes the point that theologically we are not yet authentically 
human, we are on the way to becoming human. To think of “humanity eschatologically,. . .  opens to 
each person the possibility of an eschatological self-understanding.” But this self-understanding can only 
be established through a correspondence to God. “Humanity in Correspondence to God,” Theological 
Essays, Translated with an Introduction by J. B. Webster (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1989), p. 124-125ff. 
A similar argument is made by C. E. Gunton, Christ and Creation (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1992), 
pp. 25-36ff.
"'"See Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987; David Tracy describes postmodemity as the “face of the other” in “Theology and the Many Faces 
of Postmodemity,” Theology Today VI. 1 (April, 1994): 104-114. See Michael Ignatieff s discussion of 
the heath in Shakespeare's King Lear and Macbeth. Ignatieff shows that the heath in England was the 
“huge expanse of England beyond the reach of enclosing agriculture and the centralizing state, a realm 
of wild growth and darkness without pafrols or police, king's highways or lights. It was the home of 
escapees from village order, paupers denied a parish settlement, vagrants escaping the oppression of 
wage labour, masterless men without land or trade of their own, madmen like Tom O'Bedlam, fugitives 
from justice and old people abandoned or thrown out of their families. This world beyond custom and 
obligation exerted a deep hold on Shakespeare's imagination.” Supporting Loder's point, Ignatieff 
suggests that “the heath is both a real place and a place in the mind.” The Needs o f Strangers: An Essay 
on Privacy, Solidarity, and the Politics o f Being Human, (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 40-41.
"'"Loder, p. 81.
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Loder suggests that people live in a composed reality, believing that they are keeping the void at a
distance. There are others who cannot accept the real presence of the void, and instead of accepting it
(which is too painful) act out what the void reveals to themselves in self-destructive behavior. But these
are extreme cases. There is a subtle sense of the void that permeates human existence.
The void is most apparent during times of conflict. These times of conflict arise, most notably,
when an individual's lived “world” comes under attack or is mptured by some experience that exposes
the presence of the void. According to Loder, the void is unbearable to a self that is not transparently
grounded in God. Apart from God, the self seeks to recompose the world, in the presence of the void,
by excluding the void, or by denying what the void reveals about the nature of one's existence. The self
(thi'ough the ego, as we will see) apart from God does whatever it takes to "remove the intrusive tlireat
of nothingness.""” We try to explain it away, and compose a world as i f  the threat of nothingness was
not present, just as we creatively ignore the blind spot in other knowing experiences.
To compose the world ignoring the void is extremely dangerous for the self, and by extension,
for our lives. Yet, that is what the self is doing most of the time. This could, conceivably, be a virtuous
task, to keep the enemy at a distance and guard the walls of the city. But the enemy is within.
...we always have difficulty composing out or covering over the nothingness because 
it is not merely “out there,” it is embedded in the very heart of the untransformed self.
The deepest sense of absence we have is the separateness of the self from its Source.
As "self-reflection," the self reflects nothingness everywhere by making everything 
depend on the “I” and the lived “world.”"'®
Without reflection from the Source, the self quite easily sees the void present in one's “world,” and self. 
Type A personality syndrome, for example, people become achievers to compensate for the nothingness 
around them and within them. "Achievers desperately try to compose the world so that the inner 
emptiness is not noticeable, but there is no hiding.. . .""""
The ungrounded self, composing a world that avoids the void, retreats from the sense of 
nothingness, and acts out his/her fear upon a world in a manner that affects families, societies, cultures, 
and history. This is the eikonic eclipse. “We tend to compose it out,” says Loder, “as if it were a great 
blind spot; but after birth, death is the one absolutely unavoidable experience, the one we finally cannot 
ignore,”""' What could be more indicative of the nothingness within creation than the presence of death, 
and all proximate forms of death? "This is the perfect statistic, one death per person every time in a
"'®Loder, p. 81. Loder provides the café scene in Jean Paul Sarti e's, Being and Nothingness as 
a good example of this type of experience.
"'®2YM2,p. 81. 
"""77M2, p. 82. 
""'77M2, pp. 84-85.
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material universe that is ultimately destined to silence,'”"" But even death is a symbol, a concept we use
to either think about or avoid the sense of nothingness.
...death is not ultimate. It too is a metaphor supplied by the end of life to suggest 
dissolution of existence into absolutely empty silence. Void is the ultimate end of 
creation and as such it is, ironically, the “goal” of evil. Not every absence is evil, as for 
instance the absence of pain; but every absence that reflects the inherent brokenness in 
the self, aggravating the disability of the self to be spirit, evokes evil. All evil presses 
toward the reversal of God's creative action; God created everything out of nothing, but 
evil seeks to return everything to nothing."""
In this age of “mass-death,” as Edith Wyschogrod has termed it, it is evident that the void has 
considerable sway over human existence. According to Wyschogrod, it is worse for our era. The 
potential of nuclear annihilation is “pure void.” “Contemporary man-made mass death,” she argues, “has 
come into being, in which a death-world, a sphere of life in which the living are forced to exist as if 
already dead, has been created. The death-world reflects the attempt of technological society, which is 
alienated from the life-world, the embedding matrix of all praxes, to repair the broken cosmos by an act 
of radically remythologizing: death becomes the ultimate meaning of the totality.”""'*
D. The Holy
The Holy does not allow the void to have the last word. All is not vanity, to contradict the 
Preacher in Ecclesiastes (1:14). Even though the goal of the void might be evil, there is a another part 
of being at work in us, and within the universe, that has as its goal the complete overturning of all that 
leads to human self-destruction and annihilation. Because this is perceived as a part of being, humanity 
continues to persevere. “We continue to live,” Loder believes, “precisely because in the center of the 
self, for all its potential perversity, we experience again and again the reversal of those influences that 
invite despair and drive toward void. Kierkegaard repeatedly insisted with bewildering brilliance that 
the faces of the void become the faces of God.”"""
"""77M2, p. 84.
"""77M2, p. 83.
in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), p. 34. Cf. Wyschogrod's discussion of the Enlightenment as an example of 
Loder's eikonic eclipse. "The philosophy of the Enlightenment, like science itself, loses sight of the 
immediacy of the life-world. It "forgets" the life-world as the locus of pretheoretical fullness and 
validates only the constructed, theoretical, and mediated aspect of sociological existence, which derives 
from it (p. 24).
"""“It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy and from God the enemy to God the 
companion.” A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making QAew York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 16-17, cited 
in Loder, p. 85. This is not to say that the void is God but that the void is taken up into God by Christ’s 
confrontation with death in such a way that its power is negated.
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Loder affirms that God, or the Holy, is at work in the lives of people. Even though the term
Qadosh, or holy means “separate,” Loder still believes the Holy is engaged in peoples’ lives without
giving up separateness. The experience of the Holy allows him to overcome transcendence/immanence
understandings of our experience of God. Many theologians have come down on one side or the other
in this debate, offering systems or views that are not satisfying, in my view, because they have very little
correspondence to the way we actually experience reality and experience the Holy.""" Like Kierkegaard,
Loder prefers the way of greatest resistance, of living within the tension and finding truth there, instead
of seeking quick, simplistic resolutions. So that when Loder speaks of the Holy, “there is no compromise
of that separateness in saying that in the midst of the deepest extremity a sense of the Holy in us cries
out for a manifestation of the Holy beyond us. This describes the quality of the Presence of the Holy as
that which is indeed separate but not unknowable; rather, it is separate and remaking us in its image.”""’
The primary work of the Holy is creative and transfoiTnational. When the Holy encounters the
self, the Holy will seek the transformation of the self in such a way that incorporates the void into the
composition of the World, without allowing the void to utterly destroy the self. One could say the Holy
is a realist whose paramount desire is to compose our world four-dimensionally. When this occurs we
can affirm the Holy in the face of the void, instead of falling prey to the demonic in a three-dimensional
world (world, self, void) where the void is definitive of human life, or belief in a god that looks like God,
composed from within a two-dimensional world that ignores the void, and thus recreating God in one's
own image (which is an immanentist approach to God - God defined by the predetermined theories about
God established by the noims of world and self). Alternatively, and this is key, the Holy affirms the self
and allows it to thrive in the life of the Spirit. For Loder, "the Holy is the manifest Presence of being-
itself transforming and restoring human being.” Loder's speaks of the Holy in this way:
The Divine Companion or the Presence of the Holy remains Other, even though its faces 
appear in human experience. Under its influence, the self becomes ti uly itself for the 
first time, and its “worlds” are recomposed in new ways. Subsequent experience is 
drawn into forms of awareness and behavior that include but go beyond two- 
dimensional humanity and scandalize the pessimism of three-dimensional existentialism 
by positive recognition of void as essential to human transformation. The thi*ee- 
dimensional view will say, “It is too good to be true,” implying the tautology that three- 
dimensional pessimism is the truth, so it could not be overcome by two-dimensional 
good. But tautology can be played both ways: suppose we shift the tautology and say 
the Holy is the truth. Then such behavior is so true, so filled with the Holy, that it is
"""See Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olsen, Twentieth Century Theology: God and the World 
in a Transitional Age, (IVP, 1992). They see the history of theology since the Enlightenment oscillating 
between theologies of immanence and transcendence.
""’r7M2, p. 86. Loder came to this insight from personal experience. He talks about his painful 
bout with depression, despair and loss of faith after his father's death, a time when he encountered the 
void, but also in the void, the Holy: separate, beyond the reach of the void, yet thoroughly redemptive, 
the immanent sense of the Holy constituted the fourth dimension of his being (p. 88).
p. 89. See also the Epilogue in The Transforming Moment, p. 21 If. Mention of the 
mysterium trernendum fascinans refers to Rudolf Otto’s (1869-1937) study of numinous experiences in 
The Idea o f the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea o f the Divine and Its Relation 
to the Rational (1917), Translated by John W, Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 93.
” °Z 5 ,p . 18.
""’Z5',p. 18.
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beyond good and evil as defined in two- or three-dimensional terms. Genuine 
forgiveness, inner courage, and sacrificial love are all too true to be “good” in any 
ordinary and pessimistic existentialist sense. Such scandalous claims point beyond 
everyday humanity to a quality implicit in being itself that is both awesome and 
magnetic. The "mysterium tremendum fascinans’’ manifest in the earthiness of human j
existence via the faces of new being retains Otherness and inflicts profound |
ambivalence. The experiential mark of the Presence of the Holy is just this ambivalence ;
that both draws and repels us, excites and overcomes us, intiigues and threatens us.""® iiWe can see now why Loder defines convictional knowing as the "patterned process by which |
the Holy Spirit transforms all transformations of the human spirit." And we can see how this involves '
the four dimensions of being. The definition of convictional knowing concludes as follows: initiated, I■Imediated, and concluded by Christ.""® Loder believes that when the Holy engages the self and j
establishing a fbur-dimensional experience of being (through a convictional experience) the ego is |
released from its self-defensive, self-destructive inwardness and freed to ground itself in someone other t
than itself. Or more correctly, the self is grounded in the power of the Holy that posits and constitutes f
the self, thereby allowing the self to look out beyond itself to the world and God in love. In order for i
this to take place the ego must be transformed. How Christ engages the ego is also another area that !
Loder has explored in TTM, TKM, and LS. Before we explore his ego phenomenology, it will be i
important to identify the influences upon his psychological approach. i
VI. The Interactionist Tradition '
In the LS, Loder acknowledges the leading psychological theorists who have shaped his |
understanding of human development, thus placing himself in the “interactionist” tradition. This j
iSacknowledgment further reinforces the relational-personalist themes that have permeated our exploration I
of Loder’s thought. The relational interactionist approach is not something new that emerges with LS\ j
it is the same methodology that stands behind TTM, the TKM. “Noimal human development is an 
emergent reality, a resultant of the interaction between a personality and its environment. The interaction 
gives the developmental potential of the personality particular and varied shape over the course of a 
lifetime.”""® Development occurs in stages and “those stages tend to advance according to the principle 
that they manage increasing complexity with greater simplicity and efficiency in the use of energy.”""'
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Here Loder alludes to the Freudian view that the psyche is compared to that of a steam engine, a force 
of extraordinary power and energy that produces pressure that needs to be controlled and regulated by 
the ego and the Super Ego (or Ego Ideal)."""
By adopting an interactionist approach, Loder thereby excludes other theories of human 
development, namely preformationism, predeterminism, and environmentalism. Briefly, 
preformationism refers to the idea of Anton van Leeuwenhoek (1623-1723) who when looking at 
spermatoza through the microscope (he was the inventor of the microscope) believed he saw “miniature 
human figures, who simply had to expand, in balloon fashion, to produce human beings.” 
Preformationists believe that development is simply expansion.""" Predeterminism is associated with 
the American child psychologist, Granville Stanley Hall (1844-1924) who advocated a kind of 
“developmental Darwinism.” Every human being has “preprogrammed” developmental fomis that 
emerge through life as part of the history of the species. Hall’s thesis was, “ontongeny recapitulates 
phylogeny.” Loder rejects this view because it does not take into account human uniqueness."""* 
Environmentalism pertains to behaviorist approaches as seen in .Tolin Broadus Watson (1878-1958) and 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990) who go to the opposite extreme by say that human development 
can be controlled by one’s environment, “that by controlled training, any new bom child can be molded 
into any type of adult.”""" The same techniques used to form the behavior of mice cannot be applied to 
human beings, again because the self has the potential to compose and create and even choose how one 
interacts with one’s environment. Human “development [is] an emergent resultant of interaction 
between the person and her environment, with that interaction giving rise and shape to structural 
potentials within the personality.”"""
Loder places the leading interactionists that he admires into three groups. For an understanding
"""Freud,
"""Whenever a child is naively thought of as a little adult (“Remember you are a young lady,” 
or “Act like a little man”) this is an expression of prefoimationism. LS, p. 19.
""'*G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology, and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, 
Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education (New York: Appleton Publishers, 1908) cited in ZS", 19.
“In this error, phylogenetic history becomes not a contributor to our understanding of human 
development (which it most certainly is), but an exhaustive account of human development. We are, in 
fact, bom much less adequately programmed for our environment than any other creature, but we have 
a large mass of cerebral cortex, which is designed to enable us to create and compose our own 
environment, especially culture(Z5', p. 19).”
"""ZiS, p. 19. Cf. J. B. Watson, Behaviorism (London: Kegan & Paul, 1925) and B. F. Skinner, 
Science and Human Behavior ( New York: Macmillan, 1953).
"""Z5', pp. 19-20. Loder notes that Noam Chomsky’s (b. 1928) study of the structure of language 
completely refuted Skinner ideas. See Noam Chomsky in J. Fodor and J. Katz, The Structure o f 
Language (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prenctice Hall, 1964), chapter 21.
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of the personal unconscious and ego development, he turned to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Anna 
Freud (1896-1982) ,and Erik Erikson (1902-1994) . The second group of theorists are devoted to the 
conscious mind and cognitive development, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1987), Carol 
Gilligan, and the structuralist tradition. And the third areas centers around a consideration of the 
collective unconscious, associated with the work of Carl G. Jung and Ann Ulanov and the collective 
unconscious. Although Loder establishes these categories in LS, all of these theorists informed Loder’s 
thinking (especially Freud) from the late 1950's. He turns to these theorists because all of them 
contribute to an understanding of the human spirit that “both transcends and implements the life of the 
psyche.”""’ He also relies on them not because they are authoritative for the Christian life, but because 
these are the theorists who have created the field of human development and to whom the theologian 
must be both cognizant and conversant in order to speak a redeeming word to a wider public about 
human nature.
Before we proceed we need to grasp the way Loder has come to view the ego and its 
development. His approach is primarily a fusion of Freud, Erikson, and Piaget. For Freud there are 
three realities which Loder defines as “intrapsychic, the extrapsychic public reality, and the reality 
principle by which the intrapsychic life is balanced against external reality, and so provides the rule of 
the ego.” The ego thus mediates reality and therefore has extraordinary power, “The ego is the 
intrapsychic agency that emerges as the governor of the interaction between the person and the 
environment, and the rule of the ego, the reality principle, is designed to maximize satisfaction and 
ensure survival.”""® The ego manifests its work in both consciousness and unconsciousness. In the 
developmental of psychoanalysis, Freud concentrated more on the unconscious. Neo-Freudians, like 
Erik Erikson, have concentrated on the work of the ego and its development. Instead of looking at “the 
dynamics of the unconscious and the pathological twists and turns of libidinal energy, Erikson 
concentrated more on the ego as have a structural and developmental potential of its own.”""® The Neo- 
Freudian turn to the study of the ego as it interacts with its environment informed the object-relations 
theory of D. W. Winnicott (1896-1971) in the United Kingdom or interpersonal-relations theory, as it 
is called in the United States."'*® In his review of TTM, Robert C. Fuller suggests that Loder’s discussion
p. 124.
p. 20.
""®Z^ , p. 22.
""®Z6", p. 23.
"‘*®Harry Gunting, Theory, Therapy and the Self (Hoxn York:. Basic Books, 1971),
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of transformation has less to do with ego psychology than it has it was objection relations theory.""*’ This 
is an incorrect assessment, precisely because Loder’s understanding of transformation is more than just 
the modification of the self when encountered by another, as suggested by Winnicott. Transformation 
is a psychic change that occurs within the ego when it encounters the holiness of God in the face of Jesus 
Christ. Loder makes extensive use of Erikson, but will not allow him to have the last work on human 
develoment.
Erikson’s theories of human development have become the established, almost sacrosanct, 
position of developmentalists."'*" He sets up eight stages of the life cycle and in each stage there is 
“developmental clock in the organism and . . .  in the psyche.”"'*" Freud focused on development up to 
adolescence; Erikson extended the pattern through the rest of life. Generally speaking, these are 
demarcated as infancy (birth-2), toddler (2-3), oedipal child (3-5), school-age child (6-10), adolescence 
(11-18), young adult hood (19-35), middle years (36-65), and later years (65 +). We will not discuss 
each of these stages in detail, but each period wimesses an intense struggle of the ego to achieve certain 
“virtues,” as Erikson calls them, the fulfillment of specific developmental tasks (such as trust or mistrust 
in the infancy stage). Each stage is marked by conflict and immense energy as the self tries to make 
sense of its world. Development occurs under the surface, but when the conditions are right, each stage j
emerges throughout life. Loder adopts Erikson’s stages as a reasonable way to understanding the 
development of the human spirit.
Within the domain of cognitive development, Loder relies heavily upon the work of the 
structuralist, Jean Piaget. Even though Piaget taught psychology at the University of Geneva, he wanted 
to be known as an epistemologist; as such he wanted to understand the structui e of the mind. Piaget saw 
the mind interacting with the environment and out of this interaction, Loder writes, “the innate structural 
component of the psyche produced intelligence, language, moral judgment, and imagery, to mention a 
few registers of behavior.”"'*'* According to Piaget human development is understood as an “activity 
directed toward equilibrium” that moves through stages, so that development is seen as “a progressive
"'“Robert C. Fuller, Zygon, 18(1983): 464. As Bregman correctly notes in her review, “For 
Loder, the real problem with the faith development model is that it is not about faith or only incidentally 
about faith. It is about ego development,. .  .(p. 690)”
"'*"See Erik Erikson Childhood and Society, Second Edition. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1963.); Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1968); Young Man 
Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962).




equilibration from a lesser to a higher state of equilibrium.” '^*^ Transition from one stage to another in 
cognitive development is driven by the desire for equilibrium in the face of disequilibrium. '^**  ^ A sense 
of disequilibrium establishes a need which one seeks to have met. But intelligence is also driven by a 
deeper, burning need for transcendence and the “assimilation” of that knowledge into the equilibrium 
of the self. This is similar to the earlier discussion of Pannenberg’s notion of “exocentricity.” At each 
level of development, Piaget sees the mind fulfilling the same “function,” as he put it, “which is to 
incorporate the universe to itself.” Through a process of assimilation and adaptation the mind relates 
to the external world and incorporates the world into itself, so that “mental development appears to be 
simply an ever more precise adaptation to reality.” '^*^ Of particular interest to Loder is a shift that took 
place in Piaget’s thinking before he died. In addition to the developmental structure of human 
intelligence by way of adaptation, he also came to account for the possibility of transformation to occur 
from beyond the structures. '^*®
Loder’s attitude towards Jung is more measured. In the LS, Loder incorporates Jungian 
archetypes in his discussion of human development during the middle years of life, when individuation 
(Jung’s terms for the emergence and establishment of a completely integi ated personality) can begin to
'^*®Piaget, Six Psychological Studies, p. 3.
'^*^Although Piaget’s six stages will not preoccupy us here, he summarizes them as follows: “1. 
The reflexive or hereditary stage, at which the first instinctual nutritional drives and the first emotions 
appear; 2. The stage of the first motor habits and of the first organized percepts, as well as of the first 
differentiated emotions; 3. The stage of sensorimotor or practical intelligence (prior to language), of 
elementaiy affective organization, and of the first external affective fixations. These first three stages 
constitute the infancy period - from birth till the age of one and a half to two years - i. e., the period prior 
to the development of language and thought as such; 4. The stage of intuitive intelligence, of 
spontaneous interpersonal feelings, and of social relationships in which the child is subordinate to the 
adult (ages two to seven years, or “early childhood”); 5. The stage of concrete intellectual operations 
(the beginning of logic) and of moral and social feelings of cooperation (ages seven to eleven or twelve, 
or “middle childhood”); 6. The stage of abstract intellectual operations, of the formation of the 
personality, and of affective and intellectual entry into the society of adults (adolescence).” Six 
Psychological Studies, pp. 5-6. See also Piaget’s The Construction o f Reality in the Child, trans. 
Margaret Cook (New York: Basic Books, 1954), pp. 3-96.
®'*^ Piaget, p. 8. See Pannenberg’s use of Piaget in Anthropology in Theological Perspective, pp.
346ff
'^*®Tliis is established in Piaget’s late work (with Rolando Garcia), Psychogenesis and the History 
o f Science, trans. Helga Feider (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), LS, p. 26. Loder also 
points to Fernando Vidal, Piaget Before Piaget (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), an 
account of Piaget’s life up to 1918 which relates Piaget’s commitment to Christianity and had an intense 
conversion experience when he was a university student. During the Great War he was reading 
philosophy and theology with the hope of becoming either a philosopher or a theologian. In an early 
work, “The Mission of the Idea,” Piaget saw the possibility of a renewal of Christianity from the 
destruction experienced during the war. He also engaged in an interdisciplinary study of science, 
philosophy and faith. LS, p. 25.
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be realized/'*^ In TTM, he sees in Jung a pattern of transformation that is mediated by an archetypal form 
that resides in the collective unconscious.®^® Of all the theorists, it is Jung who was most accepting of 
religious experience. Individuation is a religious process. Religious systems and symbols can aid in the 
process of individuation, but they cannot realize the transformation of the ego because they originate in 
the rich symbolic sti'ucture of the unconscious. All religions have resources within them that will enable 
great self-discovery, but this does not constitution transformation. Loder cautions against an uncritical 
adoption of Jungian thought into a Christian framework for two reasons. The goal of integration of the 
personality is a static state, of balance between opposites within the self (male-female, good-evil, 
divinity-humanity). Individuation is a stagnant structure. Loder sees the Christian life as containing a 
more dynamic experience. Second, Jung sees Jesus Christ as a symbol of the self. This confuses the 
order of being and knowing, says Loder. “There is nothing in Jung that finally answers the question of 
ultimate truth, hence there is nothing in his understanding of Chi ist to prevent Jung from assuming that 
he, his self, is the answer. Here it is all important that the truth not get confused with a structure for 
knowing it.” Loder wants to reverse Jung’s order. This is a very significant observation to stress. 
“Reversing Jung’s priorities and asserting the ultimacy of Christ with respect to the archetypes of the self 
is not just theological dialectics. It is a crucial matter whether one coming under the power of an ego- 
transforming process will be able to continue that process in love for Christ’s World or will be arrested 
in an archetypal structure of personal wholeness.”®^*
Here, we are reminded that what is most important for Loder is ego-transformation. This is 
another way of talking about the human experience. To be in Christ is to participate in a new creation, 
a new state of being. To encounter Christ, to be convicted means to have the energy of the ego refocused 
or redirected so that instead of turning inward, the ego is free in Cluist to turn outward to the world in 
sacrificial love. Loder wants to draw our attention to those forces that confound and hinder this 
transformation and we can see this most clearly in his theological reflection upon the drives of the ego 
along the stages of development. The interactionist methodology clearly will be evident. Thus we turn 
to a further explication of his phenomenology which will lead to a consideration of his pneumatology.
VII. The Primal Experience and the Search for the Face
At the center of Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology is a study of early primal 
experiences of the self and the way these experiences set the pattern for a// other human experiences and
®'‘®X5, pp. 292ff.
®^®7TM2,pp. 135ff.
®^ *T7M2, p. 138. “That is, if Christ is a symbol of the self, then self structures will define Clirist 
(Jung), but if the self is a symbol of Christ, then Christ will define the nature of the self. (p. 139)”
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encounters. That primal, originating experience is the face-to-face encounter between an infant 
(approximately three months old) and his/her primary caretaker. The responses and conclusions drawn 
from this early encounter delimits an individual’s outlook upon the world, self, other, and even God. 
This is not a deterministic viewpoint. Instead, drawing upon his background in development psychology, 
Loder offers a theological evaluation of the process of development that is unique in the field of practical 
theology.
As we move forward, it is important to keep in mind Loder’s undergirding principle regarding 
developmental psychology. To a considerable degree Loder is a structuralist. From Freud, Erikson, 
Piaget, and to an extent Parsons ’ notion of socialization, Loder concedes that there is a structure through 
which the ego develops. The structure of the ego, however, is not constitutive of the human spirit and 
it cannot account for faith. The “ego may be seen as a kind of tragic hero or a truth-producing error since 
it brings all the subject’s competencies into a working unit, but cannot itself suffice as the center of that 
integration.”®^® Faith development, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply a component of human 
development. This is because “faith is not fundamentally a developmental phenomenon. If faith is a 
human response to God’s grace, it must be rooted in God and be grounded deeper in psychic bedrock 
than the developing ego’s foundation in a favorable balance of tioist over mistrust, all of which is 
primarily dependent on interaction with a human environment.” Loder is emphatic about making this 
distinction.®”
Therefore, it must be stressed that one cannot begin to fathom Loder’s theology without a firm 
grasp of this fundamental point: “Something is inherently wrong with so-called human development. 
Normal development is psychologically constructed, socially supported, and culturally maintained so 
that people are drawn out of the full four dimensions of their being.”®”  The normalcy of that 
development is established and supported by the dynamics of ego which restrict four-dimensional 
existence. For Loder, the ego’s drive is exhibited in “the power of fashioning,” where an individual has 
fashioned a “world” wherein it exists in “well-adjusted, socially acceptable patterns of self-
®” James E. Loder, “Negation and Transformation: A Study in Theology and Human 
Development,” Christianne Brusselmans, ed. Toward Moral and Religious Maturity: The First 
International Conference on Moral and Religious Development (Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett Co., 
1980), p. 178.
®”Z,S', p. 31. This is also the claim made in TTM. The publication of TTM was also viewed as 
direct attack upon the faith development theories of James Fowler {Stages o f Faith). Loder is extiemely 
critical of Fowler because he falsely assumes human development, as outlined by Erikson and others, 
as normative for theological understandings of the self. We will pick up this discussion in the last 
chapter.
®” 7TM2, p. 157.
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destruction.”®”  That normal way of being is basically a process of socialization and maladaptive 
responses of the ego in the face of the void and its proximate expressions, especially death, loss, and 
annihilation. So-called human development is “preeminently two-dimensional, aiming at the 
comparatively meager values of survival and satisfaction as deteimined by socially accepted norms.”®”  
The restriction begins early in life and accumulates power and intensity as the self moves through the 
“normal” stages of development, following socially established patterns. The ultimate restriction of the 
adaptive ego is death itself. To see how this begins we turn to the first three months of life.
The “prototype of religious experience,” evident at three months, “sets up in subsequent human 
life a cosmic loneliness.” Loder argues that “human development beyond this period may be understood 
as a series of circumnambulations expressing this longing and implicitly searching for a transcendent 
centering of the personality.”®^® Understanding the source of this existential loneliness will show why 
it is so difficult to appease. Human birth is a “birth trauma.” It is trauma because in the natural, normal 
process of birth an infant comes close to suffocation, which Loder suggests, is “the primal existential 
negation.” It is the first experience we have of potential annihilation and non-being.®”  “This experience 
of negation ramifies through the whole organism and lays down the foundation for interpreting 
subsequent experiences of negation. If this psychoanalytic type of assertion is correct, then, 
ontogenetically, existential negation precedes all other form of negation for the newborn child.”®”  The 
child quickly searches for order, searching for a “postnatal equilibrium” in the “random uncertainty of 
the postnatal world.” A child does this by sucking, grasping, focusing, and other adaptive responses.®”  
But, it should be noted, “the solution to the fundamental “existential negation experienced by the child
®” Loder, “The Fashioning of Power: A Christian Perspective on the Life-Style Phenomenon,”
p. 187.
®” 77M2,pp. 157-158.
®” r7M 2,p. 161.
®”The fundamental assumption of developmental psychologists, it should be noted, is that the 
infant is not lacking in what John Locke (1632-1704) referred to in “The Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding,” (1689) as innate ideas. The self is not a tabula rasa upon which is written experiences, 
values, beliefs. The newborn infant is a unique self - a person - encountering, engaging, feeling the 
world at a primal, intuitive level and drawing conclusions about the nature of one’s environment.
®” 77M2, p. 162.
®” 7TM2, p. 162. These are the observations of Piaget. “.. .the infant assimilates a part of his 
universe to his sucking to the degree that his initial behavior can be described by saying that for him the 
world is essentially a thing to be sucked. In short order, this same universe will also become a thing to 
be looked at, to listen to, and, as soon as his own movements allow, to shake.” Six Psychological 
Studies, p. 10.
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cannot be met by any emexging functional competencies.”®®’ This is an exceedingly important insight, 
as we will see later on. Here begins an individual’s blessed rage for order and the search for control in 
the face of the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of human life. {
The child searches for order and the primary organizer of the personality is what René Spitz calls 1
“facial miiToring.” Spitz has observed that the search for the centering of the personality goes through 
four particular phases. The first is an oral stage in which the mouth is the primary means through which 
a child incorporates the world into himself. He is not alone in this observation. But Spitz notes a shift |
toward a particular love object, a particular person.®®® “The standard indication of this focus (some even |
say ‘imprint’) of the child on people is that at three months he or she seeks and learns to respond to the |
jpresence of a human face - even a schematic design of a face will do - and give a smile.” This is a 
marked, noticeable and significant “shift from a physiological center to an interpersonal one.”®®®
The face is the primary object and image through which the personality is ordered.®®'* “The face j
. . .  is the personal center that is innately sought by a child and the focus of the earliest sense of one’s J
humanity. The smiling response focuses primal wholeness.”®®® Loder’s emphasis upon facial min:oring
®®'rrM2, p. 162.
®®®This interpersonal, relational pattern has been identified also by D. W. Winnicott, Playing and 
Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1971); A. Rizzuto, The Birth o f the Living God: A Psychoanalytic 
Study (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979); R. Spitz, No and Yes (New York: International 
University Press, 1957), cited in Loder, p. 162.
®®®TZM2, p. 162. This becomes “a nucleus of trust as it begins to emerge and establish itself in 
the child from twelve to eighteen months of age,” a crucial stage in Erikson’s schema (p. 163).
®®'*There is some affinity here with Emmanuel Levinas’ (b. 1906) use of the word ‘face’ to 
represent a relational phenomenology that sees the Other {TAutre) - as God, as a symbol of 
transcendence - in the face of all others. The face-to-face relation of the self to the Other becomes the 
grounds for ethics. “The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, 
calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.” From 
“Ethics as First Philosophy,” included in The Levinas Reader, edited by Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), p. 83. Levinas reinforces the centrality of face-to-face interaction operating as a deep 
epistemological dynamic within the self. There is no explicitly Christological element in his 
phenomenology, making it difficult to see how a four-dimensional, transformational experience can 
occur. At least one theologian, William Stacy Johnson, is exploring the theological dimensions of 
Levinas’ work. David Ford, S e lf and Salvation: Being Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) also identifies the importance of the face within the Christian experience.
®®®Loder, p. 163. “Perhaps wholeness is experienced most primitively at the fetal level, but here 
the undifferentiated ‘cosmos’ of the child becomes personal and interpersonal, focusing on the face. 
The ‘face’ here is to be taken as an interpersonal reality and as a primal symbol of wholeness.”(p. 163) 
Cf. the Jungian idea that the “face represents an archetype of wholeness because it is generally round and 
its center bears a cross. Jolande Székâcs Jacobi (1890- ?) quotes Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) as follows: 
“The Cross is imprinted upon man, even upon his face.” {Apologia quoted in Complex, Archetype, 
Symbol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 172n. TTM2, p. 163.
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brings him to the conclusion that “what is established in the original face-to-face interaction is the child’s 
sense of personhood and a universal prototype of the Divine Presence. Loder’s turn to a consideration 
of the face as an image to engender identity and the formation of reality is suggestive of Silberer’s 
discussion of the hypnagogic vision. The power of the external image, fantasy, or vision to reorient 
reality is now understood in terms of the face of the other - the face of the primary care giver and, as we 
shall see, the face of God revealed in Jesus Christ. The power of Silberer’s paradigm continues to 
resonate throughout Loder’s thinking.
The problem, however, is that the face-to-face interaction (like all encounters with an image, a 
fantasy, or vision) does not last very long. As the child develops she quickly begins to distinguish 
between the presence of the face and its absence, as well as the faces of strangers which might be 
threatening. By six months there is already “an anxiety reaction to the sense of the absence of the 
mother’s face becomes the second organizer of the personality.” Occurring at the same time, the child’s 
verbal skills are developing and learning the meaning of the word, “No!” thus leading to another 
significant shift in the centering process of the person. The child begins to experience absence and 
negation on many levels and the developmental solutions to these threats set the stage for all further 
development.
Loder’s description of this change is worth quoting at length:
The developmental solution to this overpowering sense of absence, combined with the 
external threat of punishment or abandonment (perhaps reliving the original existential 
negation of birth), is to shift the center of the personality from an integiative to a 
defensive posture. That is, the child’s gathering sense of negation is gradually 
suppressed by his or her increased competency, activity, and mobility. However, the 
inevitable “No” - saying of parents (in gesture, word, and effect), which inhibits action 
and mobility, triggers anxiety and the deep sense of absence beneath. Trapped between 
inner absence and outer inhibition, the child takes the initiative to turn the inner sense 
of absence against the negating environment, and thereafter incorporating and 
presuming negation in all personal relationships, he or she seeks to set them up on his 
or her own terms. Thus, as the child moves into the fourteenth month of life, the 
emergent (in this case “emergency”) center of the personality becomes his or her 
determined use of negation. This persistent use of “No,” regardless of the issue at hand, 
is built on a dynamic pattern that in a more developed form would look very much like 
a reaction formation. In this defensive maneuver, one does just the opposite of what one 
wants to do with all the energy (and more) one would like to do the first thing. This, the 
fourth phase of Spitz’s outline, establishes the dynamic foundation of the autonomous 
ego. It is constructive for the purpose of repressing hurtful or potentially destructive 
inner longings and to weigh outer considerations with appropriate objectivity, but it is 
destructive of the true centering of the personality.®®®
This very important paragraph illuminates a destructive pattern deep at work in the ego, a pattern of
®®®7TM2, p. 164. 
®®®rrM2, p. 164.
122
defense before the threat of the “No” of negation, a pattern that begins in the early months of life and 
upon which the entire developmental stages of human growth are built. Considerable energy is expended 
by a child to assert one’s identity in the early months and years of life. But at what cost? “The ego 
autonomy emerges as an outgrowth of the child’s learning to function as the agent rather than the victim 
of negation. Thus, negation creates the foundation of the autonomous ego, and the personality is 
thereafter effectively divided.”®®® This is why Loder maintain “Something is inherently wrong with so- 
called human development.”
It should be noted that the adaptive responses of the ego allow for survival and growth (which 
is a good thing), but they do not satisfy the deeper longing of the human spirit. Loder believes that “the 
developmental solution to the loss of the face and primal absence is only functional. As a functional 
negation of an existential condition, it cannot affect transformation of the existential condition.”®®^ Once 
again, the point is made that “there is something existentially and theologically abnormal about 
functional normality; ego adaptation is existentially and theologically maladaptive.”®'® Loder wants us 
to see the way these functional abnormalities have distorted existential and theological considerations 
and therefore need to be transformed.
The human search for the face that will not go away persists throughout the lifespan. This need 
sometimes erroneously is met by looking to other people, looking to other faces to regain the power of 
the primal experience, only to be ultimately disappointed because the existential need can only be met 
through intimacy with God, who “gives the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of 
Jesus Christ. (2 Corinthians 4:6)” This search becomes the prototype for one’s encounter with God, face- 
to-face. Loder does not suggest that faith and the quest for God are a substitute for the search after the 
mother’s face (this would be a psychological reductionism), but it serves as the pattern or foundation 
for possible faith. Loder sees in Martin Luther’s (1483-1546) desire to look God in the face, for 
example, the hope of finding within God a “fundamental recentering of his personality on a Face that 
would not go away.”®®’ This is a critically important claim.
In a discussion of the search for the face in TTM, Loder offers what I consider to be the vital core
®®®T7M2, p. 164-165.
®®^ 7YM2, p. 165. “The constructive capacities of the autonomous ego are necessary for survival 
and satisfaction, but in an existential sense they are all peripheral; the integrative center, that primal 
longing for the cosmic ordering, self-confirming presence of a loving other, is split off and buried when 
ontogenesis turns in the direction of autonomy. This split is evident in that the innocent, wondering look 
of the infant increasingly shies away from face-to-face interaction - interaction that in adults inevitably 




of his thought. In my estimation, no paragraph better articulates the generative force behind Loder’s 
thinking. It also illustrates the relational-personalism at the heart of his theology.®®® He declares, “The 
self is looking for the impact of that experience in which one is given a place in the cosmos, confirmed 
as a self, and addressed by the presence o f a loving other. To say this is ‘nothing but’ regressive wishing 
is purely reductive; rather, the prototypical impact is set by the first encounter. The longing is for a 
loving other to address the whole person (as before), including the differentiated ego with all its 
competencies, and to set that whole-differentiated person into the cosmos as self-affirmed and 
beloved.”®®® His wish to avoid a reductionist psychologism with regards to religious experience is 
evident, yet he does not reject the wisdom gained from psychological considerations. The theologian 
cannot ignore Freud.
But beyond this, we see in these sentences a powerful summary of ideas close to Loder’s heart, 
insights that find their origin in his own face-to-face encounter with God in moments of profound 
conviction. First we see that the encounter has impact. It has a force, an energy, a drive that brings 
about a radical change in the self. The impact drives one into existence, thrusts one into life. What the 
self discovers in the encounter is “a place in the cosmos.” Here we see Loder making room for the “I.” 
Before the vastness of the universe one becomes aware of one’s own existence and declares, “I exist.” 
Existence is given a place to be. One’s life matters and, what is more, has meaning. The encounter 
speaks to the deepest existential needs of the human spirit. In “being confirmed as a self,” the 
particularity of one’s identity is heightened, and intensified. It is not annihilated or diminished by the 
Other. The “address by the presence of a loving other,” not only calls one into being, but calls one into 
a deep, intimate relationship with the source of Being and life itself. The relational personalism inherent 
in Kierkegaard and Brunner is obvious. But for Loder this is more than just the adoption or development 
of ideas. The ideas are stressed because this is his understanding of the Christian life - when God 
encounters an individual in Christ this is what happens, when one lives four-dimensionally this what the 
experience o f conviction looks like.
The question remains, however, whether or not the self will allow itself to search after that face. 
If the face was lost once, it could be lost again. Loder believes that authentic human existence is four- 
dimensionally constituted, indeed the human spirit longs to live four-dimensionally. Humanity is 
authentic when it is grounded in the Holy who establishes one’s identity in the face of the void. But will 
the maladaptive ego cooperate with the Holy or distort what it means to be human? “This is
®®®Cf. Ebner’s statement in chapter one, “It is self-love, self-regard. Nothing save a real relation 
to a real “Thou” can dispel this solitude of the soul; only a real conversation, in which we are actually 
addressed by another person, can make us responsible; this alone would be absolutely timely, personal, 
and therefore wholly serious.”
273TTM2, p. 166. Italics in the text.
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fundamentally the question of whether the personality will in fact undergo a recentering that displaces
the ego or will, in quiet desperation, persist in its addiction, distorting and tearing two-dimensional life
by attempting to stretch it over the four dimensions of human existence.”®®'* Loder notes that;
. . .  the development of the ego and all its various competencies (for example, language, 
intelligence, moral judgment) unfolds a different axis from that of spiritual 
development. The two axes of development may intersect and complement each other, 
but they diverge preeminently as to primary aim. The ego’s aim is adaptation to its 
physical, social, and cultural environment so as to maximize satisfaction and to ensure 
survival. The human spirit is both in the service of the ego and transcends it. .. .When 
the human spirit finds its ground in the Divine Spirit, then its aim is disclosed as 
harmony between the divine and contingent orders, specifically personal union with the 
presence and purposes of God. Subsequently the human spirit, in agreement with divine 
order, will seek to bring all ego competencies into line with those purposes, even if it 
means counteradaptive behavior and suffering in place of satisfaction and survival.
Human development needs to be studied in terms of both the divergence and the 
convergence of these two axes, recognizing that ultimately they converge only 
according to the higher, divine order, but never strictly within the purview of ego 
functions. It is not the result of a natural, progressive development of the ego.®®®
That recentering required can only take place through the ti ansfbrming power of the Holy Spirit.
VIII. The Dynamics of Negation
Before we end this section we must stress the power of negation throughout the life-cycle, and 
the implications of this dynamic for the way we do theology. While theologians cannot ignore Freud, 
neither can theologians allow Freud to have the last word. Loder thus offers a theological reading of 
Freud’s ego psychology. We cannot underestimate the force of the ego in the face of potential absence 
or annihilation.®®® The adaptive strategies of the ego actually hinder, indeed, enslave the human spirit.®®® 
Unless the process of negation is itself negated by someone or something beyond the control of the ego, 
the human spirit will be forever bound to either a two- or three-dimensional form of existence. The ego 
cannot bear its own annihilation and will go to great lengths to shut out the void and the Holy from its
®®'*77M2, p. 166-167.
®®®L5, pp. 72-73.
®®®This is one of his most significant theological claims concerning human development. Lucy 
Bregman contends that Loder’s identification of the process of negation is one of the most important 
contributions Loder makes in L S . “Existing models of development do not do justice to the negation 
at the core of the ego, at the core of the human from infancy onward,” she writes. “Loder... insists that 
there is a deep strand of negation within the core of the human, which developmental theories note but 
try to avoid.” The Journal o f Religion, SO (2000): 690. Thus, we ignore the “deconsti'uctive potential 
of human thought” at our own peril. Denys Turner, The Darkness o f God: Negativity in Christian 
Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 8.
®®®See also Ernest Becker The Denial o f Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973), where he also 
identifies the defense strategies of the ego in the face of death, p. 23.
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“world.” The void, which is pure negation, imposes itself upon the ego in many proximate forms. But 
the ego will go to extraordinary lengths to avoid the presence of death. The strategies of adaptation and 
survival operative in the first few months of life remain intact until the forces of negation are negated 
through the transforming power of the Christ.
Loder offers five salient observations about negation. With these insights he makes a unique 
contribution to the study of human development. Development is always obstructed by the power of 
negation. First, Loder has observed through his experience as a psychotherapist and counselor that 
“probably the most painful human experience is nothingness in its many forms (loneliness, 
meaninglessness, death).” “No one,” he claims, “overcomes this by any defensive or emergent 
competencies of the ego.”®®® The ego cannot fill in the gap because the ego is skilled in purely 
functional strategies that can never fathom or respond to the existential predicament that it experiences. 
“This is because the ego is constructed on the principle that absences, although a necessary part of 
existence, are to be denied and inflicted on the environment through objectification and control, but, from 
the egoistic standpoint, if possible they are to be ‘managed,’ not embraced and suffered through. The 
constructive aspects of the ego, creative in themselves, are nevertheless built on its defensive structure, 
and they presupposed negation thioughout the ego’s valiant, prepossessing concern for survival and long­
term satisfaction.”®®®
The second observation is that the persistent drive toward negation - again, that begins in the first 
few months of life and continues to death if not checked - increases exponentially with time. That is, 
the force of negation builds with intensity across one’s life-span. This becomes an overwhelming burden 
of the ego to keep the void and even the Holy at bay.®”  “Developmentally the defense against primal 
absence is an accumulating force that eventually (at least by the middle years) becomes an overbearing 
burden to the constructive powers of the ego, and the accumulated pain of nothingness slowly begins to
®®®77M2, p. 173.
®®®77M2,p. 173.
®®°In Kierkegaardian parlance the ego keeps the void and even the Holy at a distance because of 
the “offense” of the ti uth that such realms bestow to the self. Kierkegaard wrote in his Journal, “The 
divine truth is ‘the truth,’ but in such a way that the world takes offense at it. It cannot be otherwise. 
But it cannot therefore be said that it [divine truth] gives offense.” The reason the self takes offense to 
the truth for two theological reasons, as McCracken explains in his study of offense in the gospels, first 
“the divine is offensive to the natural world and second, that humans, who are necessarily part of the 
natural world, must encounter the offense in order to encounter the divine. . . .This difficult-to-bear, 
personal nature of an offense, its confrontational nature that makes it hard to ignore or to shrug off, its 
blatant attack on what we take to be our deepest selves or our strongest allegiances - these are precisely 
what give the offense its power. The offense has a way of bringing the individual to a moment of crisis, 
revealing the heart’s desire.” David McCracken, The Scandal o f the Gospels: Jesus, Story, and Offense 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.33. The Kierkegaard Journal entry is cited by 
McCracken, p. 33.
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draw the ego back toward that primal absence. As ego competence declines, the rate of the descent 
increases.”®®’ But there is no guarantee that it will decline or weaken. The desperate competencies of 
the ego can last right through to the end of the life-cycle.
“There is no possibility for recovering the lost face,” Loder makes clear in the third point, 
“without eventually encountering nothingness.” This is another significant point with considerable 
theological implications. The recovering of the lost face is always and only the work of God’s grace 
encountered in a convictional experience of the Holy Spirit after the pattern of Christ’s life, death and 
resurrection. It is the Holy Spirit who grants a four-dimensional human existence and that four­
dimensional reality cannot be realized apart from a confrontation with nothingness, itself -  with the 
void. The experience of the Holy “reaches back under the defensive structure of the ego and restores the 
same conditions for the mature, differentiated personality that the proto-typical facial encounter 
introduces for the emerging child ego.”®®® The Holy, mediated in Christ, frees the ego to giound itself 
in something deeper than itself. Thus the ego discovers that, by trusting God, “its defensive maneuvers 
are reversible and that the primal absence is now bearable. Indeed it is even gracious because it haunts 
the self-sufficiency of the ego with constant reminders of its conflicted origins, calling it back again and 
again into communion with the Face that endures, the Face of God.”®®®
The fourth point accentuates the theological veracity of Loder ’ s theories. If his hypotheses ring 
true theologically, it is because “the patterns and dynamics of human development are prototypically 
related to basic theological concepts; such patterns and dynamics are original but deficient expressions 
of ultimate categories of meaning.”®®'’ The patterns identified in human development are not necessarily 
bad, but inadequate in and of themselves to yield a Icnowledge of God. They serve as patterns of 
correlation. “The face of the loving parent is prototypical of the Face of God; the early sense of absence 
is prototypical of the ultimate void, ‘outer darkness’ and abandonment of God. The transforming impact 
of a convictional experience [of the Holy] on the mature personality, in which negation incorporated 
becomes a reversible process, is a prototype of the transformational work of God Spirit’s in history.”®®®
®®'“The corrective is the intentional turn inward and renewed search for the lost face.” It was this 
idea that was central to Carl Jung’s methodology and why personal transformation, intimately tied to his 
“process of individuation,” could not take place until one reached middle-age. Loder, p. 173. On the 
origin of this “process” in his thought, see C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, recorded and 




2^^TTM2, p. 174. See also LS, pp. 17-38. 
®®®rZW2, p. 174.
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Finally, the last implication of the power of negation is that in the Face-less existence of the 
maladaptive ego one finds a “denial of person-centeredness.” In a Face-less world, the struggle of the 
ego to survive and be satisfied is often achieved at the expense of other people. “To be sure, people are 
worked into the ego’s ‘world,’ but they are secondary to survival and the satisfactions that can be built 
on the dynamics of negation incorporated.”®®® When a person encounters the Holy, the Holy “restores 
the original impact of the Face and make[s] negation dynamics reversible.” What this means is that 
when the Holy encounters a human being, freed from the enslavement of the ego, the Holy will “generate 
a person-centered life of four-dimensional proportions.”®®®
To experience the Holy in a moment of conviction is to undergo transformation, now understood 
as the negation of existential negation. By “existential negation” Loder refers to the negation inherent 
to being. It is “the ultimate negation of the capacity of the ego to construct its world, sometimes called 
‘ego shock.’” This is the domain of the void. “All negation in some measure points to the void, but in 
existential negation the person is immersed in it.”®®® Transformational negation is a negation of the 
negation or “double negation” whereby a “new integration emerges” for the ego that could never be 
achieved by itself “establishing a gain over the original negated state of condition,” in that the experience 
“establishes a new state of being which includes the first negation as an essential element of the gain.”®®^ 
Convictional transformation confronts the negation inherent in being, and creates a new existence, but 
in such a way as to integrate negated negation into the incorporation. Existential negation itself is taken 
up into a larger dynamic of transfoimation, but without destroying the negation’s constituency in being. 
Negation remains a part of being, but in transformation it is not definitive for being. Negation loses its 
edge, as it were, and is no longer a threat to the ego.
With regards to Loder’s extensive research on the dynamics of negation in the human spirit he 
has made a seminal contribution in our grasp of the process of transfoimation.®”  In fact, Loder sees the 
reluctance of Fowler to talk about the power of negation in understanding faith development as a major 
flaw of his theories. Transformation requires the “negation of negation” in order to achieve an 
ontological gain that cannot be achieve tlirough the natural, although maladaptive processes of human 
development. To focus on the stages of human development alone (as Fowler has done), Grannel notes
®®®7TM2,p. 174. 
®®®rrM2, p. 174.
®®®rrM2, pp. 159ff. See also Loder’s chapter cited above, “Negation and Transformation: A 
Study in Theology and Human Development,” pp. 168ff.
®®^ Loder, p. 168.
®” This is also the view of Andrew Grannel, “The Paradox of Formation and Transformation, 
Religious Education 80 (1985): 390.
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(agreeing with Loder), “hides a latent negative reality, i. e. the repetitive failures and insufficiencies of 
each new integration. .. .transformation necessitates the overcoming of the negative ‘ other’ force which 
everywhere and always fragments.”®’"
In order for this to occur, convictional transformation requires a mediator. The ego does not 
have the ability to embrace existential negation, nor does is possess the power to overcome its drive 
towards self-destruction (destrudd). For Loder, the only one who has demonstrated the capacity to 
encounter death and experience it without being crushed by it is Jesus Christ. It is here that we begin 
to have a clearer picture of Loder’s Christology which informs his view of life in Christ. “Christ 
crucified and resun-ected is taken as a paradigm of the mediator of transformation.. . .  Christ becomes 
the adequate ‘grammar’ of existential transformation because in his crucifixion he takes ultimate 
annihilation into himself and in his resuiTection existential negation is negated.”®”
In an attempt to clarify what he means by transfoimational negation, Loder turned to Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s (b. 1908) study of the construction and analysis of myth in Structural Anthropology and 
developed the following formula or “design” to account for the ontological gain experienced in 
transformation: fpi'.fy B: :fyB:fA-,Y. The entire movement depends upon the work of the mediator (B). 
The mediator, Loder suggests, has a “dual function, one positive or constructive (fy), and one negative 
or desti'uctive (/’,).” As stated earlier, the pivotal move that accounts for change is the double negation 
exercised by the mediator “(fB  negates an original negative situationfA )."  Furthermore, the redemptive 
activity o f f y  of B, which “represents the redemptive activity ( f y )  of Christ (B),” must be equal to or 
greater than the/, of A, which “represents the double-bind condition of original sin (A), whereby every 
effort (/) to extricate oneself only intensifies the condition.” If it is not, then the double negation will 
be “effective in freeing the “redeemed state (A-1) to live in and become a function of the positive 
function of the mediator (f.tY).” This, Loder maintains, is a way to speak of the “deep structure that 
underlies the Christ event [that is, the crucifixion and resurrection], as well as a structure by which we 
comprehend the work of the Holy Spirit as ‘Spiritus Creator.’”®”  We will take up this pneumatological 
statement in the next section.
Two aspects of double-negation need to be highlighted. First, tiansfbrmation is different from 
anything that can be realized through a process of socialization or development. It is not a natural part
®^’Grannel, p. 390. Grannel affirms “the magnitude of Loder’s contributions to our 
understanding of transformation. He has taken transformation with utmost seriousness and has offered 
a radical reappraisal of its significance for the heart of all human functions and indeed the heart of the 
human condition itself, (p. 395)”
®” Loder, p. 169.
®” rrM 2, p. 187. See also “Negation and Transformation: A Study in Theology and Human 
Development, ”p. 191.
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of existence. When experienced it always grants something new.
In Christ, death dies; by his becoming sin, all sin is canceled. Christ thus creates an 
ontological gain for those who are in his nature. The crucifixion is a sine qua non of the 
new being in Christ, lest transformation be truncated in a fantastic aberration or 
elevation of one’s human existence. Likewise, resurrection is a sine qua non as the 
opposite side of crucifixion, lest God become preeminently an executioner.®”
Loder does not attach himself to any particular theory of the atonement. Instead, his primary concern 
is to establish the point that “the personal appropriation of Christ as mediator depends upon the mystical 
connection between the ego ’ s underlying self-defeating nature and the suffering and abandonment which 
Christ experiences on the cross.”®”
The second point serves to draw our attention to themes we have addressed throughout. The 
Christian experience primarily entails the transformation of the ego. Included in this is the recentering 
or re-grounding of the personality in the personhood of God. “Ego transformation may then be 
understood not as destruction to the ego, but as a clear-cut recentering of the personality around a 
transcendental reality that points to the invisible God.” This is what occurs in lives that are regenerated 
by the Spirit of Christ, which led Paul to talk about, “I, but yet, not I, but Christ. (Galatians 3:20)” 
Indeed, “personality has the structural potential for being transformed and recentered on an effective 
vision of God.®”  When Loder spoke of “mystical connection,” above, he did not mean a mystical union 
often associated with mysticism. Union implies a melding of identities into one. Loder resists this 
understanding of the Christian life at every turn by stressing the need to make a space for the individual, 
by affirming the “I.” This is not to deny that there is a connection, of course. Even the word “union” can 
be used provided that one envisions it relationally, consisting of two entities that remain distinct in the 
relationship. It is similar to the way Karl Barth (1886-1968) came to talk about the divinity and 
humanity of Christ as possessing an “indissoluble differentiation,” an “inseparable unity,” an 
“indestructible order.”®’’® The recentering is the work of the Holy Spirit who educates the human spirit 
to its innate condition, but also to its potential when grounded in God. Conviction is an experience of
®”‘’7TM2, p. 161. “Jesus is the only one who can give us the meaning of life because alone has 
overcome its end point; he alone has satisfied the drive of the human spirit to claim the last word in the 
face of death.” LS, p. 29.
®”®Loder, p. 186.
®”®Loder, p. 179. Italics in text. “. . . in knowing and being known by Jesus Chiist, where the 
not-I is the presence of the Spirit of God, my very identity as a self is transformed and inverted; my 
dialectical identity is newly composedhy the infinite and eternal not-I, who cancels my need to compose 
my own ultimate identity through the ego.” See F. LeRon Shults, p. 23. Italics in the text.
®^ ®Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. T. F. Torrance and G. W. Bromiley, ÏII/2 (Edinburgh: T 
& T Clark, 1975), p. 437, cited in LS, p. 33. See also Loder, “The Place of Science in Practical 
Theology: The Human Factor,” p. 23.
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recentering, whereby the deep structure or logic of the Holy Spirit engages the exocentric drive of the 
human spirit and transforms it. This fonns the basis of Loder's relational pneumatology.
IX. The analogis spiritus and the Work of Spiritus creator
Loder sees the primary charge of the Holy Spirit is the work of conviction. As we have seen, 
the logic of conviction or transformation as a "patterned process by which the Holy Spirit transforms all 
transformations of the human spirit” involves all four dimensions of being. It is a pattern that is 
initiated, mediated, and concluded by Christ as mediated by the Holy Spirit.®^ ® After 1970, there is a 
dramatic shift towards a consideration of pneumatology, a relational pneumatology which he describes 
as an analogia spiritus, was developed over the 1970's and comes to fruition in the The Transforming 
Moment. It is the same analogia spiritus that stands at the center of The Knight's Move and is 
incorporated into his understanding of human development from a theological perspective in The Logic 
o f the Spirit. Because conviction is the work of the Holy Spirit, the outcome is always an ontological gain 
for an individual. Transformation yields something new, summed up in Loder's adoption of Basil’s 
(c.330-379) designation of the Holy Spirit in De Spiritu Sancto as Spiritus creator - the creative spirit. 
The use of the Spiritus creator designation and the development of an analogia spiritus are quintessential 
Loder. They stand as perhaps his most unique and ingenious conti ibution to way theologians think about 
the Holy Spirit and the way a believer experiences the power and presence of the Holy Spirit in one’s 
life.
Loder wants to place pneumatological considerations at the center of the Christian life as a well- 
needed corrective to the over-emphasis upon christological definitions that have, ironically, burdened 
the mission of the church. Gary D. Badcock, for example, has shown in a recent work that the early 
centuries of the church spent far more theological energy exploring a Logos theology that sought to 
define the person and work of the Son. This was done at the expense of a detailed consideration of the 
Holy Spirit. The pneumatology that developed early in the formulation of the creed at Constantinople 
is ambiguous, which has led to an “emphasis of the Son over against the Spirit in Christian theology.’’®”  
The Constantinople creed of 381 A. D. is an improvement over the creed of 325 A. D, in that “at least 
something positive is asserted about the Spirit.”®”  Nevertheless, Constantinople does not explicitly
nM 2, p. 93.
®”®Gary D. Badcock, Light o f Truth &. Fire o f Love: A Theology o f the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 56-61, 61.
®” Badcock, p. 59. The Creed of 325, of Nicaea, states quite briefly a belief in the Holy Spirit, 
the Creed of 381 states, that we believe “ in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from 
the Father, who is worshipped and glorified together with the Father and Son,.. .” I am conscious of the 
division between the Eastern and Western church over the filioque clause. I do not want to get bogged 
down in that controversy other than to affirm that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and
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describe the relationship between the Son and the Spirit. This glaring omission, Babcock argues, would 
cause major theological problems for the church, problems we are still dealing with today.®*" Thus, the 
early church’s preoccupation to affirm the divinity and humanity of Jesus seemed to push to the 
periphery questions concerning the relationship between Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. Chiistological 
positions were firmly pronounced at the Council of Nicea in A. D. 325 which remain normative for the 
church today, but the same is not true for pneumatological assertions. Athanasius (c.296-377) noted that 
since Origin (c. 185-C.254), the Holy Spirit lagged behind in devotional practice. Eusebius (c.265-339) 
wrote that the Holy Spirit was “in third rank,” in third power,” and “third from the Supreme Cause.”®”  
And Adolf von Hamack (1851-1930) refened to the Holy Spirit as the “orphan doctrine” of Christian 
theology.®”  Indeed, George Hunsinger asserts that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, “has never been 
stabilized by a conciliar decision of the church, although it is as vexing, contested and uncertain as any 
doctiine the church has ever known.”®”
Loder sees the confessional statement, “We believe also in the Holy Spirit” added on at the end, 
“almost as an afterthought.” He suggests this attitude can still be see in the worshiping community and 
in theologians for whom the “doctrine still runs a poor third, as a derivative from Trinity or 
Christology.”®”  This seems paradoxical, since “without the Spirit, God would not be the God of the 
Scriptures, Jesus Christ would be a remote historical phenomenon, the church would be merely a
is to be worshipped as like the Father and the Son. Procession from the Father alone severs the 
relationship with the Son. This would contradict scripture which says the Spirit is the Son and the 
Father. Without proceeding from the Father and the Son, opens the “danger of a mysticism of the Spirit 
without any foundation in or relation to christology.(p. 82)” See also Alasdair I. C. Heron, ‘“Who 
Proceedeth From the Father and the Son’: The Problem of the Filioque,” Scottish Journal o f Theology, 
24(1971): 149-167. Loder never addressed the filioque question.
®*"That this remains a problem within the church today is evidenced by the number of people who 
are confused about the nature of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit’s connection with Jesus Christ, and the 
Spirit’s relationship to the Father and Son in the Trinity. I regularly encounter this in the parish.
®” J. N. D. Kelly, Early Church Doctrines, revised edition (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco,
1978).
®®®Harnack notes that the “scientific theology of the apologists did, in general, not know what 
to do with [the Holy Spirit], and even the 3d century the majority viewed the Holy Spirit as a power.” 
Outlines o f the History o f Dogma, Translated by Edwin Knox Mitchell with an Introduction by Philip 
Rieff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 266ff.
®” From his chapter, “The Mediator of Communion: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of the Holy Spirit,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, edited by John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 177.
®®®See Loder’s discussion of the history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in TKM, pp. 20-28. 
He offers Tillich, Barth, Moltmann and Pannenberg as examples. Since 1992, Jürgen Moltmann has 
published The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993).
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socially-constructed character-building agency, and the ethical life of Christianity would be purely a 
matter of forming personal and social conscience.”®”  But it really is not all that surprising when one 
considers that Jesus said the Holy Spirit is like the wind (John 3), coming and going with a freedom that 
is disturbing for those who prefer order and control. There is, by nature, an elusiveness to the person 
and work of the Spirit, so that life within the Spirit is, as the Iona Community in Scotland reminds us, 
like being on a wild goose chase, never quite within one’s grasp.®”  Hence, “as the history of the church’s 
treatment of the Holy Spirit makes abundantly clear,” explains Douglas John Hall, “it was exactly this 
potentiality of the third person of the Trinity to reintroduce life and nuance and movement that was felt 
in the church as an enormous threat.”®”  The same threat, then, threatens the church today. So that 
Hendrikus Berkhof (b. 1914) is con ect in perceptively identifying that, “To a great extent official church 
history is the story of the defeats of the [Holy] Spirit.”®®^ Loder’s wants to change this.
The way he proposes to make this correction is by reenvisioning the Holy Spirit as relational. 
This is a direct response to Alasdair I. C. Heron’s request for such a consideration, as well as Thomas 
F. Torrance’s call to see the Holy Spirit as person who exists relationally in the Trinity and rplates, 
person-to-person in the Christian experience. Torrance in particular has pointed to what he calls the 
“persistent eiror of Romanism and Protestantism; whereby one confounds the Spirit with the spirit of 
the Church,.. .and the other confounds the Spirit of God with the human spirit. Thus Icnowledge of the 
Spirit is dissolved in the subjectivities of the consciousness of the Church or of the individual, and the 
products of this consciousness, in its collective or individual genius, are put forward as operations of the 
Holy Spirit.”®'®
Drawing upon Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389), Loder wants to affirm that the
®”®7XAf, p. 20. To a considerable extent, I think Loder has diagnosed the present state of crisis 
both within the theological academy and within the church. We will take up this assertion in the last 
chapter.
®®®George Macleod (1898-1991), founder of the present-day Iona Community claimed that the 
Celtic symbol for the Holy Spirit was the wild goose. It is still used today by the Iona Community, Iona, 
Scotland where pilgrimages around the island are called “chasing the wild goose.” Recent studies, 
however, have not been able to confirm Macleod’s claims. See Ian Bradley, Colonies o f Heaven: Celtic 
Models for Today’s Church (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2000), p. x.
®®®Douglas John Hall, Thinking the Faith: Christian Theology in a North American Context 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 106.
®®”Hendrikus Berkhof, Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study o f the Faith, Translated by 
By Sier Woudstra (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), p. 42, cited in Douglas John Hall, “An 
Awkward Church,” Theology and Worship Occasional Paper No. 5, published by The Presbyterian 
Church,(U. S. A.), 1993, p. 4.
®‘®ThomasF. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Lond: SCM Press, Ltd., 1965), pp. 227-228. 
Alasdair I. C. Heron, The Holy Spirit (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983).
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Holy Spirit is not simply the spirit of the church or another name for the human spirit, nor is it simply 
a power, force or even feeling, but a “full and distinct personal reality ” who relates to and inseparable 
from the Father and the Son.®” The Holy Spirit exists in a perichoretic relationship with the Trinity. 
In this dancing or moving around within the Trinity a space is created for the persons of the Trinity to 
relate to one another. As such, “there is mutual inteipenetration at all points without loss of identity. 
Individuality and mutuality are simultaneously affirmed and the members of the Trinity can change 
places without changing their identity.” The “unity of the Trinity is the relationality, and the relationality 
is the unity.”®'® Loder’s high esteem for the Greek fathers and their understanding of the Trinity 
resonates with his relational-personalist outlook. The relational model of the Trinity becomes the model 
by which the Trinity also relates to the universe, particularly the human spirit. It is also why Loder 
claimed that “relationality is ontologically prior to rationality.”®'® Relationality not only constitutes the 
Godhead, but relationality constitutes the created order (God in relationship to the “other” of creation). 
Indeed, as we have seen, relationality constitutes reality.
Therefore, central to Loder’s thinking is the belief that the Holy Spirit can never be confused 
with the human spirit. To support him in this claim, Loder relies heavily on George Hendry’s (b. 1904), 
The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, which persuasively argues that these cannot be conflated.® 
Hendry is one of the few theologians writing after Barth to stress this differentiation.®'® A cursory 
reading of the New Testament would show that Christians viewed the Holy Spirit as distinct from, yet 
in relation with human beings, as spirit (Romans 8:16; 1 Corinthians 2: 10-16).” This is an extremely 
important distinction that needs to be upheld because it offers a way beyond the muddling conception 
of the Spirit that has remained operative in the church, especially since the nineteenth century, shaped 
by Georg Hegel’s (1770-1831) Phanomenologie der Geistes (Phenomenology o f Spirit) of 1807.®'®
®''7%M,p. 23.
®'®7XM, p. 23
®'®L^ , p. 8.
®‘‘'George S. Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1965). See also Hendry’s discussion of the Holy Spirit in The Gospel o f the Incarnation 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), pp. 159-161.
®'®That the confusion remains in evidenced in Colin Gunton, The One, The Three and The Many: 
God, Creation and the Culture o f  Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), as well 
as, in recent studies by Gaiy D. Badcock, Light o f Truth & Fire o f Love: A Theology o f the Holy Spirit 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), John McIntyre, The Shape o f Pneumatology: Studies in the 
Doctrine o f the Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997).
®'®The conflation becomes especially clear in the closing sections of the Phanomenology where 
Hegel discusses how the Subject becomes self-consious of itself as the self-unfolding of Spirit 
experienced as History, “a conscious, seXf-mediating process - the Spirit emptied out into time.” G. W.
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Hendry is not the only person to stress this distinction. Barth also identifies the differentiation. But Barth
remained ambiguous about how the Holy Spirit relates to the human spirit. Hendry provides a way for
Loder to conceptualize the connection. Let us turn briefly to Barth, then let us see the way Loder
appropriates Hendry in the formation of his analogia spiritus.
It was Barth who stressed the theological danger contained within conflation.®” As early as
October 1929, in a lecture entitled “The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life,” Barth sets forth a vision of
the need for theology to reappropriate a theology of the Holy Spirit in contrast to an idealist
understanding of the Spirit, rampant in nineteenth century philosophy.®'® Since Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804), German philosophy had been shaped by the acknowledgment that there is a portion of the
consciousness not shaped by the material world and is free vis-a-vis matter. “Spirit,” mind, or
consciousness transcends the phenomenal world. Loviii summarizes the implications of this for
nineteenth century thought:
The freedom of consciousness, rather than the detenninations of the material world, 
enables us to understand ourselves and the events that impinge upon us. Spirit, not 
matter, is the key to history. According to Hegel, however, this does not mean that ' 
history is simply a sequence of spontaneous events. The freedom of Spirit follows a 
law, but it is a law of reason, not of physical causation. To understand history and 
human beings is to understand this movement of Spirit in them.®'”
The strong, close relationship and dependence of theology upon philosophy in the nineteenth century 
meant that German Idealism made a considerable impression upon Protestant German theology.
What form did such ideas take in theology? Lovin notes that, “the pervasive Spirit implies that 
the spiritual aspirations of human individuals are indeed the most important things about them, the link
F. Hegel, Phenomenlogy o f Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller with Analysis of the Text and Foreward by 
J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 48-493, italics in original. Quentin Lauer, A 
Reading o f Hegel's Phenomenology o f the Spirit (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987). For a 
discussion on the problems with Plegel’s pneumatology as the grounds of Christian faith see Charles 
Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 491- 493ff. “Hegel cannot accommodate the 
relations of God and man as they must be for Christian faith,” he argues, because Hegel cannot conceive 
of a mutual relation between the two, because “no finite spirit can realize the infinite” without the 
infinite losings its freedom (p. 491). On the use of Hegel by theologians see Karl Barth, Protestant 
Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (Salem, New Hampshire, Aye Company, 1987), pp. 268-305.
®'®Some have said of Barth (including Barth himself) that he was primarily a pneumatic 
theologian, resting his theological system upon the need to confess the “Spirit as Lord.” Tliis statement 
was made by Barth as late as 1968. Philip J. Rosato, S.J., The Spirit As Lord: The Pneumatology o f Karl 
Barth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1981), p. v.
®'®Karl Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological Basis o f Ethics, Translated 
by R. Birch Hoyle. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993. As seen in Barth’s brother, 




to a more permanent and meaningful reality than their fragile material circumstances can provide. In 
German, as in English, the philosophers’ concept of Spirit (Geist) as the pervasive reality that orders and 
gives meaning to events lends itself to association with the theological doctrine of the Holy Spirit (der 
heilige Geist) as the creative power by which God brings the world into being, orders it, and reveals this 
order and purpose to human beings, whose capacity to receive this revelation marks the participation in 
Spirit that is the divine image in them.”®®® Thus, it is easy to see how the ‘Spirit’ of German Idealism 
was conflated with the theological image of the Holy Spirit, which meant the conflation of the human 
spirit with the Holy Spirit.®®' Heinrich Barth, for example, wanted to return to Kant, “to give the Spirit 
a place.” But it was only a place afforded by the human knower. The human spirit would be the 
appropriate starting point to come to know the place of the Holy Spirit.®®®
Karl Barth could not accept this. Human spirituality could never be the starting place for a 
Icnowledge of the Holy Spirit, We must be clear about of what or of whom we speak. Barth writes, 
“Indeed, the Spirit of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or even the Spirit of Love, or the Spirit of 
Goodness manied to Holiness, in which man has a share more or less, is certainly the Evil Spirit when 
taken as a substitute for the Holy Spirit. To make that other spirit the conqueror over sin is to put a fox 
in charge of geese!”®®® The Holy Spirit is just that: a Holy Spirit, not limited to the contingency of human 
knowledge. And if the Holy Spirit is present at all in creation it cannot be divorced from what we know 
of God as Creator and Christ. In fact, to speak of the Holy Spirit is to speak of Chi ist, and not the human 
spirit. “There is no reference,” notes George Hendry, “ in the New Testament to any work of the Spirit 
apart from Christ. The Spirit is, in an exclusive sense, the Spirit of Clirist.”®®'' To say an experience is
®®®Barth, p. xi. “The mysterious relationship of identity and objectivity by which persons both 
are and are aware of their own consciousness becomes, for the philosophy of idealism, the paradigm for 
understanding the theological mystery of the Trinity, the unity of God in the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.” (p. xi) See also Barth’s, Church Dogmatics IV/3, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), p. 761.
®®‘A good example is Hegel’s use of traditional concepts like “Spirit” and imposing upon it a 
meaning that is very different from the Christian tradition. Richard Campbell has identified places where 
Hegel does this throughout his system. “For all his sense of historicity, and for all that he presents his 
philosophy as a demythologized exposition of the content of Christianity, Hegel understands philosophy 
in terms of the Platonic theoria, a conceptual detachment from practical engagement with reality in order 
to contemplate and reflect discursively upon it. What he is seeking is scientific Icnowledge 
( Wissenschaft), a systematic set of necessary theoretical statements, encompassing the totality of all there 
is.” Truth and Historicity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 294.
®®®Barth, p. xii.
®®®Barth, p. 25.
®®''George Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, Revised and Enlarged Edition. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 26. “The Spirit continues the presence of Christ beyond the 
brief span of his historical appearance and completes it by effecting its inward apprehension among men. 
In both emphases, however, the Spirit is presented in a purely Christocentric reference (p. 26).” See also
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spiritual, within a Christian context, means that it is an experience that has its point of origin not within 
the human knower but in the mind of God. Hence, there must be a clear distinction between the human 
spirit and the Holy Spirit. What knowledge there is of God in Christ can only be mediated through the 
Person of the Holy Spirit. “But, as it is written, ‘What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of 
man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him,’ God has revealed to us through the 
Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what person knows a man’s 
thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God 
except the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2; 9-11).”
Barth himself has said that his theology has been shaped by the work and power of the Holy 
Spirit. “To groan ‘Come, Creator Spirit’ is, according to Romans 8, more hopeful than to triumph as if 
we already had him. You are already introduced to “my theology” if you have heard this groan.”®®® 
When the creative presence of the Holy Spirit engages the human spirit, the Spirit exposes the internal 
contradictions and powers of resistance in the human spirit which at the same time opens up the human 
spirit to be transformed and made alive. This is a process that reflects the pattern of Christ’s death and 
resurrection.
Patterned after the person of Christ, the Holy Spirit is engaged in eschatological endeavors of 
redemption, bringing about new-ness to humanity and the entire created order. Barth describes the work 
in this way:
The Holy Spirit makes a new heaven and a new earth, and therefore new men, new 
families, new relationships, new politics. It has no respect for old traditions simply 
because they are traditions, for old solemnities simply because they are old, for old 
powers simply because they are powerful. The Holy Spirit has respect only for truth, 
for itself. The Holy Spirit establishes the righteousness of heaven in the midst of the 
unrighteousness of the earth and will not stop or stay until all that is dead has been 
brought back to life and a new world has come into being.®®®
Contained in these sentences is a profound wisdom and insight into the way the Holy Spirit encounters 
and participates in the human spirit in order to bring about a new world, a way that has no affiliation with 
the evolving Geist of the Hegelian dialectic or anything that could be achieved by human willfulness 
alone. By new world we can take Barth to mean a new reality. World in a Loderian sense, a new 
phenomenal experience of World seen through the eyes of faith. It is eschatological in that the Holy 
Spirit graciously imposes the righteousness of God’s realm in and with the unrighteousness of a fallen 
creation (which includes fallen creatures), not to destroy, but to judge in order to restore to life, new life,
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/l (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1980), p. 482.
®®®Karl Barth, The Word o f God and the Word o f Man, Translated with a new Foreword by 
Douglas Horton, (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978 [1928], p. 134.
®®®Barth, p. 49-50.
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new possibility, new ways of seeing the world, that are not constituted or constructed by anything human.
Barth has established that there is a distinction between the Holy Spirit and human spirit, but he 
never attempts to explain how they connect. Indeed, the question of how the Holy Spirit-human spirit 
connection takes places remains a maj or weakness in his work and other recent theological discussions.®®® 
In Badcock, and Heron, as well as John McIntyre’s, The Shape o f Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine 
ofthe Holy Spirit,iüvgmyioXtmamIs, The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation and Michael Welker’s, 
God the Spirit, certainly the most exhaustive recent studies on the nature of the Spirit, a connection 
between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit is affirmed, yet there is no attempt to explore the nature 
of the relationality, the corresponding dynamics that explains how such an exchange takes place.®®® And 
they all fail to into consideration of the psychological drives of the human spirit. Badcock does suggest 
that for:
. . .  a theology of the Spirit, who is the ‘life-giver’ as well as the Lord, what matters is 
the life embraced, and not simply the truth held, as if that were sufficient for itself, or 
as if it were its own goal. Here, we are approaching the requirements for a real 
pneumatology and leaving behind the abstract ideal of Logos as self-sufficient, inclusive 
symbol of all theology. Or, to put the point another way, we are complementing the 
ideal of Logos with what it implies and that to which it leads - life in the Spirit.®®”
In identifying the Holy Spirit as the giver of life we move toward a convictional understanding of the 
Cliristian experience. How the Spirit gives life, the logic of that pattern, is what Loder is trying to 
articulate and in doing so makes an invaluable contribution to pneumatological considerations. The 
embrace of life in the Spirit forces us to leam firom the human sciences what it means to be human, as 
Loder has shown, at the same time our understanding of humanity is informed by and grounded in a 
biblical anthropology.
Loder sees the "analogia spiritus" as an intimate, transformational relationship between the 
human spirit and the Holy Spirit, He develops his pneumatology by paying close attention to references 
to the Holy Spirit in the New Testament and by incorporating the work of Hendry, Michael Polanyi, 
Douglas Hofstadter, and Regin Prenter (1907-?). But Loder goes well beyond Barth and others by 
suggesting that the Holy Spirit actually engages human experience through the intimacy of a
®®®Bo Karen Lee, “The Holy Spirit and Human Agency in Barth’s Doctrine of Sanctification,” 
Koinonia, XII (2000): 176. In CD (IV/4) Barth does suggest that a possible link is found in the act of 
prayer, the most important “action” of the Christian life.
®®®John McIntyre, The Shape o f  Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine o f  the Holy Spirit. 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997); Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit o f  Life: A Universal Affirmation 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993); Michael Welker, God the Spirit. Translated by John 
F. Hoffineyer. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994).
®®”Badcock, p. 139.
138
relationship, Holy Spirit to human spirit.®®®
The New Testament is not univocal when it speaks about the Holy Spirit and its relationship with
humanity. The synoptics, the Pauline and Johannine literature, and Acts are not in complete agreement
about this relationship. It is obvious that God’s Spirit is upon Jesus throughout his earthly ministry, it
is thi'ough the presence of the Spirit that he begins his work in Luke 4. In the farewell discourses
recounted by John, Jesus promises to send another, a “paraclete” who will lead his disciples into all truth.
(John 16: 7-15). The clearest, and probably earliest, statements on the relationship between the Spirit
and Christ can be found in the Pauline literature, and so Loder looks to Paul for the pattern. It can be
argued that pneumatology is at the heart of Paul’s theology with more than 140 references topneuma
(S/spirit) in his letters. Indeed, S. Neil and N. T. Wright suggest that “Paul’s doctrine of the Spirit is far
more central and characteristic than his doctrine of justification by faith.”®®' Loder develops his model
from a close reading of Romans 6, 1 Corinthians 2, Philippians 2 within the Pauline corpus and beyond
Paul in Hebrews in 4:12-13.®®®
Because the locus classicus of this inter-relationality for Paul, and for Loder is 1 Corinthians 2
we will focus only on this text and how Loder interprets it.®®® In a discussion on the authority and content
of his preaching, Paul tells us that he relied not on human wisdom but a demonstration of the “Spirit and
of power.” To the mature in the faith, however, he grants the wisdom of God, “not a wisdom of the age
or the rulers of the age.” He writes:
But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages 
for our glorification. None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they did they
®®®There is a tendency within the Christian theological tradition to question the possibility of the 
Holy Spirit participating in the life a person. See Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), The Christian 
Faith {Glaubenslehre, 1821-1822), edited by H.R. Mackintosh &J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1948). “.. .the Holy Spirit is not something that, although divine, is not united with our human nature,
but only somehow influences it from without There is indeed no way of imagining how the Spirit’s
gifts could be within us, and He Himself remain without, or how He is to influence us from without 
except through human speech and significant action - which just means that He is already within, and 
influencing, someone else. And the man on whom the Spirit works is not thereby made a participator 
in the Spirit (p. 571).”
®®'Of this number, ‘Holy Spirit’ is used seventeen times, the ‘ Spirit of God’ is used sixteen times, 
and ‘Spirit of Christ’ used three times. See Gordon D. Fee, Paul, the Spirit and the People o f God 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996), p. 28. See also S. Neill and N. T. Wright, The Interpretation o f the 
New Testament 1861-1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 203, cited in Fee, p. 8.
®®®TZM2, TKM, James E. Loder, “Incisions from a Two-Edged Sword: The Incarnation and the 
Soul/Spirit Relationship,” in Brian Childs & David W. Waanders, eds. The Treasure o f Earthen Vessels: 
Exploration in Theological Anthropology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994).
®®®Badcock also sees this the central text for experience of the Spirit for theological 
interpretation. He prefers to start with verse 11b, “No one comprehends what is God’s except the Spirit 
of God.” However, it seems to me, that verse 10, “For the Spirit searches eveiything even the depths of 
God,” should be emphasized in Paul’s experience.
®®"We find in Pannenberg and in Barth, a tendency to minimize, if not eradicate the significance 
of the human spirit. “In a Christian anthropology the statement that ‘man has spirit’ must be understood 
as meaning that the spirit is ‘something that comes to man, something not essentially his own but to be 
received and actually received by him.’ Human beings are body and soul, but they are not spirit in the 
same way. The spirit is the source of their life and is at work in them. ‘But while He is in man. He is 
not identical with him.’” Here Pannenberg quotes Barth {Church Dogmatics, III/2, trans. H. Knight et 
al. 1960), p. 354) m Anthropology in Theological Perspective,^. 522. See also, LS, p. 33.
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would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But, as it is written, “What no eye has seen, 
nor ear hear, nor the heart of man conceived what God has prepared for those who love 
him,” God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, 
even the depths of God. For what person knows a man’s thoughts except the spirit of 
the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the 
Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which 
is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us in God. And we j
impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting I
spiritual ti’uths to those who possess the Spirit. The unspiritual man does not receive the 
gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them 
because they are spiritually discerned. The spiritual man judges all things, but is 
himself to be judged by no one. “For who has known the mind of the Lord so as to 
instruct him?” But we have the mind of Christ.
The relationality of the Holy Spirit to human spirit is a present reality for Paul. It is not something that
once was, or something that will be. He experiences the power of Christ in the Spirit who testifies to this
fact in Paul’s own spirit. What is more, the search of the Holy Spirit from out of the depths of God
speaks to the depths of the human spirit, and yields a knowledge of God, of self, the void and the world.
That knowledge is the “mind of Christ.” The Spirit represents and enfleshes in our life the deepest
character of God, revealed in the life and death of Christ, and grants to us a new life in Christ.
Thus, in the encounter with God in Christ, face-the-face, the work of the Holy Spirit establishes
a four-dimensional reality for the human spirit, which involves an ego that is grounded in the Spirit of
the Risen Christ who frees the human spirit to grow in love after the pattern of Christ. Loder is most
helpful in identifying and stressing the relationality of the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, without
conflating them.®®'' For this emphasis Loder is indebted to the work of George Hendry. In his often
neglected work on the Holy Spirit, Hendry argued that the Reformed tradition is guilty of minimizing
the significance of the human spirit in our theological considerations. The Reformers’ stress upon sola
gratia has led to a misunderstanding of grace as revealed in the incarnation. The primaiy Augustinian
understanding of grace is that is it condescension. The Almighty God who dwells in “the high and holy
place” (Isaiah 57:15), veiled in light unapproachable (1 Timothy 6:16) moved down toward humanity
to forge a relationship. The movement down, as it were, or of God moving toward humanity first is
essential in an understanding of grace. But Hendry also identified another aspect of God’s grace revealed
in the incarnation, one that Augustine did not take into account, and that is the element of
accommodation. “The only begotten Son of God.. .came down from heaven.. .and he was made man,”
as the creed states and the eternal Word of God who was God “became flesh and dwelt among us.(John
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1: 1-14)” The humanity of accommodation is humanity that is endowed with a created spirit, the 
hallmark of which is freedom.®®®
The implications of Hendry’s analysis are far reaching and have been pressed to service in 
Loder’s methodology. Summarizing his indebtedness to Hendry and capturing the primary thrust of his 
work, Loder writes;
To be in relation with God is to be related Spirit-to-spirit, or Freedom-to-ffeedom. God 
does not dehumanize humanity or “un-man” humanity, to use Hendry’s words, in order 
to relate to humans. Irresistible grace, so called, needs to be reinterpreted as a grace 
whose keynote is nonresistance; God does not overrule human freedom but engages it 
in order that the I-Thou of the God-human relationship not be reduced to the I-it order.
By choosing to become human, God affirms humanity, but the humanity affirmed is 
essentially spirit. It is not correct to say that humanity has lost the image of God; it 
would be better to say that humanity has lost its original of which it is the image. 
Moreover, there is no way the human spirit by itself as human spirit can reverse the loss; 
the created spirit is ontologically incapable of choosing the Creator as a possibility.
Thus, when grace enters the situation, the disoriented human spirit is not destroyed by 
giace; it is ti*ansformed so that it may choose freely to testify with God’s Spirit that we 
are the children of God (Romans 8:16). Thus, the impact of grace on the human spirit 
is to awaken it to a true sense of its freedom to be itself as image restored to its 
original.®®®
The presence of Christ is mediated by the Holy Spirit to the human spirit. When that takes place
there is a new World, a new Reality, a new creation, defined by God’s grace and freedom.
It is important to note that Loder has no desire to make a metaphysical statement as much as it
is an epistemological one. Loder puts it this way:
[T]he main thrust of 1 Cor. 2 is not negative but overwhelmingly affirmative. It is not 
to denigrate vo vç or mind but to proclaim what is in the vo o;Xpioro v. It is here that one 
sees and participates in “what eye has not seen and ear has not heard.” What has not 
enetered into the human mind, God has prepared for those who love him. This is open 
to those whose spirits, in agreement with the Holy Spirit, search out the deep things of 
creation and of God, and whose relationship to God preserves the vital relationality that 
marks them as bearers of the image of God. To be endowed by the Holy Spirit with the 
vo vqXpioxo V. is not other-worldly, but it is instead to perceive and to behold this world 
as if  fo r the for thefirst time because it is knowing the world through the Logos, the One 
through whom all things have been made. The natural order then becomes, remarkably, 
the creation of God in which every moment is sustained by God’s grace alone.
Thus, by an analogia spiritus, Paul is declaring the radical transformation of all human 
horizons of reality. This is not designed to take the Corinthians out of the world but to 
restore them to their true humanity in the world through the Spirit of Christ. This is not
®®®George Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, pp. 96-117.
®®®Loder, The Logic o f the Spirit, pp. 34-35. Cf. Loder, “Incisions from a Two-Edged Sword: 
The Incarnation and the Soul/Spirit Relationship,”pp. 151-173. “The aim of the incarnation cannot be 
to obliterate what is essential to human nature, otherwise the end term of the incarnation (“.. .and was 
made man”) would lack definition. Rather, the incarnation must accommodate to human nature, 
transform it, and restore it to its origin in God. (p. 160)”
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to reduce discord and dissension to the lowest common corporate denominator, but it 
is to raise humanity into its image status so that human spirit, by the power of the Holy 
Spirit, may become true to its potentially Christomorphic nature/^^
What Loder is trying to identify and articulate is a pattern or process in which God redemptively re­
orders our reality, of the way the “Spirit so radically expands the horizons of awareness, of space and 
time, of life and death. ..  The way the Spirit does this is through its participation in the mind of 
Clirist and mediating Christ to the believer.
Thus, at the heart of Paul’s thinking about the Holy Spirit is the belief that the Holy Spirit makes 
real the presence o f Christ. The Holy Spirit is given by the Father, and is the Spirit of God. The Holy 
Spirit, proceeding also from the Son, continues the effective work of the Son in his absence. Yet, 
through the encounter with the Holy Spirit the apparent absence is overcome because the Spirit mediates 
the presence of the Risen Christ to the believer. The Holy Spirit operates as a power, as a force and, in 
this sense, the Holy Spirit is, as the Council of Constantinople decreed, “the Lord, the Life-giver.” The 
life that the Spirit bestows is none other than the zee life of God, the uncreated life that creates and 
sustains the created order. The Spirit, participating in the life of Christ and pointing the way toward 
Christ, confers the life of God that raised Jesus from the grave. In this sense, the power of God’s love 
that raised Jesus from the grave is also operative in the Spirit who testifies to Christ and thus invites and 
allows the believer to indwell within the presence of the Risen Lord. This presence is not limited to an 
particular event, nor is it bound by a particular moment in space-time. The encounter is mediated by the 
Spirit who makes present the presence of the Risen Lord.” ® That mediation posits a new orientation, 
granting a deeper and tiuer knowledge of self, world, void and the Holy, as Loder would argue. The 
Holy Spirit connects us to Christ and even as Christ indwells within the spirit of the believer.
It needs to be stressed that for Loder the Holy Spirit is neither an idea (contra Hegel), nor is the 
Spirit an impersonal force or energy field (contra Welker).” ® The Spirit is understood classically as 
person who relationally participates in the life of the Trinity. Barth has taught us that when we talk about
pp. 49-50. On Loder’s logic as an “epistemological principle,” see Elizabeth Frykberg’s 
essay, sited above, p.24.
p. 49.
339“The Spirit is none other than the fulfillment of the promise that God himself would once 
again be present with his people.” This promised presence of God runs throughout the Old Testament 
and is realized in the New. See Gordon D. Fee, Paul, the Spirit, and the People o f  God (Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997), pp. 9-22.
” ®G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology o f the Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). The 
identification of the Holy Spirit as “force field of divine power and presence,” is, therefore, a particular 
weakness of Welker’s pneumatology. He does not clearly show how the Holy Spirit participates in the 
transfoiming power of Christ. The Spirit is an impersonal power that creates “a force field of the Spirit,” 
new environments for people to become members of. See Welker, pp. 228, 235-236, 239-241.
142
the revelation of God we are not given ideas about God, but experience the unveiling of God’s identity
and being. Revelation is “the Person of God speaking.”” ' The inherent relationaiity of the Trinity,
relating person-to-person, forces us to see that the experience of and with this God must also be
inherently relational, that is personal. “The Early Greek Fathers caused a revolution in philosophical
thinking when they created the Trinitarian confession. , . , ” writes Paul Fiddes.
By equating the temi hypostasis (meaning ‘being’ or ‘reality’) with ‘person’ (prosopon) 
they made clear that to be personal is not merely a quality added on to the nature of 
someone, but that to live in relationships is the very centre of [God’s] essence. In our 
distorted, fallen existence we may begin by thinking first of someone’s being, and then 
of the relationships in which he loves, works and plays; but for God, to be and to relate 
is the same. Thus if this God is fully present in Chi'ist, regardless of the exact way we 
define the incarnation, Christ must be a fully relational reality. In Jesus Christ there is 
a new kind of human being, who could not and cannot exist except in relation to us.” ^
The task of the Holy Spirit is to bring us into the life of Christ, the Christ who by his life, death and 
resurrection has ushered us anew into the life of God. John Calvin (1509-1564) understood the dynamics 
of this pattern when he wrote that “until our minds are intent on the Spirit, Christ is in a manner 
unemployed because we view him coldly without ourselves and so at a distance from us.””  ^That which 
is brought close, therefore, is not an idea about Christ but the presence of Christ as mediated by the Holy 
Spirit.” "
The Spirit-to-spirit or Divine-human relation {analogia spiritus) is understood by Loder as a
” ‘Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/l, pp. 132-136. |
” ^Paul S. Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea o f Atonement I
(Westminster/ John Knox Press, 1989), p. 163. “God’s nature is fully relational; he is ecstatic love, love - j
that goes out beyond the self to another. The deepest reality is personal, and to be a person is not to be |
a self-contained individual but to live in relationships.(p. 163)” j
” ^John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion (III.i.3) This is the way Calvin understands %
Paul. “Paul shows the Spirit to be the inner teacher by whose effort the promise of salvation penetrates |
our minds, a promise that would otherwise only strike the air or beat upon the our ears.” i
’
” "See Calvin’s classic definition of the unio mystica in the Institutes, (Ill.xi. 10): “Therefore, that 
joining together of Head and members, that indwelling of Christ in our hearts - in short, that mystical 
union - are accorded by us the highest degree of importance, so that Christ, having been made ours, 
makes us sharers with him in the gifts with which he has been endowed.” Dennis E. Tamburello has 
shown that “Calvin is tireless in his stress on the Holy Spirit as the bond of a spiritual (yet absolutely 
real) union with Christ.” Union with Christ: John Calvin and the Mysticism o f St. Bernard (Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), p. 87, 87-88. In a letter to Peter Martyr Vermigli, 8"‘ August 
1555, Calvin wrote, “I know only this: that through the power of the Holy Spirit the life of heaven flows 
down to earth, for the flesh of Christ is neither life-giving in itself not can its effect reach us without the 
unmeasurable work of the Spirit. Thus it is the Spirit who makes Christ live in us, who sustains and 
nourishes us, who accomplishes everything on behalf of the Head.” Cited in Tamburello, p. 87.
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'‘''asymmetric bipolar relational unity. In The Knight’s Move he makes extensive use of what he calls
“the strange loop model,” and sees in it a basic pattern of relationaiity at work at both the macro and the 
micro levels of existence, and perhaps even providing a glimpse into the very mind of Christ. Coder’s 
model is based on the work of Michael Polanyi, the theory of complementarity as advanced by Niels 
Bohr, and the discovery of the two-dimensional one-sided phenomenon known as the Mobius band.^ "® 
Let us unpack this.
The logic of complementary put forth by Niels Bohr is more correctly known as the
“complementarity of contradictories.” Bohr once observed, “[There] are two sorts of truth: triviality,
where opposites are obviously absurd, and profound truths, recognized by the fact that the opposite is
also true.”” ’ With this insight, Bohr sought to account for his remarkable discovery that at the
subatomic level the nature of light is simultaneously wave and particle. [Complementarity] is the logical
relation between two descriptions or sets of concepts which, though mutually exclusive, are nevertheless
both necessary for an exhaustive description of the situation.”” ®
By “strange loop” Loder is referring to the discovery of the topological discovery made famous
by M. C. Escher’s woodcut, Mobius Strip II(Red Ants). The strip is basically a band with a 180 degree
twist in it (See Figure 1 below). More than an optical illusion, the directional flow of the lines of this
continuous loop, with one surface and one edge formed by the twist has been used as an expression of
non-duality, or more correctly, a bipolar relational unity. It was discovered by the German
mathematician and astronomer, August Ferdinand Mobius (1790-1868) in 1858. The mathematical
equation for the strip is known as The Mobius Transformation and has been used as a symbol for the
unity of all polarities.” ® This is how Loder uses it:
[T]he model presents the asymmetric bipolarity of relationaiity, suggesting its inherent 
unity. The apparent two sides or edges of the Mobius band represent the two poles in 
a dynamic interrelatedness which via a 180 degree twist brings the apparent duality into 
a paradoxical unity. This aspect of the model stresses our claim that the relationship is
p. 57.
®"®Loder is indebted to Douglas Hofstadter's ,Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1980) for his discussion of M. C. Escher’s (1898-1970) use of the Mobius 
band in his paintings.
” ’Cited in Loder, p. 154.
” ®Max Jammer, The Conceptual Development ofQuantum Mechanics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1966), p. 348, cited in Loder, p. 155. In Bohr’s Gifford Lectures (Edinburgh, 1949), he actually 
challenged theologians to make more use of the idea of complementarity. John Baillie, The Sense o f the 
Presence o f God (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 217.
” ®Loder notes that August’s grandson, Paul J. Mobius, was a “psychoneurologist frequently cited 
by Freud and others in discussions of the mind-body relationship. The Mobius strip was his model of 
the uniform interconnectedness of neurological and psychological realities.” TKM, p. 40.
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the reality.
In the model’s bipolar-relational unity, a mutual reciprocity exists between the two 
levels: the upper level implies the lower level, and the lower level implies the upper 
level. However because the two levels are regulated by a form of marginal control 
principle sustained by the asymmetry of the relationship, there is a hierarchical aspect 
to this mutual reciprocity. This hierarchical interplay results in the “lower” level having 
a value and significance in an of itself, while being given its full meaning only in 
relation to the “higher” level which exerts a controlling or “molding” function.” ®
In TKM, Loder sees this relational model working in science and theology, especially in the work of 
Kierkegaard, Piaget, Einstein, and T. F. Torrance. But we will focus on the Spirit-spirit relationship.
The bipolarity with regard to Loder’s pneumatology is the Holy Spirit (the upper level) and the 
human spirit (the lower level). To speak of one is to speak of the other. The levels are governed by what 
Loder calls “marginal control,” a term used by Polanyi in Personal Knowledge. Epistemologically, 
personal knowledge, as Polanyi has described it, consists of a “differential integration”(Loder) of tacit 
(informal) loiowledge and explicit (formal) knowledge. There is a tacit dimension to knowledge, which 
embraces a loiowledge of the whole that redefines reality at the explicit level. “Explicit knowledge is 
dependent upon and shaped by the dimension of the tacit. The whole is always tacitly present and the 
parts explicit,” Loder makes clear, “but the whole exercises marginal control over the parts. . . 
Higher levels of knowing define lower levels. “For to regard a meaningless substratum as the ultimate 
reality of all things must lead to the conclusion that all things are meaningless. We can avoid this 
conclusion only if we acknowledge instead that the deepest reality is possessed by higher things that are 
least tangible.”®”  It is important to observe that Loder remains consistent in creating a space for the self. 
The relation of higher to lower grants “value and significance” to the human spirit. Yet, the human spirit
p. 57.
®^‘Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, The Tacit Dimension', TKM, p. 41-41. Loder, “Incisions from 
a Two-Edged Sword: The Incarnation and the Soul/Spirit Relationship,” p. 163-164. All knowing has 
a tacit dimension to it, but it is never known explicitly nor implicitly. At the center of his thought is the 
idea, “We know more than we can tell.” Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday,
1967), p. 4.
®” Conceming Polanyi’s many-leveled world Drusilla Scott writes, “All the levels are real; the 
higher levels built from the lower by using the ‘play’ that is left free in the operation of the lower level 
laws. The higher levels, it is true, are at the mercy of the lower, in that the lower levels may break free 
from the control of the higher. With all living creatures they will do so eventually in death. But the 
higher levels are not less real, indeed they are more so, by Polanyi’s definition of reality, since they are 
more meaningful, more attractive of our interest because of the potentiality of still undiscovered 
implications in them. This structure of levels can be seen in everything connected with life, most of all 
in man, his consciousness, his skills, his powers of reasoning and creating, and his continuing vision of 
yet higher levels to explore and achieve.” Drusilla Scott, Everyman Revived: The Common Sense o f  
Michael Polanyi, Foreward by Lesslie Newbigin ( Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 122-12; 
Michael Polanyi, “On the Modem Mind” printed in Encounter 24 (1965), p.4, quoted in Scott, p. 69.
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only comes to see itself as spirit when defined by through its relationship with the Holy Spirit. The 
human spirit at the lower level is dependent upon the Holy Spirit (hence the asymmetry of the 
relationship). The self can only know itself through an encounter with the self-relationality of God in 
the Spirit. Here, Loder incorporates Pannenberg’s discussion of exocentricity and ecstasis.®”  .lust as no 
organism has the power within itself to sustain itself but is dependent upon another environment for life, 
so too, the human spirit is a response of the organism to a power that “seizes it and, by lifting it up 
beyond itself, the organism is inspired with creative life.”®”  The Spirit is both within and beyond the 
self.
Loder understands the human spirit as a self-relationality (Kierkegaard) and views the Holy 
Spirit as a self-relationship within the Trinity. Thus the logic of the Holy Spirit accommodates to the 
logic of the human spirit. So that “the accommodation aspect of the incarnation [drawing from Hendry] 
is accomplished spiritually as the relationaiity between Holy Spirit and human spirit recapitulates in 
human experience the relationaiity between the divine and the human in the nature of Christ. In other 
words, the relationaiity that pertains to the ultimate bipolar nature of Christ is experienced proximately 
in a bipolar relationship that pertains when our spirits testify with the Divine Spirit that we are the 
children of God (Romans 8:16).”®”  When this occurs one undergoes conviction, transformation.
To be convicted means one has encountered the Holy Spirit as Spiritus Creator - the creative 
Spirit. This, too, is a designation that was very important in Loder’s life and thought, especially after 
1970. He borrows and adopts it from Regin Prenter’s weighty, exhaustive study of the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit in Martin Luther’s (1483-1546) theology, entitled Spiritus Creator. Prenter’s work was of 
inestimable value to Loder - so much so that he seems to have adopted it completely, uncritically.
Prenter wants to establish Luther’s theology of the Holy Spirit as an essential component of his 
theology.®”  At the center of Luther’s theology of the Spirit is a concrete realism that would have easily
®” p. LeRon Shults sees Loder & Neidhardt’s relational model as a helpful heuristic to 
substantiate the value of Pannenberg’s theology, even as Pannenberg’s work offers a good example of 
the kind of interdisciplinary work that Loder and Neidhardt advocate. The Postfoundationalist Task o f 
Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality. Foreword by Wolfhart 
Pannenberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 21, 166, 206-210, 238, 240.
®” Wolfhart Pannenberg, to Systematic Theology Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1991), pp. 44ff. Loder, p. 158. Cf. Loder’s favorable review of this volume, primarily due to the 
personal-relational aspects of Pannenberg’s thought. Summarizing Pannenberg, Loder writes, “the 
biblical God is personal in will and action and as revealed in Jesus Christ.. . . ” The “eternal act of the
Son’s differentiation [from God] becomes[s] the generative principle of otherness from which new
creatures come forth. This kenotic view of Christ leads into a reconstiuction of the doctrine of the Spirit 
understood as the dynamic principle of all life, not just new life.” Theology Today, 49(1993): 557-560
®” Loder, p. 161.
®” This against Rudolf Otto’s Die AnschauungvomBeiligen Geiste bei Luther (Gottingen, 1898). 
Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 200).
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resonated with Loder. Speaking of Luther, Prenter writes, “Without the work of the Spirit, Christ is not 
a redeeming reality. Without the work of the Spirit, Chiist remains an example and faith a historical 
faith.”®®’ The work of the Spirit is to mediate the present presence of Christ. The faith is not an 
historical fact that is translated into the present, but a reality here-and-now experience, Luther ’ s realism, 
Prenter suggests, is a dramatic break with the medieval tradition of caritas idealism with its imitatio 
piety.”®®® While Luther breaks with the medievalists, Prenter suggests that a Kantian interpretation of 
Luther continues to distort what Luther was trying to establish, where “the idea of the Spirit is considered 
closely related to the idealistic idea of the continuity between man’s highest spiritual nature and the 
center of existence. . . .”®®® Luther believed, says Prenter, that “the experience of faith is a true 
experience. In the man in whom the experience of faith by the witness of the Spirit is produced, there 
is no doubt that he is face to face with reality, yes, face to face with a reality which is over and above all 
other reality. Therefore Luther does not hesitate to say that he who believes in Christ shall feel the Holy 
Spirit in himself.”®®®
The feeling that one experiences begins with inner conflict. “The inner conflict.. .is that test 
which proves whether faith and its objects were just a fancy, an imaginary affair, or reality. That which 
is able to stand the fiery test of inner conflict is confirmed as reality and thus is experienced.”®®* It 
involves a shattering of reality in which one is compelled “to test” what is real and what is not, to know 
what is or is not the true object of faith. The “test of inner conflict is given only by the Holy Spirit,” 
according to Luther.®®® “Experience means that the intercession of the Spirit for us proves that the Christ, 
in whom we take refuge and with whom we are made to conform in the groanings that cannot be uttered, 
is a reality and not a dream.”®®® The conflict is caused when the Holy Spirit engages the human spirit. 
This must take place because without “this experience given by the Holy Spirit the whole content of the 
gospel remains in the sphere of history and the ideal. The whole thing is then just an idea, just words
®®’Prenter, p. 54. 
®®®Prenter, p. 179. 
®®®Prenter, p. 179.
®®®Prenter, p. 57. Italics in the text. Prenter sees the “Spirit’s activity in the individual soul,” 
thereby calling our attention to be open to a “greater presence” of the Spirit “in the church.” Michael 
O’Carrol, Vent Creator Spiritus: A Theological Encyclopedia o f the Holy Spirit (Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 1990).




and pictures, just the recollection of a distant past, at best an example which may be imitated.”®®" But 
Jesus Christ is not merely an example, contends Luther, Prenter, and Loder, but a person to be 
encountered in the present through the Holy Spirit. And when that occurs, something new is experienced.
Prenter shows us that in Luther’s theology before the Spirit provides comfort, the Spirit comes 
to expose and thereby create the inherent conflict within the self. The “Spirit is inteipellator and 
consoler.” But consolation cannot take place without first encountering the source of alienation from 
God and this knowledge is painful to bear. The “comfort of the Spirit is identical with his creative and 
life-giving work. The Spirit knows no other form for comfort than the one in which man is brought 
through death into life.” This is because, as Loder would stress and as we have seen, “The Spirit does 
not comfort by stopping inner conflict midway but by raising to new life the man who is overcome by 
death. Thus sanctification is simply another expression for the creative work of the Spirit.”®®®
The movement of the Spirit cannot deny reality, but as agent of truth forces the believer to 
confront the truth in all its brutality. When the Spirit moves in a person’s life there will inevitably be 
conflict because in the encounter one becomes conscious of one’s alienation from God. This is alsp what 
took place on the cross, a demonstration of the brutality of humanity in its alienation from itself and from 
God. The movement of the Spirit that participated in the alienation of the cross continues to move, as 
Prenter put is, “under the burden of the cross.” This means that the movement of the Spirit must be 
discerned in the most unlikely places - like a cross or wherever humanity is crucifying itself. He 
continues:
But in this strange garb, which no one would surmise to be God’s reality because it 
resembles the very opposite, God’s whole reality is found in the midst of our distress.
It is a creation out of nothing. The message about the creative Spirit shows us God on 
the way to distant man, who is lost in sin and death, in order constantly to create new 
life out of nothing, life out of death. Therefore God must show himself in a manner 
which is in contrast to every metaphysical concept of God. Whatever metaphysics may 
attribute to God - such as his remoteness, his “blessedness,’ his immovabilitiy, his 
impassibility - is constantly disavowed by the creative Spirit who is present in the midst 
of the fury of death and hell where God, if he is “good,” cannot be present (except in all 
his gifts and his influence). There he stiuggles and suffers with lost man and he 
conquers in a way in which he the blessed, impassive, eternally self-sufficient, “God 
cannot struggle at all and suffer.®®®
®®"Prenter, p. 58. 
®®®Prenter, p. 186.
®®®Prenter, p. 192. Cf. Barth’s view that the encounter with God as “alien factor,” effects a 
“disturbance,” -  and “irresistible” and “invincible” one. {CD IV/2: 527). Barth also uses the language 
of “invasion” and “attack” (CD IV/2:523, 543). Lee writes, “The Kingdom of God not only ‘conhonts, 
contradicts, and opposes’ humanity, grace comes upon Cliristians in the form of a ‘great onslaught (CD 
IV/2: 543). It is God’s 'coup d ’etat," His revolution, that 'breaks" (544), ‘cuts across" (530), and 
'radically assails ’ (531) them.” Lee, “The Holy Spirit and Human Agency,” p. 179. Italics in the text.
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Tlie Spirit participated in the work of God on the cross in Jesus Christ and the Spirit continues to work 
those places of alienation, abandonment, isolation, pain, and even death. The Spirit’s presence thus 
exposes the power of the void, to use Loder’s term, in order to ensure that the void does not have the last 
word.
But in order to experience the Holy, the void must be embraced and this can only be done 
through the power of the Holy Spirit who both convicts and transforms. The Spiritus Creator wants us 
to face the nothingness, yet incoiporate into itself in such a way that it yields an ontological gain for the 
believer. This is why for Loder, the Christian experience begins with conflict. Conflict is the language 
of conviction. And once the individual has been convicted, the Holy Spirit will bring one through the 
sequence to a point of resolution. But resolution cannot be achieved without the work of the Holy Spirit 
and without confronting nothingness. This is why before the Christian gospel can become meaningful, 
it first result in conflict - inner conflict as the self is force to confront the nothingness inherent to being.
This is also why Loder would claim, “To have the gospel come to us with meaning is to be thrown into 
a conflict of immense proportions. The Spirit of Holiness makes us sinners, the enlightenment makes 
us blind; the dimension fo^the Holy calls into play the threats of evil, annihilation and damnation. The 
self, its community, and its world are exposed as alienated from each other and within themselves”. . .and 
ultimately with God.®®’
X. Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the primary themes and influences upon Loder’s work that 
cluster around what I have termed his relational phenomenological pneumatology. When the Holy Spirit 
encounters the human spirit and calls it to ti'ue life, the logic of transformation that enables the ego to 
be gi ounded in something other than the drives of self-protection and self-destruction, then that life will 
model the pattern of the life of Christ. In this sense the relationship will be Christomorphic, a pattern 
of mortification and vivification after the pattern of Christ. All of this is done in and through and for 
humanity in order for humanity to regain its true identity as a child of God. The result is a life that is 
four-dimensionally grounded in the Spirit that is able to participate redemptively in a world that Christ 
died to save. This is the work of sanctification: a pattern of rehumanization through which the New 
Humanity of Christ enjoins the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit in the work of transformation. Thus, 
conviction results in a reorientation to reality and a new way of living within the World as mediated by 
the spiritual presence of Christ. Reality, itself, becomes a place of encounter where one experiences the 
presence of Clirist in space-time. And in that Reality one lives a life that is completely unique. In the 
next chapter we will explore the nature of this reality using Loder’s framework with regards to the 
question of history and historical existence. In the final chapter will examined the wider implications
r  /
®®’Loder, “Transformation in Christian Education,” p. 18.
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of Loder’s thinking for the way we conceive and experience the Christian life.
Figure 1 : From The Knight’s Move, p. 41.
©  1992 M.C. Escher /  Cordon A r t  -  lian-rn - Holland.
Chapter Three
Conviction and the Pneumatically Relativized Spatio-Temporal World
"Probably the most painful human experience is nothingness in its many forms 
(loneliness, meaningless, death). No one overcomes this by a defensive or emergent 
competencies o f the ego. This is because the ego is constructed on the principle that 
absences, although a necessary part o f existence, are to be denied and inflicted on the 
environment through objectification and control, but, from the egoistic standpoint, i f  
possible they are to be ‘managed, ’ not embraced and suffered through. The 
constructive aspects o f the ego, creative in themselves, are nevertheless built on its 
defensive structure, and they presupposed negation throughout the ego’s valiant, 
prepossessing concern for survival and long-term satisfaction. ’’
James E. Loder
The Transforming Moment
In this chapter I will offer a further elaboration of Loder’s vision of the Christian life by 
bringing it to bear upon an area of thinking not usually associated with his work -  a theological 
consideration of the nature of historical existence as a relational reality. Such a reading, I would argue, 
is implicit to his convictional theology. My intention here is to highlight an aspect of Loder’s work that 
has been overlooked and in doing so suggest some wider implications of this thought. This attempt 
makes a unique contribution to Loder scholarship because no one to my knowledge has identified the 
enormous contributions he makes in helping us redefine the relationship between history and faith, the 
thorny issues which have plagued the Western church from its inception, especially since the seventeenth 
century. In order to see this, we will explore what I think are the early origins of historical 
consciousness in the early church. In doing so, however, my intent here is not to get bogged down in 
the miry muck of the faith-history debate (although a reasonably firm grasp of these issues lies behind 
our discussion). Instead, my purpose here with regards to historical existence is to show: First, that 
Loder’s convictional theology exposes submerged conflicts and patterns ofnegation operating in human 
thought with regard to its use o f “histoiy” and the way these maladaptive patterns have inflicted 
considerable damage upon the life o f the church; second, to show that Loder’s understanding o f the 
Christian life existing in a pneumatically radicalized spatio-temporal reality has the potential to negate 
these negations, thus providing a well-needed corrective and new framework fo r articulating the 
characteristics o f the Christian life.
Before we proceed, let me state that by historical existence I mean the characteristics of a life 
that is thoroughly historical, that is fully cognizant of its contingency and its embeddedness within the 
nexus of space and time (or more correctly in a post-Einsteinian view, space-time). Historical existence 
becomes a synonym for the Christian life, for as Loder has argued and as we have seen, to be in Chi ist 
means that one is both given a new reality and placed firmly in that reality. That reality, to borrow from
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Wolfhart Pannenberg, is history, is “reality in its totality.”* As Loder often affirmed (quoting Luther), 
the Convictor “fire[s] one into the world with a velocity not his own.”® This new four-dimensional 
reality is not a flight from history, but the experience of newness within a historical context or 
environment (World). It is within the structures of space-time, the totality of reality, we live and move 
and have our being. Thus, how we think about historical existence has profound implications for the way 
we live the Christian life.
I. Preliminary Considerations of the Term “History”
Let us first begin with the acknowledgment that the word “history” is notoriously difficult to 
define. In his essay “Hegel and Historiography (1928),” José Ortega Y Gassett (1883-1955) coined anew 
teim, “historiology” - by which he meant not the study of the past, but the study of history itself, a study 
of the divergent meanings of this term generated over the last four hundred years.® “History” can refer 
to everything that once was present is now placed into the container of the past. It can refer to the study 
of the past, what Johan Huizinga calls “the impulse toward the past.”" It can also be viewed as a reified 
force -  Distory -  understood as an objective, external idea that is working itself out through human 
beings. This approach is often associated with Georg Hegel’s (1770-1831) view that histoiy is the setting 
for the unfolding and fulfillment of the Geist.^ History as constituted by an inexorable drive towards the 
culmination of an idea or a state of being is grounded in some Christian views of history as a 
Heilsgeschichte, of God achieving salvation for humanity in and through histoiy.® By understanding the 
patterns, narratives or systems of history’s movement leads potentially to wisdom, thus improving
‘Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Redemptive Event and History,” Questions in Theology, Volume 
I, tmns. George H. Kehim (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), p. 21. See sdso Anthropology in 
Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), pp. 
485ff.
®James E. Loder, “Creativity In and Beyond Human Development,” in Gloria Durka and 
Joanmarie Aesthetic Dimensions o f Religious Education (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), p. 232.
® John T. Graham, The Theory o f History in Ortega Y Gassett: "The Dawn o f Historical Reason, ” 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997).
"Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, trans. James 
S. Holmes and Hans van Marie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
®Georg Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, Introduction by C. J. Friedrich. Prefaces by Charles 
Hegel and the translator, J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956). More recently this view can 
be seen in Francis Fukayama’s The End o f History and the Last Man makes the claim that the triumph 
of liberal democracy is “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution,” thus bringing about “the end 
of history.” (New York: Avon Books, 1993), p. xi.
®Karl Ldwith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
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humankind by assisting people to make better choices.’ As a result, history can have a didactic or 
pedagogical quality to help heed George Santayana’s (1863-1952) warning that those who forget history 
are condemned to repeat it.
Paradigmatically, “history” has been defined as the res gestae, the totality of events, the human 
actuality that shapes reality and as historia rerum gestarum, the account or report of these events. The 
res gestae consists of the objective, external occurrences of temporal reality. The historia rerum 
gestarum refers to the subjective chronicle or narrative of what took place. History can thus be an idea 
or “thing,” possessing an objective reality. Or histoiy can be the narrative of one’s experience in space­
time, encountering that objective reality as the phenomenon of history experienced. This demarcation 
rests upon making a clean distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, a dualism that has plagued 
philosophical and theological considerations of history for centuries.® It has proved extremely 
problematic due to the fact that the object of faith for the Christian is not a thing, but a subject, is the 
person Jesus Christ who, according to the confessions of the church and as subjectively appropriated in 
the faith-life of millions, remains both personally and historically present. As we have seen, -Loder 
wants to overcome all dualisms; his work addresses this epistemological crisis by suggesting a theory 
of knowledge which accounts for precisely this kind of faith experience.
For what if the experience of objective reality is somehow constituted and thereby shaped by the 
way one tells or forms the narrative of historical experience? If the knower is involved in what is known 
(Polanyi), then history (both as idea and phenomenon) becomes like an idol that one fashions, invests 
with extraordinary interpretative power to mediate meaning, and then worships; all the while forgetting 
its origin as a human construct. If this is so, then it begs the question whether history can be anything 
at all. Closer to our concerns, theologically it also raises considerable doubts about the ability of 
historical knowledge to serve as a foundation for faith unless it is transformed by the Spiritual Presence 
of Chiist.
II. History as a Human Construct
In the preceding chapters we identified the personalist-relational, interactionist, and 
constiuctivist aspects of Loder’s thought. In his discussion of the “anthropic principle” or the “human 
factor” he reminds us that “what we know and understand about the universe is in some respect already 
a part of how we have developed.” That is, the “universe we have got our heads into is in some respects
’Cf. Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons o f History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). 
®James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955).
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already in our heads to begin with.”® The intelligence of the universe mirrors human intelligence, Loder 
suggests; they mirror one another, “not only in respect of what they are in themselves (which is why 
mathematics works) but also in their openness to what is altogether beyond them (which is why human 
development and the universe must be studied theologically). The human mind is adapted to the rational 
structures and laws of the universe, and the universe is so coordinated with the developing mind of 
persons that via the anthropic principle we must recognize that we are caught up in an unbounded range 
of relational intelligibility.”*® Even though our knowledge and our capacity to mirror the universe is 
imperfect, this does not deny the “inner logic” of the human spirit “its creative drive to construct 
coherence and remain open to ultimacy, its irrepressible self-transcendence and transformational 
potential, its revulsion at confusion and its discoveiy of order in chaos: all these characteristics working 
to disclose the structures, patterns, and power hidden in the universe and in human nature point toward 
God the Creator.”** The “creative drive” of the human spirit is operative in all forms of knowing, 
wherever the human spirit strives after knowledge and constructs a reality that discovers order in chaos.
This same creative drive, I would argue, is active when we approach a consideration of history. 
R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) identified the thoroughgoing epistemological enterprise of the historian 
as representation. Because an event, thought, or person is no longer present the historian engages in a 
sophisticated process of retrieval. What is recovered, in Collingwood’s estimation, is not the event, 
thought, or person per se, but the thought that leads to action. “Historical knowledge is the knowledge 
of what mind has done in the past, and at the same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past 
acts in the present.”*® History is more than just a study of the past or an objective interpretation of “just 
the facts.”*® The historian engages in “a legitimate historical construction,” which is not only creative.
®L5, p. 8. Loder sees the “most staggering aspect” of existence is “the transcending human spirit 
generating and inspiring human intelligence. The intelligent human mind that can begin to grasp the 
immense scope of this reality, knows that it grasps it, and is able, at least in part, to make it intelligible, 
transcend all that it knows”. . .moving “in all directions [on both a micro and macro level].” LS, p. 7.
*®Z5', p. 9. Loder quotes T. F. Torrance, “Not only is the universe the home of humankind, but 
the personal nature of humankind belongs to the nature of nature, and we are thereby called to recognize 
that the universe owes its existence, nature and structure to a personal Author infinitely greater than we 
can ever conceived - to God the Creator.” This is from a lecture given at Princeton Theological 
Seminary (March, 1990), “The Transcendental Role of Wisdom in Science.”
**L*S',p. 10.
*®R. G. Collingwood, The Idea o f History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 218. Cf. 
Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), The Theory and History o f Historiography (1916) where he sees historical 
reconstruction as the re-creation of past experience in the mind of the historian. “All history is history 
of thought.” “All history is contemporary history.”
*®Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics o f Christian Theology (London: SPCK,1995), pp.
48ff.
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but highly dependent upon the power of the imagination. “The imagination... operating not capriciously 
as fancy but in its a priori form, does the entire work of historical construction.”*" The authority of the 
interpretation is not contingent upon the facts, joer se, but what is “done” with them by examining sense- 
data and determining what is inferred from the facts. “The web of imaginative construction,” 
Collingwood submits, “is something far more solid and powerful than we have hitherto realized.”*®
Thus, to a considerable degree it can be said that history (as both idea and phenomenon) is 
included as one of the many creative expressions of the human spirit. Only human beings write history, 
think historically, raise historical questions, are conscious of their historicity, and are aware of their 
movement through space-time. For example, the emergence of historical consciousness, of a sensus 
historiens in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a response to the increasingly technological and 
scientific world view that devalued the significance of the person. It denotes a massive shift in 
consciousness in which humanity becomes aware of change and development, conscious of the 
malleability of human existence which summons from deep within the self a desire to find meaning in 
the flow of historical experience, and to find order within the chaos of time.*® The renown German 
historian, Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) said, “The essence of history is change.” More specifically, 
it is change as experienced by individuals, “man suffering, striving, doing, as he is and was and ever shall 
be.”*’ As people suffer, strive, do, and then contemplate on experience, historical images begin to 
appear. These images then mediate reality. “After all, our historical pictures are, for the most part, pure 
constructions,” J. T. Fraser argues. “Indeed, they are mere reflections of ourselves.”*® Marc Bloch 
(1886-1944) echoes this same sentiment when he said that “history is the science of men in time.”*® Karl 
Marx (1818-1883) was even more explicit in this regard. "History does nothing, it ‘possesses no
*"Collingwood, p. 241. i
I
*®Collingwood, p. 244. I
*®Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, & Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought |
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 142ff. Alan Richardson, History: Sacred and i
Profane (London: SCM Press, 1964). Donald R. Kelley, ed. Versions o f History from Antiquity to the
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). Friedrich Meineke (1862-1954) held that the j
development of the historical sense was “the greatest spiritual revolution which Western thought had j
undergone.” Cited in John Lukacs, Historical Consciousness or the Remembered Past (New York: 1
Harper & Row, 1968), p. 18. i
*’Jacob Burckhardt, Reflections on History. Introduction by Gottfried Dietze; trans. M. D.
Hottinger (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1979), p. 35. I
*®J. T. Fraser, O f Time, Passion, and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy o f Existence, second \
edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 4 Iff. !
I*®Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), p. I
27. i
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immense wealth,’ it ‘wages no battles,”’ he said. “It is man, real living man, that does all that, that 
possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; 
history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.”®® John McIntyre, for example, argued that 
theologically, a doctrine of history should be understood as a corollary to a doctrine of humanity.®* 
Phenomenologically, Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued more recently that, “Historical consciousness is 
a mode of self-knowledge.”®® Paul Ricouer (b. 1913) reinforces this claim by pointing out that the 
objectivity of the historian is gained through a subjective “work of methodical activity,” engaging the 
past not to restore things “as they happened,” but to reconstruct and recompose the past in a present 
sequence. All of this is done without forgetting that “the object of history is the human subject itself.”®® 
I would argue that in the pursuit of all things historical is the drive to make a claim for the personal.
Thus we see that history as an epistemological construct is really knowledge of humanity, 
humanity living and striving after meaning; it is the present epistemological strategy of the human 
knower seeking to order reality.®" The same point was made theologically by John Baillie (1886-1960) 
who said our experience of history is actually a present endeavor, what he called a “mediated 
immediacy.” Baillie credits Friedrich Gogarten with this insight: “The problem of history is 
fundamentally the problem of presentness of the past.” Something past has become present and thus.
®®Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, Collected Works (London; Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 
iv, 93. Italics in the text.
®* John McIntyre, The Christian Doctrine o f History(EàvSbvx^\ Oliver and Boyd, 1957), pp. 10-
11 .
®®Hans-George Gadamer, Truth and Method, Second, Revised Edition, Translation revised by 
Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshal (New York: Continuum, 1999), p. 235.
®®Paul Ricouer, History and Truth, Translated, with an Introduction by Charles A. Kelbley 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p.40. Ricoeur is alluding to Leopold von Ranke’s 
(1795-1886) imperative that historians "simply show how it really was {wie es eigentlich gewesen).” His 
imperative shaped the historiography traditions of German, British, and French historians for three 
generations. See Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice o f History, Edited with an Introduction 
and New Translation by George Iggers and Konrad von Moltke (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill 1973). 
The wie es eigentlich geswesen, it should be noted, was not viewed as a purely factual reconstruction of 
the past but an attempt to depict that which was “characteristic, essential” (p. ix). The goal, however, 
was to be objective. Wilhelm von Humbolt (1767-1835) summarizes this push for objectivity in his “On 
the Historian’s Task” (1821), “The historian’s task is to present what actually happened. The more 
purely and completely he achieves this, the more perfectly has he solved his problem” (p. 5). The 
historian here is passive, receptive, and simply re-presents only that which is discovered, but is not active 
or creative in the process (p. 5).
®"Collingwood, p. 3.
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“History is something that happens in the present.”®® It is these strategies, constructions, patterns, or
structures of human knowledge that concern me, for they shape what we mean by this word; but not
merely the word, they shape the way we talk about and experience this reality.
Therefore, we can affirm theologically that when we are dealing with history (again, whether
as idea or phenomenon) we are given, Loder believed, “the best approach to understanding human reality
in its fullness.”®® In the spring of 1992, Loder taught a doctoral seminar entitled “Theology and the
Human Sciences.” One of the major texts for the course was Pannenberg’s, Anthropology in Theological
Perspective, with an entire class session reserved for a discussion of the last chapter, “Human Beings
and History, “ thus illustrating Loder’s interest in the historical expression of convictional life. From
the entire chapter, Loder selects three quotes from Pannenberg which he deemed of particular
importance. The first:
Human life, whether it is the life space or the individual or the large story of peoples and 
states, takes concrete form in history. When compared with this concreteness, the 
approaches taken in human biology, sociology, and psychology show themselves to be 
only abstract approximations to human reality. History is theprincipium individuationis -- 
(“principle of individuation”) in the life of both individuals and of peoples and cultures.
It is true, of course, that a historical account is still selective and therefore fails to 
convey the full richness of concrete life. Nonetheless, of all the disciplines that have 
the human being for their subject, the science of history and historiography comes 
closest to grasping human reality as it is experienced.®’
The second:
The fulfillment that is the goal of human beings in history transcends the limits of every 
historical present and rejects the present, for while the present too may seem to show 
a likeness to an everlasting order of things, it deserves, from another viewpoint, to pass 
away.®®
With the third reference being: “The unfinished character of the historical process challenges the claim 
of either the philosopher of history or the historian to grasp the whole of reality.”®® These quotes draw 
our attention to the inherently human dimensions of the historical.
But they also point to an idea that was extremely important to Loder and perhaps the reason why
®®Friedrich Gogarten, Ich Glaube an den Dreieinigen Gott (1926) cited in John Baillie, Our 
Knowledge o f God (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), pp. 188-189. The context of Baillie’s 
discussion is that aspect of the Christian life in which one actually experiences the presence of Christ 
hie et nunc. *
®®From a transcription of Loder’s doctoral seminar, “Theology and the Human Sciences,” j
recorded by Dr. Dana Wright, Princeton Theological Seminary, 27®' April 1992.




Pannenberg had such an attraction for him; Historical existence is an open-ended affair. With the drive
to transcend the present, reaching into the future becomes the foundation for hope. As the self reaches
forward, the present, as well as the past “pass away” and have no constitutive value. The
“unfinished”quality of being means that no one has the ability to definitively “grasp” or explain this
reality. We are continually dependent upon other sources to mediate that meaning, such as the future -
or as we shall see for Loder, the Spirit. How is it possible to grasp that of which one is a part? No one
has the ability to stand outside the flow of time. Thus Loder raises these questions in the seminar:
What is the problem of history? Why do we write histoiy and who writes it and when 
they do write it [histoiy] do they change it? How can you write history if everything 
changes? And how can you write history without talking about change? You have both 
continuity and discontinuity. . . . How do we focus upon this question in tenus of 
Spirit?®®
We will take up these questions throughout this chapter.
III. The Search for Order and Meaning
In this regard, Loder’s approach is very similar to the view advanced by the philosopher of 
history, Eric Voegelin (1901-1985). While there is no mention of Voegelin in any of his publications, 
I know personally that Loder was conversant with Voegelin’s multi-volume work Order and History and 
valued his approach to history. Voegelin theorized that history is the account of humanity ordering the 
past; it is a process of configuration.®* “What happens ‘in’ history,” Voegelin suggests, “is the very 
process of differentiating consciousness that constitutes history.”®® For Voegelin, history is “the 
unfolding of a pattern of meaning in time.” It is “a process of increasingly differentiated insight into the 
order of being in which man participates by his existence.”®® If history is really humanity writ large, 
then this has to be taken into account when we attempt to talk theologically about historical existence. 
Loder thus incorporates and complements Voegelin’s viewpoint by theologically discerning that the 
human spirit is also searching after patterns of meaning, an ultimate meaning which can only be 
mediated by the Holy Spirit, who also aspires to give it.
Like Voegelin, Loder establishes an experiential methodology in which experience is valued as
®®Seminar transcript.
®*Eric Voegelin, “Configurations in Histoiy,” The Collected Works o f Eric Voegelin, Volume 
Twelve - Published Essays, 1966-1985, Edited with an Introduction by Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1989), pp. 95-114.
®®Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Volume 4: The Ecumenic Age {B?iXon'R.o\ige: LA: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1974), p. 332. See also Anamnesis. Translated and Edited by Gerhart Niemeyer 
(South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966).
Order and History, 4:11. Eugene Webb, Eric Voegelin: Philosophy o f Histoiy (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 1981).
158
a starting point for truth. As we have seen, Loder’s theories are the result of intentionally indwelling 
moments of conviction. For Voegelin, theology is also rooted in human experience. Theory and praxis 
are not antithetical, but stand in a dialectical relationship that deepens our capacity to experience truth. 
Experience can thus be luminous for consciousness, providing what Voegelin called “leaps in being,” 
epochal advances in consciousness.®" But experience is more than just sense-perception, it consists of 
human drives, desires, pulls, always searching forward to recover a loss of meaning. What the human 
spirit leaves in its wake is the “stuff’ of histoiy. Voegelin refers to this as “derailments,” “deformation 
of character,” “egophony,” (the destructive obsessions of the ego), of “pathologies of the psyche.”®® 
Thus what the psyche or spirit discovers when it searches after meaning is the presence of chaos that 
exists underneath all forms of knowledge. The human spirit strives for transcendence, but discovers its 
limits. It is attracted toward an inexhaustible mystery, yet it cannot be objectified or grasped and any 
attempt yields further frustration. This is what Voegelin called the “In-Between,”so that “all forms of 
pneumopathology are strategies for repressing the inevitable tension of existence in the hi-Between.”®®
In this drive for meaning Voegelin pays close attention to the dynamics of religious experience, 
because it is in this dimension that one finds the strongest demonstration of humanity’s struggle for 
order.®’ Of particular interest are religious experiences which are pneumapathologies (not unlike what 
Loder demonstrated in his work on Freud and Kierkegaard). Voegelin makes a distinction between the 
noetic (reason) and the pneumatic (spirit or revelation). “The structure of a theophanic experience 
reaches from a pneumatic center to a noetic peripheiy.”®® Thus before history and philosophy there is 
first “the primary experience of the order of the world.”®® It is this shift from the pneumatic to the noetic 
that Voegelin sees as a maladaptive response that removes or cuts one off from the generating source of 
the “originating experience.” This is because very often the originating experience does not resolve the 
inherent tension in meaning, but actually heightens it.
The similarity with Loder’s theories of convictional knowing and creativity are evident. Even
®"Voegelin, Order and History, 1:10 cited in John Kirby & William M. Thompson, ed. Voegelin 
and the Theologian: Ten Studies in Interpretation (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1983). This 
resonates with Loder’s belief that the logic of transformation is in and beyond patterns of socialization.
®®Kirby & Thompson, p. 15.
®®Kirby & Thompson, pp. 8, 15.
®’Kirby & Thompson, p. 7.
Order and History, IV: 244 cited in Kirby & Thompson, p. 10.
®®Voegelin cited in Paul Grimley Kuntz, “Voegelin’s Experience of Disorder Out of Order and 
Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder,” in Ellis 
Sandoz, ed. Eric Voegelin’s Significance for the Modern Mind (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana University 
Press, 1991), p. 111.
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though the pneumatic experience offers the deepest needs of the human spirit and resolves the existential 
anxiety of being, the implications of living from  that experience become a threat because one’s 
orientation to the world is forever changed. Because this tension is too great the ego cuts itself off from 
the pneumatic. The tension or chaos threatens being itself, and yet only through an engagement with 
chaos (Loder = void) can the meaning be achieved. A theophanic experience offers what the human 
spirit desires: a “recapturing of reality.”"® As a result Voegelin voices a loud caution to theologians who 
are more comfortable talking about the noetic and ignoring the pneumatic. “When we speak of theology 
confronting the world religions we must know what we are talking about. . .  It is better to start right 
from the beginning from the experiences which engendered philosophical symbols before they became 
deformed into metaphysical dogmas.”"* To dwell in the realm of the noetic and thereby ignore the 
generative power of the pneumatic is a symptom of pneumapathology. Likewise, Loder wants to make 
sure that all theological considerations (including his own) do not become substitutes for the theophanic 
experience of encountering God in the face of Jesus Christ. He wants to establish a theological 
framework that can be invisible or transparent, allowing one to encounter God for oneself. It is the 
generative power of the originating, convicting experiences that brings life to the Clirist. Thus, to be 
preoccupied with the noetic is pathological. Theology must stay close to the pneumatic, to the source 
experience, to the originating event."®
Similarly, in his recent work on pneumatology, Gary Badcock draws upon the thought of the 
Irish theologian and Carmelite mystic, Noel Dermot O’Donoghue, for whose thought the idea of a 
“source experience” plays a central part. The “source experience” is mediated by the Holy Spirit, and 
without that experience as mediated by the Holy Spirit, “the whole theological enterprise,” Badcock 
writes, “either hardens into intellectual or moral puritanism, or else tends too radically to humanism.”"®
"®This is Voegelin’s answer to the question, why philosophize? “To Recapture Reality!” Eric 
Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Edited, with an Introduction by Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1989), p. 93.
"'Voegelin in Kirby and Thompson, p. 15.
"®Cf. a similar point made by Thomas F. Torrance, God and Rationality (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971): “Theology must be reconstructed by keeping the concepts close to the objective 
source that gave rise to them.(p. 20)” For when “we detach concepts from their natural field of 
continuous interrelation in space-time and break them up into individual clear-cut ideas, we snap their 
line of intelligible connection with reality, for it is through that field at its basic points that they are 
correlated with reality, (p. 17)” In Loder’s theology the source of theological consideration is not an 
idea, but the person Jesus Christ. Ideas become surrogates for the person-to-person encounter, thereby 
distorting the Christian life.
"®Gary D. Badcock, Light o f Truth & Fire o f Love: A Theology o f the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, p. 4. “If theology ceases to be really related to God who is the source of life, in other 
words, then it is no longer truly theological (p. 4).” Cf. Noel Dermot O’Donoghue, “Vision and 
Systems,” in Heaven in Ordinarie (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1979), p. 149, and his “Mystical
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Which means as “long as there is any attachment to something other than the source,” he writes, “then 
full attachment to the source is impossible, impossible by a kind of mathematical impossibility.”"" Which 
means, as Badcock shows, “it is the authenticity of the source, rather than external criteria, that lends 
authenticity and value to the source experience, and to the visionary-worlds of the mystical writers and 
poets that flow from it.”"^  The external criteria, such as historical text, nanatives, or interpretations of 
what took place in an experience as determined by historical-critical methods, reliance upon tradition 
cannot become substitutes for the real thing. And yet, this appears to be precisely what has transpired 
over the centuries of the Christian church."®
Therefore, the way in which history is constructed and used might say more about the inner 
dynamics of the self than about some objective reality we might create and call “history.”"’ As Loder 
has shown us, integral to being human is the drive toward greater meaning and intelligibility of reality. 
How the human mind organizes reality is contingent upon the encounter between the ego and one’s
Imagination,” in Religious Imagination, Edited by James P. Mackey (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), 
pp. 186-205. “For the mystic as such the commitment is, first and last, finalised and energised by an 
experience of the source of all man’s worlds and works, an experience of the source of man’s being and 
of all goodness. All truth and beauty as well. It is from this experience that all mystical imagination 
flows.” Cited in Badcock, p. 142.
""O’Donoghue, “Mystical Imagination,” cited in Badcock, p. 142. Attachment to something 
other than the source is an expression of two-dimensional existence. Attachment to the source and 
dwelling in the generative power of it is to exist four-dimensionally.
"®Badcock, p. 142.
"®Badcock goes on to suggest, with views that are parallel with my own and what Loder was 
tiying to do for the discipline of theology in its service to the church: “It is to a theology geared to such 
experience, an experience that we might describe in biblical terms as what occurs when seeking becomes 
finding, that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit calls us. It may even be that an openness to such experience 
is the one thing that might sustain theology itself, while also preserving it from becoming a moral or 
intellectual strait] acket. At times, in short, theological formulation must be secondary to spiritual 
experience, the ‘system’ to the ‘vision,’ for it is only where the religious vision is kept alive that justice 
can be done to the object of the system itself, who is not so much the God of the philosophers as he is 
the living God of the human heart.(pp. 142-143)”
"’On the way ideas can be used to push away seeing reality refer to José Ortega Y Gasset, The 
Revolt o f the Masses {Fievf Y  oxk'.'Horion, 1957),pp. 156-157. “Take stock of those around you and you 
will hear them talk in precise terms about themselves and their surroundings, which would seem to point 
to them having ideas on the matter. But start to analyze those ideas and you will find that they hardly 
reflect in any way the reality to which they appear to refer, and if you go deeper you will discover that 
there is not even an attempt to adjust the ideas to this reality. Quite the contrary: through these notions 
the individual is trying to cut off any personal vision of reality, of his own very life. For life is at the 
start a chaos in which one is lost. The individual suspects this, but he is frightened at finding himself 
face to face with this tenible reality, and tries to cover it over with a curtain of fantasy, where everything 
is clear. It does not worry him that his ‘ideas’ are not true, he uses them as trenches for the defense of 
his existence, as scarecrows to fright away reality.”
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environment. Standing between the ego and one’s environment is the power of negation. Loder, 
therefore, cautions us to pay attention to the way in which all ideas function within the self and wider 
society and more importantly, to listen to what they tell us about the self.
III. The Grammar of Absence
If we accept Loder’s multi-dimensional schema of the way reality is constituted in the human 
knower, then the view of reality from which we operate is contingent upon the degree to which the 
human spirit cooperates with the Holy Spirit in His intent to yield a knowledge of reality that is 
Christomorphically defined. But, as we have seen from Loder’s work, reality cannot be constituted four- 
dimensionally by the ego without the work of the Spiritual Presence of Christ. The ego can neither face 
nor embrace the void at the heart of being without the power of God, which allows the ego to affirm life 
in the face of the void (absence, loneliness, meaningless, and death). Apart from the power of the Holy 
to establish this reality, the ego is left to construct a two-dimensional world that seeks to block out the 
void. “This is because,” Loder submits, “the ego is constructed on the principle that absences, although 
a necessary part of existence, are to be denied and inflicted on the environment through objectification 
and control, but from the egoistic standpoint, if possible they are to be ‘managed,’ not embraced and 
suffered through.”"®
In the realm of human experience, I would suggest that one of the obvious (although often 
overlooked) expressions of our struggle with the void can be seen in our preoccupation with history, 
specifically the way historical knowledge originates in the face of an existential crisis of being. Our 
drive to remember former times, to study the past, the emergence of historical consciousness and the 
sensus historiens, our desire to capture that which has been lost and in so doing becoming aware of our 
historicity and the limits of human experience within time-space are all expressions of absence. As 
Eberhard Jüngel (b. 1932) illustrates, “Our historical knowledge covers only what remains. The past as 
a totality is always being lost. . . .’’"® The purpose of writing an historical text, for example, is to make 
present that which once was. When one seeks to give voice to the past, when one seeks to articulate that 
which once was, one searches for a grammar, a vocabulary that can give voice to and articulate an 
experience of absence. As a result, the pursuit after the historical is one way humanity tries to come to 
terms with its mortality. The sense of loss is expressed through a text and what we find in most 
historical texts are, as Anthony Kemp has trenchantly and poignantly described in The Estrangement o f
"®rZM2, p. 173.
"®Eberhard Jüngel, “The Effectiveness of Clirist Withdrawn: On the process of historical 
understanding as an introduction to Chi istology,” Theological Essays, trans. J. B. Webster (Edinburgh: 
T & T  Clark, 1989), pp. 226-227:
162
the Past: A Study in the Origins o f Modern Historical Consciousness, grammars of absence.®® What 
drives the historian, Edith Wyschogrod submits, is an “eros for the dead.” The “historian’s 
responsibility is mandated by another who is absent, cannot speak for herself, one whose actual face the 
historian may never see, yet to whom ‘giving countenance’ becomes a task.”®* Similarly, George Hegel 
(1770-1831) said the task of the historian is “to hold fast what is dead. ”®® The inner dynamics of the self, 
the deep structures of the psyche, subject to sin, brokenness and alienation, are written large upon the 
tableau of reality we often think of as history, which is in many ways reality as the totality of death.®® 
This land of shadows is perhaps one of the most tangible reminders and demonstrations of the 
void at the heart of being. As a result, it also raises considerable theological questions as to whether 
“history” (as an expression of the void), understood in any form, has the power mediate the presence of 
Christ. A quick glance over the last two millennia of the church will demonstrate that this is precisely 
what we have done. Karl Barth once mourned that after Schleiermacher, the potentially great theological 
minds became historians, and instead of theologizing wrote histories of theology. '^* Christian historians 
and historical theologians have tried to give countenance to Jesus and thus establish a continuity him. 
Characterizing Schleiermacher’s approach, Barth writes, “The primary thing that makes a Christian a 
Christian and establishes the church neither is nor has to be an original encounter of God with man but 
the mediacy of a supposedly Christian history, the continuum of the religious stimulation which runs
through this history ”®® I would argue that the church has been guilty of this since the early centuries
of the church. “Christian history” cannot serve for Loder as a substitute for the encounter required in
®® Anthony Kemp, The Estrangement o f the Past: A Study in the Origins o f Modern Historical 
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 3ff.
®* Edith Wyschogrod, Ethics o f Remembering: History, Heterology, and the Nameless Others
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. xii - xiii.
®®Cited Wyschogrod, p. ix. Tire distinguished historian, G. M. Trevelyan (1876-1928) referred 
to his work as entering “that land of mystery we call the past.” “The dead were and are not. Their place 
loiows them no more, and is ours today. Yet they were once as real as we, and we shall tomorrow be 
shadows like them.” G. M. Trevelyan, Clio: A Muse and Other Essays (1913) cited in David Cannadine,
G. M. Trevelyan: A Life in History^ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 196.
®®Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), “At every point in history we find life. And it is of life and 
of every kind in the most varied relationships that history consists. Histoiy is simply life conceived of 
from the standpoint of mankind as a total coherence.” From his Fortsetzung, cited in Tlieodore Plantinga, 
Historical Understanding in the Thought o f Wilhelm Dilthey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1980), p. 129.
®"Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (Salem, NH: Ayer Company, 1971).
®®Karl Barth, The Theology o f Schleiermacher: Lectures at Gottingen, Winter Semester o f 
1923/24. Edited by Dietrich Ritschl; Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Press, 1982), p. 31.
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moments of conviction. Conviction is always an encounter with an Other, with a Thou, a presence in 
the now. To have reality mediated by any other means (such as “Christian history”) is representative of 
a two-dimensional mode of being that is, in truth of fact, alienated from the presence of God. For Loder, 
it is the Holy Spirit - and only the Holy Spirit - who “gives countenance” to the glory of God in the face 
of Jesus Christ. Thus, Loder would lead us to conclude that to a considerable degree our views of 
history, apart from the mediating presence of the Holy Spirit, are miiTor projections of the fallen self. 
So that if we took Loder’s work as an imaginative interpretative lens through which to apprehend the 
ego’s historico-epistemological constructions of reality, I think we would discover that maladaptive 
patterns have been at work for centuries, patterns that have actually hindered faith and disfigured the face 
of Christ.
IV. The Search for the Face and the Power of Negation
The birth of the Christian era began with the source or primal experience of the early Christians 
in their face-to-face encounter with Jesus Christ. From the time of the ascension to the present, as the 
church waits for the parousia, one of the greatest challenges to the church in its articulation of the 
Christian life and its theological reflection is explaining how we continue to maintain a meaningful, life- 
giving connection with its source who is not historically absent and physically displaced. Loder suggests 
that the Cliristian experience involves a continuous desire and search after the Face - for the presence 
of God in Clu'ist, a presence that fills the experience of absence which the ego cannot endure or embrace. 
But time is not static, we perceive movement - movement toward some unknown horizon away from the 
source. Yet the ability to reach our destination is somehow contingent upon our ability to relate to the 
source. This relationaiity of source to destination and destination to source can serve as a helpful image 
to get a handle on these maladaptive patterns at the heart of the early church experience coming to grips 
with its identity after the ascension of Jesus Christ. Issues relating to remembrance, the need to connect 
somehow with the Risen Christ, the increasing generational spans as the church moved further away 
from its generative experience, and the problems this created for the next seventeen hundred years might 
all be viewed within the framework of searching after the face of Christ. What the first disciples and 
early church experienced can also be understood as an originating, primal experience. But the question 
remains, how can there be continuity with Christ in the midst of so much that suggests historical 
discontinuity? For those who are untimely born, centuries after this source experience the question 
remains how we connect with it.
If we take Loder’s study of the primal psychological experience of an infant and then apply it 
to the crisis brought on by the delay of the parousia, which is an experience of facelessness, then we are 
given, perhaps, a new framework to understand the early church’s primal experience with Jesus and how 
the turn to history instead of bringing us closer to Christ has actually moved us farther away from him.
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That primal, originating experience of life is the face-to-face encounter between an infant (approximately 
three months old) and his/her primary caretaker. As we saw in the last chapter, Loder believes everyone 
is searching for a recovery of the primal, originating experience of the face-to-face relationship between 
an infant and an other. “The self is looking for the impact of that experience in which one is given a 
place in the cosmos, confirmed as a self and addressed by the presence o f a loving other. To say this 
is ‘nothing but’ regressive wishing is purely reductive; rather, the prototypical impact is set by the first 
encounter. The longing is for a loving other to address the whole person (as before), including the 
differentiated ego with all its competencies, and to set that whole-differentiated person into the cosmos 
as self-affirmed and beloved.”®® This is the desire of the human spirit, but the story of the church is in 
many ways a frustration of this goal. Let us take a closer look at this process.
A. The Primal/Source Experience
The Apostle Paul (d. 64/67) wi'ote to the church in Corinth, “Chiist has been raised from the 
dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep. For as by a man came death, by a man has^come 
also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But 
each in his own order: Christ the first fruits, then at his coming those who belong to Christ. Then comes 
the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father after destroying every rule and eveiy authority 
and power ( 1 Corinthians 15:20-24).” For Paul, the coming of the promised Messiah in the man, Jesus 
of Nazareth, announced the fulfillment of God’s promises revealed through God’s encounter with the 
people Israel. The triumph of God over the forces of sin and death through the resurrection of Jesus from 
the grave ushered in a new time in the history of the world. Paul believed in the reality of this new time, 
based not upon his reading of the scriptures or upon stories about what happen in Jesus’ life, but because 
of the transforming encounter he experienced along the Damascus Road.®’ This Paul, who as Saul was 
popularly known as one bent on the abuse and murder of this disturbing Christian sect (Galatians 1:13; 
Acts 8:3; 9:21; 22:4) became a follower of Christ due to an individual encounter. When Paul refers to 
his encounter with Christ or the Spirit of Clirist he is not relating to an idea about Clirist, but engaging 
the presence of Christ, person to person, who acts relationally. The resurrection for Paul involved a 
radical perceptual transformation of the way he viewed himself, Judaism, even creation. This is because 
the experience itself was historical and ontological. That is, similar to all those prior to Paul who came 
to faith in Christ, Paul’s experience was anchored firmly in the coordinates of space-time. This historical 
encounter took on ontological significance because it brought about a radical change in his being, the
®®7TM2, p. 166. Italics in the text.
®’Paul’s account is recorded in Galatians 1:11-2:10. See also Acts 9:3-16 with some minor 
differences. “For I did not receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation of 
Jesus Christ. (Galatians 1:12)”
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implications of which were played out in his life and ministiy. This why for Paul “Resurrection is a 
historical-ontological category, manifesting in this world the dawning of the new age of 
transformation.”®®
The resurrection brings with it new insights as it opens up and reveals new avenues into the 
knowledge and work of God in creation. As a result, the resurrection is viewed by Paul as an apocalyptic 
event.®® Apocalyptic thinking revolved around three basic ideas of historical dualism, universal cosmic 
expectation, and the imminent end of the world. An event will take place to produce a radical 
discontinuity between the present age and the age to come. It would be a time of immense struggle, but 
in the end results in the culmination of God’s reign over creation. What is more, this event would occur 
soon - very soon. Beker makes the point that these were not preoccupations of speculative and abstract 
thinkers. Instead, “apocalyptic is bom out of a deep existential concern and is in many respects a 
theology of martyrdom. The apocalyptist has a profound awareness of a distinction between what is and 
what should be, and of the tragic tension between faithfulness to the Torah and its apparent futility.”®® 
Resurrection signals the beginning of the new realm to come, the final justice and triumph of God, 
because “the resurrection of Christ announces the imminent dawn of the general resurrection to come.”®*
Therefore, one of the major insights Paul received from the resun*ection of Christ, viewed 
apocalyptically, is that the world as he knew it, indeed, all of histoiy, was coming to an end. Paul’s 
“passionate temper and lifestyle are not the result of personal idiosyncrasy, but are the part of his 
awareness that he is the man of the hour whose mission takes place in the last hours of world history. 
He Icno ws himself to be the eschatological apostle who spans the times between the resurrection of Christ 
and the final resurrection of the dead.”®^ Throughout his correspondence, Paul talks about the revelation 
of God’s final glory, although he appears to be ambiguous about the order of events, and what exactly 
will transpire.®® The glory of God will be revealed and enter the fallen world, bringing about the
®®J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph o f God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987), p. 153.
®®Beker, pp. 135,143-144. Beker has clearly identified that Paul was apocalyptic in his Pharisaic 
career, and this apocalyptic perspective was heightened after his Damascus Road experience, in fact, for 
Paul the resurrection of Christ can only be viewed within such a framework
®®Beker, p. 136.
®*Beker, p. 153.
®^ Beker, pp. 144-145. “The major apocalyptic forces are, for [Paul], those ontological powers 
that determine the human situation within the context of God’s created order and comprise the ‘field’ 
of death, sin, the law, and the flesh. Paul does not oppose ‘this age’ to ‘the coming age.’ (p. 145)”
®®"The catchword glory is used wherever the final state of affairs is set apart from the present and 
whenever a final amalgamation of the earthly and heavenly spheres is prophesied.” Klaus Koch, The
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redemption of all that has decayed (Romans 8:19-23). Significantly, this gloiy “will not annihilate the 
world,” Beker suggests, “but only break off its present structure of death, because it aims to transform 
the cosmos rather than to confirm its ontological n o t h i n g n e s s . “The resurrection of Christ marks the 
beginning of the process of transformation,” Beker observes, “and its historical reality is therefore crucial 
to Paul because it marks the appearance of the end in history and not simply the end of history. It is not 
the intrapsychic event; rather, it appeals to the Christian’s solidarity with the stuff of creation that God 
has destined for ‘resurrection’ glory.”^^  The victory of God over evil, decay and death, will take place 
in the parousia of Christ in history, then the kingdom of God will be fully realized (1 Corinthians 15:24).
We see that history viewed as a dynamic field  of activity that was open to the future, with events 
constituted, as it were, by the tension or conflict between the initial resunection of Christ and his 
promised return at the culmination of the age, which will be at any moment.®*^  Paul’s ministry and his 
writings, (composed between A.D. 50-56) are situated within this tension. Yet, Paul is very vague as to 
whether this new creation will include a redeemed historical reality or not, for to be apocalyptic is not 
necessarily to be anti-history. The glorious liberty of the children of God (Romans 8:21) is lived out, 
not after the destruction of the world, but within the cosmos redeemed by the same God who created, 
upholds and remains faithful to it. Nevertheless, the parousia, Paul believed, will bring about the end 
of the world as he knew it, so that the world can be redeemed and restored to what it was intended to 
be, a world beyond his ability to conceive or imagine (1 Corinthians 2:9).
But how long does one have to wait? Living within this tension could not be maintained forever 
without seriously undermining the meaning of Christ’s resurrection, without it becoming an empty 
promise. The delay of the parousia caused considerable problems for the early church. The historical 
field constituted by the tension between the particular resurrection and the general, universal one, began 
to collapse, and the conceptions of the way time was perceived started to change. We can identify two 
strategies. We turn to Beker for yet another helpful summary. One way involved a conflation of the 
points, a spiritualization. Colossians, Ephesians, Jolm are representative of this approach. The second 
is the diffusion of the tension, which allowed the postponement of the apocalyptic promise indefinitely. 
This tendency can be found in 2 Peter, 2 Thessalonians, and, most-importantly for our study, in Luke-
Rediscovery o f the Apocalyptic: A Polemical Work on a Neglected Area o f Biblical Studies and Its 
Damaging Effects on Theology and Philosophy. Studies in Biblical Tlieology, 2/22. (London: SCM 
Press, 1972), pp. 28-32.
^"Beker, p. 149.
"'Beker, p. 149.
"""The resunection heightened rather than relaxed the longing for the Parousia.” Beker, p. 152. 
Cf.. 1 Thessalonians 1:9-10 & Philippians 3:20-21.
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Acts."’
B. The Delay o f the Parousia and the Appeal to History
When the gospel writers of the New Testament composed their accounts of Jesus’ life, they did 
so not as historians, but as theologians. Their intent was not to write history, as we have come to 
understand history as offering a chronological or an objective account of what really happened, but to 
reflect theologically upon what occurred in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Their goal 
was to give an account, a narrative grounded in theological reflection and imagination. They are all 
different in focus and intent. But the genre was certainly unparalleled, formed to meet the needs of the 
First Century congregations."*
As theological texts, and not necessarily historical ones, they were written with certain basic 
assumptions. For our purposes here, we must note that the gospels were not wi'itten to confirm historical 
facts."  ^ Instead, the facticity of the claims was important only to the degree that they provided the basis 
for what was really important, namely, the message of the Gospel, and the one who proclaimed this 
message - Jesus, the Christ. First century Christians were not trapped in a positivistic obsession with 
“just the facts,” as twentieth century historians have tended to be; as if “just the facts” could exhaust and 
reveal what is true or real, and therefore historical, and if historical, then true or real. To take our 
contemporary presuppositions concerning facts and history and apply them to the gospel is actually 
abusive to the texts, forcing them to do something they were never intended to do.’" The first Christians 
came to place their faith in Jesus Christ, not through a reliance upon the story, but through an encounter
"’Beker, p. 160.
"*See Luke T. Johnson, The Writings o f the New Testament: An Interpretation (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1986), pp. 35-39. See also Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse o f Biblical Narrative: A Study in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 10-13.
""in Matthew 2:23, we find this verse, “And [Jesus] went and dwelt in a city called Nazareth, that 
what was spoken by the prophets might be fulfilled, ‘he shall be called a Nazarene.’” However, biblical 
scholars are at odds to find this prophecy anywhere in the Old Testament. In The Art o f Biblical 
Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), literary critic Robert Alter claims that biblical writers were 
fully aware that they were not scripting first person accounts, and intentionally employed the 
“playfulness and skill of a modem storyteller. Not only did they interpret historical events, argues Alter; 
they sometimes created events out of their own literary imaginations.” Quoted in Nancy J. Duff, 
Humanization and the Politics of God: The Koinonia Ethics o f Paul Lehmann (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1992), p. 89.
’"This was the major mistake of historical criticism, treating the gospels as source material for 
the historian and for the theologian writing as a historian. A reliance upon the critical-historical method 
paved the way for Rudolf Bultmann’s (1884-1976) “demythologization” of the New Testament. See 
Alister E. McGrath, The Making o f Modern German Christology, 1750-1990 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1994), pp.154-162.
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with the Risen Chi'ist that was either physical or spiritual in nature. The truth claims of the gospels were 
not the result of conclusions deductively drawn through the analysis of the facts. The gospel writers 
came to their conclusions about Jesus Christ because of their encounters with him, which constituted a 
new view of reality, and when appropriated through faith and made concrete thi'ough the power of the 
Holy Spirit, led to confession, discipleship, yielding a completely new understanding and experience 
of reality never previously experienced.
It is somewhat ironic, given the historical character of the divine revelation in the New 
Testament (as well as the Old Testament) in that it took place in space-time and given the power of this 
revelation to redefine the way reality is perceived (even the way we date years from that defining 
moment), that the word “history” is conspicuously absent in the texts. An examination of the etymology 
of the word “history” and its use in the New Testament is important to note. “History” originated with 
the Greeks for whom it was closely tied to philosophy and poetiy. It derives from eidenai, meaning “to 
know (thought having seen),” and is related to the philosophic tei*m eidos meaning, “idea.” The early 
form of the word generally meant “witnessing,” “knowing,” or “enquiring.”’  ^ Ricouer notes that the 
noun form of historeo, '’"'historia is precisely the ‘availability’ and ‘submission to the unexpected,’ that 
‘openness to others’ whereby bad subjectivity is overcome.”’^
These Greek notions of “history,” certainly influenced the writers of the New Testament. Kittel 
makes the point that Paul was not “indifferent to the actual history of Jesus. He used to display Jesus 
before the eyes of the communities as crucified among them (Galatians 1:1). But he had nothing in 
common with Greek historical writing, though he does use [historeo] at Gal. 1:18 - the only occurrence 
in the NT - in the common Hellenistic sense of ‘visit in order to get to know.”’’'  Paul relays that “after 
tliree days [he] went up to Jerusalem to visit Peter, and remained with him fifteen days.” Historeo is 
translated “to visit” in the New Revised Standard Version. In his commentary on this pericope, Eugene
H. Peterson detects a “colloquial tone to it,” meaning “to sit down and swap stories. Paul did not go to 
lecture to him or to report to him or to propagandize him, he only went to visit. The two men put their 
feet up in front of a few coals of fire and traded stories.. .  What is important to stress here is that 
the only time when this word is used in the New Testament it is understood as an interpersonal
’‘Gillespie, p. 2.
’^The origins of historiography can be established around the fifth century, B. C., generally 
associated with the writings of Herodotus (c.484-c.425), considered the “father of history,” for whom 
history was an enquiry not of ideas but of human affairs. Here the distinctively personal element of 
historical knowledge can be seen. Ricouer, History and Truth, p. 31.
’'Kittel, p. 396.
’'‘Eugene H. Peterson, Traveling Light: Modern Meditations o f St. Paul’s Letter o f Freedom 
(Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 1988), p. 53.
169
interaction, a personal encounter, whereby indwelling the presence of the other yields a certain kind of 
personal knowledge. The use of historeo implies not so much an objective, analytic, matter-of-fact 
quality often identified with this word. Instead, biblically speaking its use speaks of encounter, an 
engagement or conversation between two people. There is the additional sense that this exchange is 
almost an unconscious, natural occurrence. The deeply personal element cannot be denied. Gerhard 
Kittel (1888-1948) notes that “The man who knows puts his knowledge into effect vis-à-vis the ignorant 
by telling what he knows.” So that the end or purpose of history in this context can be understood as a 
personal, subjective engagement.’'  However, the interpersonal, subjective, future oriented dynamic field 
would soon come to an end.
Luke-Acts marks a significant shift in the way the early church starts to think of itself as a 
historical entity and reevaluates the importance of history as a way of preserving the tradition.’" What 
is missing is the personal dimension found in Paul’s use of the word. The reason for this shift is what 
interests us here. The literary genre of Luke-Acts has interesting parallels with various forms of Greek 
historical writing.”  As stated above, this is because of the delay of the parousia caused a majorcrisis j
within the early church, precipitating a move away from apocalyptic thinking.’* But Luke is not j
interested in writing to this crisis and instead comes up with a completely different schema. Luke J
restructures the whole understanding of his present time by introducing a new idea. Beker has made a |
significant observation in seeing that Luke substitutes apocalyptic presumptions with historical j
assumptions, influenced by Hellenistic historiography. Luke’s “salvation-historical sketch turns I
’'Gerhard Kittel, editor. Theological Dictionary o f the New Testament, Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
Translator and Editor (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1965), pp. 391-396.
’"The inception and development of a distinctively Greek use of history in the Christian 
experience can be identified quite clearly in Luke and Acts. “The early Christian tradition first comes 
into contact with Greek historical writing in Luke,” suggests Kittel, p. 396.
” G. W. Trompf, The Idea o f Historical Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to the 
Reformation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). Luke is an Hellenistic historian who 
forms a narrative {d i^M o)  from material handed down by eyewitnesses (p. 321). Trompf notes that 
“much has been done on Greco-Roman influence on Christianity, little on the merging of 
historiographical perceptions, models and methods in the patristic and later periods, (p. 179)”
’*Beker attributes a shifting philosophical and cultural climate, as well as, the apologetic 
missionary objectives of the first Christians, p. 160. The strain in apocalyptic thinking can be seen in 
Paul’s response to those questioning the return of Christ, in 2 Thessalonians. Rudolf Bultmann writes, 
“The problem of Eschatology [synonymous with apocalyptic in Bultmann’s Gifford Lectures of 1955] 
grew out of the fact that the expected end of the world failed to arrive, that the ‘Son of Man’ did not 
appear in the clouds of heaven, that history went on, and that the eschatological community could not 
fail to recognise that it had become a historical phenomenon and that the Christian faith had taken on the 
shape of a new religion. This is made clear by two facts: (a) the historiography of the author of Luke 
and the Acts of the Apostles (b) the importance which tradition gained in the Christian community.” The 
Presence o f Eternity: History and Eschatology (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 38.
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attention away from the problem of the delay of the parousia. What occupies him is the present time as
a time of missions.”’" He has no interest in writing about the “last days,” he is writing to equip the
church to live indefinitely in the new age of the Holy Spirit inaugurated in Jerusalem at Pentecost (Acts
2). With Luke, we have the church as historical, temporal entity, and the beginning of theological
reflection informed by historical constnrcts. The church starts to think historically, and the narrative
account of what transpired serves pedagogical and apologetic purposes. Let us take a brief look at the
introductoiy words of the gospel.
Luke writes to his friend, Theophilus, the general reader, as honored, “the beloved of God”;
Inasmuch as many have already undertaken to compile a narrative of events which have j
been accomplished among us - just as those who from the beginning had been i
eyewitnesses and ministers of the word delivered to us - it seemed good to me also, j
having followed all things carefully from the beginning, to write a sequential account i
for you, dear Theophilus, that you may know the truth of the words in which you have j
been instructed. (Luke 1:1-14, translated by Eduard Schweizer) |
Several important observations can be made concerning this text. The phrases “narrative of i
events,” and “sequential account,” based on “eyewitnesses and ministers of the word,” indicate Luke’s j
intent to make a connection between what transpired in Christ and what that experience has to do with 1
his present situation in the church. The ordering of time, arranging sequence, and then providing an 
inteipretative framework all point to methods of Greek historiography.*" It is a movement from the past 
to their present, telling of an event that although in the past continues to live on in the present. The 
person recounting this is Luke, the historian. The past is not a completed past, but lives on through the 
present into an open future. The past is not completed or closed off. The promise of the gospel is 
forward looking because what transpired in the past continues effectually to shape all of time. Luke 
“stands between the past (the completed study on which his writing is based [perfect tense]) and the goal 
of his writing, which lies in the future: that Theophilus will be assured of what he has heard [aorist]. The 
line from the past through the present to the future is artfully presented: the saving event, institution of 
witnesses, their tradition, previous attempts, Luke’s Gospel, the assurance of faith.”*‘
’"Beker, p. 162. “Although he does not deny the Parousia and its expectation (Acts 1:11 ;3:20-
21), he allows it to fade away to the periphery Luke aptly uses the solution of apocalyptic
postponement to concentrate on the missionary demands of the church. The temporal end of time is 
diffused for the sake of the mission of the church.”
*"Eduard Schweizer has shown that the first sentence alone resembles similar prefaces in 
contemporary historical works. Schweizer’s study of the Greek verbs in this pericope reveals a 
contrastive movement from Greek aorist and Greek perfect, with a dative reference to himself. Eduard 
Schweizer, The Good News According to Luke, Translated by David E. Green (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 
1984), pp. 10-11.
*‘“That the object, the events to be comprehended in words, is mentioned before the evangelist 
is no accident. Only the saving act itself and Luke’s thorough study of it appear in the perfect tense, as 
elements of the past that continue to live in the present.” Schweizer, pp. 10-11.
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The need to write a new account of what transpired, with a specific heimeneutical perspective 
suggests, however, that the content and meaning of the tradition was open to debate.*' The objective 
to narrate the events of Jesus’ life and ministry reflects the need to clarify what actually occurred, to say 
what essentially took place through Christ. There is no need to write down what happened unless there 
is some doubt over what exactly took place. There is no need to write it down, to make it into a concrete 
text, unless there is some fear it will be forgotten and hence misunderstood.*' Already, it seems that 
as the church finds itself moving further and further away from the originating event it becomes 
increasingly difficult to know how to relate back to that event. Gaps begin to emerge, both temporal and 
psychological, that slowly produced anxiety within the early church.
The perceived absence of Christ and the delay of the parousia required a theological response. 
Luke’s answer, suggestive of the Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus (d. after 21 B. C.), is to say that 
tlirough these events something happened, and that its effects are still being felt tliroughout their time.*"* 
Luke applies a distinctively Greek way to order and comiect with these events, by using primary sources 
and seeking a narrative.*' For that is what historians primarily do, they create narratives. The “historical 
narrative transforms chronos into history sensu strictissimo, it appears that ‘where there is no narrative, 
there is no history.’” This is because “narrativization ties together the separate threads of chronicle by 
forming a centered structure with a definite beginning, middle, and end. This reading of narrative helps 
to explain the structure of history as a wAo/e.”*" This is the point that Ricouer has made. “Histoiy 
begins and ends with the reciting of a tale {recit)\ and its intelligibility and coherence rest upon its
*'Schweizer, p. 11.
*'“History is only a catalogue of the forgotten.” Flenry Adams, Mont Saint Michel and Chartres, 
in Henry Adams: Novels, Mont Saint Michel, The Education, Edited by Ernest Samuels and Jane N. 
Samuels (New York: Library of America, 1983), p. 343.
*'‘Schweizer, p. 11. “Accomplished” in Luke 1:1 can “mean the end of a certain period of time 
(as in Acts 14:26; 19:21 ; 24:24,27), but it usually refers to the will of God (Luke 8:31; 21:24; 22:16; Acts 
7:23;9:23) already announced in the Old Testament (Luke 4:21; 24:44; Acts 1:16; 3:18; 13:27). The 
latter is probably the meaning here. (p. 11)”
*'".. .Luke gives speeches of Peter and Paul at important points in the story after the pattern of 
ancient historians.” Hans Conzelmann, Die Mitte der Zeit. Studien zur Theologie des Lukas (1954) 
quoted in Bultmann, p.39.
*"Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), p. 63, 64. Paul Ricouer makes the same point in Time and Narrative, Volume 1, Translated by 
Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pelauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), where he sees 
his goal is to discover “how the act of raconteur, of telling a story, can transmute natural time into a 
specifically human time, irreducible to mathematical, chronological ‘clock time’.(p. 3)” As to whether 
or not Luke was a good historian or not, see Luke T. Johnson, The Writings o f the New Testament: An 
Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), pp. 200- 204.
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recital.”*’ The identification of the narrative structure of a story, and in particular, history, are creative 
acts whereby a self comes to obtain “new forms of human time.”** The way Luke seeks to connect with 
the past is by appealing to history, the story or narration of the event.
With the writing of The Gospel According to Luke and the Acts o f the Apostles, one can discern 
a significant shift in the way the church begins to reflect upon its existence. It could be argued that Luke 
is probably the first Christian writer to make an appeal to history, to use it as a theological tool to retain 
continuity, a way to bridge the gap caused by the delay of the parousia.*" With the continuing delay of 
the parousia, the early church was forced to wrestle with its relationship to the past. With the advent of 
new generations of Christians, living farther away in time from Jesus’ death and resurrection, and the 
collapse of an apocalyptic outlook, the church had to provide a way, a model of how one can be a 
contemporary of Christ in terms of a faith experience, while at the same time, being a historical entity 
moving farther away from the original event."" How does one ensure the vitality of the faith against the 
vicissitudes of time moving one away from the revelational constitution of reality in Christ? How does 
one traverse this temporal distance?
Certainly, the widespread reference to the Holy Spirit throughout Acts is one way of coming to 
terms with this loss. The Holy Spirit has an active historical role, encountering disciples, directing 
missionary journeys, evangelical meetings, forming the church, pointing the way to Christ, making that 
connection. Even so, it is what the Holy Spirit had done in the past, not a report of what was happening 
in the immediate present. The Holy Spirit becomes limited to the words of the story. This is because
*’ln an interview with Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers 
(Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1984), p. 16.
**Ricouer, quoted in Kearney, p. 20. Drawing upon Hannah Arendt, Ricoeur affirms, “the 
meaning of existence is not just the power to change or master the world, but also the ability to be 
remembered and recollected in narrative discourse, to be memorable. There existential and historical 
implications of narratives are very far-reaching, for they determine what is to be preserved and rendered 
‘permanent’ in a culture’s sense of its own past, of its own ‘identity’.(p. 18)”
*""Luke’s view of history also determines his conception of Scripture, as is evident from his use 
of Scripture proof.” Hans Conzelmann, Acts o f the Apostles: A Commentary on the Acts o f the Apostles, 
Translated by James Limburg, A. Thomas Kraabel, and Donald H. Juel, Edited by Eldon Jay Epp with 
Christopher R. Matthews (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p. xlvi.
""See J. Louis Martyn’s discussion of the way the gospel writers sought to preserve the tradition 
of the church and at the same time speak to their contemporary situation. “The early church shared with 
many groups of its time a concern for tradition which exceeds by far that known to us. The past - 
specific events and teachings of the past - lived on with power and somehow mingled with events of the 
present. To the ancients it was far more obvious than it is to us that one’s response to contemporary 
issues involves careful consideration of the traditions inherited from one’s forbears. Indeed it was 
responsible contemporary involvement which most often sharpened the sense of need for tradition and 
which is therefore mainly to be thanked for preserving the voice of the past.” History and Theology in 
the Fourth Gospel (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1979), pp. 18-19.
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the primary way of providing a solution is by making an appeal to history. For Luke, Hans Conzelmann 
writes, “The presupposition is that the church is a historical entity which has its own particular time; in 
other words, that the imminent end of history has been transformed into a portrait of history.”"*
It is no mistake, then, that Acts is considered the first recorded history of the church and the only 
document in the New Testament that could be categorized as history, but with a strong theological 
flavour. Perhaps. The emergence of such a unique document, I would suggest, says more about what 
the community lacked than about what it “possessed,” namely a connection with the Risen Christ. As 
historical text, it serves as a literary expression of the particularly Christian dilemma of a community 
coming to terms with historical reality, brought on by the delay of the parousia. That historical reality 
is the awareness of temporal distance, is experienced as a form of despair over the church’s inability to 
retain a sense of contemporaneity with the Risen Christ. The place where we can see this struggle to 
connect with the Risen Christ is through the writings of the early church, specifically in Luke-Acts. The 
sense of loss is expressed through a text and what we find in most historical texts is what Anthony Kemp 
has trenchantly described as grammars of absence."'
Looking at Luke’s unique methodology in writing his Gospel miàActs we can identify a subtle, 
yet critical shift in the way the early church began to look theologically at historical reality. What we 
have in Luke is a vision that is, in the end, certainly theologically informed, but before we arrive there 
it is first filtered through a particular view of history. There is a considerable appeal to Hellenist 
historiographical methods, and a recasting of historical phenomena in such a way that tries to “make 
sense” of the parousia’s delay, as it equips the church for this world-historical missionary and apologetic 
experience. It is as if Luke is saying to the church, “We could be here for a while. We might as well 
settle in and get used to it.” It seems to me that the apocalyptic expectations become historicized in ways 
that are theologically inadequate because they yield an understanding of reality that is not thoroughly 
grounded in an understanding of the incamation-resurrection and are not personal and relational."'
"‘Conzelmann, p. xlv. “Continuity is also established by the Spirit as the abiding possession of 
the church. It is striking that continuity in the history of the church is not located in institutions.(p. xlv)” 
Bultmann notes that tradition took on greater significance during this time, as well. The Pastoral 
Epistles, for example, “are especially interested in the trustworthiness of the leaders of the community, 
whose duty it is to uphold the tradition. Indeed, the growth and development of the ecclesiastical office 
has its ground especially in the need to guarantee the safety of the tradition. The most important part of 
that tradition is the doctrine, because the community is not constituted on a national or social basis but 
by the word which calls the individuals into the community, (p. 39)”
"'The central argument in Anthony Kemp, The Estrangement o f the Past: A Study in the Origins 
o f Modern Historical Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 3ff.
"'Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s comment that the early church did not live out the “Incarnation.
. . in all its consequences. The first Christians felt abandoned after the death of Christ and looked 
everywhere for a trace of him. Centuries later the Crusaders plunged into the search for an empty tomb. 
And this was because they has worshiped the Son in the spirit of the religion of the Father. They had not
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C. Disorientation and the Restriction o f Time
To “be here,” to have duration, is one way of saying that the church came to see itself as an 
historical entity. This realization posed considerable difficulties for the church. First, there was the 
problem of how to take the power of the originating, primal, transforming experiences with Jesus Christ 
that eventually formed the church and convey it to succeeding generations in such a way that was 
equally primal and transforming."'* Ernst Breisach has demonstrated that after the year 500 the church 
had to wrestle with the “problem of continuity in an age of upheaval.”"' But the problem emerges even 
earlier. The question posed to them was, “How can we preserve what transpired in our lives and impart 
it to those others, like Paul, who are ‘untimely bom,’ who come after the first generation church?” First­
hand knowledge is always more persuasive, and has within it a greater potential for change and 
transfoimation. By first-hand, I mean something that one personally experiences for oneself, it is not 
mediated through another source. To hear someone else give an account of their significant, meaningful 
event, and not experience it for oneself, as witness, first-hand, is never as powerful. Because this is 
often the case the primal experience is codified, fixed within the oral tradition of a culture, or written 
down as text and formed into a canon."" A tradition then develops around that event preserved by an 
institution that looks to the tradition to communicate the intensity and significance of the originating 
event. It is questionable, however, whether later generations are ever able to know what it was like for 
the first generation of Christians. This is an issue that Loder’s pneumatology addresses directly and 
offers a correction. It is this prevailing, non-pneumatologically oriented approach throughout the histoiy 
of the church that devitalizes the Christian life.
The life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ takes place in a certain point of time, bringing 
about revolutionary changes in the way God, reality, humanity, and the world are all conceived. As the 
church, discovering and coming to gi'ips with its historical identity, moved farther and farther away from 
the originating event it struggled to maintain a connection with its valuable past. This slow drift away
yet understood that God was with them now and forever.” “Faith and Good Faith,” in Sense and  
Nonsense, Translated by Hubert L. & Patricia Allen Dreyfuss (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), p. 172.
"‘This is often the case for religious and social reforms groups trying to pass on their beliefs to 
the next generation that finds itself removed from the originating circumstance. See the insightful essay 
by anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Revitalization Movements,” American Anthropology, 58 
(1956): 264-81.
"'Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), p. 88.
""On the way a text and further commentary on and criticism of a text creates a sense of “false 
immediacy,” see George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989), pp. 4-50.
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in time, yields over time, a perception of time as a mighty, swift current separating early Christians from 
their Savior. There was an increasing awareness of the emergence of gaps, as it were, temporal, 
psychological, and spiritual in nature."’ The movement through time and identification of these gaps 
created a sense of loss and alienation, abandonment, and absence for early Christians, feelings that 
continue to affect the church today.
Since Jesus’ ascension and the birth of the church, the development of narratives, frameworks 
of coherence, philosophies of history, and theological conceptualizations of history can all be viewed 
as having their root in this Promethean-like desire to pull together disparate moments in time, to preserve 
them as a unity, as a whole. One way of looking at this drive toward narrative and coherence is the need 
to maintain the primary relationship with the Risen Christ. They are attempts to explain what happened 
at that point in time as having a relationship with what transpires in every subsequent moment in time. 
The writings from the first few centuries of the church reveal an obsession with continuity, a fear of 
heresy, of anything that could make them feel even further away from Christ, but they must not be taken 
at face value. All of this reveals something else. “The formulation of a verbal consciousness implies 
the subverbal experience of its opposite; the rhetoric of unity and coherence is necessitated by the great 
and probable fear of infinite incoherence. .. .”"* The drive for coherence and connection is a symptom 
of a deeper problem, namely the fear of temporal and spiritual absence. The church’s relationship with 
and to what extent it is dependent upon its past ultimately deals with this question of coherence. For 
unless this relationship across time and in time can be maintained, then the effectiveness of the gospel 
and its claims to universal truth are seriously compromised, and the authority of the church itself 
undeiTnined. In some ways, an argument can be made that the task of theology, especially over the last 
two hundred years in defense against the attacks of the Enlightenment, can be characterized as the need 
to respond in apologetic fashion to these perceived gaps - temporal, psychological, spiritual - that begin 
to emerge early in the history of the church."" Throughout the last two millennia, the church has looked
"’This is not unlike what Gotthold Ephraim Lessing ( 1729-1781) referred to in his essay “On the 
Proof o f the Spirit and o f Power (Ueber den Beweis des Geises und der Kraft).” Henry Chadwick 
Lessing's Theological Writings: Selections in Translation with an Introductory Essay (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1956).
"*Kemp, p. 44.
""That theology must not be reactionary to such secular threats, that it cannot be apologetic, has 
been advanced quite powerfully in the theology of Karl Barth in this century, “, . .  good theologians do 
not serve themselves but God, since they do not proclaim themselves but God, their questions and doubts 
must have no final power over them. Nor must they tiy to support their heavenly Father with any well- 
meaning apologetics, but with confidence and gladness they must believe that God is not really dead and 
will thus himself see to the acknowledgment of his name, his will, and his kingdom.” Offene Briefe 
1945-68 (Zurich, 1984), pp. 553f. I use the word “perceived,” intentionally. That these gaps were 
perceived does not necessarily mean they are real. They were perceived. Then as now, no doubt, 
perception is reality.
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to conceptions of history, either as text or idea, as one possible way of dealing with these issues that 
developed as a result of the church becoming increasingly aware its historicity, seeing itself as an 
historical entity persisting through time. In this shift the seeds are planted for the depersonalization of 
the Christian experience.
As a result, various strategies developed to deal with these gaps, which I would argue are two- 
dimensional defense mechanisms that deny the gaps. Simply put, throughout the history of theology, 
once these gaps were identified, at least two strategies of response can be recognized: Avoidance and 
accommodation. Avoidance basically involved acting as if the gaps did not exist with outright denial. 
The other involved developing ways of negotiation through the gap or around it. Sti'ategies of avoidance 
materialized in the first centuries of the Christian Era and lasted through the Reformation in the sixteenth 
century. The Renaissance-Reformation marks a major shift in the way the church thought about history. 
As Martin Luther was rediscovering the gospel, his contemporaries were also rediscovering the temporal 
gap that was denied by the early and medieval church. After the Reformation, these gaps could no longer 
be denied. But this does not mean they were accepted either, because the fundamental problem of how 
one relates to primal, originating experience was not solved. The fundamental problem posed by their 
conceptions of history could not deal with the temporal/historical/spiritual gap which was even more 
apparent to them, living fifteen hundreds years later. It is after this period that we start hearing about 
the “problem of history,” specifically the problems history poses for faith. Although history posed a 
problem all along, one that theology had never really come to terms with. By the end of the nineteenth 
centuiy theologians began to wrestle with what had become known as the faith and history question, a 
question that has cast a terrible shadow over much of twentieth century theology, as well. Eveiy 
noteworthy theologian of the last two centuries has contributed to finding a solution to this thorny 
problem confronting theology and the church.
D. The Loss o f the Face and Two-Dimensionality
One of the most engaging and adept studies on the origins of historical thinking in the West is 
Anthony Kemp’s The Estrangement o f the Past: A Study in the Origins o f Modern Historical 
Consciousness. He writes not as a theologian or church historian, but as literary analyst with theological 
skill and, as a result, comes at the historical material with refreshing insights that have a profound effect 
upon the way we have come to think about history. He does a remarkable job of getting behind the texts 
to identify deeper patterns at work in the way the church has approached historical knowledge. 
Historical frameworks and texts were used by the early church to make up for the lost face of Christ. 
This work is particularly insightful and will be discussed at length because Kemp substantiates Loder’s 
depiction of world views that are constituted two-dimensionally, established primarily as maladaptive 
responses of the ego to experiences of absence and loss. Let us see how this was done in the early
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centuries of the church.
It is in the Eusebius of Caesarea’s (c,260-c.340) Historia ecclesiastical in 324 that Kemp 
identifies the appearance of a new literary genre that serves a particular purpose, very similar to the 
intentions of the gospel writer, Luke.*"" Eusebius “attempts a comprehensive telling of the history of the 
Church, from Christ’s Advent to Eusebius’s present, and as such it must contain, at least implicitly, an 
interpretation of the structure of time.” Eusebius’ creative efforts to write a comprehensive, coherent 
narrative established a pattern for later attempts to write history. It is interesting to observe that the 
reason an official interpretation is required is due to the glowing number of sources open to the 
chronicler or historian. The events cannot only be listed, they need to be ordered, arranged in order, to 
handle, grasp them. All efforts to formulate philosophies of history, both religious and secular, also find 
their origins here. All attempts at metaphysical frameworks for history, the need to “make sense,” with 
grand overarching schemes of universal histoiy, gianting order to the chaos of time, the knitting together 
of fragments of history into a unified whole, can all find their inception here.
Kemp is most helpful in his examination of the motivations behind this drive for 
comprehensiveness. Echoing some of the themes raised earlier, Kemp explains a possible reason. “All 
religions posit some kind of separation between the believer and God; indeed, religions and myths are 
grammars of absence; they are complex verbal formulas that bring into consciousness that which is 
beyond the limits of phenomenal perception: the origins and telos of the universe, survival beyond death, 
the transcendent. In most religions this separation is phenomenal or perceptual; in Christianity, it is also 
temporal.”'"' The phenomenal or perceptual separation in Christianity is caused by the absence of Christ 
after the ascension. The apostolic witness testifies to this. “The object of faith, then, cannot be Christ 
himself, but the memory of Christ preserved by these witnesses; but the witnesses, although delivered 
from death in a spiritual or metahistorical sense, all died within history. The result was the inevitable 
reification of the living person of Christ into a text (actually a whole series of uncertain and competing 
texts, some outright forgeries), which became the object of faith when no living witnesses remained.”'"' 
There was some appeal to the Holy Spirit to make a connection with Christ. Nevertheless, a fixed.
'""After Luke-Acts, the application of historiography as a tool for the advancement of the gospel 
started by the early third century. The Chronographia, written between 212 and 221, by Sextus Julius 
Africanua (c. 160-C.240) was probably the first attempt at an exhaustive account of the life of Christ and 
the church. But it is not a histoiy as we would define it today. It was chronology, a listing of events 
without an overarching narrative structure. The text was revised by Eusebius and published as the 
Chronicum libri duo. Later revised by Jerome (348-420) and others, the Chronicum become the model 
for medieval chronology. Indrikis Stems, The Greater Medieval Historians: An Interpretation and 




orthodox, written creed was needed. The more the Spirit was invoked, however, the more the Church 
turned back to a written text. What takes place during this time is an emphasis on the power and 
authority of the organized Church (especially during the weakening and after the collapse of the Roman 
Empire), and the development of new temporal configurations. “This time of no revelation, of God’s 
silence, of the long waiting, of the last hour that stretches into infinity - this was the history that Eusebius 
had to invent a shape for.”'"' Eusebius’ need to mold, configure, invent a shape for this past serves as 
the subtext of his endeavor, wrestling with an awareness that has haunted the last two thousand years of 
Western thought. In Christian consciousness - and the consciousness of the West cannot be separated 
from a specifically Christian consciousness - history is perceived as the absence of God.'"''
For Eusebius, history becomes the language of absence that tries to re-present the past. His 
“formulation of history is such a complex interplay of absence and presence. Tlie rhetoric is all of 
presence, of a unity with the past and with Christ; beneath can be discerned the terrible fear of 
discontinuity, the void his words must fill.”'"^  Language, story, narrative, verbal theology fill the gaps - 
an “experiential void” - created by the absence of Christ.
What haunted Eusebius and motivated his writing was the need to maintain a “sameness,” with 
the past, to deny mutability of truth and time.'"" “I have purposed to record in writing the successions 
of the sacred apostles, covering the period stretching from our Saviour to ourselves; the number and 
character of the transactions recorded in the history of the church. . . The use of the word 
“successions,” Kemp notes, does not refer to the “passing of the mantle from one generation to the next,” 
it does not refer to permutation or development, “but rather sameness.”'"* Eusebius’ time was the same
‘"'Kemp, p. 6.
'"''There is a need to connect with that one far-off divine event. R. L. P. Milbum, Early Christian 
Interpretations o f History (London: Adams and Charles Black, 1954).
‘"'Kemp, p. 10.
‘""Cf. Paul Ricouer’s phenomenology exploring the challenges of narrating time, see Paul 
Ricouer, Time and Narrative, Volume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 41, 83-87.
‘"’Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius: The Ecclesiastical History , Translated by Kirsop Lake, 2 
Volumes., Loeb Classical Library (New York: Putnam’s, 1926), 1:6-7; Bk.l, Chap 1.
'"*Kemp, p. 7. He quotes the commentator and translator of his English text: “‘Succession,’ .. 
. did not merely mean, though it certainly included, the apostolic succession of the bishops of the four 
great ‘thrones,’ but rather the whole intellectual, spiritual, and institutional life of the Church. It cannot 
be too strongly emphasized that Eusebius, like all early church historians, can be understood only if it 
be recognized that whereas modem writers try to trace the development, growth, and change of doctrines 
and institutions, their predecessors were trying to prove that nothing of the kind ever happened. 
According to them the Church had one and only one teaching from the beginning; it had been preseiwed 
by the ‘Succession’ and heresy was the attempt of the Devil to change it,”
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as Christ’s, held together by the framework of history. “In this time of silence between divine events
[ascension and parousia], faith and authority can only be founded on the past: Christ and the apostles,
who recede each year further from the grasp of present knowledge, into the ungraspable tenuousness of
collective memory. The only way to palliate this recession of the focus of faith is to deny
psychologically, and subsequently ideologically, the mutability of time and, as mutability is the essence
of our experience of time, consequently to deny time itself.”'"" Sorting through his sources and
explaining his methodology, Eusebius writes, “We shall endeavour to give them unity by historical
treatment, rejoicing to rescue the successions, if not of all, at least of the most distinguished of the
apostles of our Saviour throughout those churches of which the fame is still remembered.”""
By denying the mutability of time, Eusebius offers the first strategy of avoidance. From a
Loderian perspective, it can be viewed as a two-dimensional avoidance of an experiential void, a
proximate experience of death and loss, created by the accumulation of time away from Christ, Kemp
summarizes his point this way:
The elimination of historical mutable time, then, acts as a comforter for those deprived 
of the direct revelation. Eusebius does of course give a history of events and 
generations, but his theoretical rhetoric works against the accumulation of years that he 
chronicles. If the mutable and innovative character of history can be denied, then the 
believer can achieve a rhetorical, linguistic union with the past, and a linguistic union 
can become a mystical union. The denial of mutability has a second, related, and 
essential function: as the authority lies in the past only, any mutation from that past will 
transform the content of Christian belief, by slow degrees, into something 
unrecognizable.
What Eusebius fears is an Ariadne’s thread far too complex to be retraced - a labyrinth 
of time with convolutions and comers that cut off forever the prospect of where one has 
been, that leads ever and only inward, away from the light of the divine event and into 
an interiority of fragmented history. The void that lies behind this rhetoric of union is 
not so much the impossibility of faith in a history so conceived as its complexity.'"
What Eusebius seems to fear is the possibility of incoherence, that it cannot be held together. “To keep 
the world in touch with its monochronically incarnated savior required a radical denial of the movement, 
the discontinuity of time.”" ' The experience of historical reality as absence and loss precipitated various 
responses of denial. For Eusebius, it was characterized by the need to stop the flow of psychological
'""Kemp, p. 8. Eusebius writes, “the names, the number and the age of those who, driven by the 
desire of innovation to an extremity of error, have heralded themselves as the introducers of Knowledge, 
falsely so-called, ravaging the flock of Christ unsparingly, like grim wolves.” (Kemp, p. 8.)
""Eusebius, 1:8-10; bk. 1, chi.
"'Kemp, p. 12, 12-13.
' "Kemp, p. 15. Kemp refers to this fear as the “darkness couched beneath.(p. 14)”
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time, to bring history, as it were, to a screeching halt. “Temporal unity [was] the essential balance,” 
Kemp has shown, which he likens to a flying buttress of a cathedral “that holds the great weight and 
burden of the Church in equilibrium.”" '
My reason for drawing our attention to Kemp’s study of Eusebius is because it reinforces 
Pannenberg’s argument with regards to the use of history. The experience of history brings with it an 
awareness of mutability and change, an awareness that for Loder is a participation in the void at the heart 
of being. Mutability is rooted in the exocentric capacities of the self in the way that “human beings can 
distance themselves from the immediately given,” such as the originating experience of the early 
church.'" As Loder summarizes Pannenberg, “primordial cultures were preoccupied with trying to 
withstand chaos and change that was disruptive. The problem was always how to preserve order or, 
when it broke down, how to reestablish it.”" ' “For the greatest part of their history,” Pannenberg 
suggests, “human beings dedicated themselves to permanence; only five thousand years ago did they 
abandon the rule according to which they had lived for hundreds of thousands of years.”"" Yet, it was 
this drive for constancy in the face of chaos that was so evident in the early centuries of the church. I 
would argue, and believe Loder would concur, that this drive for permanence or coherence continues to 
have a hold over the human psyche and continues to have a detrimental effect upon the life of the church. 
Mutability is still considered a threat. Johann Goethe’s (1749-1832) Faust shouting "Verweile Dock! ” - 
Last Forever! is the cry of the ego cognizant of the mortal truth that “things” do not last, but die.
Kemp has shown how these strategies of avoidance continued from Eusebius through to the 
Reformation where that sense of absence was heightened. The pattern can be traced from the 
Reformation right down to the present as the church continues to struggle in its search for the historical 
Jesus and whether or not historical knowledge can ever be the foundation for faith. If space allowed, we 
would be able to move through the last fifteen hundred years and substantiate Kemp’s claims. 
Christianity continues to wrestle with the apparent present absence of Chi'ist and the church continues 
to look to the discipline of history to make that connection. Yet, to rely upon history is a maladaptive 
response because historical knowledge is build upon absence.
' "Kemp, p. 44. The image is borrowed from Heniy Adams’ (1838-1918) Mont Saint Michel and 
Chartres (1918).
" ‘'Pannenberg, p. 490. This is my example, not Pannenberg’s. 
'"Doctoral seminar transcript.
' ‘"Pannenberg, pp. 490-491. For example, the main concern of the Sumerian myths “was to resist 
the destructive powers of chaos and restore the original order of things or, in other words, to undo the 
fact of historical change, (p. 493)”
181
V. A Loderian Reading of Historical Existence
It is precisely to this present crisis that Loder’s convictional theology has something to say and 
why his work is so profoundly important. It allows us to get around or through the cognitive barriers that 
have hindered the church to extend a vision of the Christian life that is both meaningful and 
transformative.
As we have see,“There is no possibility for recovering the lost face,” Loder says, “without 
eventually encountering nothingness.” The recovering of the lost face is always and only the work of 
God’s grace encountered in a convictional experience of the Holy Spirit after the pattern of Christ’s life, 
death and resurrection. It is the Holy Spirit who giants a four-dimensional human existence and that 
four-dimensional reality cannot be realized apart from a confrontation with nothingness - with the void. 
The experience of the Holy “reaches back under the defensive structure of the ego and restores the same 
conditions for the mature, differentiated personality that the proto-typical facial encounter intioduce for 
the emerging child ego.”" ’ The Holy, mediated in Christ, frees the ego to ground itself in something 
deeper than itself. Thus the ego discovers that, by trusting God, “its defensive maneuvers are reversible 
and that the primal absence is now bearable. Indeed it is even gracious because it haunts the self- 
sufficiency of the ego with constant reminders of its conflicted origins, calling it back again and again 
into communion with the Face that endures, the Face of God.”"*
The defensive structures of the ego carry on the work of negation throughout the life-cycle. The 
self is continually being shaped by the ego that is trying to negate the presence of the void in one’s being. 
Tlie ego cannot tolerate its own annihilation and so it blocks out and seeks to cover over experiences of 
absence and loss. The self, however, was created to live four-dimensionally, but the adaptive and 
accommodative strategies of the ego impede the selfs desire to experience this, to live in relationship 
with the Holy in the face of the void. Unless this negating dynamic is itself negated by a force stronger 
than the ego, the self can never be free to live four-dimensionally. What Loder has identified are 
psychological dynamics that cannot be divorced from epistemological strategies that continue throughout 
the life-cycle, which means that all expressions of human thought, because of their origin in the life of 
a person, can have characteristics of being two-, three -, or four-dimensional.
As a result, two-dimensionality is a face-less existence of the maladaptive ego marked by a 
“denial of person-centeredness.”"" The push to survive even at the expense of people depersonalizes 
existence. When a person encounters the Holy in the face of Christ, the Holy restores the original impact 
of the primal, face-to-face encounter of infancy. When the Holy faces an individual, one becomes a self
" ’7TM2,p. 173. 
"*rrM2, pp. 173-174.
\ \ 9 r'TTM2, p. 174.
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free from the defensive structures of the ego and the Holy generates “a person-centered life of four­
dimensional proportions.”"" The encounter with the Holy is person to person, and this also yields an 
outlook whereby the other is no longer an “it,” incorporated into the life of the ego, but becomes a thou, 
a person.
Two-dimensionality is governed by fear - fear of death and therefore fear of life. It is the 
opposite of four-dimensional life, which is graciously ruled by love. “There is no fear in love, but 
perfect love casts out fear. (1 John 4:18)” Because fear is the determining emotion of the unredeemed 
ego, it will push the self into patterns of control and domination, anything that will allow the ego to 
establish its own security. The self seeks to grab hold of everything - people, things, positions of 
authority and power, knowledge, texts, even God - and presses everything into a death-grip in service 
to the ego.
If we take Loder’s framework and apply it to the way the church has thought about histoiy and 
how the church has understood its movement over time, it would seem to me, given our discussion, that 
the ways we have relied upon the study of history as a foundation for theology are symptomatic of 
theologians thinking two-dimensionally, and not four-dimensionally. We can say this because the study 
of history, as we have seen, has been used as a tool to reconnect us with the source experience of the 
church, namely Jesus Chi ist. The appeal to history becomes a substitute for an encounter with the face 
of Christ, two-dimensional constructs that seek to overcome the apparent absence of Christ. The study 
and writing of histoiy are acts after the fact, that seek to regain that which has been lost to the present, 
due to the flow of time. The trust in and reliance upon the historical pursuit implicitly presupposes a 
sense of absence and loss, of our inability to connect with Jesus. When the church trusts in history to 
prove the veracity of its truth claims, it is actually making a confession of doubt. It bespeaks of the 
church’s uncertainty and confusion of identity. This is why the trust in historical truth, which is to some 
extent a trust in humanity, is functional atheism. A study of the past can enable the functionality of the 
church, allowing it to continue to function as an institution, but this is no substitute for the life-giving 
relationship that the human spirit desires and the Holy Spirit longs to give. John Macmurray (1891- 
1960) makes the trenchant observation that “the historical development of Churches or other institutions 
in no way guarantees that the original teaching of their founder is retained. Historical continuity is no 
guarantee of spiritual continuity.”" ' Perhaps the appeal to histoiy reflects the possible fear that Jesus 
is still absent from us, disconnected from us, far removed from the present. Trusting in historical 
knowledge, this grammar of absence would help to explain why the contemporary church finds itself 
struggling through a period of self-doubt, brought on by the apparent present absence of Christ within
p. 3.
""7TM2, p. 174.
"'John Macmurray, Tlie Clue to History (London: Student Chiistian Movement Press, 1938),
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the church and within the world. In sharpt contrast, Loder is an advocate for spiritual presence and 
continuity above all else - because the spiritual connection with Jesus is fundamentally personal and 
relational.
Another way of applying Loder’s work is to say the history of thought is in many respects the 
history of the individual writ large, it exposes the deep psychological traumas experienced by the self 
in its struggle to find meaning in the world free from the ego’s dynamic of negation. Recall that Loder 
believes there is something “inherently wi ong with so-called human development. Normal development 
is psychologically constructed, socially supported, and culturally maintained so that people are drawn 
out of the full four dimensions of being.”" ' If the search for the Face that will not go away is the 
ultimate need of every individual at every stage o f the life-cycle, then the history of collective thought 
will also reflect that struggle to find the source of meaning for its life at every period of its history. 
Despite the enormous creative potential of the human spirit there are also maladaptive, defensive 
structures of the ego which are operative throughout the life-cycle starting with infancy, preventing the 
self from achieving its goal. These patterns can be observed in the constructions of thought throughout 
history, in the foiled attempts of human knowledge to connect with the Object of its deepest desire.
For example, if we imagine a time-line representing the history of the church stretching from 
the first century to the present, and then impose over it the stages of the life-cycle as observed by 
developmental theorists, we would come up with very interesting comparisons. Erik Erikson’s study of 
human development has shown there are distinct stages or periods through which the ego and the self 
are developed."' Generally speaking, these are demarcated as infancy (birth-2), toddler (2-3), oedipal 
child (3-5), school-age child (6-10), adolescence (11-18), young adult hood (19-35), middle years (36- 
65), and later years (65 +). We will not discuss each of these stages in detail, but each period witnesses 
an intense struggle of the self to achieve certain “virtues,” as Erikson calls them, specific developmental 
tasks. Each stage is marked by conflict and immense energy as the self tries to make sense of the world. 
For Loder, each stage, each attempt to make sense, is driven by the power of negation cutting the self 
off from what it truly desires, intimacy with a loving Other. The formation of the early church, for 
example, was a birthing experience, a primal, source experience of its infancy. The constituting 
experience was the encounter with Jesus Clirist who fathered/mothered a new world for them. Before
"'77M2, p. 157.
"'Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, Second edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1963). In this context Anthony Kemp’s research on the origins of historical consciousness in the early 
church takes on great significance because it substantiates the presence of a maladaptive cognitive 
dynamic at work.
"^James E. Loder, The Logic o f the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998). This is what Loder refers to as the “triumph of negation.”
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becoming a toddler, the infancy period ends with ferocious intensity as a child seeks to say NO to the 
presence of the constituting other (parent) because the child has discovered that the parent will not 
always be present, the face goes away (which is a proximate form of loss). The “terrible twos” are 
positive in that they enable a child to achieve autonomy, but at an extraordinary cost. A two-year-old 
wants continuity with the parent even as he seeks to be independent. In a similar way, as we saw earlier, 
the church also wrestled with the question of identity and continuity as it saw itself moving away from 
the source experience of the church.
We will not touch upon every stage of development, but if we skip to the toddler years we will 
see that they are typified by a child’s need for conformity, sameness, and the need to fit in. Notions of 
history used by the church, for example, to stop the temporal flow and counter heresy, would reflect a 
toddler stage. The intellectual and technical accomplishments of the Renaissance and Reformation 
periods represent the prodigious achievements of the school boy discovering the world afresh. These 
are years of extraordinary productivity. This is the era, we recall, that witnessed the birth of the 
historical sciences. The presuppositions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with its^  drive 
toward self-reliance, skepticism, and individualism are typical of the adolescent who is questioning the 
world, seeking autonomy, and displaying an attitude of arrogance that is critical of any authority or 
tradition, all of which is an overcompensation for the anxiety of puberty. Historical knowledge was used 
as a way to question authority and undermine the traditions of the church. The modem period has given 
way to what is being described as postmodern, a kind of young adulthood where we are learning that the 
self is not the center of the universe. In the postmodern world, all knowledge has become relative, 
including historical knowledge, with no basis for truth. Characteristic of adulthood is living with 
ambiguity and the unknown, but this too is an expression of absence and cannot be tolerated for long, 
because marriage, the raising of children, and career are all “used” as a way to make sense of absence 
that is at the heart of being and to keep the sense of absence at a distance. If these observations have any 
correspondence to reality, then inevitably postmodernism will yield to other epistemological strategies 
reflective of the developmental needs in the stages in the life-cycle.
We need to remember, though, that negation is operative in the early experiences of the infant. 
The experience of negation (keeping the void at bay) builds momentum across the individual life-cycle. 
Similarly, the dynamic of negation continues to build throughout the Western historical process 
contributing to further experiences of untold horror and destruction, such wide-scale brutality that 
humanity has never witnessed before in its history. Before our existential awareness of absence we 
continue to search for epistemological strategies that enable us to connect with the source of life, which 
offers meaning to our lives (both personally and collectively in the culture) that we cannot establish for
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ourselves."' The drive of the human spirit is creative, but it is fallible and cannot get beyond the limits 
of the ego. The result is always what Loder has called “a truth producing error.”""
This was certainly the case for in Hegel’s obsession with the philosophy of history."’ Often left 
unexamined are the motivations for his need to develop a philosophy of history. George Lukacs is one 
of many commentators who sees Hegel’s philosophy as a “response to loss.”"* In his masterful study, 
Charles Taylor notes that, “Much in the writings of Hegel and his contemporaries can be explained by 
the need to come to terms with the painful, perturbing, conflict-ridden moral experience of the French 
Revolution.” The breakdown of the social order, combined with the power of Kantianism, which 
attempted to establish a strict separation of noumena from phenomena, all contributed to the crisis of 
“human subjectivity and its relation to the world.”"'’ Hegel’s thought is his answer to a world marked 
by diremption, division, and fragmentation. The Europe he knew was falling apart, intellectual shifts 
were tearing asunder his rational world. It is in such a context that Hegel developed his picture of 
history. There was a loss of primal connection and return was inconceivable. The “spiral of history” 
brings us not to the past, but a future guided by the spirit {Geist) who overcomes the loss by positing
" 'I  have not found any other attempt to see in development theory a way to interpret trends in 
the evolution of human thought, with the possible exception of Wyand de Kock, “Fowler and Faithful 
Change,” Scriptura 12 (2000); 87-95. Here de Kock applies the stages offaith development theory as 
conceived by James Fowler (which was shaped by Erikson’s stage theory) as a way to understand 
“transitions in cultural consciousness” throughout history. For Fowler, individuative -reflexive faith (the 
faith stance of a young adult) is characteristically overconfident and critical of authority, typical of the 
Enlightenment period. Conjunctive faith (the faith stance of a person in mid-life) possesses an 
“epistemological humility,” and sees this approach in the work of Michael Polanyi, Paul Ricouer, Jürgen 
Habermas (b. 1929), and Niels Bohi* (1885-1962).
""James E. Loder, “Negation and Transformation: A Study in Theology and Human 
Development,” Christianne Brusselmans, ed. Toward Moral and Religious Maturity: The First 
International Conference on Moral and Religious Development (Morristown, NJ: Silver Burdett Co., 
1980), p. 178
" ’Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, Preface by Charles Hegel and the 
translator, J. Sibree; A new Introduction by Professor C. J. Friedrich (New York: Dover Publications, 
1956).
"*Cited in Jolm E. Grumley, History & Totality: Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault 
(London: Routledge, 1989), p. 1. “The unified totality of immediate, meaningful social experience 
characterising integrated, closed societies had begun to dissolve,” Grumley points out, and sees Hegel’s 
work as an, “Utopian aim of philosophy to theoretically impose the lost unity, to overcome the rifts 
between essence and appearance, subject and object engendered by historical conditions. . . .The idea 
of a totalising historical process can be viewed as a modem reaction to a later, seemingly permanent 
historical crisis: the epochal transition to dynamic, bourgeois socio-economic relations and forms.(p. 1)”
""Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 3, 36ff.
186
something new."" Thus, as John E. Grumley observes, “Hegel’s first tentative moves toward a 
philosophy of history escaped the practical dilemmas of pessimistic retreat into a lost, idealised past. 
Anticipating radical historical possibilities, he projected his vision of a revitalized, unified, harmonious 
culture into an immediate future with the grasp of the revolutionary present,”" ' Whether or not Hegel 
was actually successful in offering that unity is questionable. What is important here is to see the 
instrumental use of history and the way it develops out of one’s personal, subjective experience of 
absence and loss."'
Our search for Jesus, this desire to connect with the Jesus of history and of faith, possesses many 
of the same dynamics of the self’s search for the face that will not go away. Our pursuit of the 
originating, generative experience encountered by the first Christians who experienced Christ face-to- 
face is very similar to the same pattern of the self looking for the primal experience of the face. Both 
source experiences yield life and meaning. The face-to-face encounter of the developing child serves 
as the foundational experience throughout life. The implications of a loss of the face, however, are also 
operative throughout the life-cycle. As we saw above, the face is the center of the personality “innately 
sought by a child and the focus of the earliest sense of one’s humanity.” The face is a symbol of 
wholeness and through that early facial encounter “a child seeks a cosmic-ordering, self-confirming 
impact from the presence o f a loving o t h e r . If the ultimate loving Other, the face after which all 
humanity longs, is, Jesus Christ, then how much more important and informative was the experience of 
the first Cliristians. For the first Clrristians, and we see this particularly in Paul’s writing, it was the 
encounter with Jesus as person, and what was revealed through the transformative encounter with him, 
face-to-face, that fomied the basis of this primal experience. “For it is the God who said, ‘Let light shine
""Taylor, pp. 35, 44ff.
"'Grumley, p. 15.
" 'in  the postmodern era, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) saw the drive toward totalisation as an 
“agent of oppression and normalization,” limiting freedom for the individual. (Grumley, pp. 207-208). 
Whereas Hegel’s philosophy was generally optimistic of human potential, Foucault in contrast sees it 
as a pessimistic vision for human life. Here, Foucault reflects the belief of the Geisteswissenschaften 
philosophers such as Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who saw the 
totalisation as a force of de-personalisation, where the individual is secondary to the universal. The 
search for laws, rules and patterns in historical research, even the presence of an historical conscious are 
for Foucault significations that humanity has lost its bearing in the world and has become dehistoricized. 
The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 
367-373. The nineteenth century’s obsession is a dialectic of loss and retrieval. “[Njineteenth century 
man did not discover history: he needed to discover history, or, as it were to remake history on his own 
terms.” Stephan Bann, “The Sense of the Past: Image, Text, and Object in the Formation of Historical 
Consciousness,” in H. Aram. Veeser, Editor, The New Historicism (New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 
103-104.
"'Loder, p. 163. Italics in the text.
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out of darkness,’ who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in 
the face of Christ. (2 Corinthians 4:6)” Paul’s desire and yearning was to know Christ “face to face,” 
the promise extended to him by virtue of the resurrection (1 Corinthians 13:12). The delay of the 
parousia can be viewed as removal of the face of Jesus, an absence that threw the church into a major 
crisis.
Loder’s convictional theology thus leads us to submit that perhaps the church’s appeal to history 
to reconnect with Christ can be seen as a kind of functional solution to an existential problem. A 
preoccupation with history takes us away from Christ. This is an extremely important point, because 
unless this pattern is identified, notions of history and our experience of historical existence will remain 
two-dimensional. The existential problem is a question of being, namely, a human being’s fundamental 
desire to connect with Christ. The longing within the self for the Face of God is deep and powerful. This 
is why Loder’s emphasis upon the search for the face is so incredibly important to us here. Whether 
considering Chiistian discipleship or if one is already a Christian, an individual is always searching for 
the face of Christ, the facial encounter that not only affirms our belief in Christ but also transforms our 
lives.
It now becomes clearer why Loder makes the point that “there is no possibility for recovering 
the lost face .. .without eventually encountering nothingness.” When we encounter the Floly in the face 
of Jesus Christ, “the experience reaches back under the defensive structure of the ego and restores the 
same conditions for the mature, differentiated personality that the prototypical facial encounter 
introduced for the emerging child ego.”"'' In the face-to-face encounter with Christ, the ego is not 
destroyed, but is recentered and grounded in Christ. Many of our philosophies and theologies of history 
have been forged out of this desperate desire to grasp, to grab hold of one who was once past. They are 
two-dimensional attempts of the ego in the face of the experienced absence of Christ. There can be no 
substitute for the original face of Christ, any such attempt is, thus, a functional solution to an existential 
problem.
How do we, therefore, connect with the person Jesus Christ? How do we address this essential 
existential question? The existential problem of distance can only be ‘ solved’ through the realization that 
the transforming reality of the first Christians was a result of an experience of the Holy, whether with 
Jesus Christ or the Spirit of Clirist. In this sense, the New Testament’s account of encounters with Jesus 
were four-dimensional experiences. They were experiences in which the self was constituted vis-à-vis 
a world in which life is affirmed and granted by the Holy in the face of the void. If true, authentic reality 
is constituted four-dimensionally from an encounter with the Holy, if reality is established thi'ough the 
revelatory experience of the Holy, then we are forced to re-examine the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of history. 
That is, if the study of history does not allow us to connect with the Holy, but the Holy instead
"'Loder, p. 173.
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encounters humanity in its historicity, then we need to re-think the nature of historical reality. If the 
totality of history is the face of the void, then a four-dimensional experience of reality must be 
established by the Holy beyond the power of the void. This will shape the way we look at the study of 
history and its real “uses” for theology. It will also color the way we see ourselves moving through time, 
that is, the way we experience reality, relate to the past, and face the future.
Once again, the study of history cannot be the means of connecting us with Jesus Christ. A study 
of the past will not bring us any closer to him. For he is not in the past, which is the place of the dead. 
He is not relegated to a specific moment in time which is no more. The voice of the angel to the women 
at the tomb remains the voice to any age, “Why do you seek the living among the dead?” (Luke 24:5). 
A living faith is rooted in a living Lord who is not confined to the dead past but who encounters the 
living in the present. Jesus is found not only in the present, but goes before us. That is why it is futile 
to go back to where he was, for we will not find him there. We cannot find the living among the dead. 
“For he is not here,” as the angel said before the tomb (Matthew 28:6). The resuiTection of Jesus points 
to a new Reality that tells us that we cannot encounter him where he once was, in the past. Thabplace 
will be empty. Indeed, the shift is a radical one. For we will not find him in the past, but in the future, 
for “he is going before you to Galilee; there you will see him (Matthew 28:7).” The Resurrection 
radically reorients the way reality is construed, thus it grants a new reality grounded in the revelation.
Earlier we noted Hegel’s claim that the task of the historian is “to hold fast what is dead.”" ' 
If Loder is correct, then to embrace that which is dead requires at some level the ability to take on one’s 
own death. But can the ego really bear this? There is physical death as well as proximate forms of 
death. Any experience of loss and absence, including the past, is experienced by the ego as a reminder 
of its eventual annihilation. Loder wants us to look at the void and not deny its presence. There is no 
room for fantasy, myth, or false views of reality, no room of avoidance of any kind, no room for anything 
that denies the life-giving Spirit from granting life. This is because the cross stands at the center of the 
Cln istian life and this life in the Spirit is continually pointing toward the crosses we experience in human 
experience. There is no way to escape the absolute horror and violence in life, the pain and senseless 
suffering of life. Yet, the ego tries to create a world that composes out the honor by trying to live “as 
i f ’ it were not the case. But the void continues to encroach upon reality. For there are aspects of reality 
that the ego cannot bear to look, cannot tolerate, will not face. There are occurrences in the human 
experience so ghastly that no imaginative reconstruction will allow us to tell it “as it actually happened.” 
Who will ever be able to reconstruct the past and tell us what actually happened on the cross when Chi ist 
faced the void of death and sin? What human being has the ability to give voice to that horror? Only 
the Holy can allow us to face death itself and through the negation of death’s power, gi ant us life. Only
"'Cited in Edith Wyschogrod, An Ethics o f Remembering: History, Heterology, and the 
Nameless Others (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. ix.
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the Holy gives one the ability to compose a view of the world that includes and yet is not ultimately 
defined by the void.""
In contrast to Hegel, the task of the theologian is not “to hold fast what is dead,” but to be held 
fast by One who is living. Loder’s theology is an articulation of the gracious grammar of the presence 
of God who speaks in and through Christ into the void of our being and offers new life in the face of 
death. God’s grammar of presence speaks into our fallen grammars of absence, making even absence 
itself the bearer of the Spirit’s life. If the starting point for the historian is death, then the starting point 
for the theologian must be life - the resurrected life of Christ. As we have seen throughout, Loder’s work 
helps us to see that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way we have understood our 
connection with the past and the way we have conceived of our movement within space-time. Therefore, 
it must be asked whether absence and void are appropriate starting points for a theological understanding 
of the Christian life?
Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology provides a helpful connective by 
understanding the Holy Spirit as making the apparently absent Christ present to the modern day believer. 
Such a theology would be grounded in the view that a reality historically constnicted cannot supersede 
one that is constituted by Christ - the One who not only entered into the temporal flow of time-space and 
dwelt among us, but who continues to shape our present historical experience and dwells with us through 
his Spirit. Historical knowledge constituted four-dimensionally by the mediating presence of the Risen 
Christ becomes a grammar ofpresence. This pneumatology envisions the work of the Holy Spirit as One 
who seeks to free us from our myopic views of reality by extending a knowledge of reality that comes 
from beyond us, through a relational experience which in actuality frees us to become truly historical 
by putting us into the flow of space-time - that is, entrenched in an authentic historical reality as defined 
by Christ. Loder’s multi-dimensional schema provides a henneneutic of reality that is grounded 
pneumatologically and therefore, is invaluable to the theologian.
VI. Historical Existence and Four-Dimensionality
The question remains for Loder: If Jesus Christ is the object of our personal encounter, how do 
we know him in a way that does not separate us from him? Even this language is problematic, for Christ 
certainly is more than an object of human study. The content of faith is a person, a subject. Driving a 
sharp wedge between subject and object, typical of a Kantian epistemology, is phenomenologically
""Rowan Williams speaks of the crucifixion as something that cannot be easily categorized or 
explained in strictly human terms. “ ..  .the union of divine and human interest must be affirmed and 
understood at just that point where the sheer historical vulnerability of the human is most starkly shown, 
where unfinishedness, tension, the rejection of meaning and community are displayed in the figure of 
a man simultaneously denied voice or identity by the religious and political rationalities of his day.” 
“Hegel and the gods of postmodernity,” in Philippa Berry and Andrew Wemick, Editors. Shadow o f 
Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 78.
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misleading. For Jesus Christ is not a Ding-an-sich, one who can be objectified and then studied and 
examined. This is because the object of faith is a subject. We can hold from a critically-realist 
(Polanyian) standpoint that God’s revelation of Godself in the life of Jesus is objectively ti'ue. But the 
medium of the revelation is a person, Jesus Clirist. The revelation points to the saving activity of God 
in Jesus Christ, therefore we must not depersonalize the activity in forgetting that the revelation was 
experienced in and through and mediated by Jesus in his humanity. The activity of Christ cannot be 
divorced from his personality, for his action was an extension of who he was and is, grounded in his 
identity as fully God and fully human. The disciples encountered a person, which means that the pattern 
of our knowledge of Jesus must retain this personal element, a knowledge determined by the ‘subject 
matter,’ by the person. When the person Jesus is objectified, that is when his life is viewed as an event 
of the past, transposed and broken down into a fact of histoiy to be studied, then we have moved very 
far from him, indeed, and the distance can appear to be great. For we must remember, as Karl Barth 
(1886-1968) made clear-in his work, we know thi'ough Jesus Christ that God is also Subject who 
encounters humanity as the Object of God’s grace. “God comes before us as the one who addresses us 
and who is to be addressed in return.” God is the “I” who addresses humanity as “thou” and to whom 
we say “Thou” in response."’
Our discussion throughout substantiates Loder’s identification of the “gaps” in all knowing 
events and the power of the “eikonic eclipse to cut the knower off from an accurate apprehension of 
one’s experience of reality. An eikonic eclipse, we will recall, is “a theory of error in which rationalist 
assumptions about truth cut off reason from its generative resources in personal knowledge and the 
imagination.”"* The emergence of gap imagery and the sense of distance are the results of human 
constructions of reality, a construction of the human mind shaped by the existential experience of 
distance, the knower cut off from the ‘object’ of the past due to constructs of reality informed by an 
emerging historical consciousness. Perhaps we experience this sense of distance and have difficulties 
bridging the subject-object divide because the gap is a projection of the gap within the human knower. "" 
In this light, we can view them as maladaptive rationalist strategies trying to accomplish what only 
personal knowledge and imagination can offer.
Loder’s work stresses the point that the subject-object divide is present in all forms of human
" ’Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975), p. 58.
"*7TM2, pp. 27-30, 223.
""James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955) also 
points to this phenomenon. “It is part of our situation that we are inevitably and inescapably inside the 
knowledge relation, from the start and to the end, and so cannot step outside of ourselves to an indifferent 
standpoint from which to view and adjust the relations of thought and being. Thought and being are 
together from the beginning.(p. 170)” Italics in the text.
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knowledge and cannot be bridged by the human knower participating in reality. Because this is so, then
theologically it must be asserted that there is no way to span this division when it comes to our
knowledge of God. Loder makes a considerable contribution by recasting the way we think about the
problem of distance. Drawing upon the rich imageiy of the Cappadocian fathers who were able to hold
in creative tension the humanity and divinity of Jesus, who were able to conceive of ways in which
polarities were held together, Loder affirms that the same Chalcedonian pattern is at work today through
the Spiritual Presence of Christ who mediates reality for the believer.
[PJsychic structures or structures o f knowing that unite extreme opposites are 
fundamental to the imaginative vision o f Jesus Christ. He himself united God and 
humanity, the universal and the particular, life o f life and death o f death, the depths o f 
hell with the heights o f heaven, sin and holiness, human wretchedness and divine gloiy, 
the beginning and the end - the list could be continued. However, Christ’s being far  
exceeds any analysis o f opposites because no mere consequence o f analysis is able to 
make the Christian difference; it is Presence, personal and transfiguring the dark face 
o f sheer balance into the ‘light o f his countenance, ‘ that makes the difference . . . .  
Responding to a sense o f his Presence, we know intuitively, i f  not immediately in an 
image, as i f  lightning had flashed across the sky and illuminated his face, that his ' 
Presence unites all things without confusing or dissolving anything. As he initiates and 
mediates so he will bring to complete and final conclusion all things in himself; so 
mediation is not merely the way by which a human being is transformed but a disclosure 
to any who can “see” o f all that is to come.
What Loder is describing here is a four-dimensionally grounded reality constituted by the Spirit 
when an individual faces the Holy in the loving face of Christ and discovers reality beyond the gaps, 
voids, distances and absences of experience. For the love of God, said Barth, “always throws a bridge 
over a crevasse. It is always the light shining out of the d a r k n e s s . A s  we have seen, the interpersonal 
dynamic is central to Loder’s work. But this knowing event is not just a knowledge about a person, it 
entails an encounter with the person Jesus, tlirough the intimacy of the Spirit, It is at this juncture that 
Loder’s pneumatology has the most to say about the structure of reality and calls us to reffame the way 
we think about the Christian life, with far-reaching implications for the church and its ministry.
Let us take up a consideration of this phrase: As i f  lightning had flashed across the sky and 
illuminated his face. This statement is more than Loder trying to be poetic; he is being very literal. That 
light is the Holy Spirit who illuminates the face of Jesus Christ, “the light of humanity” (John 1:5). 
Even as the properties of light are not limited to space-time but are themselves constituted vis-à-vis their 
relationship to light, so too is the Christian life constituted by one’s present relationship with Christ. The 
relationship between the person Jesus and the Christian is not determined or hindered by temporal
p. 147.
‘'‘^ Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, 278.
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distance or a difference in physical locat ion.Ins tead ,  Loder wants to reinforce the idea that the 
Christian experience involves a “radical view of space and time,” a position that is backed up by theories 
of contemporary physics.
Loder’s ideas are informed by Thomas F. Torrance’s writings on the relational properties of 
light. Loder makes the fullest use of Tonance in The Knight’s M ovef^  The discovery that light is a 
relation of particle to wave was made by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. Torrance wants make a 
comparison between the characteristics and properties of light and the way we conceive of God as 
L i g h t . L i g h t  is the most “refined form of matter.” As such it has “a unique role in linking and 
coordinating them all together within its rational haraiony. In this way tlirough the discovery of light, 
by reference to which the whole space-time framework of empirical reality is to be understood, modem 
physics has brought us to the conception of the universe as a universe o f l i g h t . The structures of 
reality are revealed even as they are constituted by light. Torrance suggests that the behavior of created 
light is “a reflection of the uncreated and unlimited Light which God himself is.”‘‘‘’
Relying on the work of James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1870) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955), 
Torrance has made several important comparisons between the created light of the universe and the 
uncreated Light of God.^ '*^  Let us look at two, in particular. One of the remarkable characteristics of 
light is that “physical light itself has no need of a medium such as ‘ether’ to support its transmission.” 
Light is contingent upon light alone. Torrance projects this idea onto an understanding of God as light
p. 206.
, pp. 194ff.
i44“This is not to say that the Light of God may be understood only as it depends on and is 
conditioned by created light as a necessary medium and earner for its movement.” Thomas F. Torrance, 
Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Belfast: Christian Journals, Ltd.), p. 77.
''‘^ Torrance, p. 76.
i46tcThe immense extent of the universe, judged by the time it takes rays of light to traverse it at 
the fantastic speed of about 186,000 miles per second, it utterly overwhelming. Judged by the same 
standard, the finite speed of light, the universe is finite, yet since it is found to be continuously expanding 
at a rate approaching the speed of light, it is also unbounded in a double sense: it extends its boundaries 
and breaks through the bound of our comprehension.” Torrance, p. 77.
'“’^ Ton'ance, p. 77. See “Theology of Light: A University Sermon,” The Christian Frame o f 
Mind: Reason, Order, and Openness in Theology and Natural Science, Introduction by W. Jim 
Neidhardt (Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 1989), pp. 147-155.
‘‘^Maxwell; “On Physical Lines of Forces” (1861-1862), “ Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory 
of Gases” (1860) and “A Dynamical Model of the Electromagnetic Field” (1865); Einstein: “Theory of 
Special Relativity” Annalen der Physic (1905) and four other papers published in Annalen der Physic 
(1916X
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and provides a helpful insight into the possible way God relates to the created order. “How much less
does the creative Light of God, which is the source of all light and all intelligible media in the universe,
need any means of transmission other than its own force to reach us!”''’^
The second observation has to do with the constancy of light. Light is always moving in empty
space at a constant velocity. “It is important to realise,” Torrance notes, “that the constancy of the speed
of light in all systems is not a derivative but an ultimate principle with an independence of its own.
While all entities and events in the universe are defined relationally in terms of time and space, and space
and time are defined relationally in terms of light, light is not defined by reference to any contingent
reality beyond itself. In other words. Tight has a unique metaphysical status in the u n i v e r s e . O n e ’s
perspective on the physical universe changes vis-à-vis one’s relation to light‘^ ‘. What this means is that,
“No one can be in a privileged position, for the speed of light in different systems of time and place, of
which one is in motion relative to another, remains constant.”
Einstein’s view of light, as expressed in the theory of relativity, when used as a possible way of
imagining God’s relationship with and in the universe has far-reaching implications for the way we think
about reality and historical existence. Torrance summarizes his view in the following way:
[Tjhrough the constancy of its immense and unsurpassable speed and its supremacy 
over all space and time, light behaves in the same equable way toward all that takes
‘‘^Torrance, p. 77. “Analogies, comparisons or illustrations taken from created realities are 
properly employed, not to bring our understanding of the Creator within the measure of our creaturely 
conceptions, but rather to aid the expression and communication of what we apprehend apart from them. 
On the other hand, the point must be made that, far from discounting or depreciating created light, 
uncreated Light constitutes the ultimate ground of its intelligibility and as such establishes it and gives 
it its ti’ue value. Apart from such a basis in uncreated Light all our experience and knowledge of things 
in the universe would finally be meaningless, for they would be devoid of any ultimate standards of truth, 
goodness or beauty, (p. 78)”
‘^ “Torrance, p. 78. This is Einstein’s discovery that the speed of light remains constant 
“irrespective of any motion in its source or of any motion on the part of the observer, (p. 78)”
‘^ '“All things naturally appear different to different observers, for they are relative to their 
perceptions and their positions in space and time, but the staggering fact about light is that the constancy 
of its speed remains the same for all observers through all those relativities, no matter where they are or 
how fast or slow they may move.” Torrance, p. 79
“Since this implies that one observer’s time is different from another observer’s time - really 
and not just apparently different, for space and time cannot be separated from one another but constitute 
a continual indivisible field - it became clear to Einstein that the notions of absolute space and time of 
classical physics, which constituted a homogenous unchanging system, had to be dismantled and that 
the concepts of space and time had to be rethought very radically as relative features of actual on-going 
events contingent upon the propagation of light, (p. 79)” Einstein never completely broke free from a 
classical metaphysical view, see John Polkinghome’s Gifford Lectures of 1993-1994, The Faith o f a 
Physicist: Reflections o f a Bottom-Up Thinker (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996). Lyndon F. 
Hams, “Divine Action: An Interview with John Polkinghome,” Cross Currents, 48 (1998): 1
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place within the universe, and as such provides an invariant and reliable, while dynamic, 
base, for all its regularity and order. It should be appreciated that invariance is a realist 
and not a determinist concept. It has nothing to do with the rigid necessity that 
characterised the static structure of causal connections imposed on our understanding 
of nature by the framework of absolute isotropic time and space. Rather does invariance 
refer to a dynamic relatedness inherent in the empirical universe which through the 
space-time metrical field gives objective, reliable configuration to all our experiences 
within it. Thus the unique and central role of the speed of light and its uniform 
constancy enable modem science to interpret and explain the phenomena of nature with 
a profounder and more unrestricted notion of objectivity than was possible for classical 
physics.
Let us now apply Torrance’s observations.
The Johannine attestation of Jesus as “light,” as one who like God is light, now becomes more 
than an adjectival identification. That is, if we conceive of the light of God pouring through the face of 
Jesus Christ, who is himself light, and apply to these theological statements what we have come to know 
of the properties of light, certain conclusions can be made. Jesus as light would be seen as the constant 
of the universe. As that constant, all individual perspectives in and of space-time would be relative to 
the movement of that light. All is contingent upon one’s relation to the light. Jesus, as light, is not 
“derivative,” such as through historical study, but “ultimate principle.” Jesus is the light through which 
all history is seen and cannot be “defined by reference to any contingent reality beyond itself,” although 
all that is experienced is done so through the relational encounter with Jesus as light. If we carry this 
further, we see that the number of varied observers or witnesses does not distract from the integrity of 
Jesus as light. One’s perspective changes depending upon one’s relationship with Jesus, but the 
relationship or perspective does not change the essence of Jesus who is light. There is no one who has 
a “privileged position.”
Jesus as light is not bound by space and time, for space and time themselves are defined and
constituted through the relational encounter with the constancy of Jesus’ presence throughout all space
and time. Just as light is part of the created order and lights up the universe, yet is not defined by the
universe, so too is Jesus the light of the world, who illumines our reality in such a way that he cannot be
defined or limited by the created order. Jesus participates in space-time even at the same time he reveals
and opens up, that is allows us “to see” our lives within time-space.
As constant, the light of the universe is the grace of God revealed in Jesus Christ whose
inexorable faithfulness remains in place for all space-time. The light of God’s grace shapes and creates
the field of space-time, but is not controlled by contingencies of space-time. Comparing the constancy
of light with the grace of God, Torrance writes,
the transcendent and invariant operation of divine Grace bears upon human life and 
history in such a way that it is not entangled or tied to or conditioned by the spatio- 
temporal relations, empirical structures or inter-personal reciprocities in our creaturely
^Torrance, p. 80.
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existence, but remains supreme above them all. Strange and astonishing as we may find 
it, God makes all things operate together for good, regardless of the divergencies of 
human reactions to his saving Love, because his Grace is so sovereignly, free and 
unlimited in its possibilities that in his interaction with humanity God provides the 
invariant but dynamically objective Ground for the fulfillment of his eternal purpose in 
the creation. Thus far from being antinomian, the unconditional Grace of God acts in 
such a creative and redemptive way upon human life and history that it makes them, and 
indeed all that takes place within the creation, serve the invariant laws of God’s eternal 
love.*^ "*
Discoveries in physics over the last century, therefore, open up for us new ways of thinking about the 
created order.Dualist ic and mechanistic understandings of time and space have to yield to a relational 
model in which time and space are relationally constituted by the constancy of and relationship to light. 
Thus, instead of space and time, we need to think of space-time operating in a type of field that is caused 
by space-time in relation to light. Static structures of time and space, built upon causal connections must 
give way to more dynamic ways of conceiving the empirical world, particularly reality.
This is why Loder continually affirms “the ineducible relationality of reality.” He makes this 
claim from his reading of Torrance, as well as Michael Polanyi, Albert Einstein, and Jean Piaget. But 
more than anyone, he sees this interpretative framework in Kierkegaard. The relational phenomenology 
that we saw previously in Kierkegaard and used in his formation of the analogia spiritus, we find here 
in Loder’s consideration of light. Even as relationality pervades the universal constant of light (wave- 
particle), Kierkegaard pointed to the “the relation of the observer to that observed... and the relation of 
the observer to him or herself.”*^® This is the operating dynamic of the “strange loop” that we discussed 
in the last chapter. For Kierkegaard stressed that “the Universal Constant” -  “the Light,” is “ultimately 
relational,” Loder suggests, “in that all created relations are related to the uncreated relationality, the
‘^ '’Torrance, p. 86. “Grace may be described as the consistently free and unreserved self-giving 
of God in love to all alike, which is not conditioned or controlled in any way whatsoever by the worth 
of its object. It is the constant and ceaseless out-flow of the Love of God which has no other reason for 
its movement than the Love that God is, and is therefore entirely without respect of persons and 
irrespective of their reactions, (p. 84)”
‘^ Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); 
Ilya Prigogine, The End o f Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws o f Nature. In collaboration with 
Isabelle Stenger (New York: The Free Press, 1996).
^^^Torrance speaks of this as “a relativity of simultaneity, which relativity theory has brought 
to light and which seems to contradict the common sense notions which we generate within the split 
space and time of everyday experience.” Transformation and Convergence in the Frame ofKnowledge: 
Explorations in the Interrelation o f Scientific and Theological Enterprise (Belfast: Christian Journals, 




Holy Trinity.” Kierkegaard takes the “pervasive relationality already evident in the created order to its 
ultimate conclusion.” So that “the ultimate relationality inherent in the Divine uncreated nature precedes 
in the order of being and becoming the pervasive relationality of the created order.” '^ ^
Consequently, we are led to the other major theme in Loder’s thought with regards to historical 
existence, what he refers to as “time-embeddedness” and the kinetic view of reality. It was Einstein who 
recognized “the inseparability of time and space relative to the speed of light.. . . ” But Loder also sees 
this pattern at work in Kierkegaard’s understanding of human existence before the presence of God. 
“Kierkegaard’s abandonment of any point of ‘absolute rest’ for human existence in relation to the God- 
man generated a ‘kinetic’ view of reality that can only be fully appreciated by recognizing its 
fundamental consistency with Einstein’s universe.”
By kinesis (KÎvqmç) we mean a way of knowing that is not locked into specific events or 
moments in space-time, but is dynamic and flowing. This way of thinking is at the center of Albert 
Einstein’s (1879-1955) understanding of “kinematics,” or a “kinetic mode of reasoning,” whereby 
knowledge of the physical universe is not known from a position of rest, but from one’s relation, to the 
speed of l i g h t .A l th o u g h  he affirms that Jesus was a “definite historical person,” the salvific power 
of Kierkegaard’s experience as a Christian is grounded not through a study of the past, but through an 
encounter, a personal relationship with the “God-man, Jesus Clirist.” Kierkegaard’s encounter is not with 
a distant historical figure, but one who is still present to him within his own time. The significance of 
what happened in and through the life of Christ was not viewed simply as an event, that occurred in time. 
There is no denying the fact that in the incarnation God identifies with the temporal process through 
Christ and does not withdraw from the temporal process. What is most important about the incarnation, 
that God took on flesh in Jesus Christ, is that people encountered a person, namely Jesus: the God-man. 
Kierkegaard does not consign him to a past, but views the God-man accessible to every man and woman, 
not bound by time or space. Thomas F. Torrance stresses the point that “Kierkegaard succeeds in 
penetrating into the inner logic of the incarnation as bound up with temporal movement (kinesis), but
^^^TKM, p. 183.
p. 184. Loder continues: “This is not too surprising if we remember, as T. F. Torrance 
has taught us, that Athanasius [c.296-377] and later the Cappadocian church fathers, especially Gregory 
of Nazianzus [330-389], entertained this view of existence in relation to God and the universe within the 
first thi ee centuries after Christ. Of course, the language was different, but what was in the Christian 
tradition from its beginning drew upon concepts of God and create that were also in Judaism. Perhaps 
it is only as the origins of the Judeo-Christian tradition surface with those who are faithful to its essence 
that the partial answers from the medieval, Reforaiation, and Enlightenment periods can be transformed 
and the original vision restored with accurate contemporary significance, (p. 184)”
‘^ ‘Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame o f Knowledge: 
Explorations in the Interrelations o f Scientific and Theological Enterprise, (Belfast: Christian Journals 
Limited, 1984), p. 278.
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this raises the basic question as to the appropriate mode of the reason with which to grasp the movement
of truth. So a hundred years ahead of his time Kierkegaard devised a way of thinking by abandoning a
point of absolute rest and moving kinetically along with the truth in order to understand it.” *^’^
This is why the obstacles of historical knowledge or the gap of time do not hinder Kierkegaard’s
ability to encounter the God-man because the very nature of the incarnation itself refigures the way we
conceptualize the relationality of eternity and time. That the incarnation occurred at one point in time
and is still accessible by faith because of the ongoing presence of Christ throughout time calls for shift
in the way history or time is constituted. Kierkegaard contends:
. .  .it will always prove when becoming a Christian in truth comes to mean to become 
contemporaiy with Christ. And if becoming a Christian does not come to mean this 
then all the talk of becoming a Christian is nonsense and self-deception and conceit, in 
part even blasphemy and sin against the Second Commandment of the Law and sin 
against the Holy Ghost.
For in relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present. For him who is not 
contemporary with the absolute - for him it has no existence. And as Christ is the 
absolute, it is easy to see that with respect to Him there is only one situation: that of - 
contemporaneousness.
By encountering the God-man as a contemporary, Kierkegaard believed he lived in the life shaped by 
the encounter, thus participating in the “act” of God’s revelation in Christ and temporally relating to it 
within his own time. One moves through time as one engages with eternity which constitutes the 
boundaries of times, itself. For the person of faith, there is no distance as the historical Jesus continues 
to encounter him as historical, in the Spirit. Kierkegaard’s “passionate leap of faith” across Lessing’s 
“ugly, broad ditch (garstiger briter Graben)f is an example of k ine s i s .Th is  is more than a subjective
'"'Torrance, p. 278. TKM, p. 129, 183-184.
‘"'Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 67. Kierkegaard also discusses this idea at length 
in the section entitled “The Situation of the Contemporary Follower,” in Philosophical 
Fragments/Johannes Climacus, Edited and Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong with 
Introduction and Notes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 55ff.
'"'*Cf. Gordon E. Michalson, Jr. Lessing's "Ugly Ditch": A Study o f Theology and History. 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985). TKM, pp. 134ff. While one cannot 
deny the fact that Christian faith stands in some relation to history, Michalson makes the strong case that 
the way we have been thinking about the relationship in terms set up by Lessing have led to the present- 
day “impasse and frustration.” We are suffering from “a theological illness.” The “employment of ditch 
imagery in the discussion of faith and history is itself the chief symptom” of a disease in theology’s 
ability to come to grips with historical revelation. “The deeper issue really is not even that we suffer 
from the disease of confusion, but that we are unaware that we suffer from it. In a situation such as this, 
something closer to conversion than to therapy is probably called for. At any rate, a true “cure” here 
would not consist of a “solution” to the “problem of faith and history,” but an emerging sense of ironic 
detachment toward the way in which we have traditionally conceptualized the problem, (pp. viii-ix)” 
The conceptualization of the problem cannot begin with philosophical presuppositions or 
historiographical methods. “The wrong topic. . . is criticism and the procedures of historical research
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projection upon the nature of reality. For Kierkegaard it is real. Kierkegaard’s ability to reconceptualize
the historicity of his being informed by his encounter with the God-man is one attempt to bridge all gaps.
This encounter is real for Loder, too.
Thus, Loder applies his bipolar-relational model to the way we kinetically experience both
eternity (in the presence of God) and histoiy. There is a sharp distinction between eternity and history,
but also a unity. This is not possible “without the passionate appropriation by the believer of the
relationality revealed in the nature of Jesus Christ.”'"' It is within this context that we see Loder’s
understanding of faith:
[Fjaith is the happy inward passion by which eternity and history are held together in 
the bipolar-relational unity, and by which they embrace the entire human situation.
Strictly speaking, faith is not bound to either a historical or and eternal object, but to 
their relationality in Jesus Christ; this is the objective aspect of faith, but the believer 
is first encountered by it, and it redefines the believer in both his subjective and his 
objective nature.”'""
When the Christian is given a knowledge of God then she participates kinetically. That “kinetic key,” 
Loder maintains, “is the passionate leap of faith which embraces the ugly ditch, the abyss, the 70,000 
fathoms, and makes it a part of what is known. This is because it was first embraced in all its ugliness, 
as the wretchedness of histoiy threw its full weight against the nature of Jesus Chiist and found itself not 
only unable to crush him, but taken in and transformed into part of God’s comprehension of all things.”'"' 
Theologically speaking, reality is constituted by the Holy Spirit who grants us the power of that 
originating experience when we encounter the Risen Christ. The reality of the Christian is not rooted 
in historical scrutiny (it does play an important role, although not an ultimately defining one), but is 
given through an encounter with the person Jesus Christ. Reality historically constructed camiot 
supersede one that is constituted by Christ - the One who not only entered into the temporal flow of time- 
space and dwelt among us, but who continues to shape our present historical experience and dwells with 
us through his Spirit. The Holy Spirit faces the void and offers a wider framework that goes beyond the 
competencies of the ego, thus establishing a four-dimensional reality as defined by the redemptive 
presence and work of Jesus Christ, Included in this new reality are new frameworks that allows us to 
speak of a grammar o f presence, where our understandings of historical existence may be grounded
as they relate to the Cliristian faith,” Michalson suggests. “The right topic, by contrast, is historical 
revelation.” And the reason he believes the topic is wrong is “because it reflects the concerns of the 
secular, academic sensibility.” Consequently, the right topic is right “because it is what animates and 





pneumatologically in seeing the Holy Spirit as making the apparently absent Christ present to the modem 
day believer. The Christian life must be viewed not as a place that bespeaks the absence of Christ but 
the present presence of the Living Christ. Thus, historical existence is constituted by the mediating 
presence of the Risen Christ. Put another way, the Holy Spirit is the creator of history and frees us from 
myopic views of reality limited by the gaps in human knowledge, extending a knowledge of reality that 
comes from beyond us. Because the experience flows from the Person-to-person encounter with Christ 
and because it puts one in the world in a new way, it thus frees us to become truly historical. What I 
mean by this is that the Spirit puts us into the flow of time-space - that is, entrenched in an authentic 
historical reality as defined by Christ. The reality established by the Holy Spirit will thus be patterned 
after the life of Christ.
VII. Conclusion
Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology reaffirms and strengthens the early church’s
experience of the Holy Spirit as a relational, personal, mediating presence. This means that the
transforming work of the Holy Spirit cannot be bound to the historical past, but seen as a present-day
potentiality. Neither can the work of the Spirit be “trapped” or limited to a particular moment in time.
The “grammar of transformation,” Loder contends, “is ahistorical. . . . ” But this does not deny in any
way that experiences of transformation are inherently historical, indeed “its generative capacity produces
a great variety of expressions which are diachronic or historical in nature, ranging from personal history
to the broader expressions of social and cultural transformation.”'"® This is because the pattern of
transformation is Christomorphic, following the pattern of Jesus’ life.
We are given a fuller understanding of Loder’s view of historical existence in his discussion of
the “Christ event.” Tlie use of the word “event” might be misleading in that he is not referring to a one
time happening, relegated to the past. The “Christ event” for Loder refers to the unique and particular
“way in which God himself appeared in history through the understanding of the early church.” The
“Clirist event” is the five-step pattern of convictional experiences witnessed in Jesus’ life and relived in
the life of the believer who relates to him in the Spirit. Loder puts it this way:
[Christ] does not appear as a merely momentary or episodic vision of light, nor does he 
take over political leadership and construct a utopian social system. He appears to the 
early church as one who by his own initiative enters into all “worlds” (incarnation): by
'"®James E. Loder, “Transformation in Christian Education,” p. 14.
'"^Here we can see Loder expanding a conventional understanding of the historical. Compare 
Heinrich Rickert’s concept of event or “the historical” as that which is individual (in the sense of that 
which is qualitatively once-occurrent) or singular. Limits o f Concept Formation in Natural Sciences, 
Abridged, Translated and Edited by Guy Oakes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 78. 
‘“The historical in its most comprehensive sense’ coincides with ‘the unique, invariably individual, and 
empirically real event itself .(p. 79)”
p. 148.
" ‘Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 147.
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the proclamation of his World, he exposes the deepest possible conflict (sin) and then I
takes it into himself (crucifixion). In an interlude, he enters into the condemned and |
buried past of world history (the descent into hell) with the intention to draw all things |
together beneath the earth, on the earth, and above the earth. Then he emerges as the |
bearer of a radically new being, or new being breaks in on the earth through him j
(resurrection): The inherent continuity of God’s action in Jesus Christ is exultantly j
affirmed (glorification), and it corresponds with public life in history to the great gain j
of all who can “see” that continuity (Pentecostal creation of the church)."" I
When the logic of transformation in Christ confronts the human spirit then historical existence itself will |
reflect this pattern, so that when Loder speaks of four-dimensionality he is really speaking about a j
relational view of historical reality as mediated by the Spiritual Presence of Christ. *
Four-dimensionality can be understood as a field o f encounter - a relational field  of encounter |
created by the Holy Spirit who is continually at work in the redemption of people through the power of |
Christ. For the person in Christ historical existence means participating in the perichoretic interpersonal |
relationality of the Trinity, and as such is continually becoming a field of interpersonal encounters: Holy I
Spirit to human spirit, and human spirit to human spirit. History is becoming a field of redeemed space- |
time eschatologically mediated by Christ who shows us the meaning of our lives and allows us to live i
freely in space-time beyond the fearful hold of the void. It is a life marked by a continued sense of î
Iopenness of what is yet to be revealed in the Spirit, holding to a fluid view of reality that is relentlessly |
open to new ways of perceiving the world. The same old world is at the same time becoming the new |
world of Christ, the New Creation that the Spirit of Christ offers. The human knower exists, lives, !
moves, evm  plays within the field that is created by the Holy Spirit’s transformation of reality into the |
Reality, the New Creation of Jesus Christ. When a person ’ s Reality has been so constituted by the Spirit, I
one’s grasp of and relationship with the past is no longer definitive, neither is one’s grasp or experience |
of the present, because even the past and with it one’s present must be open to the Spirit’s |
reconfiguration of the facts of existence leading us into the tmth about our lives. The place of encounter 
with the Risen Christ is always in the present because he is not bound by space-time, but he is not 
limited to the present either because he is present equably to all people in space-time. One’s encounter ]
with Christ as the constant thus relativizes all time-space: past, present, and future. Indeed, |
contemporary physics is thus allowing theologians to articulate what Christians have known from I
experience all along, that the experience of Christ defines the nature of temporality and not the other way |
around."*
Theologically, space and time are all relative to the presence of the light of Clirist who is not I
bound to either. Well before Loder formally addressed these issues in The Knight’s Move, he took up ;
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the question of historicity and temporality in a lecture given at the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church in
New York City in 1969. He offers a succinct vision of how a Christian experiences space-time;
It seems to me that in Jesus’ physical odyssey on earth we have the perfect paradigm for 
space and time thrown into radical perspective. Do you realize what he did to the Judaic 
view of space? He revealed the timeless, unlimitable faceless Yahweh within the limits 
of a man’s height, starting in the even more diminished space of a womb. He expanded 
into the unlimited life-space of God, claiming that he was at one with the Father. This 
claim puts into perspective his apparent capacity to expand or extend himself almost 
without limit into the lived-space of other people. You will remember this is what he 
did when he called Nathaniel sitting under a tree far away in terms of objective space, 
but Jesus was apparently no further away than Nathaniel’s own heart because he knew 
that he was an “Israelite without guile.” When the right time came, “his time” he called 
it, he shrank to the dimension of a dead body, and then he completely disappeared, but 
only to re-appear in a fashion which permitted him to occupy the lived-space of others 
with or without objective space . . . .  Then, again at the right time, he disappeared by 
going “up.” And we say that was it: the beginning and the end revealed in one 
abbreviated lifetime."'
The Christian life is grounded in the pneumatological mediation of Christ which is not limited to the
past, but remains a present reality. “Whatever you may want to say exegetically, it is perfectly evident
that Jesus paradigmatically radicalized the spatio-temporal world of his followers. The Christ life-space
is not strictly bound by objective or practical space; it can take it or leave it. The Christian does not have
the ‘correct time’ perhaps, but he knows what time it is in the lives of men.”" '
When we think of history as made up of particular events located in specific points in time - this
happened and then that, this caused that to happen - we are still stuck in a classical metaphysic, holding
to a mechanistic understanding of time-space."'* With this metaphysic, an event occurs in a particular
time and then it is stuck there. Loder is unbending in his desire that we view reality in a new way.
Kierkegaard is his guide:
[W]e must dispel our tendency to think of time in terais of clocks. Clocks are useful, 
but they are an inadequate measure of the richness of time. We must even attempt to 
get behind our tendency to think of time in terms of past, present, and future, since these 
categories are also a kind of cultural fiction. This effort to penetrate behind common 
sense views of time is not a scientific ploy; it is Kierkegaard’s effort to grasp the 
fundamental phenomenon behind our experience of time in a way that is simultaneously 
experientially concrete and also descriptive of how we construct our lives as temporal
"'James E. Loder, “Adults in Crisis,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 63 (1970): 37-38. This 
was the John Sutherland Bonnel Lectureship in Pastoral Psychology established by the Fifth Avenue 
Presbyterian Church to honor the ministry and scholarship of Dr. Bonnell. Bonnell was one of Loder’s 
teachers at Princeton.
"'Loder, p. 38.
"''The late physicist, Richard Feynman (1918-1988)states, “. . . in all laws of physics that we 
have found so far there does not seem to be any distinction between past and future.” Cited in M. M. 
Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy o f the Act, Translated and Notes by Vadim Liapunov, Edited by Vadim 
Liapunov and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. ix.
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beings. His aim is not to make an abstract study of time, but to enable us, his readers, 
to enter fully into the temporal, the historical, the existential, and so to participate with 
our humanity in the full nature of Christ."'
In many ways, this is also Loder’s intent, that we “enter fully into the temporal, the historical, the 
existential, and so to participate with our humanity in the full nature of Christ.” Here we also find a clear 
identification of Loder’s aim to speak of the “how” of the Christian life. For all the intellectual and 
scholarly sophistication of his work, his goal is really quite simple - yet possessing enormous 
implications for the life of the church.
At the end of the second edition of The Transforming Moment, Loder added an Epilogue. Only 
eight pages long, it deserves to be seen as a classic of devotional writing. In the last paragraph, he 
explains his reason for writing the book was not merely “reconceptualization but renewal of life in the 
Spirit of Christ.” This is the motivating factor of everything he wrote. “Perhaps the mutual enhancement 
of mind and Spirit will yield up new ways of conceiving the life of God in our midst, so that the 
communion of saints may again - as at its Pentecostal inception - be ultimately defined by no other 
reality than the Spiritual Presence of God in Jesus Christ at work to restored an anguished creation to its 
Creator.”"" It is to a consideration of Loder’s work, its vision of personal renewal, and it capacity to 
reform the church and the world that we now turn.
"'rX M ,p. 137. 
""77M2, p. 219.
Chapter Four
The Christian Life in the Field of Encounter: An “Openness to the W orld”
“Perhaps only those who have once been partially blinded by the Truth - whether 
suddenly or gradually - come to the breath-taking realization that the One who sits at 
table and breaks bread and drinks wine with us is the One through whom and for whom 
all ten billion light years o f creation, including our own come-lately, here-and-now 
existence, have their being. To sit at table with Him is more wonderful and terrible than 
a blinding light since it allows us no fictional existence in which to shroud ourselves, 
no place to hide from the relentlessly gracious claim that our very existence, fractured 
and fictionalized as it is, is o f infinite worth, potentially a bearer o f the veiy Truth which 
we fear could so easily crush us under the weight o f its glory. ”
James E. Loder 
From the “Epilogue”
The Transforming Moment
In the preceding chapters I have introduced and examined Loder’s convictional theology, what 
I have characterized as a relational phenomenological pneumatology. The source of my interest in 
Loder’s work and the premise of this thesis are both grounded in the belief that his theology contains rich 
and principally unrecognized resources for providing a new framework for the Christian life. A 
secondary concern of this thesis is that his convictional theology also has enormous potential for 
revitalizing an ailing church, especially in Europe and North America. The order is important. I am not 
suggesting that his theology can be evaluated according to its ability to serve the church (although, as 
we will see this has been one of the major critiques of his work). Functionality and relevancy to enable 
the continuance and progress of the church are not acceptable criteria for him. Loder does care about 
the church and its ministry, as we shall see. But what is of inestimable value to him is the greater 
theological and existential claim “that our veiy existence, fractured and fictionalized as it is, is of infinite 
worth, potentially a bearer of the very Truth which we fear could so easily crush us under the weight of 
its glory.”' This is the work of the church - to preach, to teach, to enflesh this message in the lives of 
individuals - personally, relationally - which for him is the summary of the Gospel. His target audience, 
I would argue, is not only the church. In addition to the church, he has a universal, cosmological 
concern because all of humanity shares in the existential struggle in its alienation from God. The 
“Spiritual Presence of God in Jesus Christ is at work to restore an anguished creation to its Creator.”'  
When this relation is established by Christ - and every time it is reestablished - “a relation to the Divine 
Presence is implicitly openness to the world.”'  Thus Loder’s vision of the Christian life can be summed 
up with these words of the Apostle Paul, “God was in Christ reconciling the world (cosmos) to himself.
^TTM2, pp. 211-212. 
^TTM2, p. 219. 
'TKM, p. 285.
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(2 Corinthians 5: 17)” This chapter will further articulate Loder’s image of the redeemed life and its 
implication for the mission of the church. I
I. Convictional Experiences and the Christomorphic Pattern of the Holy Spirit
As we have seen, “Convictional experiences are revelatory of the self, world, nothingness and j
God.” Because these experiences are initiated, guided, and completed by the Holy Spirit mediating the 4
tmth, “they do not occlude vision but widen and deepen it. Thus, the convicting experience that is of 1IChrist will open up the self to itself^ put one deeper into the world, and expose even as it reveals God’s j
nature.”'' Conviction yields a reorientation which occurs when the Holy Spirit encounters the human I
spirit, what Loder has described as an analogia spiritus, a framework that is not meant to be a |
metaphysical statement as much as an epistemological one. It is a patterned process in which God j
orders our understanding of reality as mediated by Christ. Loder understands Paul declaring “the radical j
transformation of all human horizons of reality,” through which humanity is raised “into its image status |
so that human spirit, by the power of the Holy Spirit, may become true to its potentially Christomorphic I
nature.”'  Loder is also drawing upon an idea frequently used by John Calvin (1509-1964), who I
understood Jesus Christ as the sole mediator of truth. It is Christ, through the Holy Spirit, who mediates j
the world." Without the mediation of the Spirit one is constantly at risk of having one’s reality mediated I
two- or three-dimensionally by other ideas or persons. Conviction by the Holy Spirit continues the work I
of Jesus Christ. As a present-day work, the experience of the Spirit is an extension of Christ’s ministry I
whose presence, as John McIntyre aptly put it, bestows the “whole power of God, completing the work i
Îof the Son as the Son had perfected the work of creation.” |
Therefore, Loder wants to affirm a pneumatic dynamism. By this, I mean that he wants us to I
apprehend and anticipate the movement of the Spirit as a present reality subjectively experienced.®
Conviction in the Holy Spirit is kinetic, yielding an experience of flowing with the pulse and rhythm of 
God’s movement in time-space. As such, the Spirit is infinitely swift, blowing where he will (John 3:8).
"77M2, p. 61. 
'TKM, pp. 4, 49-50.
6iJolin Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion (1559), II. vi, Edited by John T. McNeill. 
Translated and Indexed by Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960).
'John McIntyre, The Shape o f Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine o f the Holy Spirit 
(Edinburgh: T&TClark, 1997),p. 671.
®As we move to a description of the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of a Christian, I will be 
referring to the Holy Spirit with the pronoun, He (capitalized). The word “spirit” is feminine in Hebrew, 
neuter in Greek, and masculine in Latin. “He” or “she” might be problematic, but “it” is absolutely 
incorrect. The Personhood of the Spirit will be upheld.
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The Spirit cannot be managed, controlled, or tamed. The action of the Spirit cannot be regulated by the 
human spirit, as if to direct the Spirit’s power for its own purposes. In this way experiences of the Spirit 
cannot be socialized. The Spirit always maintains “marginal control.” Remarkably, the Spirit never 
trounces the human spirit, but moves with extraordinary respect for the “otherness” of human life.
Yet, even with this respect Loder sees the Holy Spirit as wild, not averse to conflict and even 
the “sword” (Hebrews 4: 12-13) before betstowing peace and comfort. We must remember that the 
experience of Pentecost was radical as it was revolutionary, offering us images of the Spirit as fire and 
wind - violent wind.^ Some of this vigor is captured by the way the French refer to the L ’esprit audace: 
the audacity of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is audacious: daring, never contained, recklessly bold, 
intrepidly daring, adventurous. The adoption of the wild goose as an image of the Holy Spirit in 
contemporary Celtic Christian expressions is a wonderful example of this dimension of the Christian life, 
given by the Spirit.'" Life in the Spirit is like being on a wild goose chase. One cannot control the Holy 
Spirit. He always gets beyond our grips, but we chase after him. As we chase we are led forward into 
wild, playful, sportive, risky, even disorderly experiences of grace. This wild experience in the Spirit 
can even be chaotic, but it is not capricious or destructive." Loder would share Walter Kasper’s 
description of what happens when life is imposed by the Holy Spirit. “Everywhere that life breaks forth 
and comes into being, everywhere that new life as it were seethes and bubbles, and even, in the form of 
hope, everywhere that life is violently devastated, throttled, gagged and slain - wherever true life exists.
"Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s essay “Faith and Good Faith,” Sense and Nonsense, trans. Hubert 
L. And Patricia Allen Dreyfuss (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964): “The meaning of 
Pentecost is that the religion of both Father and the Son are to be fulfilled in the religion of the Spirit, 
that God is no longer in Heaven but in human society and communicating, wherever men come together 
in His name. Christ’s stay on earth was only the beginning of his presence, which is continued by the 
church, (p. 177)” Loder would prefer to say Christ’s presence is continued by the Spirit who forms the 
church.
'"As we have seen, Ian Bradley notes that no reference to this image can be found among the 
early Celtic Christians and seems to have been “created” by George Macleod (1895-1991). Nevertheless, 
it remains a powerful image for the contemporary church. Ron Ferguson, Chasing the Wild Goose: The 
Iona Community (London: Collins, 1988); Michael Miiioxi, Restoring the Woven Cord: Strands o f Celtic 
Christianity fo r the Church Today, foreword bySimon Barrington-Ward (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1995), pp. 157-167.
"Michael Mitton writes that, “The Holy Spirit is not a tame bird, kept in a clean cage, to be 
released for short bursts of charismatic meetings.. . .  The Holy Spirit makes his habitation in some of 
the wildest and darkest places this world has to offer.. . .  The Holy Spirit is wonderfully free, able to 
go to the dark places of our own lives, for healing to the dark unvisited places of our churches, and to 
the dark and demon-infested places of our society.” Cited in Ray Simpson Exploring Celtic Spirituality: 
Historic Roots fo r  Our Future (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), p. 123.
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there the Spirit of God is at work.”"
For Loder, the chaos and even wildness of God experienced in conviction must be seen within 
the wider purpose or telos of conviction: that we experience the freedom and love of God in Christ. " 
“Convictional knowing is primarily a free and gracious act of love.” Paul describes the Spirit at work 
in our lives as a call to freedom (Galatians 5: 13): “For freedom Christ has set us free (Galatians 5:1). 
Paul also lists the first fruits of the Spirit as love (Galatians 5:22). In John 14, the Spirit and love and 
truth “keep intertwining,” as William Placher put it “with the memory hovering over them of that earlier 
word that the truth will make us free (John 8:32).”"  Whenever the “Spirit manifests God’s love in 
freedom,” Placher continues, “and when the Spirit has sealed God’s work in us, then we ourselves live 
in love and freedom.” '" Placher’s description of the Spirit nicely sums up Loder’s understanding of the 
Christian life. What Loder adds is his understanding of how the Spirit does this, how we move to a 
greater capacity for freedom and the ability to give and to receive love. In this attempt he by no means 
wishes to “diminish the freedom of Clnist’s Spirit,” instead Loder wants us to be conscious of what the 
Spirit is trying to do in us and for  us. His theology seeks to offer guidelines to help others identify the 
work of the Spirit in their lives, thereby intentionally participating in and with the Spirit’s work of 
“humanizing humanity according to the nature of Clirist.”" Loder’s work can be seen as an answer to 
these questions: What is the style of the Holy Spirit? What is the Spirit trying to do? What is the Spirit 
trying to realize within us? How is the Spirit continuing the work of Christ within us, for us?
Loder’s objective is inherently pastoral, to help people see what the Spirit of Christ is already 
doing and wants to do in their lives, thereby strengthening their identity in God. If the Spirit is truly the 
Life Giver, then as an extension of the life-giving presence of the Resurrected Christ who conquered 
death the Spirit is involved in the gracious work of bringing people to life and thereby “renewing the face 
of creation. (Psalm 104:30)” The Spiritual Presence of Christ brings people to life. But what does it take 
to bring a person to life, especially one who is dead (either biologically or existentially)? As an 
extension of Christ’s life and work, the Spirit’s pattern is Christomorphic in the sense that it reenacts the
"Walter Kasper, The God o f Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew O’Connell (New York: Crossroad, 
1984), p. 202 cited in William C. Placher, Narratives o f a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and 
Scripture (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Kinox Press, 1994), p. 64.
"Cf. Placher’s observation that “the Spirit bears a special relation to freedom and love (p. 64).”





Paschal mystery within an individual’s life. There can be no resurrection without facing the void and 
negating the forces of negation which threaten life itself. There is no life without first entering and 
confronting death and this is something the ego can never do on its own. As a result, Loder sees the 
Christian life as a movement “from negation to love.”"
In Loder’s theology, Christ’s crucifixion was not an episodic, one-time event that triumphed over 
death in a generic sense, death in the abstract. In Christ’s confrontation with death one comes to know 
the way of Christ individually confi*onts the forces of death in every individual. The Spirit brings life 
to the human spirit by revealing the void at the center of one’s existence - the very aspect of life that the 
ego struggles with all its might to deny. Too often, the church associates the Holy Spirit primarily as 
a docile creature. For centuries the church has praised God with the singing of the Te Deum in which 
the “Holy Ghost” is designated “the Comforter.” Loder would have us believe that the Holy Spirit is 
also the Provoker and Conflictor. Or more correctly, we come to see the Holy Spirit as Comforter only 
after we realize that the true state of our lives, only after we realize we are in need of deep healing and 
assurance. The goal of the Spirit is freedom, but sometimes freedom and liberation are painful-:
If this is the case, then from Loder’s perspective of the Christian experience we need to pay close 
to attention to moments of pain, anguish, and existential crisis. Instead of seeing these moments as 
isolation or alienation from God they could be the result of the liberating Spirit of God trying to bring 
one to life through the conflict. As we saw in the first chapter, Loder’s tiansfbrmational calls us to pay 
close attention to the cracks, ruptures, and breaks in human knowing because they contain the means 
through which a deeper intelligibility can be discerned, and thereby are potentially more significant in 
the way they encourage new creative expressions in all forms of knowledge and lead to experiences of 
profound conviction. A person is most fully alive and authentically oneself when thrown into moments 
of heightened being and tension, when the dichotomies are most pronounced. That is the moment when 
education can be most fruitful and where the Chiistian faith can be “learned,” or more coixectly, 
experienced. This means that “no community of believers should tolerate the assumption that ‘pattern 
maintenance’ is their raison d ’etre. The Christian solutions a man achieves for the crucial struggles of 
his personal life need to be repeatedly called into question.”'" The church plays a crucial role here of 
either cutting its people off from conflict altogether or being comfortable with the level of existential 
confusion and doubt necessary for Christian faith and practice. The task of the Spirit as educator is 
continually to crack open the false resolutions of the human spirit and allow the conflict to push one to 
deeper levels of intelligibility. The Christian life, echoing Kierkegaard, consists of crisis and conflict, 
and that from crisis to crisis a man’s relationship with God must grow.
*®rrM2,pp. 157-181.
'"Loder, “Conflict Resolution in Christian Education,” p. 34.
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To exist in this state of heightened tension is what Loder calls “intensification.” Intensification
is the place where new knowledge and growth find their origins. It is a place of considerable creativity.
From the Latin, tenere (literally, “to hold”) and intendere (literally, “to stretch, to intend”),
intensification means “to hold in tensive unity.” As Loder explains, “intensification means to draw up
the optimal tension between two poles, as in the tightening of a violin string between the pegs and the
string holder in order to produce maximal tonal beauty.”'" He continues:
When the constructive capacity of the human spirit engages a given conflict with 
intensification, it reaches in a straight line from the depths of human subjectivity to the 
outer reaches of the context in question. From that subjective polarity through the 
person to the outer pole of the conflict in question, intensification draws forth a clear 
and resonant resolution, a hitherto hidden form of intelligibility that will likely define 
the conflict while resolving it."
Uncomfortable with this state, the ego will seek to avoid it by two-dimensionally resolving the conflict 
and running from the tension. Hidden forms of intelligibility, such as the knowledge of God, however 
are given when one is able to indwell or sustain the conflict - to live in the pain, to choose for the 
neurosis, to face the void. Conviction is a stretching and opening up of reality; as it stretches and pulls 
it also provokes the human spirit to rise to higher forms of knowing, to cognitively make space for what 
it revealed in the knowing event, the new Reality, the New Creation (2 Corinthians 5: 17). The Presence 
of the Holy in an individual’s life inevitably increases existential tension, that is it heightens the tension 
and distinction between death and life, between time and eternity, sin and grace, the human spirit and 
the Holy Spirit. At the same time the Spirit as mediating the Presence of Christ is the embodiment of 
intensification - the “tensive unity” of human and divinity which is the incarnation."
'"7XM, p. 267.
"TKM, p. 267.
"Whether at the cross-sectional extremities of human pain and joy, or at the longitudinal 
extremities of the human life space from birth to death, the transforming Spirit of Christ precedes and 
seeks to refashion us according to His nature - indeed, according to Him whose outstretched arms are 
simultaneously crucifixion and liberation. The loving embraces which crucifies us, and the crucifixion 
which frees us, disclose a grandeur of design and an ultimate contingency far greater than the universe 
itself embodies because they include us and the answer to our relentless question. Why?” TTM2, p. 218. 
Cf. the “tensive unity” in the Medieval use of the mandorla (Latin for “almond”), the almond-shaped 
segment that is made when two circles partly overlap, representing the reconciliation of opposites (such 
as heaven and earth, or divinity and humanity), creating a profound symbol of healing, energy, and 
power. Images of Clirist and the Virgin Mary are often portrayed within the framework of the mandorla, 
usually at the entrance to cathedrals. A mandorla represents “two orders of reality” that have been 
superimposed. The Jungian Christian analyst, Robert A. Johnson writes, “Whenever you have a clash 
of opposites in your being and neither will give way to the other (the bush will not be consumed and the 
fire will not stop), you can be certain that God is present. We dislike this experience intensely and avoid 
it at any cost; but if we can endure it, the conflict-without-resolution is a direct experience of God.” 
Owning Your Own Shadow: Understanding the Dark Side o f the Psyche (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), p. 98-107.
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When scripture talks about being “searched by the Spirit” it can be understood as a process of 
intensification. So that when the church prays, “Veni, Creator Spiritus,” we need to be mindful of what 
is involved in such a request. When we ask for the Creator Spirit to be present in our lives, we are really 
asking that the very Spirit who searches the inner, most intimate depths of God’s Being reveal to our 
human spirits the deepest mysteries and hidden wisdom of God. If the purpose of God’s Spirit is to free 
us, and if we really want to be free (which is not always the case, even though we pray for it), then we 
must be open to what such a liberation will look like. We are literally playing with fire. “We only live, 
only suspire/ Consumed by either fire or fire.”"  To be searched by the Spirit is a powerful and awesome 
experience. Because the Spirit cannot be controlled or managed, there is no way to anticipate what the 
outcome might be. We can only give ourselves over to its liberating work. Loder would often say, 
“Yield to the Spirit.” Or as Basil the Great (c.330-379) put it, we are called to live “with the co­
operation of the Spirit.”"
There is no room for fear. This is because the search by this Spirit, reflecting the very depths 
of God, is by a Spirit who searches the very depths of the human spirit so in the end we might know the 
love of God. Indeed, as many Christian will attest, often in the moment of strife we appear blind to 
God’s presence. Only in retrospect can we see that the Spirit was indeed at work in our lives during 
periods of greatest chaos. It really should not be surprising that the Spirit can be known in chaos, 
because the Spirit who searches the human spirit has also searched the depths of God, a God who 
disclosed the depths of His love through Christ in the chaos of the cross.
Viewed from atop the cross, our lives are seen in a whole new light. To be searched by the Spirit 
of God means to witness the work of God who is vulnerable and open, a God who decides to be strong 
in weakness, a God who desires to create and re-create us, making sinners into saints and making all 
things new. God reveals His character and power through the scandal and pain of the cross. To be 
searched by the Spirit means that God breaks in and reveals the chaos of our lives, who opens us up to 
the fresh breath of the Spirit in order to be healed and brought to life. The Spirit disrupts and disturbs, 
turns our worlds upside down and inside out, in order to shake the foundations of our lives with fear and 
trembling until we wake up and experience the depth of God’s love. All of this occurs deeper than the 
defensive structures of the ego. The Spirit plumbs to the veiy core of our being, to our heart of hearts, 
and one by one, lays bare the things that distort our lives and need to be healed, all the things that 
obstruct our relationship with God and thus hinder the experience of true life. The one whose hands were 
pierced and stretched out is the same one who holds us in the hollow of his hand with a love that will
"T. s. Eliot, “Four Quartets,” The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1971), p. 147.
"Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit XVI.38 cited in Colin Gunton, The Promise o f Trinitarian 
Theology (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1993), p. 37.
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never let us go." It is Christ’s Spirit who brings us to his cross, which becomes our cross. Just as Christ 
“descended into hell,” to “make captivity captive, (Ephesians 4: 8)” so too the Spirit compels us to 
descend into the “hell” of our lives and not run from the presence of the void. Just as the Spirit raised 
Christ up, so the Spirit will raise us up, bring us to an empty tomb, and extend the promise of new life. 
The Paschal mystery demonstiates that God will do whatever it takes to reveal this love to us. There is 
no extent to which God will not go to show us just how much we are loved by him,
II. Discerning the Christomorphic Pattern
Convictional theology places considerable value upon religious experience. Loder is a realist, 
as we have seen. He firmly believes that the Spirit of Chiist is at work in the world and is experienced 
as a present reality. He is compelled to say this because of his own moments of conviction. Loder wants 
others to be as open to what the Spirit is doing in their lives in concrete, tangible ways. In order to do 
this, one needs to be familiar with the style of the Spirit. Yet, it is this aspect of this thought, I would 
argue, which has hindered its reception. Experiential theology is problematic and looked down upon 
within the Reformed tradition. Saying this, Loder did not want to say that every experience is the 
baseline or foundation of religious tiTith. Individual experience cannot be pressed into universals. For 
example, “the black experience,” the “Hispanic experience,” or the “women’s experience” cannot be 
universally applied to eveiyone." In some ways, Loder could be guilty of this, making his convictional 
experiences into a universally applicable framework. One could mistakenly view his theology as an 
example of George A. Lindbeck’s “experiential-expressive model” of religion. What we find is more 
there just a turn to or obsession with the subjective." But neither would Loder feel comfortable within 
Lindbeck’s “cultural-linguistic model,” primarily because it suggests a human construct that serves a 
functional purpose within society. Given Loder’s critique of socialization, Lindbeck’s model does not 
do justice to an experience which finds its origins beyond the confines of the self. There is a difference 
between human experience as mediated by the ego and a convictional one that confers an experience and 
knowledge beyond the defensive structures of the ego. Loder argues that:
Self-involvement implies self-knowledge, b u t . . .knowing ourselves is no easy task
"As expressed in George Matheson’s (1842-1906) well-known hymn, “O Love that wilt not let 
me go.” See Ian Campbell Bradely, O Love that wilt not let me go: Meditations, Prayers and Poems by 
George Matheson (London: Found Paperbacks, 1990).
"James E. Loder, “Normativity and Context in Practical Theology: ‘The Interdisciplinary Issue,” 
in Friedrich Schweitzer and Johannes A. Van der Van, Editors, Practical Theology: International 
Perspectives (New York; Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 363-364.
"George A. Lindbeck, The Nature o f Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), pp. 3Off. Religious experience is contingent upon a specific 
cultural-linguistic parameters, however the experience cannot be reductionistically appropriated as such.
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primarily because we do not really want to know ourselves. Tacitly, we suspect that we 
will find human nature too devastatingly empty in itself and at the same time - perhaps 
in the same breath - too awesomely close to God. This unyielding ti*uth about us beyond 
what we would ordinarily choose to know is nevertheless the key to our knowledge of 
everything else. That is, we know that sooner or later the boundaries of our best- j
conceived worlds, as with the best-lived lives, must yield to destruction, so we challenge |
those boundaries even where they seem secure, buffers against apparent chaos. |
Implicitly, we seem to know that the only order we can ultimately count on must exceed î
the boundaries of the known universe - the infinitesimally small as well as the infinitely |
great - and we know that knowing itself must yield to a higher intelligibility because j
knowing cannot be its own reason for being. Thus, it is from beyond such boundaries 
that insight - sometimes of revolutionary proportions - comes upon j
I
Such a view does not deny the importance of human experience, but it is not definitive until it is taken i
up or incorporated into the presence of Christ. Self-knowledge is delusion unless it is mediated by the |
Spirit of Christ." j
How does one guard against delusion and self deception? How does one know if a religious j
experience is conviction (that is grounded in Christ) or simply “subjective intoxication.”"  To help us |
in this determination, Loder offers five theological and five psychological guidelines which are |
interrelated. While they serve as a good summary of Loder’s theology, especially how he uses |Itheological and psychological insights, they also are of inestimable value to the ordinary Christian i
suffering through convictional experiences. Clergy and spiritual directors would also do well to be led I
by these tendencies. These are not attempts to establish “spiritual laws,” nor provide counseling |
techniques, but a way to discern the style of the Spirit. j
1. Theologically, “Convictional experiences are to be seen as initiated by Christ, not by any J
human effort, spirits, or departed souls. The source of the experience is not found in the self. One i
cannot lift oneself into a spiritual realm in order to make “contact” or in the attempt to be more 1
"rrM 2, pp. 216-217. Italics in the text.
" in  this regard Loder would be in agreement with Reinhard Hütter’s argument that theological 
claims are rooted in pathos, which “originally referred to any kind of suffering in the sense of undergoing 
or incurring as opposed to acting or doing,. . .” He sees “pathos characterizing the core of Christian 
experience,” whereby the “center of pathic existence i s . . . .  aiidire, the receptivity of faith.” Audire is 
a sunendering “to God’s presence such that this presence defines or determines us and in so doing 
inevitably also defines or determines our theological discourse. ” As a result, we must say “not only does 
God’s action ‘determine ’ human beings qualitatively (as regards accidens/ it also creates them as both 
creature and new creation. This human pathos (and that o f the theologian) corresponds to God’s own 
poiesis, the poiesis o f the Holy Spirit to which all theology is subjected and which is presented to 
theology in a quite specific way. ” Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice, trans., Doug 
Stott (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 31. Italics in the text.
"rZM2, p. 185.
"T7M2, p. 185. Italics in the text. Loder provides clinical case studies from his counseling 
experiences to authenticate each guideline. They will not preoccupy us here.
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“spiritual.” Simply put, when human existential needs are manipulated with religious or spiritual 
overtones they do not offer what the human spirit is searching for, namely freedom and love. The human 
spirit might have a sense of “spiritual power over oneself, others, and all ‘worlds,’” but this power is a 
desti'uctive overcompensation of the ego. “What does not begin with Christ’s initiative, either directly 
or by implication, cannot end in him.”"
2, "Transforming experiences initiated by Christ are characterized by a resulting sacrificial 
love in the one transformed. This, more than any other “result” marks an experience as being “of 
Christ.” Loder believes that “deeper than consciousness, is the longing to give love and a willingness 
to give it sacrificially.” By sacrifice he does not mean anything having to do with blood, death or 
martyrdom; “it has to do with ‘making sacred.”"  When Christ enters into human brokenness and conflict 
with the power of resurrection this is an act of “making sacred.” Similarly, when the power of Christ 
is at work in an individual one is then free to love and to be loved. One is freed to enter into the 
brokenness and conflicted life of another and love empathically. The goal of conviction is love because 
the human spirit restricted by the ego is incapable of giving this kind of love."
3. "Consistent with the continuity o f Christ’s initiative, transforming moments, subjectively 
sensed to be from Christ, will go in search o f objective expressions about Christ. It is within this 
context that we see Loder’s understanding of other aspects of what is traditionally considered constitutive 
of the Christian life. As a result, “scripture, sacrament, worship, and theological writings take on fresh 
life and become extremely vital in establishing the meaning of transforming moments.”"  We saw this 
in Loder’s personal accounts of conviction. He turned to Brumier’s The Scandal o f Christianity and read 
it from within the intuitive framework of the text. Scripture is read from the “inside” because one 
“knows” the reality to which it points. The sacraments deepen and define the far-reaching implications 
of transfoiTnation. To say the Sursum corda in the Eucharist is to be literally lifted up into the company
"TTM2, p. 187.
"rrM 2, p. 187.
"T7M2, p. 177.
"T7M2, p. 175. “There are two fundamental enemies to giving love. The first is the fear that 
acceptance become absorption, and the second is the fear of rejection, abandonment, and, in effect 
dying.” This struggle begins to emerge in the early months of life through the relationship between a 
child and its mother. “The only defense one has against absorption is the distancing powers of the 
autonomous ego, but the ego is so constructed that it prevents face-to-face intimacy. Therefore it puts 
the personality in a double-bind: without the defensive ego, absoiption follows; with the defensive ego, 




of heaven. It is not simply a function to “‘technique’ remembrance. . . .” The Eucharist “cannot be a 
response that imitates his presence, not one which flees from it; his real presence must make it possible 
for us to be really present for each other.”'®
4. "Convictional experiences are to be seen preeminently as a breakthrough from thefuture.
Here the eschatological elements of Loder’s thought become evident. The past is not definitive for him.
For the Christian history is never destiny. Because he refuses to think linearly about time, he can claim 
that moments of the Spirit “bring the past forward into a new future made possible by the transforming 
event.”'"' Even after a moment of conviction it is possible to go back into the memory of Christ’s 
Presence “and find that his Presence is no longer a memory but a living reality in the present, the future 
of time past.”'" This is also why Erikson’s model of human development is flawed, theologically 
speaking, because it does not do just to moments when the meaning of past events can be altered through 
the redeeming present of Christ’s new future. “The convictional experience is a breakthrough from the 
future even as it is a transformation of the past.”'"
Finally, 5. "Convictional experiences call for a social context whose inner and outer structures 
sustain and celebrate the continuities o f Christ (especially the Word and sacrament). This 
corresponds to the last stage of convictional knowing.? But it is also, perhaps, the most critical because |
this context has the power to either “sustain or celebrate the continuities of Christ” or it can extinguish j
them. One cannot sustain the conviction alone. This is why Loder’s theology is not individualistic. Yet, ]
one must not enter into a social construct uncritically. The social construct needs to be transfoi*med.
Because of this, Loder lists general characteristics of societies that foster further growth in the Spirit.
There can be “no absolute human authority, because authority rests with the Author of the convictional 
experience.” There must be an openness to "complexity rather than superficiality.” Communities that 
favor legalistic approaches to the Christian life and favor simplistic answers to life’s mysteries hinder 
life in the Spirit. Due to the creative element within transforming experiences, they inherently open up
'® JTM2, p. 120. James E. Loder, “Dimensions of Real Presence,” The Princeton Seminary
Corinthians 2; 1-6; 11:23-24.
"77M2, p. 191.
"Y7M2, p. 190.
'"rrM 2, p. 190.
"'77M2, p. 193.
" 'n w 2 , p. 193.
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“new realms of being and meaning that call for richer, deeper understandings.”'*'' The community should 
nurture this experience. There should be a respect for the “inner life of the individual.’"^ A positive 
value is placed on conflict within the community, because the presence of conflict has the potential of 
offering new visions of the Christian life. Related to this there must “a recognition and acceptance o f 
personal differences as manifestations of the divine interest in particularity.”'*^ Lastly, the social context 
needs to contain “an instiumental or activist axis” built into it. There needs to be support in “doing 
something about one’s convictional experience” in that it leads to further action on the part of the 
individual.
Loder’s psychological guidelines reinforce the theological ones. As we move through these 
descriptions, the personalist, relational dynamic of his thought will be even more pronounced.
1. "Convictional experiences are revelatory o f the self world, God, and evil. " '*' As such, they 
never “occlude vision but deepen it.” In this way they are insight producing in that revelation and 
experience are integrated. This leads to a fuller understanding or embrace of reality as it really it. They 
crack open well-established beliefs, opinions, perspectives, and assumptions and expose them for what 
they really are. As such, convictional experiences lead one deeper into truth and allow one to find the 
face of God even in the void. Convictional experiences do not protect us even from long-held spiritual 
or religious beliefs, for even religious faith and practice can be used by the ego as protection in the face 
of the void. There is no place for the ego to hide. From an ethical viewpoint, even aspects of one’s life 
that might be attributed to the devil or evil need to be shattered, because these strategies prevent us from 
engaging in the question of evil. As a result, one can come “to see the ‘good’ buried in [ones] vices.”
Most notably, a convictional experience “is designed to increase one’s sense of self-worth 
without decreasing one’s capacity to give love.”'*® Conviction is grounded in the love of God. This is 
clear, but Loder also wants to affirm that what the conviction discloses is “God’s appreciation for the 
particularity of the individual.”'*^ Conviction brings a heightened sense of the Holy, but it also bring with 
it a more pronounced sense of the self. One’s individuality becomes more “real,” and by extension the 
individuality and particularly of others also become more real. The result is that one begins to affirm
'*'*This discourages “cultic formulas, cliches, and trite Christian language, which foster partial 
truths, curtail thinking, and obviate attention to the uniqueness of the individual, (p. 194)”
'*^ This is to support the development of imagination in an individual, to “prevent an external 






the self (in a healthy way) and affirms the self-worth of others. This is done through the personal 
intimacy of spirit to Spirit. Because of this relational model Loder is sure to point out that “knowing God 
only as an archetype, Idea, metaphysical process or political ideology may turn one’s life around, but 
none of these alternatives suffices to present the personal God revealed in Clirist.”'"
2. "Regardless o f how sudden such experiences may seem to be, they have a personal history 
in the individual. The experiences might come from out of nowhere, but they are rooted in the deep 
past of the self. They are not generic, but “person-specific.” Even though they all lead to four­
dimensional being, what that looks like will be particular to the individual. Loder is not saying that 
there is a direct correlation between one’s past (either conscious or unconscious) and transformation. 
The insights that come can very often open up experiences long forgotten. In fact, “one fr equently finds 
the whole record of one’s memories reordered by the convicting experience, and many forgotten events, 
persons, and meanings are illuminated as surprisingly significant.” What makes these experiences 
particular is the way they open up a future for the individual, without denying the experiences of the 
past."
3. "Consistent with the principle that convicting experiences are revelatory o f one’s personal 
past is the proposition that the so-called normal sequence o f human development may become 
reversible. Because the Spirit is not bound by time, to some degree neither is the human spirit. 
Conviction might require reliving an experience from early childhood or an anticipation of one’s death. 
“Much of the health that comes from such experiences derives from this unique transcendent relationship 
to the ordinary course of human development.” By reversibility, Loder means, first, that “the meaning 
of past experiences and of inevitable future experiences such as death may be automatically or 
subliminally altered.” The second “is that one’s self-consciousness is liberated to revisit the past or to 
anticipate the future with increasing flexibility and freedom. Thus the linear unfolding of life through 
a prescribed sequence becomes, in effect reversible for future development and self-understanding.” 
God’s action in effecting both is determinant.''* Even an anticipation of death has the power to undo its 
hold over life. Since “death is already familiar to oneself and also to Christ, who goes through it ahead
'"77M2, p. 200.
"77M2, p. 201.
" “Correlatively, convicting moments that work simply to seal off the past, making it a closed 
book, are likely to be repressive not only of future growth but also of all the meaning that may be in the 
experience for others. Reopening the past is an important latent potentiality that nearly always needs 
support and encouragement in one’s personal appropriation of convictional experience, (p. 201)”
" rrM 2,p . 201.
''*T7M2, p. 202.
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of, and with, his people,” it has the power - in Christ - to be an illuminating, transforming awareness/^ |
4. "Reversibility o f human development does not imply absorption o f the psychological ego. |
As we have seen from the beginning, for Loder health is determined by one’s ability to choose and to |
choose freely. When the ego is grounded in Christ, “freedom to choose for or against what God is doing j
in the world is actually enhanced, because fewer of one’s choices are subject to unexamined t
psychological influences,” such as neurotic tendencies that distort r e a l i t y I n s t e a d ,  the ego is |
!strengthened and free from its self-destructive, self-defensive patterns. Instead of serving itself, one is I
.1free to choose from the strength of the ego to live into the new future that God is granting in and through i
the moment of conviction, thereby enhancing the lives of others. Conviction involves the transfoimation j
of the ego in order to free the ego to choose life, which is why these experiences cannot be socialized 
or forced, managed or staged.
5. “The transformational process facilitated by a convictional experience calls for continuity I
o f expression. This corresponds to the last theological guideline concerning context. Convicting j
power is not designed to be arrested and invested in “authoritarian frames of reference.” ®^ Power and 
authority rest only in Christ. Transformation calls forth further transformation, whether within the 
individual or within a wider frame of reference. The human spirit longs to remain and indwell the 
Presence of the Convictor who continues the work of transformation, for there is never a sense of arrival.
The Creator Spiritus can “initiate the process again and again in the course of one’s spiritual 
formation.”'’*’
At the end of the five theological guidelines, Loder describes a social context that embraces, 
affirms, and fosters a convictional way of knowing and being Christian. His expectations appear ideal 
if not utopian. Is there such a place where all of these requirements would be fulfilled? Loder is not
"^rZM2,p. 205. 
p. 205.
5TttM2, p. 205. “Neurosis in general is characterized by a symbolically distorted world in which 
one sees realities overladen with incongruent meanings that must be consciously rectified or accounted 
for. . . . When the reality of everyday life is distorted from the moment of perception, there is no 
freedom of choice; all choices are inherently misconceived. Thus, under neurotic conditions, all choices 
are bound to repeat the past and relive the distortion endlessly, (p. 206)”
58
59 TTM2, p. 207.
TTM2, p. 207. I
^°TTM2, p. 208. “What needs to be understood is that the Spirit, who is the Teacher, intends the |
wholeness, freedom, and joy of the one who comes under conviction. There is nothing vacuous or i
uncertain about this; the initially convicting process, moving from conflict through resolution, is the i
same sure process by which God’s intention operates in subsequent periods to generate wholeness after i
the pattern of Christ, (p. 208)” 1
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trying to be idealist. Instead, what begins to emerge here is his vision of the church in his discussion of 
the koinonia. Perhaps one of the reasons Loder’s theology has been charged as lacking a clear 
ecclesiology is because other scholars have been looking for it in the wrong place. Their expectations 
of what the church is supposed to be have eclipse their ability to grasp Loder’s vision, one that for many 
is both radical and alien compared to contemporary understandings of the church.
III. The Dialectic of the Koinonia and the Ekklesia
It is in the area of Loder’s ecclesiology that he has received the strongest critique. In her 
memorial tiibute, Freda A. Gardner, former Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church (USA) and Loder’s long-time colleague in the School of Christian Education at Princeton, noted 
a concern held by many who came to respect his work: the nature of the church.®’ In Craig Dykstra’s 
completely appreciative review of The Transforming Moment he wonders about the “the role of 
communities of faith in human transformation.”®^ Loder’s reliance upon Kierkegaard (who is often 
misunderstood as an individualist), as well as his preoccupation with ego development and the individual 
have further reinforced this notion that what he offers is privatistic, thereby shunning the faith 
community.
To throw these charges at Loder is a gross misreading of his entire oeuvre because they fail to 
see the power of relationality driving his theology. They have also conflated his stress of the personal 
as a celebration of individualism. However, Loder believed there cannot be an authentic /  without a 
Thou. The Thou is Christ as head of the church, not the church as a substitute for Christ (Ephesians 
1:22). One time Loder said to me, “Serve Clirist, Ken, not the church.” This statement might seem to 
validate Gardner, Dykstra and others’ who have this concern, of Loder somehow setting Christ against 
the church, setting up a false and overly simplistic dichotomy. But what Loder is stressing in this 
aphorism is the importance of seeing ministry - indeed, the Cliristian life - as one of service to the person 
Jesus Clirist and through Christ as service to all persons. As we have seen, the center of Loder’s 
concern is the transformation of the person which can only take place through an encounter with the 
Spiritual Presence of Christ, as Spirit-to-spirit. Relationality is the heuristic through which Loder 
understands everything. The reason why Loder is silent and in his silence highly critical of the church 
(correctly, I would argue) is because the community as community has failed to see itself as constituted
®’Freda Gardner, “James Edwin Loder, Jr.: A Tribute,” The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 23 
(2002): 191.
®^ Craig Dykstra, review of The Transforming Moment: Understanding Convictional Experiences, 
by James E. Loder, The Princeton Theological Seminary Bulletin 3 (1982): 341. See also Dykstra’s 
review, “Transformation in Faith and Morals,” Theology Today, 39 (1982): 56-64. Dykstra was one of 
Loder’s doctoral students and later his colleague at Princeton. His doctoral dissertation was “Christian 
Education and the Moral Life: An Evaluation of and Alternative to Kohlberg/Piaget” (1978).
63 TTM2, p. 194.
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by the work of the Spirit. When this occurs the institution comes to have greater value than the people.
The people are “used” for the sake of the institution’s work. The community as community does not 
have the power or the authority to give what only can be given in and through Jesus Christ. The church 
or community of faith cannot be a surrogate for one’s relationship with Christ, because usually veiy often 
the church is little more than an extension of the collective egos of the membership or the dictatorial ego |
of the minister or priest. In this Loder offers a biting critique of the church. For those who are invested |
in the preservation of the church as an institution, what Loder offers is extremely threatening. Yet, what I
Loder offers here has the potential of reframing the way we view the church and offers the possibility 
of its revitalization.
Instead of talking about the church, Loder prefers to concentrate on the koinonia. In The 
Transforming Moment, The Knight’s Move, and the Logic o f the Spirit, Loder places considerable stock 
in Paul Lehmann’s discussion of this word in Ethics in a Christian Context. Indeed, Loder sees the 
koinonia as “the overall pattern of Christ life... Lehmann’s concern is for establishing continuities 
with Christ and thus defines the koinonia as “the fellowship-creating reality of Jesus Christ.”®'’ The 
koinonia is a social reality, but it is unique, Loder argues, because “people enter it by grace, not by 
socialization patterns.” This is a significant statement. The presence of Christ constitutes the social 
reality and has absolute authority - not the community so formed. Christians have roles and functions,
“but their particularity is heightened rather than diminished by the corporate reality.” Convictional 
experience compels one to “go in search of the koinonia as its context for growth, interpretation, and 
ethical expression.”®® Convicted persons need a context to wrestle with the implications of convictional 
knowing by strengthening them to live from within the transformation, to make ethical decisions based 
upon their ongoing encounter with Jesus Christ. It is a social context that nurtures the person in Christ; 
it reinforces the transformational paradigm and does not reduce it to something else.
As a result, the koinonia has corporate power which limits “institutional power to dehumanize 
tluough an imposition of role structures and status systems.” It becomes clear that “the koinonia is not 
to be identified with the institutional church; neither is it to be separated from it.”®® They stand in a
i®'’Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) cited in TTM2, 
p. 195. In his essay “The Fashioning of Power: A Christian Perspective on the Life-Style Phenomenon,” I
contributed to Lehmann’s Festschrift, Loder sees the koinonia as “a convictional operation which is I
fundamentally transcendent and therefore free to be solidly social.” Alexander J. McKelway and E.
David Willis, eds.. The Context o f Contemporary Theology: Essays in Honor o f Paul Lehmann (Atlanta,




dialectic, yet it appears that the koinonia is given a kind of marginal control over the church.®’' The
koinonia places demands upon the church seen as an institution, because transformational experiences
disrupt and dismantle the authority the church likes to maintain as an institution. It acts as a ferment
within the institution to keep it humble. In The Knight’s Move, Loder also adopts T. F Ton ance’s view
of the koinonia as “the communion-creating activity of the Holy Spirit.”®* Loder stresses the distinction
between the koinonia and the church and keeps them in creative tension because he sees the work of the
Holy Spirit as primarily negating the patterns of socialization so prevalent in the church.
We are particularly concerned here with the ecclesial significance of koinonia. In this 
connection, what the “communion-creating activity of the Holy Spirit” negates is as 
sti ong and clear as what it affirms. It negates the formation of such a communion by 
ordinary socialization processes: detemiination and defense of territory, initiation rites, 
rites of intensification, role structures, hierarchical stratification, and a legal system are 
all obviated and transformed by the notion of this sort of communion. This is a 
community that includes but transcends such anthropological considerations precisely 
because each member and all together are transformed with respect to such constraints.®*’
Loder is not calling for the dismantling of the institutional structure of the church, but saying that the
structure cannot be definitive for the Christian life.™ It is in need of constant reform and transformation.
^^LS, p. 194. The “institutional church is a socially constructed reality based on roles and role 
systems, which are the outgrowth of, not the condition for, koinonia. To be sure, these two, the koinonia 
and the institutional church, will always be found together and dialectically related, as the Chalcedonian 
understanding of Christ would dictate, with the spiritual presence of Christ exercising marginal control 
over the institutional forms that are created to express it. (p. 194)” No doubt, Loder’s critique of the 
institutional church has some affinity with Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom. See, Kierkegaard’s, 
Training in Christianity. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972). He might also have been informed by Hans Hofmann’s views: “The 
Church is forever in danger of becoming an institution where individuals want to receive life cheaply
through a magic misunderstanding of the liturgical and sacramental aspect of the Church Thus, the
Church was understood as the place where the individual could accept either a magic device which 
promotes spiritual life [that is, seeing the sacrament as a pharmacon athanasiasl, or tiain his moral 
conscience and ability for happiness toward an ideal of the self as a moral hero of stoic emotional 
equilibrium. In opposition to this selfishly individualistic misunderstanding of the church, there was 
always a trend in the history of the Church to go to the other extreme, namely, to define the Church 
merely as a gathering of those enlightened people, who, on their own, know the meaning of religion and 
inspire each other to be trained toward an even more ideal life together.” See “Immortality or Life,” 
Theology Today 15 (1958): 241.
®*rKM, p. 305. Cf. T. F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith (New York: HarperCoIlins, 1988). 
Loder notes that Torrance’s definition might be preferable to Lehmann’s “since it applies both to the 
koinonia of the Godhead and to the koinonia of the church, (p. 305)”
^^TKM, p. 205. “Koinonia is a transformation of the cult by the Holy Spirit such that in the 
worship of the triune God by the koinonia, the underlying order of the universe revealed in Jesus Christ 
is portiayed for the Christian participants, (p. 306)”
“^“Koinonia is thoroughly social, but not able to be socialized; persons are present to each other 
in ways not able to be fully gi asped by functional categories because the fullness of the communion is 
the premise, not the outcome, of relationships in the koinonia.” LS, p. 40.
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Loder wants to affirm that the place where individuals experience the power of the Risen Christ 
is primarily through their participation in the life of the church. But experiences of the Spirit cannot be 
limited to the church. The Spirit is not limited to the gathered of the worshiping community. The Holy 
Spirit is not a possession of the church, instead the church is formed through and by the Holy Spirit. 
Here we see the church not as a bureaucratic institution, but as the gathering of people called out from 
the common life of the culture due to an experience they had “in Christ.” The church was not formed 
as an institution to preserve the tradition of Jesus, but was primarily a meeting place established for 
women and men who had similar experiences of the Holy Spirit, who encountered the transforming 
presence of Jesus Christ and needed to come together to testify to each other of the extraordinary things 
God was doing in their lives. As the community listened to one another’s testimony and witness they 
offered praise and thanksgiving for all that God had done in Christ and continued to do through him in 
the Spirit.*” This exchange also formed the basis of koinonia in the community.
This understanding of the koinonia-ekklesia dialectic is a refreshing, if not radical vision for the 
church because it serves as a corrective to some of the destructive, pervasive images currently operative. 
It is refreshing because an emphasis upon the koinonia in contradistinction to the institution puts the 
morass of the present-day church in sharp relief. In this light we come to see the church as institution 
as dysfunctional and neurotic in that it hinders the freedom of those who are taking their inner life 
seriously and are attempting to be faithful to the convictional process. The institution seeks to manage 
the action of the community, but in this way it actually clips or cuts off the community from the Spirit 
who seeks to constitute it as a “fellowship-creating reality of Jesus Christ.” There is so much power in 
the presence of Christ available to the individual and, by extension to the church. But it is threatening 
to the ego and so we seek to tame it, organize it, manage it. Far too many clergy are guilty of trying to 
tame the Spirit in their own lives that it leads to a further repression of the Spirit in the lives of their 
congiegants. Ministry thus becomes loyalty to an institution and not to Jesus Christ as head of the 
church. By stressing the koinonia as a parallel element throws the institution into conflict, heightens the 
tension between the two (intensification), thereby giving those within the institution the freedom to 
choose and in choosing hopefully reach for reform that will allow the church to be renewed. This is 
desperately needed.
^'C. Jeff Woods, Congregational Megatrends (New York: The Alban Institute, 1996), “New 
Testament Christians encountered God directly. They also encountered God corporately. Whenever the 
church gathered for worship, the participants expect the Spirit to take the lead. The word church is 
derived from the New Testament Greek word ekklesia, which literally means a ‘meeting,’ without any 
reference to purpose or organization. When we think of ‘meeting’ today, we often picture two or more 
people encountering one another. But it seems that the New Testament word for church suggested a 
meeting between people and God, rather than one another. Viewing church as an opportunity to 
encounter God is more powerful than many of our images of church today. . . .  Viewing the church as 
more of an organization than a place to interact with the Spirit of God misses the mark. When the people 
of God, gathered as the church, fail to encounter God, then they are not really the church, (p. 99)”
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My denomination, the Presbyterian Church (U. S. A.), has for the last twenty years recorded 
significant losses in membership. In 2001, we lost close to 30,000 members and that number has been 
the same for the last couple of years. We are not alone. The other mainline churches (United Methodist, 
the United Church of Christ, the Episcopalian) have reported similar losses. These are only symptoms 
of something deeper, something desperately wrong with Protestantism. The church in North America 
and Europe is anemic. The majority of those who live beyond the walls of the church view the Christian 
Gospel and the institutional expressions of its seemingly archaic ideas as a relic of the past with little or 
no relevancy to the present generation, offering no words of hope and healing, almost denying the 
potential of transformation. Within the walls of the church frustration, anxiety, and anger reign supreme 
because the old patterns of “doing church” simply no longer work. Gone are the days of Christendom 
when it was assumed that to be European or American meant to be Christian of some sort. Church and 
culture were one. The church had a voice, offered hope, worked for the refoiTn of society. Today is a 
post-Chi'istian age and we have lost our voice and respect in the culture. We still have a functional use 
in that the church helps to teach and reinforce the morality of the culture. The supernatural claimsof the 
Gospel have all been whittled down to what is reasonable (meaning flinctional) and therefore relevant, 
leaving us with little more than moral platitudes to offer the world.^^ There is a sense that God is absent - 
even in the church. It is clear that the church is in serious trouble. Once a community constituted by the 
power of God’s radical, redeeming, liberating love, now the church has become an entrenched, inherently 
conservative, socio-cultural institution that gathers to perform its rituals and organize strawberry 
festivals.’® Where are the signs that the transforming presence of Christ is at work?
IV. Transformation vs. Formation
Loder’s work urges the contemporary institutional church to reaffirm that the Christian 
experience, as both the New Testament witnesses and countless other Christians have also testified, is 
essentially about transformation. He stresses this not only because it is the Biblical model, but also to 
put it in sharp relief against the patterns of socialization or formation which have and continue to suck
™In the United States a firm separation of church and state keeps us apart, that is until it is 
politically convenient to tear down the wall to rally around the flag and declare that we are “One Nation 
Under God.” This has become all too apparent in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11”' September 
2001 .
’®Not every church is in dire straits. I am talking generally, and that is always dangerous. But 
I do think I give voice to the deep frustration of many clergy, church members, and non-Christians in 
both the United States and Scotland who are distressed by and disappointed with the present state of the 
church. On the other hand, the present state of the church could be seen as a positive one, in that our 
alienation from the culture is forcing us to be clearer about the true nature of the church apart from its 
identification with the culture. See Douglas John Hall, “The Future of the Church,” Sewanee 
Theological Review, 36 (1993): 463-492.
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the life out of the church - both as institution and koinonia. As the scriptures clearly maintain, whoever 
came into contact with Jesus was changed. Paul speaks for many who encountered God’s love in the 
face of Clirist when he wrote, “If anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation; everything old has passed 
away; see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through 
Clii'ist, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world 
to himself, . . . .”(2 Corinthians 5:17-19). The source of the transformation is the power of God’s 
redeeming grace revealed in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. After the resun ection, it is 
the Holy Spirit who mediates the presence of the Risen Christ to individuals and continues the process 
of this new creation revealed in the resurrection. “Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the 
Lord is, there is freedom. And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though 
reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for 
this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.(2 Corinthians 3:17-18)” The Spirit as the presence of Jesus, the 
Lord, continues the work of transfoiination, bringing to life all that was dead and reversing the forces 
of evil and decay that seek to bring all things to nothing. For “the Spirit gives life. (2 Corinthians, 3:6)”
The life of Jesus culminating in the resurrection was and remains the primal, constitutive, life 
engendering experience for the Christian. On the first day of the week, with the Sabbath completed, the 
three women who made their way to anoint Jesus’s body with spices did not go expecting an empty 
tomb. They went to embalm the body of Jesus and prepare it for deterioration. They did not go with 
hope, but with grief. They were shocked to find the stone rolled away and the body gone. Luke tells us 
that they were startled by angels, and terrified by their presence, and confused even more when they 
heard the men say, “Why do you seek the living among the dead? He is not here, but has risen”(Luke 
14: 1-12). They flee to tell the others and Peter returns quickly, completely amazed to find the death 
wrap left behind.
The primal experiences of transformation include terror and amazement, fear, joy, and, most of 
all, power.™ Easter was not about spring time renewal, the so-called rebirth of trees and plants that were 
never dead in winter in the first place. The cycles of physical nature have nothing to do with the
™Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion cited in Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious 
Experience in Earliest Christianity: A Missing Dimension in New Testament Studies (Minneapolis, MN: 
Foitress Press, 1998), p. 64. Kratophany or the appearance of power in religious experience reorders 
conceptions of space and time. Johnson draws attention to studies from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century religionsgeschichtliche Schule that clearly identified the New Testament experience 
as primarily an encounter and expression of power. Quoting H. Gunkel, Influence o f the Holy Spirit : 
A View ofthe Apostolic Age and the Teaching ofthe Apostle Paul: A Biblical-Theological Study, Johnson 
writes, ‘“For Paul the Spirit is a power,’ and if his teaching on the Spirit is to be understood, it must be 
in light of ‘his experience of the power and the depth of his spiritual inspiration.(p. 16)” The 
religiongeschichtliche Schule viewed the New Testament not as a compilation of theological propositions 
but as attestations and testimonies of experience and conviction. Pivotal in this approach was W. Wrede 
(1859-1906), ÜberAufgabe undMethode der sogennatan Neutestamentlichen Theologie of 1897. See 
Johnson, pp. 14-15.
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experience these women had on that morning. What they encountered was the bold, dynamic, disruption 
of the natural order of creation. What they faced was the reversal of the earth’s slow process toward 
death and destruction. What they felt was the awe and exhilarating power of God which turned the world 
upside down by bringing Christ back to life from the dead. Easter is about something absolutely, 
extraordinarily new, never before seen, unexpected, because it is not something for which anyone looks. 
Easter is the glorious triumph of God. The actual, physical, historical resurrection of Jesus Christ is 
God’s last and final word on all the sin and evil of the world. The resurrection is the final vindication 
of God that confirms, substantiates, assures that God is God of the living, not of .the dead. The 
resurrection life of God that brought Jesus back to life is the same life being poured out through the Holy 
Spirit, who is, slowly but surely, bringing life to all that is dead and dying. When one encounters Jesus 
Christ, one experiences this new life. It is the kind of life the Holy Spirit gives. It is the life of 
transformation.™
This is what the women and men experienced that first Easter - it was unique. For Christian faith 
and theology, the resunection extends the horizon of being projected by Jesus himself and remains 
effective, because what God has done and continues to do through him has the power to transform human 
life and establish new horizons of meaning that the self enslaved to the ego could never achieve on its 
own. This is not unlike Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1900-2002) description of experience as Erfahrung 
understood as “historically effected consciousness.” Erfahrung suggests movement, an extension out 
toward a future, a venturing out (farhren)?^ Yet, even Gadamer admits that in many ways the disciples’ 
encounter with Jesus was a different kind of experience, “for they proclaim something that surpasses
’®Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame o f Knowledge: 
Explorations in the Interrelations o f Scientific and Theological Enterprise (Belfast: Christian Journals, 
Ltd., 1984). The New Testament speaks of “salvation by grace as which God ‘has manifested through 
the epiphany of our Saviour Christ Jesus, who abolished death and brought life and immortality to light 
through the Gospel’.” The epiphaneia “involves a vast palingennesia (regeneration) of humanity and 
ultimately a new heaven and a new earth, (pp. 339-340)”
’®Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, second revised edition, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1999), pp. 346-362. Gadamer favors this word to establish 
a phenomenology of experience instead of Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833-1911) use of the word Erlebnis. 
Erlebnis has a double meaning rooted in the verb erleben, both the immediacy of an experience that 
oneself has, but also the way the experience yields a sense of permanence. The sense o îErlebnis is too 
static for Gadamer because it cannot grasp the ongoing, (what Loder would see as the kinetic) continuity 
of historical experience and the relationship between experience and knowledge. See also James Risser, 
Hermeneutics and the Voice o f the Other: Re-reading Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). “Gadamer’s desire to link understanding to experience 
as Erfahrung is tied directly to the way in which this experience it itself learning, is itself knowing.(p. 
85)” Curiously, Erfahrung is used by Hegel in the Phenomenology o f the Spirit (which was originally 
entitled “The Science of the Experience of Consciousness”). It refers to an experience that one has 
“undergone,” an encounter through which one is changed. Erfahrung essentially entails a transformation 
of that life. Risser, pp. 83-86.
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their own horizon of understanding.”™ They articulate a knowledge of God, of the world, and of 
themselves which did not originate from within their own tradition and frame of reference. As such, 
Loder would saw they were convicted four-dimensinoally. Martin Heidegger’s definition oiErfahrung 
resonates even more clearly with Loder’s understanding of conviction. “To undergo an experience 
[Erfahrung] with something - be it a thing, a person, or a god - means that this something befalls us, 
sti'ikes us, comes over us, overwhelms us and transfoi*ms us. When we talk of ‘undergoing’ an 
experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means 
that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it.”™ For the disciples the terror and 
amazement were found in their own personal encounter with the Risen Christ. It should be noted that 
it was not dependent upon a second-hand word, not reliant upon a history, or even a tradition. It was the 
present moment of reality of the resurrected Lord that changed their lives. They could not encounter 
Jesus by going back to the past, by going back to the grave. Because, as Luke makes clear, one does not 
find Jesus among the dead past, at some historical marker in Jerusalem, you find him where there is life. 
What was true for them would be true for others who had similar testifying, convicting experiences of 
the Holy Spirit.
Thus, New Testament Christians did not rely upon second-hand information, second-order 
knowing about Jesus. Theirs was a first-hand experience of power and transformation and Loder wants 
to suggest that there is no reason why this cannot be true today. They expected to encounter God 
directly, not indirectly mediated through another source. The direct mediation of the Holy was offered 
in countless experiences of the Holy Spirit, as confirmed in Acts, in Paul’s letters and beyond. These 
were primary experiences happening to individuals directly, not based on records of what happened to 
others. These encounters with the Holy Spirit were constitutive, they were originating experiences that 
redefined and reordered their understanding of reality.™ Something happened to these people. What
™Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Heidegger and Marburg Theology,” (1964) in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), p. 210.
’^Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” from On the Way to Language cited in James 
Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice o f the Other: Re-reading Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1997), p. 288. With Erfahrung one can “no longer be at 
ease here, in the old dispensation,” to quote T. S. Eliot (1888-1965), because as Heidegger would put it, 
“one is oneself transformed.” See Robert Bemasconi, The Question o f Language in Heidegger's History 
o f Being (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1985), p. 82. Eliot reference, 
“Journey of the Magi,” The Collected Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1971), p.68
™John A. Mackay, Christian Reality and Appearance (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1969). 
On the centrality of the transforming encounter in the Christian experience Mackay (1889-1983) writes, 
“God’s self-disclosure of himself, which constitutes the objective, historical dimension of Christian 
reality, gave birth and continues to give birth to a subjective dimension - the dimension of personal 
religious experience. What God did for man in Christ is followed by what he does in man through
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they experienced was power, the power of God’s love experienced in the Spirit, a power that re-ordered 
the reality of eveiyone who came into contact with it.
Luke Timothy Johnson’s recent study, Religious Experience in Earliest Christianity, is a seminal 
work for our discussion here in that it calls for a reexamination of the dynamics of religious experience 
in order to allow us to grasp what the first Christians witnessed. What the New Testament texts point 
to is the unleashing of extraordinary power never witnessed before in space-time. Johnson is worth 
quoting at length:
The experiences articulated by these texts . . .  are not mainly about quotidian matters 
of upkeep and maintenance, routine engagements with domestic and social realities.
The New Testament shows scant interest in domestic economy, city politics, or imperial 
stability. The experiences expressed by these texts involve power but a power of a 
peculiar sort. It has nothing to do with rank or status derived from a place within 
society’s disposition of military, social, or economic resources. The power is not simply 
physical, although it involves bodies. It is not simply mental, although it affects 
emotional and cognitive capacities. It is not simply individual, although it is personal.
Neither is it exclusively social, although it has social consequences.*”
Perhaps most significantly, the texts do not speak of this power as something generated 
by or originating with those experiencing it even though those experiencing it provide 
the vehicle for expression. It is a power that comes from outside those touched by it and 
is transmitted to them from another, to whom it properly belongs. The power 
transmitted to them reaches external expression in various “wonders and signs,” 
including healing and exorcisms and gifts of ecstatic speech. But it is also said to be at 
work in the internal transformation of human freedom.*’
Thus, Johnson is extremely critical of the historical-critical studies of the last century which have been 
uncomfortable with a discussion of religious experience because there is no historical category to make
Christ. He meets man; he communes with man; he changes man. When man takes God seriously, 
responding in love to God’s love for him, he becomes a new man, . . . .  From thinking about God and 
longing for God, he experiences God. The God whom he has encountered and who has changed the 
direction of his life, becomes for the ‘new man’ both a living presence and a compulsive power, (pp. 24- 
25)”
*°Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Experience in Earliest Christianity: A Missing Dimension 
in New Testament Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998). Three different words are used for power 
in New Testament Greek. Exousia connects a power of freedom and authority (John 1:12; 1 Cor. 6:12; 
8:9; 9:4; 2 Cor. 10:8; 13:10; 2 Thess 3:(; Heb 13:10; Rev. 2:26); energeia suggests efficacy and energy 
(1 Cor. 12:6,11; 1 Thess 2:13; Phm. 6; Gal. 3:5; 5:6; Col. 1:29; Eph 3:20-21) and more frequently, 
dunamis (Rom 1:16; 15:13, 19; 1 Cor. 1:18; 6:14; 12:3; 12:28; 14:31; 15:50; 2 Cor. 1:4; 6:7; 8:3; 10:4; 
12-9-10; 13:4, 9; Gal. 3:5; Eph. 3:20; 6:10; Phil 3:10, 21; 4:13; Col. 1:29; 1 Thess 1:5; 2 Thess 2:11; 1 
Tim 1:7; 2:1; 4:17; ! Tim. 1:12; Heb. 2:4; James 1:21; 2:14; 4:12; 1 Pet. 1:5; 2 Pet. 1:16. Johnson’s 
references, p. 6.
*’Beyond the references to power, Johnson also gives roughly fifty biblical references to all the 
points made in this quotation. On the internal transformation of human freedom see Gal. 3:5; Rom. 12:2; 
1 Cor. 2:16; 2 Cor 3:18; Eph 4:23; Col 3:10; 1 Pet. 1:22. Johnson, pp. 7-8.
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sense out of it. The experience of the early church is one of power, and the experiences cannot be 
controlled, explained, or even interpreted by historical methodologies.*^
This discussion compels us to raise the following questions: Is it possible to be a Christian 
without transformation? Or can a Christian formed! If transformation has its origins in the work of 
God, then what is the nature of the church’s teaching ministry? Is it possible to teach faith? J. Steve 
Rhodes has wondered if Loder’s view does not lend itself to the formation of a “system which seeks to 
manipulate people into having a certain kind of convictional experience.” In fact, Rhodes queries, “if 
the gratuitous healing event is the focal point of human meaning [i.e. for Loder], it is difficult not to 
perceive how Loder’s ecclesiology would lend itself to discerning the goal of Christian education, 
liturgy, and pastoral counseling.”*® I will use this question as a framework for moving forward. 
Although worship and the liturgical life of the Christian were extremely important to him, Loder never 
fully develops these ideas.*'* However, he had much to say about transformation and Christian education, 
as well as the structure of convictional theology in pastoral counseling.
A. Educating in the Spirit
At the end of Religious Pathology and Christian Faith, Loder writes that “Christian education 
is structuring the creative act for the purpose of expanding the boundaries of freedom. Without this
*^Johnson identifies Ferdinand Christian Bauer’s (1792-1860) histories of early Christianity as 
one of the first expressions of a historical-critical methodology uncomfortable with religious experiences. 
“The incessant quest for the ‘origins’ of Christianity was in no small part the search for the essential 
form of Cliristianity that was of enduring (“eternal”) worth, covered over, perhaps, by the tendencies of 
ecclesiastical manipulation, but recoverable in principle both by the Reformation and by critical 
scholarship.(p. 13)” Johnson includes a quotation from Bauer which captures the Zeitgeist of the early 
nineteenth century’s uncritical reliance on the historical method. “Christianity is on the one hand the 
great spiritual power which determines all the belief and thought of the present age, the absolute 
principle on which the self-consciousness of the spirit is supported and maintained, so that, unless it were 
essentially Christian, it would have not stability or firmness in itself at all. On the other hand, the 
essential nature o f Christianity is a purely historical question, whose solution lies only in that Past in 
which Christianity itself had its origin’, it is a problem which can only be solved by that critical attitude 
of thought which the consciousness of the present age assumes towards the Past” (emphasis added). 
Paul, the Apostle o f Jesus Christ, His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine: A Contribution to 
the Critical History o f Primitive Christianity (1845), cited in Jolmson, p. 13.
*®J. Steve Rhodes, “Conversion as Crisis and Process: A Comparison of Two Models,” Journal 
o f Psychology and Christianity, 5 (3): 26. Identifying Loder’s work in terms of conversion (as oppose 
to conviction) is to misrepresent him. This is a Fowlerian reading of Loder. Rhodes critiques his 
ecclesiology without grasping Loder’s the dialectic of the koinonia,
*'* Apart from allusions to the worshiping community as koinonia, see TTM2, p .70,91,115-116, 
190; TKM, p. 306; LS, p. 170-171. Loder understands development as the drive of the human spirit 
searching for God whereby “the worship of God” is “an expression of the highest form of human 
behavior, (p. 170)”
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central emphasis, it becomes fantastic, and in Kierkegaard’s words: “Christian education is a lie.”*® 
Christian education is no longer a lie when it creates contexts of truth, where the structures are in place 
to foster an openness to the inner life of the Spirit and a social context that nurtures and reinforces the 
living out of this knowledge. The regulating principle is freedom and a determined resistance to 
anything that might try to curtail this creative act (such as the institution). For Loder, the task of 
Christian education is not to create religious beings or form Christians, but to nurture the human spirit 
by helping the self come to its true identity transparently grounded in the presence of Christ. Education 
must be done in service to the Holy Spirit, who always remains the true Teacher. It entails cooperating 
with the ongoing transforming work of the presence of Christ. Education in the church is less an 
instruction about Christ, as it is educating the human spirit in to the reality of Christ relating with the 
self.
Accordingly, Christian education cannot be seen as socialization and the faith that it teaches
cannot be understood as a skill, a hobby, or a code that one learns, develops and then passes on to
another generation to maintain continuity. Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic model beautifully illustrates
some of the very tendencies that Loder rejects. Lindbeck writes:
[T]o be religious -  no less than to become culturally or linguistically competent -  is to 
interiorize a set of skills by practice and training. One learns how to feel, act, and think 
in confoimity with a religious tradition that is, in its inner structure, far richer and more 
subtle than can be explicitly articulated. The primary knowledge is not about the 
religion, nor that the religious teaches such and such, but rather how to be religious in 
such and such ways. Sometimes explicitly formulated statements of the beliefs or 
behavioral norms of a religion may be helpful in the learning process, but by no means 
always. Ritual, prayer, and example are noimally much more important.*®
Lindbeck acknowledges that a cultural-linguistic model is no less experiential or existential in its 
approach to religion. This way of approaching religion is not necessarily bad. A lot of good has been 
achieved, even by the church, operating from this perspective. It has some functional value. The 
problem is that such an approach is not vivifying, it never really gets to the core, existential questions 
of the human spirit. What is a lifetime? and Why do I  live it? The danger in Lindbeck’s approach is that 
this model always runs the risk of moving from the pneumatic to the noetic (Voegelin). Unless there 
is some way to cultivate and even maintain the initial conflict that the pneumatic always generates, the 
result will be a noetic talk about religion, instead of allowing one to intuitively enter and re-enter -  
indwell (Polanyi) -  the generative core of religious experience. Learning to be religious becomes little 
more than an aid to social adjustment and institutional maintenance. Without a pneumatic corrective, 
learning to worship as a religious person might be merely an extension of the ego, little more than an
*®7?PCF, p. 228. 
*®Lindbeck, p. 35.
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expression of idolatry, and actually harmful to the human spirit.*’
Loder’s understanding of Christian education can best be seen in his relationship with the faith 
development theories often associated with the work of James Fowler. Space does not allow for a full 
treatment of this issue, but turning to it allows one to see how Loder’s work has been received by a wider 
audience and more fully explicates the uniqueness of his convictional theology. In the fall of 1981, tliree 
important books were published all of them dealing with human development. Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
The Philosophy ofMoral Development explored the dynamics of moral development. James Fowler’s 
Stages o f Faith: The Psychology o f Human Development and the Quest for Meaning, which applies 
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development to an understanding of faith development. The third was 
Loder’s The Transforming Moment. In a review essay of these three books, Craig R. Dykstra incorrectly 
refers to all of them as having to do with human transformation.** Kohlberg and Fowler are 
developmentalists and are more concerned with compassing patterns of change, primarily through stages 
of transition. As Dykstra acknowledges in the review, it is really only Loder who stresses the critical 
importance of transformation. By focusing on the process of transformation rather than the stages of 
development, or more correctly seeing that transformation is at work in and with the stages of 
development, Loder is led in a very different direction from that of Kohlberg and Fowler. We will focus 
on Fowler’s work here.
Briefly, Fowler’s study offers a “theory of growth in faith.” Drawing upon the theology of Paul 
Tillich (1886-1965) and H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962), Fowlers articulates a theoiy of faith 
development that seeks to understand what he calls “the universal concern” of faith.®” As a structuralist, 
Fowler explains that faith develops through six stages: 1. Intuitive-Projective Faith; 2. Mythic-Literal 
Faith; 3. Synthetic-Conventional Faith; 4. Individuative-Reflective Faith; 5. Conjunctive Faith; 6. 
Universalizing Faith. A description of each stage will not detail us. Stage 6, obviously, is the most 
advanced expression of faith, typified by a “disciplined, activist incarnation -  a making real and tangible 
-  of the imperatives of absolute love and justice.’’”” For the sake of brevity, Grannell’s comparison of 
Fowler and Loder is useful. Fowler investigates “the social-psychological implications of a life-long 
search for ultimate meaning;” whereas Loder prefers to explore the theological implications of what it 
means to be grasped by God. Fowler “delineates the religious/ethical importance of perspectival shifts 
that stress increasing ego detachment,” Loder calls for a radical recentering of the ego. Finally, Fowler
*’Z^, p. 169.
**Craig R. Dyksfra, “Transformation in Faith and Morals,” Theology Today, 39 (1982): 56-64.
*”James W. Fowler, Stages o f Faith: The Psychology o f Human Development and the Quest fo r  
Meaning (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. xiii, 5.
””Fowler, p. 200.
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“establishes the heuristic power of a hierarchical schema which enumerates ‘ stages; ’ ” Loder places stress
upon what happens between the stages.”’
In 1982, the Religious Education Association staged a debate in Lansing, Michigan between
Loder and Fowler. Although Loder never refers to Fowler in The Transforming Moment, his “description
of the work of the Holy Spirit in human transformation provided Christian educators with a credible
means to critique the near normative status which.. .Fowler’s faith development paradigm had accrued
during that time.”^  Their mutual critiques were later published.”® Loder welcomed and commended
Fowler’s work, especially his study of conversion and its relation to stage development, however not
without major reservations. Two in particular have to do with Fowler’s definition of faith and the
arbitrary way in which he came up with the stages. Loder’s critique is that Fowler’s work has little to
do with a biblical understanding of faith.”“
But more significantly, Loder completely dismantles Fowler’s methodology by showing that a
developmental sequence is not normative and thereby exposing the self-contradiction of his theory. This
“difficulty focuses on the problematic standpoint for the observer.”
If one asks, where would anyone have to be, in the system’s own way of accounting for 
things, to be preeminently interested in stages and the staging of the whole of human 
development -  if one asks this, it seems unlikely that one could be beyond stage 4. If 
this is the case and, if one were to move into stage 5 and paradoxicality, the stages 
would become ambiguous; in stage 6 universality, they would appear to be of minor 
interest and not definitive of anything. Indeed insofar as they were thought to be 
definitive, they would be representative of an error with respect to the normative way 
of constructing meaning and being. But the normative goal of Fowler’s sequence is 
precisely this: universalizing. What kind of a model is it that sets up a normative goal 
which if it is attained would expose the model itself to be inadequate and in error?”®
Andrew Grannell, “The Paradox of Formation and Transformation,” Religious Education 80 
(1985): 388.
”^ Dana Wright, Loder biographical essay (to be published), p. 18.
”® James E. Loder and James W. Fowler, “Conversations on Fowler ’ s o f Faith and Loder’s
The Transforming Moment,Religious Education Journal, 77(1982): 133-148.
”‘*Loder is not alone in this view, Dykstra sees two different definitions at work in Fowler. See, 
“What is Faith? An Experiment in the Hypothetical Mode,” Craig Dykstra and Sharon Parks, eds. Faith 
Development and Fowler (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1986), pp. 45ff  Loder is not 
alone in identifying the need to critique Fowler from a theological perspective. See Richard H. Osmer’s 
critique of Dykstra, and his dependence upon Lindbeck as leading to a “cultural relativism” with regards 
to theological claims, in “James W. Fowler and the Reformed Tradition: An Exercise in Theology 
Reflection in Religious Education,”Religious Education 85(1990): 66,51-58. Osmer begins his critique 
of Fowler with a reference to the famous debate with Loder in which he claims that Fowler’s view has 
little to do with a biblical understanding of faith.
”®Loder in Loder/Fowler, p. 137.
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Fowler does not reply to this critique. In fact, Fowler does not register any major disagreements with 
Loder’s approach. What he does acknowledge is that they both have very different aims. Fowler wants 
to reinforce his view that there is such a thing as human development and that it moves through stages. 
Loder will not deny this, of course. Fowler is looking for a general theory of religion which makes 
Loder’s Christocentric paradigm problematic. In fact, Fowler admits that TTM is “unique in my recent 
experience because it tries and largely succeeds in bringing us into dangerous proximity to the 
transforming event of divine-human intercourse.””®
Some educational theorists have tried to hold these two perspectives -  formation and 
transformation -  in a creative tension. To some degree, like the koinonia-ekklesia relationship, there 
is a foimation-transformation dialectic. But ti'ansformation will always maintain a marginal control. 
Grannnel sees Loder’s work as having “successfully challenged the idea of any unilateral formationist 
perspective on Christian nurture.””’ Loder holds to the claim that “Christian faith is not something that 
can be learned. . . . Faith is received by grace, and grace not only is not man’s to administer but it 
conforms man to that faith which is not of himself; it shapes him into the basic foim of humanity, which 
is the man Jesus.””* The purpose of education in the Christian life is to awaken faith, to provide a context 
for individuals to encounter Christ.
The challenge before the church, to which Loder’s work is an initial offering, is the need to 
develop educational curricula that allow us to teach transformationally. Margaret A. Krych’s, Teaching 
the Gospel Today: A Guide for Education in the Congregation serves as such a model. Based on her 
doctoral dissertation which she wrote under Loder’s supervision, Krych applies Loder’s transformational 
narrative, the five-step pattern of convictional knowing, to the way educators talk with children about 
God’s grace. We can more easily teach for transformation after first identifying convictional knowing 
operative within the Biblical narratives. She sees the sequence operative in the four gospels, especially 
in Jesus’ exchange with Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1-10) and Peter’s denial and restoration as told in the 
Gospel of John (John 13:36-38:18:15-18,25-27; John21:15-19). Indeed, she is not alone in identifying 
this sequence at work in scripture. Paul N. Anderson has creative use of Loder’s paradigm as a way to 
interpret John 6, so that the thrust of the story is not merely stilling the storm, but “an awesome calming
”®Fowler in Loder/Fowler, p. 146.
”’Grannell, p. 395.
”*RPCF, p. 19. For Loder the epistemology of faith that reveals divine must be favored over 
“various philosophical theories of knowledge. Thus, idealism [, for example,] has made faith education 
more a matter of grasping right ideas, images, and idealized persons . . . .” Loder’s entry, 
“Epistemology,” in Harper’s Encyclopedia o f Religious Education. Iris V. Cully & Kendig Brubaker 
Cully, general editors (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 220.
231
of the disciples.’’”” Krych writes, “Transformational narrative in religious education fulfills a symbolic 
function -  it points beyond itself to God’s ultimate transforming forgiveness by grace received in faith, 
which gives the believer a new situation of acceptability in spite of his or her unacceptableness. If the 
transformational pattern in narrative communicates this message so that children respond not to the 
naiTative itself, but to God’s saving activity in Christ, then the transformational nairative will be an agent 
of healing.” The objective of religious education is to lead one to an encounter with Christ, not merely 
the recounting of an interesting story. Krych’s work with the logic of transformation is the exception 
to the norm that favors a different pedagogical approach.
For example, if one looks at the present church school curriculum in the Presbyterian Church 
(U. S. A.) for ages tliree/four to eighteen, it would be obvious that the material aims to educate in tei*ms 
of propositions, ideas about the faith, as well as an emphasis upon morals. The curriculum has a 
consistent pattern that seeks to tell the Christian story, but the purpose in telling the stoiy is to learn the 
lesson and apply it to one’s life. In selected passages from the New Testament, especially the gospels, 
students learn that Jesus calls us to be kind and helpful toward others, loving and good. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with this. There is a particular ethic for the Christian walk. But the power of the 
gospel is more than an appeal to the ethical and the teaching of a particular morality. The good news of 
the Christian message is about so much more. It is a testimony to the present-day presence of God at 
work through Christ who continues to bring about transformation in the hearts and minds of God’s 
people.
Part of the present crisis of the church, therefore, is that people assume being a Christian 
involves merely intellectual assent to theological propositions that are grounded, hopefully, in historical 
evidence (e. g., Jesus was born in Bethlehem. Jesus calmed the storm. Jesus raised Lazarus from the 
grave. Jesus died on the cross for my sins. On the third day, God raised Jesus from the grave.) and an 
emphasis upon morality. What I witness in the church are individuals who believe that faith entails 
belief in certain propositions, primarily summed up in one of the early creeds. Again, confession is 
important but it must be grounded in something more than just assent. How do the creedal statements 
point to and participate in a deeper reality and truth? Christian faith seems to entail only holding a 
belief in key doctrines, where faith is devoid from action. Related to this is the view that the Christian 
life is primarily about learning right from wrong, learning the lessons of Jesus’ teachings. This view
””PauTN. Anderson, The Christology o f the Fourth Gospel: Its Unity and Disunity in the Light 
o f John 6 (Tübingen: Morh-Siebeck, 1996), based on his 1988 University of Glasgow doctoral thesis. 
John Painter favorably reviews Anderson ’ s reading of the text in Review ofBiblical Literature, 8(1997). 
Loder believed his insights into the logic of transformation could serve as a hermeneutical principle in 
the study of the Bible, especially the Gospel of John. See also Loder’s foreword in Cullen I. K. Stoiy, 
The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose, Pattern, and Power (Shippensburg, PA: Ragged Edge Press, 1997).
reduces the Christian experience to simple moralisms. Both assumptions disconnect us from the power j
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of the gospel.
Such a view also limits the expectations of what people can experience in relationship to and 
with God. In my experience, the overwhelming reason parents bring their children to church school is 
so that they leam right from wrong, develop Christian values and learn the story. It is common for 
university-age men and women to move away from the church (providing they grew up in the church), 
only to return after marriage and the birth of their first child. They look to the church to guide their 
children and undergird them with a morality that would be useful, good, and ultimately pleasing to God. 
Children then grow up and are socialized into the church, leam the lessons, leam the stories of the Bible. 
By the time they are adolescents, they know the stories very well - and they are also extremely bored! 
Then they begin to drift away. There is no need to be in church because they have leamed all that they 
need to leam. They will retum when their children need to hear the story and leam the lessons. As for 
the adults, once their children have moved through church school and reach adolescents very often they, 
too, start to drift away from active participation in the church. They know the story and do not expect 
to hear anything they have not already heard. I also witness older adults who have been in the church 
their entire lives, who know the Bible stories (even better than the clergy) but do not expect to hear 
anything new. In such a setting there is no expectation that there can be anything new. The church 
functions to preserve a dead tradition, to tell the same old story, to reinforce a socially contrived 
morality. In such a context there is little expectation of experiencing the present reality of Christ who 
comes to enliven, to make new, to hansform human life and society.
Loder’s work leads us to question whether or not our reliance upon story (including the telling 
of history which is obviously a story, a narration of events) is a blessing or a curse for the church. Story 
has become a hot-topic within the church over the past couple of years. Ministers and educators today 
are learning how to become storytellers, developing imaginative ways of making the stories of the Bible 
come alive to the contemporary reader and hearer. We are invited to think about the stoiy of our lives, 
“our story,” as part of “God’s story.”™” In truth, the members of a church, as preservers of the story, 
know the stories of the Bible. Christians know the stories all too well. Placing considerable trust in 
narration alone to convey theological truth, tiuth that has the power to tiansfigure reality is highly 
dubious.™' Indeed, it is questionable whether the stories can actually produce the same kind of
™”There are a plethora of books on the importance of story in the church. See Thomas E. 
Boomershine, Story Journey: An Invitation to the Gospel as Storytelling (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1988) and Walter Bmeggemann, The Creative Word: Canon as a Model fo r Biblical Education 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982). Brueggemann sees the story as a distinctively Jewish and Christian 
way of epistemology, pp. 22-23ff.
™‘ln this sense theologians need to pay attention to Benedetto Croce’s (1866-1952) statement 
that “all history is contemporary history.” The Theory and History o f Historiography (1916). 
“Historians are increasingly aware,” writes George Steiner on the subject of language and narrative, “that
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transformation apart from the presence of the Holy Spirit. Knowing about Jesus’ crucifixion and 
resurrection are important things to know. But unless that which Christ gained on our behalf in his death |
and resurrection is experienced in the Spirit mediating that power, we remain distant and cut off from I
the vitality of the Gospel. Lessons about and stories about Jesus cannot be substitutes for encounters î
with Jesus in the present.™’
The purpose of education in the church is to awaken faith, to provide a context for an individual 1
to encounter Christ. In that encounter, as mediated by the Holy Spirit, one experiences the transforming J
work of God in the world today. Richard Robert Osmer identifies the dangers of seeing Christian
education as merely the transmission of information or knowledge and argues; instead, the “the goal of !iteaching is to create a context in which faith is awakened, supported, and challenged.. . .’’™® Teaching !
the faith involves teaching for belief, teaching for relationship that draws people into a living relationship ^
with a living God, teaching for commitment, and teaching that is open to mystery. The role of the 
teacher, Osmer believes, is to “serve as an instrument in the meeting of the Holy Spirit and the human j
Tspirit, the Word of God and human words of confession. Accepting the limits of our teaching is a way j
of acknowledging the mystery that is a part of faith.”™'* !
iLoder’s challenge to the teaching ministry of the church has exciting possibilities for homiletic ]
the conventions of narrative and of implicit reality with which they work are philosophically vulnerable.” 
George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects o f Language and Translation, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 140.
™’Whether or not a particular story ‘ captures’ the past event and conveys the reality of that event 
needs to be critically examined in light of our discussion. “What wish is enacted, what desire is gratified 
by the fantasy that real events are properly represented when they are shown to display the formal 
coherence of a story?” Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality,” in 
On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 4, cited in David 
Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 11. Carr and 
others argue that narrative is not a flight from reality, but an extension of “pattern and configurations” 
built into reality (p. 16). Cf. also Alasdair MacIntyre’s chapter, “Virtues, Unity of Life and Concept of 
a Tradition,” 'm After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second Edition (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 
204-225 who argues in favor of the importance of narrative structures in establishing a connection to 
reality, that narratives are integral to daily life. “.. .we always move towards placing a particular episode 
in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings 
in which they act and suffer. . . .we render the actions of other intelligible in this way because action 
itself has a basically historical character. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because 
we understand our own lives in terms of narratives that we live out the form of narrative appropriate for 
understanding the actions of others.” Thus, “we are never more (sometimes less ) than the co-authors 
of our own narratives, (pp. 212-213)” Informed by Loder, I believe that it is precisely our nan*atives that 
need to be transformed and re-narrated by the One Who can truly narrate our lives,
™®Richard Robert Osmer, In Teaching for Faith: A Guide fo r Teachers o f Adult Classes 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press 1992), p. 22.
™'*Osmer, p. 22-38, 38.
234
theory. This is one area of Loder’s thinking that has yet to be explored; How does one preach for 
transformation? The sermon is more than the transmission of information about Jesus. It is not a lecture. 
It an invitation to participate in the transforming life of Christ, Is it possible to create a transformational 
context in the sermon that somehow releases the transformational pattern, leading to a “meeting of the 
Holy Spirit and the human spirit (Osmer)”? If so, then the role of conflict will have a major part in the 
preaching moment. This is a rich area for further research and reflection.™®
B. Counseling in the Spirit
One place where we see Loder being an educator, awakening faith in individuals is through his 
experience as a therapist. In his essays, articles, and books, Loder widely draws upon what he has 
learned over the years as a counselor, amassing considerable insight into the human condition as he tries 
to speak to human need from within the heuristic of his convictional theology. This is an aspect of his 
work that has been left completely unexamined. In addition to his own description of cases sprinkled 
thiough his writings, there are literally hundreds (maybe thousands) of individuals who have gone to him 
for counseling.
Loder began his clinical training at the Massachusetts Mental Health Clinic in Boston, followed 
by time at the Menninger Clinic during the 1960's and worked with individuals (primarily students) in 
Princeton for close to forty years. Although it would be difficult to prove this, I would suggest that those 
who counseled with him over the years know best the extraordinary impact and integrity of his 
convictional theology.™® In those counseling sessions Loder modeled and practiced what he believed, 
preached, taught, and theorized about throughout his wi itings. Combining his enormous grasp of the 
psychoanalytic tradition and a profound insight and respect for the work of the Holy Spirit at work in 
the world and in the lives of all people, Loder provided new frameworks for the Christian life by 
extending a rnajwelous vision o f what life can be like in Jesus Christ and holding this up as a possibility 
for everyone.
™®No one, to my knowledge, has begun to explore this issue. Learning from Loder, the use of 
conflict is an important element in my preaching. I have found that the more comfortable I am in 
addressing, creating, and/or exposing the inherent conflict within human life, the more engaging the 
sermon becomes - both for me and the listeners. When exposed, the Gospel can then speak to the place 
of greatest conflict and human need. Indeed, we begin to leam that even the conflict itself can become 
a place of meeting, a sacred place, where the face of the void becomes the face of God.
™®The proof for this claim will be found in the accounts of people who did psychotherapy with 
him, locked away in their private journals or diaries, enfleshed in their ministry, expressed in their 
sermons, further modeled in pastoral counseling sessions in their parishes. Since his death, there is 
already a need to get in touch with people who worked with him so that they can give an account. I was 
privileged to have a therapeutic relationship with him for two and a half years. Recently, Kenda Dean 
said she knew of people who were in counseling for years and never got anywhere until they met Loder. 
This is an aspect of his life that needs to be preserved.
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Loder believed the entire logic of transformation was expressed in the “Carmen Chiisti” (the '
song of Christ) of Philippians 2: 5-11, a song that was sung, as it were, in his counseling sessions. In i
Loder’s reading of the text, he sees Paul holding out a claim for the Philippians that they already had
within them. Their responsibility was to “let it be.” The pattern of Christ - the crucifixion and liberation
pattern of his life - was already at work in their lives through the Spirit. When Paul implores them to |
let or “have this mind among you which is yours in Christ Jesus (Phil. 2:5),” Loder interprets this as a |
plea to “let Christ’s way become the way that defined them,” and paraphrases this verse in the following
way: “Let transformation after this pattern unfold you.”™’ One could debate whether or not this is an
accurate paraphrase of Paul’s intent, nevertheless it provides an invaluable insight into Loder’s own |
methodology. The invitation that Loder sees Paul extending to the church in Philippi is a desire he hopes I
for everyone. He wants to see the life of Christ unfold in and through the individual, bringing the human \
spirit to life. Moments of conviction have persuaded Loder that what was afforded him, the Spirit of I
Christ affords to everyone. In this way “convictional experiences are invitations or moments of ;
awakening” in which one discovers that “the void is not bottomless” because God: '  j
. . .  call[s] us into the resurrected life of Chiist, who filling all in all, seeks to actualize j
that fulfillment through the transformation of all human life (Ephesians 1: 23, 4:13). I
The convicting experience is saying, “Don’t be afraid -  trust and live. Live beyond the |
boundaries of the shelters you have built up against the void. Live in the transparency |
of the self with the Holy. ™*
This is the vital nerve of the Christian life, living transparently in the presence of God. I
Upholding a non-reductionist, interdisciplinary methodology, transformation cannot be |
understood functionally as a means of producing mental health; similarly psychological techniques j
cannot be used to manipulate religious experience. Theology and psychology must be mutually edifying I
and correcting. ™” Nevertheless, one must not assume that the objectives of the Spirit are the same as the f
psychotherapist. Clinical work is more than simply “psychological adjustment” or simply “damage l
control.” The Spirit will not be “used” to help psychically troubled individuals simply to function in a !
society that is predominately sick to begin with. Theologically, health is not determined by merely being i
able to function in society -  when society is probably the chief cause of illness. As a result, Loder ;
cautions us against the way religion or faith has been used by parents and institutions (like the church) I
in order to help an individual function in a given society. Sick religion reinforces and sanctifies a sick I
™’77M2, p. 148.
™*rrM2, p. 121.
™”Cf. Loder’s entry “Theology and Psychology” in The Dictionary o f Pastoral Care and 
Counseling. Rodney J. Hunter, general editor (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), p. 1270: “ The aim 
of the task of relating theology and psychology should be mutual correction for the sake of a mutually 




society making it all the more difficult to hear and be open to the life-transforming power of the Spirit 
who yearns to bring healing and fireedom for the self. Indeed, it is only a Christomorphic transformation 
that gives one the ability to move out beyond the social structures that hinder the self.
Given this assessment, it is significant to note that no where does Loder address the origins of 
mental illness. He was very familiar with and interested in current brain research theory.'™ Penfield 
remained his primary guide because he retained a place for the human spirit that was not 
reductionistically defined by chemical reactions in the brain. Underneath the disturbed ego is a spirit 
that longs for liberation and goes to extraordinaiy lengths (sometimes maladaptively) to seek freedom. 
The Christian community would have been better served had Loder taken more time to articulate a 
theologically informed understanding of mental illness from the perspective of the obstructed desires of 
the human spirit. Nevertheless, in examining his methodology, especially in his case studies, one finds 
Loder always searching to connect with the drives of the human spirit at work underneath the neurosis 
or even psychosis. For example, in dealing with depression, Loder tried to find a way to speak to the 
human spirit who was experiencing the depression, searching for the self that was expressing itself in 
a depressed state. One’s identity must never be confused with the illness. One is always more than the 
illness, A person enslaved to depression knows, for example, that underneath there is still a self that 
longs for freedom and healing. Loder is always making an appeal for the fractured self.
In the transparency with God the self never loses its identity, but finds its true self made whole 
in the relationship with Christ. This cannot be stressed enough - Loder’s theology is person focused.'” 
It is for the sake of the anguished creature that God sent the Son. To ignore this dimension of his thought 
is to misunderstand his primary objective. As we saw in chapters one and two, conviction always makes
””See Loder’s review of James B. Ashbrook The Human Mind and the Mind o f God: 
Theological Promise in Brain Research in Religious Education 81 (1986): 655-656. On contemporary 
theories concerning contemporary neuro-scientific approaches to faith see Andrew Newberg, Eugene 
D’Aquili, Vince Rause, Why God Won V Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology o f Belief ÇHqw York: 
Ballantine Books, 2002). According to my research, there has been no significant response to Loder’s 
work from the psychoanalytic community. In many ways, his interdisciplinary approach and the 
unconventional incorporation of theology and psychoanalytic theory beyond pattern maintenance and 
psycho-social adjustment have obstmcted a view and therefore a reception of his work.
' "In the only article that explores the psychotherapeutic dimensions of Loder’s theology, Patrick 
M. Barker is correct to note that what is offered is “a client-centered spiritual direction where the 
emphasis is on enabling [one] to attend and respond to the Holy Spirit in his or her life.” But he is 
somewhat inaccurate in that Loder’s approach was more than simply spiritual direction. Barker neglects 
to see the psychoanalytic foundations of his work. He also critiques Loder’s approach for being too 
“conflict-centered rather than growth-centered.” This is a remarkable claim given that implicit to 
transformation is human growth. His claim that also fails to grasp the potentially creative element of 
conflict. In the end. Barker suggests that Loder’s paradigm is only useful for moments when “crisis 
counseling” is needed. What Barker fails to see that life itself is the crisis that continually demands 
resolution. “The Relevance of James Loder’s Grammar of Transformation for Pastoral Care and 
Counseling,” The Journal o f Pastoral Care, 49 (1995): 164-166.
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a place for the “I,” and grants the “I” freedom to live from beyond the power of the ego. In the presence
of the otherness of Christ, in and through the relationship one comes to know oneself. Apart from that
mirroring reflection, one is left to see in a “glass dimly” (1 Corinthians 13:12). With Christ we see “face
to face.”(l Cor. 13:13). Conviction never extinguishes, annihilates, or destroys the ego or the self, but
recenters the personality in Christ, affirms the inherent ascriptive worth of the self and mirrors back to
the individual one’s true identity as a child of God.”’ Worth and identity can only be established by
Clirist - not through the mirroring of one’s peers, social network, parents, teachers, or anyone else. Only
Chi'ist has the authority and the ability to truly mediate reality, the truth, and one’s true identity. Loder
might be charged with a kind of “Christological imperialism,” and such a accusation would be justified
if one ignored his personalist dimension. He makes these claims for and about Christ because of the
extraordinary implications they have for a fearful ego struggling to achieve and defenseively protect its
own imperial domain.”® This quotation captures the thrust of Loder’s personalism:
It takes a universe and more to create a child, and it takes a “love that surpasses 
knowledge” (Eph. 3: 19) to cast out the fear that reverberates between the internal 
emptiness of persons and the vast emptiness of outer space. To see that this silent 
resonance of emptiness is the obverse side of a love so great it can be comprehended 
only from the inside out as human emptiness is filled with all the fullness of God, is to 
have been grasped by the Spirit of God in total transformation. It is to have experienced 
from the ground up a transformation of one’s lifetime so complete that all proximate 
transformations are themselves transformed into subparts of the whole.'™
Thus, in making a room for the “I,” Loder sees God demonstrating a profound desire to maintain the 
integrity of the person at all costs. With this comes the knowledge of God’s extraordinary respect for 
the human spirit, a God whose love is inexorable in its determination to grant freedom to the human 
spirit.”®
”’Cf. Loder’s approach and that of Hans Hofmann, “The good news of the Christian faith 
consists basically of the divine determination to give new meaning and purpose to individual and 
community life. The religious challenge to the feeling of helplessness in the face of seemingly 
unconti'ollable forces is the insistence that there is a power greater than any personal or external 
circumstances. This power of God seeks first of all to integrate the personality in order that it may exert 
itself in the world through people who have found that with God’s help they can take an active and 
creative stand in dealing with the world.” Religion and Mental Health, Religion and Mental Health: 
A Casebookwith Commentary and An Essay on Pertinent Literature (Hem York: Harper, 1961), 
p. 252. These are the introductory words to a case study written by Loder when he was Hofmann’s 
research assistant at Harvard.
' '®Steven S. Ivy makes this obseiwation in his review of The Logic o f the Spirit. See Journal o f 
Pastoral Care~53{ 1999): 496.
p. 15.
' '®The Emmaus Road account in Luke 24 had a special meaning for Loder, especially when Jesus 
asked of his walking companions, “What is this conversation which you are holding with each other as
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His counseling technique consisted of holding up the image of Christ which was at work in 
everyone - whether one knows it or not. Drawing upon his use of the hypnagogic vision and the trust 
he put in the creative power of the imagination to “choose” new ways of being in response to the 
mediation of an image, Loder held out the image of Clirist. He viewed “Jesus Christ as the master image 
who presents the personality with the occasion to experience transformation.. .’’”® By holding out the 
image of Clirist, Christ becomes that mirror in which the self can choose either for or against the image. 
The encounter with the image of Christ overcomes the eikonic eclipse in that the exchange allows us to 
see what we cannot see on our own - namely, the power of sin at work in all areas of our lives which is 
slowly killing us. We can either face the truth and acknowledge our sinfulness (“choose for the 
neurosis”) or live in a two-dimensional denial where we continue to live but are never fully alive.”’ By 
inviting one to become who one really is, one is thrown into conflict and intensification at the same time. 
In the tension one is called to live into the image of Clirist and in this way Christ as Mediator mediates 
a new image of the self, the void, the world, and even God. Throughout the course of counseling (and 
throughout his writings), he consistently extended this image of Christ - of love, of acceptance, of 
freedpm - and held out the challenge to allow the image to define one’s life, as if saying, “This is who 
you Ideally are. Live into the image o f the One who is recreating you according to His image. ” He 
imbued amazing confidence in the power of God and in the power of the self to realize its deepest needs 
in the Spirit. This is realized through the relationship of Spirit-to-spirit.
If convictional theology hinges on the inter-relationality of the Holy Spirit to the human spirit, 
then to separate, confuse or conflate this distinction will lead to considerable chaos in the way the church 
talks about spirituality. In many way, this is the present state of things. Throughout the culture, 
spirituality (with all its manifold definitions) is extremely popular. Generally speaking, spiritual growth 
is understood as a development of the human spirit, of ways to grow the self. Loder’s work therefore 
offers a powerful critique of the pervasive interest in spirituality in the contemporary church and beyond 
it. If we are to use the word “spirituality”in the church, then we must be clear whether we are talking
you walk? (vs. 17)” I heard Loder lectui e on this text several times and each time he paused after reading 
this verse, overcome by emotion, as if overwhelmed by the awareness of Christ’s singular regard for the 
otherness of the self, as a thou before Jesus. As an aside, it was not uncommon for Loder to become 
very emotional during his lectures, even moved to tears when talking about the love of Christ. On the 
first day of a new course he usually warned the class that he might become emotional and even ciy, to 
which he would say, “If this bothers you, that’s your problem, not mine.”
”®7%M, p. 256. Italics in the text. Loder sees Kierkegaard’s focus upon the God-man, “The 
Absolute Paradox” as operating in a similar mode.
”’TTM2, p. 168: “The work of the mediating image [namely, the presence of Christ] is both to 
externalize for the personal ego the underlying threat of nothingness and at the same time supply a new 
context of meaning that embraces and transcends it. Thus the image becomes the Face of God, 
relativizing the ego and at the same time setting it free.”
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about opening ourselves up to the Holy Spirit of God or merely using religious language to describe 
something that is only human.”* If the Holy Spirit is separated from the work of Christ, the Spirit is 
“separated from the objective revelation and reconciling work that orients the Spirit and the way is open 
for general spirits in creation giving rise to amorphous spiritualities defined by human spiritual 
experiences rather than the Holy Spirit of God.”'™ When the Holy Spirit is conflated with the human 
spirit, then spirituality becomes little more than ego or self-development, sanctified navel gazing 
{incurvatus in se), thus eclipsing the possibility of the Holy to accomplish for the ego what it could never 
achieve on its own.
Convictional experiences and the new life they generate are thus defined by an increased
awareness of the importance of intimacy.”” The relational component of the Christian life takes on
greater intensity and importance when it is seen primarily as an experience of intimacy. Intimacy is a
face-to-face indwelling in the presence of Christ, where the relationship Spirit-to-spirit takes on a life
of its own through prayer. Matthew J. Frawley notes that this is one of the major themes that Loder
identifies and values in Kierkegaard, the centrality of intimacy in the Christian experience.'’' In The
Logic o f the Spirit, Loder explores at length the importance of intimacy in convictional experiences:
Intimacy derives from the Latin intimus, and refers to the innermost place in oneself at 
the core of one’s identity. Here one may say correctly, ‘You may know what it is like 
to be me, but you will never know what is for me to be me. ’ In an intimate relationship, 
what it is ‘for me to be me’ is disclosed as openly as possible, each one to the other.
When each side receives the other with accurate empathy, then a synergy is generated 
that can make such a relationship feel almost like an interpersonal trance.” This is the 
basis for prayer and why one’s true identity emerges from the intimacy of prayer.'”
Prayer then becomes for Loder one of the most powerful aspects of the Chiistian life, because through 
prayer one abides in and with the presence of Christ (John 15:4).
To abide or indwell in the presence of a loving Other, Christ mediates an image of the self. It
”*Loder did not understand the Christian life in terms of spiritual growth and only rarely used j
the term. I rarely use it in my ministry. Jesus never called his disciples to be spiritual, but to be disciples. J
' '”Frank Rogers, Jr. “Karl Barth’s Faith Epistemology of the Spirit as a Critical and Constructive |
Framework for Christian Education,” (Doctoral dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1991), p. j
125. Loder was Roger’s advisor.
'’”7TM2, p. 122: “The essence of convictional knowing is the intimacy of the self with its I
Source.”
'’'Matthew J. Frawley, “Loder on Kierkegaard,” The Princeton Theological Review, VII (2000) : I
14. Kierkegaard wrote: “His intimacy surrounds you everywhere; it is offered to you at every moment: 
in this intimacy in the decision you are with the good.” Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits.
Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 107. i
'’’ZiS, p. 61. Italics in the text. ;
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is a dwelling defined and sustained by the movement of love that maintains the relationship. “God is 
love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him.( 1 John 4: 16)” Yet, the greatest 
resistance to this intimacy is the ego. The human spirit longs for the face of God and the ego is ever- 
reluctant to seek God’s face. Whether in a human-to-human love relationship or a human-to-divine one, 
this fear of intimacy “has deep roots in the personality because our primal association with a genuine 
face-to-face intimacy is absence.””® In intimacy we fear both absorption in the other, as well as the fear 
of rejection, abandonment, and, maybe even a sense of our own death. No person can satisfy the “primal 
longing for a face that will not go away.”'™ This can only be given in “a convincing sense of the 
Spiritual Presence of Christ, the Face of God.”'™ Human intimacy is one of the greatest threats to the 
ego, making the possibility of intimacy with God even greater. “The idea of intimacy with the Holy is 
a paradox too great for us to entertain, but it is just such intimacy that establishes the authority of the 
Holy for itself.”'™ Yet, this is the very thing that the human spirit craves. Loder’s counseling technique 
in many respects sought to model the koinonia - a social environment that nurtures the human spirit as 
it seeks to live convictionally. In his desire to support the “inner life,” he pushed every “client” to seek 
that place of intimacy with God in prayer.
Loder challenged every individual to become authentically oneself by pushing one to a deeper 
intimacy with the spiritual presence of Christ, thus allowing Christ to mediate one’s identity.'”  As a 
result, Loder’s vision of the Christian life entails the formation of unique individuals in the presence of 
Christ, This is not an individualistic vision. Instead, he wants us to see that Christ’s relationship with 
the self is unique for every person. It is particular because love itself is particular. In an extremely 
poignant expression of love in the Christian experience, Loder defined it this way: “the non-possessive 
delight in the particularity of the other one.”'™ Love sees the other and does not confuse itself with the 
other. Love allows the other to exist in freedom and creates a space for the other to be. Love does not
'’®rrM2, p. 175.
'™This is why for Loder human love cannot ultimately meet the needs of the human spirit. When 
the primal longing is satisfied in the face of Christ - the face that will not go away - then the “person is 




'” He often said, “You’re no better than your mediator.”
'’*2,5", pp. 266-267. See also TKM, p. 279. Although never articulated by Loder, this definition 
appears to be informed by Kierkegaard’s discussion of “particularity” and love in Works o f Love: Some 
Christian Reflections in the Form o f Discourses, trans. Howard and Edna Hong, preface by R. Gregor 
Smith (New York: Harper Torchbooks,1964), p. 143.
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try to possess the other, control it, define it or delimit it. Love transforms the other from an it into a thou.
Love allows the other to be, existing apart from itself, taking immense delight and joy in the 
particularity, the uniqueness, the incomparability of the other. As a result, the other is brought to life and 
allowed to thrive. Love “earnestly desires the fulfillment of the unique particularity of the other one.”
Loder claims that this is exactly what happens in conviction and it describes the kind of love that j
conviction itself creates. “This is not obscure to the lover who has known love through the spiritual |
presence of Christ; indeed, this is precisely how one has experienced the love of God - intimately, !
knowing better than I do what it means for me to be me and in liberation, as in ‘for freedom Christ has |
set us free,’ so I am possessed only by the One who sets me free.”’^® s
Because the Christian experience is governed by the love of the Spirit operating relationally with |
the human spirit, Loder’s vision is a corrective to those who have reduced the value of the Christian J
experience to a kind of Kantian moralism or a striving after moral perfection. Perhaps this is why ;ithroughout Loder ’ s writings there is very little discussion about sin - although the ego confounded in its |
ability to love is certainly an expression of the power of sin. The Christian life for Loder is not a matter |
of following rules in order to make God happy or emulating Christ as some moral ideal. Discussions of iImorality often take place at Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage and therefore cannot be the source of freedom |
for the self. Love is not an ethical duty that can be achieved by the human spirit. The capacity to love 
is given through a wider loving relationship with God who is love (1 John 4:7). The command to love 
would be oppressive if it were not for the fact that God gives the human spirit the ability to love in the !
intimacy of the S p i r i t . I n  contradistinction to the prevailing views of Aiasdair MacIntyre and others, I
the Christian must not be obsessed with morality, rules, the seeking after virtues, and the enacting of j
practices to help form or shape a Christian life.‘^  ^ Instead, the Christian life consists of an openness to i
the ongoing enfleshment of the Spirit in the work of humanization no matter how unconventional or •
radical that might be. I
p. 267.
pp. 462-463. An article by Seward Hiltner which has been designated “one of the 
clearest expositions that have ever been made of the real contribution of Sigmund Freud and . . .  of 
Freud’s actual impact on the relationship of religion, psychology and psychiatry,” Hiltner writes, “It was 
not morality, nor a sensitivity to culture, that Freud found devastating in his patients, but a legalistic 
morality of conformity containing understanding neither of one’s self nor of culture.” “Freud, 
Psychoanalysis, and Religion,” Pastoral Psychology, VII (1956), p. 9ff cited by Loder in NRC, p. 463.
‘^ ‘Frawley notes that Kierkegaard’s Works o f Love must not be seen as Kierkegaard’s great work 
on Christian ethics, as an overwhelming majority of commentators have done (p. 14). Ethics must be 
first grounded in one’s relationship with God - then one discovers how to love with particularity.
Aiasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, second edition (London: 
Duckworth, 1985). See also Craig Dykstra, Growing in the Life o f Faith: Education and Christian 
Practices (Louisville, KY; Westminster/John Knox Press, 1999).
242
There is no room for an ethical idealism in Loder’s theology because this would deny the 
personal, relational aspects of the spiritual presence of Christ at work today in the world. Neither is 
Loder advocating that all Christians must follow the same pattern and be alike, because this would 
remove the sense of particularity that comes with the experience of love. Through Christ, John Baillie 
notes, “it is no mere law that is revealed to us, but a living Person, and what we call the moral law is but 
an abstraction which our limited and limiting minds make from the concreteness of the living Glory that 
is revealed.”’”  Similarly, Loder wants to hold up the personal and sees the Christian life as an 
experience of humanization or rehumanization, “of keeping human life human,” which is the work of 
the Spirit. As Irenaeus (c. 115-190) claimed in Against the Heresies, “The glory of God is the human 
person fully alive,” so, too, Loder’s humanism seeks to further advance the glory of God. Humanization 
is a movement down and in, as if into the soil out of which our creatureliness is formed. It is learning 
to be a creature dependent upon the Creator. Only life in the Spirit can define and grant such a fully 
human life.’”  Thus, sanctification involves not becoming like Christ (as in a copy or replica), but 
conforming to the image of Christ who as the fully human one (as true creature) was relationally 
dependent and intimate with the Father, whose identity was grounded firmly in that relationship. Life 
in the Spirit is a process of becoming authentically human, that is learning what it means to be a 
redeemed creature in the presence of God.’”
V. Critical Engagement of the World
The telos of conviction is to allow greater engagement with the created order so that when 
individuals come alive in the Spirit of Christ the glory of God is revealed throughout the world, so that
’^ ^John Baillie, Our Knowledge o f God (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), pp. 162-163. 
“What we have most fundamentally to do with in religion is not a demand that is being made upon us 
but a gift that is being offered to us.”
'” See also Eberhard Jiingel’s important essay, “On Becoming Truly Human,” Theological 
Essays, II, Edited with an Introduction by J. B. Webster; Translated by Arnold Neufeldt-Fast and J. B. 
Webster. (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1995), pp. 216ff. “Human persons do not decide who they truly are. 
..  .It is essential to the human person to exist in relation to others and in relation to God. For only the 
one for whom it is essential to be manifest before another longs for recognition. The human person is 
essentially a person in the presence o f . . .  that is, human in relation to . . . .  One is essentially human 
before God {coram deo) and human before the forum of the world {coram mundo).” The “true humanity 
of human persons” from a biblical perspective leads us to affirm that, “only as the human T’ is 
addressed not only about itself, but rather addressed in such a way that it is simultaneously claimed by 
something outside itself, that one is really speaking about the human T’ as such. (pp. 220-221)”
’^ ^Cf. JohnD. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1993), p. 58. “. . .salvation is not a matter of moral perfection, an improvement of nature, but a new 
hypostatis of nature, a new creation,.. .this new hypostasis is not something theoretical, but a historical 
experience, even though it is not permanent.” See also Colin E. Gunton, Christ and Creation (Carlisle, 
UK: Paternoster Press, 1992), pp. 25-27.
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human being becomes, as Kathryn Tanner put it, “the administrative center of cosmic-wide service.”’”  
As we have seen, the four-dimensional existence of the Christian is a this worldly one, and not an 
otherworldly one. Loder’s incamational emphasis sees the movement of the Spirit in the Christian life 
as moving one down and in, not up and out. As Elizabeth Frykberg put it, “When persons recognize that 
Jesus Christ is ‘for’ them, they also come to understand the he is ‘for’ the church and world, as well.”'”  
The transforming presence of Christ creates a field of encounter, a New Creation, a new reality that is 
defined by God’s grace. If the Spirit of Christ is the creator of this field, working with the desire to bring 
everyone into the redemptive reality even as he is participating in the new reality, then Loder leads us 
to believe that the Spirit is at work in the world wherever people are coming to life, whether they know 
it is through Christ or not. The experience of the Spirit does not cut us off from the world, but grants a 
greater identification and participation in the world, The Christian can only extend the hope of the 
Gospel on behalf of the world from the firm conviction that the Spirit of Chi ist is present in the lives of 
all people, bringing people to life by enabling them to affirm the goodness of life and the love of God 
in the face of the void, allowing people to say Yes I in the face of everything and everyone who utters No! 
The Spirit confronts, reveals, and provides a way through the nothingness. In the place of such 
nothingness the Spirit is extending life. Loder’s pneumatology challenges theologians and clergy - 
indeed every Cliristian - to expect and eagerly look for the Spirit at work in the world, moving over the 
chaos of the world and bringing the power of the resurrection to those enslaved to the power of death.
When the Christian exists four-dimensionally it yields a particular kind of experience, a present- 
oriented phenomenon in a field of encounter with the Holy Spirit who is eschatologically constituting 
reality in which the self is thereby freed to live with what Loder has called a “mundane ecstacy.””“ The 
Christian experience is not escapist, but consists of a re-emergence into the world. The Spirit thrusts 
the human spirit into the world with extraordinary intensity. “We usually think of ec-static as taking us
‘” Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2001), p. 60. Tanner alludes to Irenaeus’ “administrative anthropocentrism” in Paul 
Santmire, The Travail o f Nature (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 42.
‘^ Elizabeth Frykberg, “Karl Barth’s Theological Anthropology: An Analogical Critique 
Regarding Gender Relations,” Studies in Reformed Theology and History, I (1993): 19
‘” A similar point is made by Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 99ff.
'” Cf. Christoph Blumhardt, Action in Waiting, Foreword by Rodney Clapp; Afterword by Karl 
Barth (Farmington, PA: The Plough Publishing House, 1998), p. 39.
p. 109. Colin Gunton observes in scripture, “the Spirit is God being eschatological.” 
“We Believe in the Holy Spirit, Who with the Father and the Son Is Worshiped and Glorified,” in Joseph 
D. Small, Editor, Fire and Wind: The Holy Spirit in the Church Today (Louisville: Geneva Press, 2002),
p. 22.
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out of our senses,” Loder points out, “and therefore out of the world known and shared with others.
Being beside oneself, as the word suggests, and so ‘out of the body’ in some sense, is, of course, a
possibility; but it is not a distinctively Christian form of ecstacy, although such ecstasy does occur in
Christian experience (2 Corinthians 12: 1-4).”” ’ Instead, Loder wants to stress a different image, no
doubt gi'ounded in his own convictional experiences, as well as his reading of Kierkegaard:
In Christian ecstasy, one is beside oneself in depth as well as height, so to say. In the 
ecstasy of Christian experience, one perceives the world of common experience in a new 
way; one becomes absorbent of almost more “mundaneness” than can be contained.
One is beside oneself in the perception of particularity and the essential goodness of 
being itself. This is a direct reflection of one’s awakening to one’s own particularity 
and goodness as given by grace. This is to say, one comes into Christ’s World -  his 
intended creation -  out of those “worlds” that produce self-alienation.
When the Christian is thrown at the world thiough the Spirit the entire world is illuminated in a whole 
new light. The Christian is “free to indwell and compose his World in all of its particularity, fascination, 
and beauty. One’s eyes are opened to the particularity of goodness and the goodness of being-itself when 
one’s own particular being has been embraced and affirmed by Christ Jesus, in whom being-itself 
became particular.”’'’^  “To experience ‘mundane ecstasy’ is to recognize the world God so loved. The 
thrust of transformation, then, is not to discover how to do things spiritually, but to discover the Spirit 
of Christ and choose his world.”’"’'’
The Spirit puts one into the world in a process of historicization, whereby one is thrust into time- 
space. When the Holy Spirit as the giver of life grants the life-giving power of Christ, an individual is 
situated in a world of openness and freedom. Because the Spirit is continuing the work of Christ, the 
Spirit enfleshes the human spirit, creating a context and framework to live with intensity and 
embodiment. One is placed more firmly in one’s skin. The Holy Spirit thereby historicizes the human 
spirit, placing one into the flow of reality in time-space. The Spirit embeds the Christian in time-space 
and yet the Christian is not completely bound to the contingencies of time-space. The Cliristian moves 
with the Spirit and is not limited to the present because the Spirit is continually opening up the future 
and increasingly placing one firmly into reality with freedom and love. The Christian is hot supposed 
to be stuck in the past, nor limited by the present, or even living in fear of the future.




’'’'’Tom Brownell’s review of The Transforming Moment, Epiphany 3 (1982): 92-93.
145LS, p. 334.
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Jürgen Moltmann’s description of life in the Spirit sei*ves as a wonderful summai*y of and points to what
I think Loder is trying to articulate:
When the heart expands and we stretch our limbs, and feel the new vitality everywhere, 
then life unfolds in us. But it needs a living space in which it can develop. Life in the 
Spirit is a life in the ‘broad place where there is no cramping’ (Job 36:16). So in the 
new life we experience the Spirit as a ‘broad place’ - as the free space for our freedom, 
as the living space for our lives, as the horizon inviting us to discover life. ‘The broad 
place’ is the most hidden and most silent presence of God’s Spirit in us and round about 
us. But how else could ‘life in the Spirit’ be understood, if the Spirit were not the space 
‘in’ which this life can grow and unfurl? We explore the depths of this space through 
the trust of the heart. We search out the length of this space through extravagant hope.
We discover the breadth of this space through the torrents of love which we receive and 
give. God’s Spirit encompasses us from all sides and wherever we are (Ps. 139).
Christ’s Spirit is our immanent power to live - God’s Spirit is our transcendent space 
for living.’”
The Holy Spirit opens up the human spirit so that it no longer turns inward, but can be free to turn 
outward in love toward the world. All the energy that was previously used to protect the ego is now 
released with passion for the world and life itself.
It should be noted that although Loder’s four-dimensionality might appear to reflect a form of 
Platonism, this is not the case. As we have see throughout, Loder is ti'ying to remove all dualisms and 
move to a more holistic, gestalt-like understanding of reality. The gestalt is a part of the whole. What 
is required in the Christian life is a frgure-gi ound shift in which the true reality of Christ’s redeeming 
presence be seen as the truer reality. The world and all it contains belongs to God (Psalm 24:1), which 
means that the work of the Spirit consists of educating the human spirit to the reality that one is already 
participating in the life of God - whether one knows it or not. Four-dimensionality always results in a 
paradigm or figure-ground gestalt shift in which the way the self, world, void, and even God are all 
reconstituted by the mediating presence of Chiist. The Christian lives an ordinary life at the same time
he/she is participating in a whole other reality.
The image that Loder uses most frequently for the Christian life is Kierkegaard’s description of 
the knight of faith. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard offered a vision of a Christian who is so 
ordinary that he/she is almost invisible to the common eye. “The moment I set eyes on him I instantly 
push him from me, I myself leap backwards, I clasp my hands and say half aloud, ‘Good Lord, is this 
the man? Is it really he? Why, he looks like a tax-collector!”’ Even in church, the knight of faith in
’” Moltmann, p. 178. “In ‘life in the Spirit’ one even notices physically something of the ‘life 
given to our mortal bodies’. We sense the exhilaration of existence and the élan of life in the Spirit. 
Spirituality is in a holistic sense new vitality. It is not a religious and moral restriction of life and its 
enfeebling reduction. It is a new delight in living in the joy of God. (p. 178)”
’4?cf xhomas S. Kuhn’s discussion of paradigm shifts in acts of discovery and creativity. The 
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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indistinguishable. “No heavenly glance or any other token of the incommensurable betrays him; if one 
did not know him, it would be impossible to distinguish him from the rest of the congregation, for his 
healthy and vigorous hymn-singing proves at the most that he has good chest.” Yet, this knight is so 
amazingly alive. “He takes delight in everything he sees, in the human swarm, in the new omnibuses, 
in the water of the Sound.” The knight of faith is grounded in the particularity of love who takes 
immense delight in the goodness and beauty of creation without being determined by all that he sees and 
experiences. “He lives as carefree as a ne’er-do-well, and yet he buys up the acceptable time at the 
dearest price, for he does not do the least thing except by virtue of the absurd.”’”
This was an important image for Loder, primarily because it captures an understanding of the 
human spirit fully alive in all its particularity.’”  The knight of faith, Loder affirms, 'Hives in the 
seacrossing theophany and so is engaged in the quiet passion of believing at every moment. Thus, he 
is fascinated that every particular is an embodiment of the universal, yet without losing its particularity; 
every event and interaction is a gift that is unique but embodies eternity; eveiything is truly possible not 
nothing is necessary -  all ‘by virtue of the absurd.’”’^ ”
If the telos of conviction is a deepened engagement with the world, what is the further purpose 
of such an engagement? Loder seems to suggest that conviction yields primarily a sense of delight and 
fascination with being. But if this sense of particularity is an expression of love (as we saw earlier), then 
surely the power of transfonning love would require a deeper engagement with social issues. If the Spirit 
thrusts the Christian more deeply into the world with love, then, it seems to me that the Christian life 
inevitably involves a critical engagement with culture, especially when the forces of culture (as in the 
power of socialization) are so destructive of the human spirit. Yet, for all of Loder’s stress upon the 
power of God to transform the human spirit, there is a noticeable silence and glaring omission of any 
concern for social justice in his writings. Loder does believe that transformed persons have the power 
to shape the socio-cultural order, but he does not elaborate upon what that might look like other than to 
say that it will be koinonia-like. “Countering dualistic themes and atomistic objectivism, the relational 
reality of the koinonia attempts to live out in human forms the inner life of the trinitarian God. Indeed, 
insofar as it is true to itself, the relational life of persons in God’s Spirit will always search out, be 
sustained by, and call forth from within its own depths and from beyond its boundaries, the communion-
’'‘^ Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p.
’” He makes reference to the knight of faith in NRC, pp. 442ff; RPCF, pp. 145-146, 177-178; 
TKM, 104-105ff, andZ5', pp. 334-336. Kierkegaard explains that the knight of faith, “.. .takes delight 
in everything, and whenever one sees him taking part in a particular pleasure, he does it with the 
persistence which is the mark of the earthly man whose soul is absorbed in such things.. . .  Yet he does 
not do the least thing except by virtue of the absurd [the God-man received in faith].” Fear and 
Trembling, Translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 49ff.
150LS, p. 334.
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creating presence of Jesus Christ.”” ’ However, this is never completely articulated.’^ ^
But it should come as no surprise that Loder is reluctant to convey such a vision. What must one 
do in response to the life given in Christ? The answer will be unique for every individual. What is more 
important is giving the human spirit the freedom to choose, as if God is saying back, “What àoyou want 
to do?” Loder wants to ensure freedom of the ego to choose based on self-worth - because the concern 
for self-worth will save the person from self-destruction.’” This is why the ethical component of the 
Christian life always flows after a period of abiding or indwelling in the presence of Christ, chiefly in 
the form of prayer.
Because Loder wants to hold out the possibility of uniqueness and particularity, he also affirms 
that within the Christian experience there must inevitably be an openness to the future, an awareness of 
the possibility contained in every encounter. This guarantees uniqueness and particularity, but it also 
affirms the eschatalogical aspect of four-dimensional existence. While theories of development might 
have a place in the way we understand human growth, they have no power over the eschatological power 
of the Spirit that is continually at work in producing something new. Moments of transformation are 
inherently eschatological in nature, they are not simply naturally emerging experiences, but something 
that comes upon the individual. Here, Moltmann is helpful in his point that the Christian experience
’” 7%M,p. 306.
’” There is one exception. In LS (pp. 222-223) and in “The Great Sex Charade and the Loss of 
Intimacy,” Word and World, XXI (2001): 81-87, Loder takes up the issue of homosexuality and the 
Christian experience. He does not see this as a social justice issue, but as primarily a psycho-spiritual 
“condition” connected to issues of intimacy. In LS, he places the origins of homosexuality during 
adolescence and sees it as arrested human development. This is a view that has been repudiated by many 
in both the church and in the psychoanalytic community. Loder goes so far to say, after working with 
a “changed” homosexual, that the homosexual lifestyle is a “love of death, (p. 222)” “ ,. .homosexuality 
is not ultimately fundamental to anyone’s nature; it lives too close to death for that. The condition of 
homosexuality is, however, provocation to look deeper and discover that the real issue is not sexuality 
at all. It is intimacy.” This is the theme that he further develops in “The Great Sex Charade.” Loder’s 
strong statements on this issue are unique for him and seem to be shaped by the destructive experiences 
of those he has counseled. In a conversation with Loder on this issue in November, 2000,1 expressed 
my own views, which are diametrically opposed to his, and shared my frustration with the severity of 
his statements. He acknowledged that if he had the chance to re-write LS, he would modify that section, 
as his understanding of homosexuality and the Christian experience was still evolving. For alternative 
interpretations of homosexuality and Christian experience see: James Alison, Faith Beyond Resentment: 
Fragments Catholic and Gay (New York: Crossroad, 2001); Choon-Leong Seow, ed.. Homosexuality 
and the Christian Community (Louisville, KY : Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996); Eugene F. Rogers, 
Jr. Sexuality and the Christian Body (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); Rowan Williams, “Is There a Christian 
Sexual Ethic?” Ray o f Darkness: Sermons and Reflections (Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1995); Walter 
Wink, ed.. Homosexuality and the Christian Faith: Questions o f Conscience for the Churches 
(Minneapolis, MN: Foifress Press, 1999).
’” T7M2, p. 198.
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consists of an encounter with God which yields something that is radically new - the novum, the new 
thing (Isaiah 43:18). One might easily think that the novum is an intenuption, but “interruption is not 
an eschatological category.” “The eschatological category is conversion,” or what Loder would prefer 
to say is transformation.”'’ Eschatological events bring about fundamental changes in the order of time 
and the structure of existence. “The prophets ‘interrupt’, but not just for a moment,” Moltmann suggests, 
“they call the people to the conversion of the courses of time. Conversion and the rebirth to a new life 
change time and the experience of time.”’”  Because such moments come from the future, in that they 
cannot be produced by the past, the Christian looks forward to the in-breaking of God’s reign. “The 
future-made-present creates new conditions for possibilities in history. Mere interruption just disturbs; 
conversion creates new life.”’”
In holding out the openness of the universe, Loder avows the possibility of new life which is the 
basis of Cliristian hope.’”  Resurrection, for example, does not evolve or emerge out of the past or 
present. It breaks in from the future. The resurrection not only converts the power of death, it says 
something about the structure of creation which tells us that resurrection and transformation are possible 
in the world. The conditions of the universe allow for such an occurrence. Just as there are proximate 
forms of death, as Loder suggests, so too are there proximate expressions of resuiTection. While no one 
is beyond the grip of biological death, even it does not have the last word. The Spirit as the giver of life 
is renewing the face of the earth (Psalm 104:30), giving life, bestowing power, healing, and hope - all 
of which have their source in the life of the resurrected Christ who breaks in from the future. As a result, 
Moltmann strengthens Loder’s point that the affirmation of the novum is the primary eschatological 
experience of the Sprit. Resurrection itself points to the openness inherent to the Christian experience. 
“The raising of Christ from the dead has no analogies in experienced history, and is comparable only 
with the miracle of existence itself,” notes Moltmann. This means that the future of the Christ, is the 
new creation. Moltmann puts it beautifully, “The new thing, the Kaivo 9, the novum ultimum, is the 
quintessence of the wholly other, marvelous thing that the eschatological future brings. With the raising
’”  “The future tense of the verb inhabits nearly every saying of Jesus. He is, for his followers, 
hope made flesh.” George Steiner, Grammars o f Creation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 
p. 9.
’^ ®Moltmann, p. 23.
’” Jügen Moltmann, The Coming God: Christian Eschatology, trans. Margaret Kdhl I
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), p. 22. See also Richard Bauckham and Trevor Hart, Hope 1
Against Hope: Christian Eschatology at the Turn o f the Millennium (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, i
1999), pp. 199-200. |
’^ ^Moltmann, p. 22. |
’^ ^Moltman, p. 22. i
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of Christ from the dead, the future of the new creation sheds its lustre into the present of the old world, 
and in ‘the sufferings of the present time’ kindles hope for the world.” '”  As such, the novum ultimum 
is completely beyond one’s imagining at the level of the old creation. The work of the Spirit suiprises, 
shocks, overwhelms, all of which is the prelude to transformation. This is because the in-breaking of 
God’s New Creation bestows new interpretative framework. Yet, on the other hand, it is exactly the 
imagination that is required, but the imagination of one who is open to the mediating presence of the 
Spirit constructing a new reality that redemptively incorporates the void.'”
The place where the incorporation is experienced in the present, in the mundane ecstacy of four­
dimensional life. While the new life is gift of the future, it is experienced in the particularity of the here 
and now. Colin Gunton has demonstrated that Christian theology’s ambivalent understanding of history 
has led to an ambiguous apprehension of the value and reality of time.'^' “The modem obsession with 
the future,” as Gunton says, also prevents us from affirming the importance of the present. “The anxiety 
to bring the future about is the cause of the frantic rush that is one mark of the modem failure to live 
serenely in time.” Thus, “the future” is a false abstraction because it “constrains life into false pattems 
of meaning.”'^  ^ As the New Testament affirms and Loder attests, one’s encounter with Jesus was an 
inbreaking of God’s Kingdom, of the new Reality offered through God’s grace. It is not the product of 
something that evolved or developed from the past but came upon them. Yet, the encounter was never 
anything less than something that was experienced in the present. Indeed, these experiences put them 
into space-time in new ways and reoriented their relationship with the world. The truth be told, we know 
little of the past and close to nothing of the future; what we have is the present, where we “live and move 
and have our being. (Acts 17:28)” Thus, agreeing with Gunton, “we require a reaffirmation of the 
centrality of the present for those whose createdness makes them creatures who know little of the past
‘” Moltmann, p. 28.
'” 7XM, pp. 240-264. When “the human spirit is awakened and empowered by the Creator Spirit, 
then human intensity is transfoimed into Christ’s passion for the world, and human imagination becomes 
his vision for the world.” “Normativity and Context in Practical Theology,” p. 370.
Colin Gunton, The One, The Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture o f 
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 74-100. Gunton sees part of the problem 
rooted in theologies of creation that, since Augustine, have not been able to affirm the temporality of 
time, that is, to see it as part of the created order and therefore good. This is a form of Gnosticism, 
Gunton notes, in that it is a denial “of the goodness and meaningfulness of the world of time.” It “is 
encouraged by a theology that is pessimistic because it lacks christological and pneumatological 
determinants and thus divorces creation and redemption.”Gunton, pp. 84-85. For example, “There is 
no realized eschatology for Augustine, or rather there is an eschatology realized only in the incarnation 
and at the end of time: accordingly, there is no anticipated eschatology. After the incarnation and before 
the end, all history is equally fallen.” For Augustine, the incarnation was “a timeless presence inserted 
into time rather than a genuinely economic action, (p. 84)”
”^Gunton, p. 90.
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and even less of the future.”'”  The present is the place where we live as creatures, fully dependent upon 
God. It is the place where we encounter Christ and live out our lives in relation to Him. It is the place 
where we experience life in all its falleness, but also in all its fullness as mediated by the Spirit, the 
“Life-giver.” The present is the place of freedom, the vast, broad, place where there is no cramping, 
where we grow after the likeness of Christ, where we grow into our humanity. As Gunton recognizes, 
“it is the present that must be understood as that which, through Christ and the Spirit, is given from the 
past and redirected to its true end by the one God, creator and redeemer.”'”
VI. Transforming the Witness of the Church
Loder’s convictional theology thus speaks a powerful and timely word to the church. A word 
that is desperately needed at the beginning of a new millennium. As we have seen throughout, Loder’s 
writings make a significant contribution to the field of practical theology, primarily in the area of 
interdisciplinary study. But his insights and vision need to be taken out from the realm of the academy 
and translated for the parish, given to theologians writing for the church and clergy who are at odds to 
offer a compelling vision of the Christian life. Congregations and their pastors are weary and 
despondent. Most Protestant churches are engaged in status quo, maintenance-level ministry, just trying 
to preserve and hold the institution together a little longer. In this defensive mode, the church does not 
have the resources, especially the energy and imagination to be open to new ways of being the church 
and speaking to the culture.
If we bring Loder’s convictional theology to bear upon the present state of the church, we might 
come to see that perhaps the crisis we now face is rooted in the fact that a considerable amount of 
ministry is focused upon the preservation of the church, primarily viewed as an institution (worrying 
incessantly about numbers, statistics, and growth) and less about ministering to the needs of the human 
spirit. So much energy is being exerted to “save the church” that the people in the pews (if they are still 
in the pews) are perishing. Parishioners are often “used” for the sake of running the institution, paying 
the bills, keeping the operation going. But ministry and the Christian life are more than just 
socialization, which ensures the furtherance the institution. The Christian life, Loder reminds us, is about 
conviction, it is about transformation, it is about holding “the concrete claim that Christianity makes for 
human society [which] is the ability to change human life.”'”
In my estimation, contained within his relational phenomenological pneumatology is a vital 
dynamism that has the potential to provide new frameworks for the Cliristian life. To be a Christian
'“ Gunton, p. 93. 
'“ Gunton, p. 94. 
'“ RPCf, pp. 20-21.
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means to be continually open to the movement of the Holy Spirit who longs to bring the human spirit 
to life in a Christomorphic pattern. There is movement. It is kinetic. The Holy Spirit is active and 
present in the world, encountering individuals, producing change. Blowing through the lives of 
individuals and making real the presence of Christ. In this way the Holy Spirit is extending the work of 
Jesus Christ and inviting people to get caught up in what the Spirit is trying to do and realize through 
real, flesh and blood human beings. To be thrust into the world also means a radical openness to the 
World that God is giving, open to the World that the Spirit is creating and giving to the one in Christ. 
Instead of making the evangelical appeal of inviting Christ into one’s life, Loder leads us to see that the 
Spirit is engaging the human spirit so that the human spirit can get caught up in the wider, ongoing, 
transforming work of Jesus Christ, caught up in his World. Loder’s theology challenges theologians, 
clergy, and the ordinary layperson (and even non-believer) to expect and eagerly look for the Holy Spirit 
at work in the world, moving over the chaos of the world and bringing the power of the resun'ection to 
those enslaved to the power of death. Because the “Spiritual Presence of God in Jesus Christ [is] at work 
to restore an anguished creation to its Creator,” as Loder put it, we must affirm that the Spirit of Christ 
is moying through people’s live - whether they know it or not.
As such, I see a radical and even subversive element within Loder’s thought.”  ^ It is edgy and 
uncomfortable with present ecclesiastical restrictions which appear to hinder the work of the Holy Spirit. 
The Spirit is not in service to the church, but in service to the Word who through the Spirit is continuing 
the work of the incarnation by enfleshing human life with the Spirit of God. This view has far-reaching 
implications for the church and the world. The Spirit has no respect for the past or for traditions per se, 
no respect for the institution, but only for the redemption of human lives and how redeemed lives live 
within the koinonia.”  ^ As the Creator Spiritus the Spirit is the Provoker and Conflictor, stiiTing up 
human life and exposing the self-destructive pattems of the human spirit. The Spirit is moving and the
'“ This tone is especially noticeable in his early work with its counter-cultural emphases. Even 
though Loder has identified himself in the last decade with some of the more conservative elements in 
the Presbyterian Church. This is particularly true with regards to the subject of homosexuality and his 
co-authorship of a letter denouncing that actions of feminist and womanist theologians at the 
“Ecumenical Decade: Churches in Solidarity with Women, 1988-1998" conference in Minneapolis, MN,
1993. See “An Open Letter to Presbyterians: Theological Analysis of Issues Raised by the Re-Imaging 
Conference,” written with other Princeton faculty: Diogenes Allen, Charles Bartow, Ülrich Mauser,
Bruce McCormack and David Willis-Watkins. I find it difficult to square Loder’s outlook with what I
have come to see in his pneumatology - which is anything but conservative. |
'“ “The Christian tradition is by no means inevitably traditionalist. Its eschatalogical hope and *
its missionary orientation press is towards constantly changing contextualizations of the Gospel, in which ]
the resources of the past are brought into critical relationship with the present with a view to the future,” |
in which the Christian remains “subject to the apostolic accounts of its fundamental meaning.” Richard j
Bauckliam, “Tradition in Relation to Scripture and Reason,” in Richard Bauckham and B. Drewery, eds. ]
Tradition in Relation to Scripture and Reason: A Study in the Criteria o f Christian Doctrine (Edinburgh: j
T. & T. Clark, 1988), p. 128. |
J
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Christian life must be equally mobile, traveling light, open to the freedom of the Spirit that is making
us free (Galatians 5:1). When members of the church view the Christian life in this way the entire
structure and mission of the church will change. Trusting in the movement of the Holy Spirit thus frees
the church to be as revolutionary and as radical as the Gospel message itself.’”  To live in this way
liberates the church to be creative and not tied to the past. The challenges facing the church are
immense. The old ways of doing ministry must yield to different, new ways. There is no clear
consensus how the church laden with the institutional burdens of its collective past and its tradition can
be “light” enough to move with what Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) called the “burden of history.”’”
The church must break from the “inertia of history” and be present to the present time. Released to be
authentically present, kinetically moving through space-time under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the
church will then be free to be present to the age and thus free to speak a creative word of healing in such
a way that is contextual, that is meaningful to the age,
In order for the church to speak to the present age it must be free to be creative and imaginative.
There is no one more creative and imaginative than the Holy Spirit who is continually creating and
recreating the world and our lives from within the generative power of God’s redeeming love. The
church can then begin to move, free to go where the Spirit leads. New pattems, new paradigms are
needed for thinking about ministry and communicating the message of the Gospel. C. Jeff Woods calls
the church to action. He writes:
The church is changing. The change is significant enough to be termed a crisis. The 
word crisis stems from a Latin root which mean ‘to part’ or ‘to separate.’ The church 
is cuiTcntly faced with parting from the old ways of doing things. The church must 
orient itself toward the future. The word orient originally meant the direction of the 
rising sun. Many believe that the sun is setting on the church. Rather, it may be that the 
church has been in a period of darkness, and a totally new sun is just about to emerge 
upon the horizon. To follow that sun, the church must venture out.’’°
In order for this to happen, we have to unload the burden of the past. We need to turn our faces away 
from the past, assured of what has been, and turn our faces toward the needs of the present church, open 
toward the future.
Loder’s framework allows us to engage in what Peter M. Senge recently identified as “generative
’^ ^When Christianity “remains true to the Incarnation, it can be revolutionary. . . .” Merleau- 
Ponty, Sense and Nonsense, p. 177.
’“ Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Uses and Abuses of History (1874),” in Thoughts Out o f Season, 
Part II. trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965).
170/C. Jeff Woods, Congregational Megatrends, p. 27.
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learning.”' ’^ Senge studies the pattern of behavior in learning organizations, focusing primarily on 
businesses, but some of the pattems can be applied to the church. In an organization “that is continually 
expanding its capacity to create its future,” there are often two types of learning: survival/adaptive and 
generative. The survival/adaptive reflects a two-dimensional pattern. Being generative is four­
dimensional. For a leaming organization it is not enough merely to survive. This is important, but it |
must be combined with the capacity to be generative, providing new ways of being, moving, acting that ;!
1
fosters creativity and gi'owth. The church as a leaming organization, I would argue, has spent far too |
much time in the survival mode. This would be equivalent to Loder’s understanding of socialization as j
pattem maintenance. In contrast, to be in a four-dimensional, generative mode, people are conscious |
of the degree to which they create their reality and to what extent reality is malleable. It is significant I
that the word Senge uses to make this shift from adaptive to generative leaming is the Greek word with j
obvious Christian overtones: metanoia. Leaming requires a fundamental shift or movement of mind.
It is not acting or leaming as before. Theologically, it is a change of mind, but a change that comes upon 
one from beyond or above one’s mind, not intemal to the self.
It is further significant to note that Senge has found that the primary cause for adaptive/suiwival 
strategies, and thus that which hinders an organization from being generative and creative in the present, 
is what he calls “the fixation on events.” Although he does not identify it, this fixation on events can be 
viewed as an expression of the historical sense infiltrating all areas of our life and commerce. We 
continually compare two events on a time-line and trace their pattem, change or development over time. |
This configuration of time results in events taking on a life of their own, distorting reality and preventing j
!us from moving creatively into the future. For example: j
Conversations in organizations are dominated by concem with events: last month’s j
sales, the new budget cuts, last quarter’s earnings, who just got promoted or fired, the i
new product our competitors just announced, the delay that just was announced on our |
new product, and so on. The media reinforces an emphasis on short-term events- after 
all, if it’s more than two days’ old it’s no longer “news.” Focusing on events leads to 
“event” explanations: “The Dow Jones average dropped sixteen points today,” i
announces the newspaper, “because low fourth-quarter profits were announced j
yesterday.” Such explanations may be true as far as they go, but they distract us from |
seeing the longer-term pattems of change that lie behind the events and from j
understanding the causes of those pattems. !
Our fixation on events is actually part of our evolutionary programming. If you wanted Î
to design a cave person for survival, ability to contemplate the cosmos would not be a Î
high-ranking design criterion. What is important is the ability to see the saber-tooted |
tiger over your left shoulder and react quickly. The irony is that, today, the primary |
threats to our survival, both o f our organizations and o f our societies, come not from  |
sudden events but from slow, gradual processes; the anns race, environmental decay, j
’’’Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice o f The Learning Organization (New 
York: Currency/Doubleday, 1990), p. 22.
’’’Senge, pp. 12-13.
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the erosion of a society’s public education system, increasingly physical capital, and 
decline in design or product quality (at least relative to competitors’ quality) are all 
slow, gradual processes.
Generative leaming cannot be sustained in an organization if people’s thinking is 
dominated by short-term events. If we focus on events, the best we can ever do is 
predict an event before it happens so that we can react optimally. But we cannot learn 
to create.”’
Similarly, the slow decline of the church in the West could be seen as a further expression of 
survival/adaptive strategies because of our fixation on events, such as seeing the life of Christ as merely 
an historical event of the past. Loder’s theology tells the church that it has the capacity to experience 
the very metanoia it proclaims and offers to people, to participate in what H. Richard Niebuhr called “the 
permanent revolution of heart and mind.””'* This can only be accomplished through the empowering 
presence of the Holy Spirit. The principal way generative leaming takes place, as the New Testament 
confimis, is by “direct experience.””  ^ In order for us to have that “direct experience” of Christ, we need 
to re-conceptualize the way we think about time and reaffirm the possibility and reality that the Holy 
Spirit moves across the vast, broad, “gaps” of time and distance to mediate the presence of Christ.
Thus, Loder’s pneumatology provides a framework for us to take seriously the claim that when 
we talk about Jesus we are not referring to merely an historical event that occurred at some point in the 
past, but a personal presence we somehow encounter and experience today. It is this ongoing 
relationship with Christ that constitutes the Christian life. H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) captures this 
idea when he said, “Jesus Christ is not an object, but a person. He is trusted, receives loyalty 
(commitment).” He is “not the object of our teaching, not the object of our common knowledge but he 
acknowledged companion.””  ^ This is what Loder is trying to uphold - Jesus as companion.
Loder’s theology speaks to the needs of believers and the religious seekers who are looking for 
an experience of the Holy. Second-order Icnowing (through texts, traditions, narratives, or stories) are
173Senge, pp. 21-22. Emphasis in text.
”'’H. Richard Niebuhr, Theology, History, and Culture: Major Unpublished Writings, Edited by 
William Stacy Johnson; Foreword by Richard R. Niebuhr (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 
p. xvii.
”’Senge, p. 23. G. B. Caird, New Testament Theology, Completed and Edited by L. D. Hurst 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 347-348.
”®Richard R. Niebuhr, ed. Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure o f Human Faith by H. 
Richard Niebuhr ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 88. “The Christ of our life in faith is 
not simply the historic individual Jesus, though he is that too, but he is the inner personal companion who 
as person is present in the memory and expectation of the believer. He is acknowledged as person. 
Clirist is the personal companion who has been engrafted into my personal existence so that I cannot and 
do not live except in this companionship. I am unfrue to him, I deny him, but he does not let me go and 
I cannot let him go.(p. 105)”
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not sufficient to bring about the kind of change given in first-order knowing. This is the same point 
recently raised by George Steiner in Real Presences. Steiner redefines the meaning of hermeneutics 
beyond a “signifying [of]. . .  systematic methods and practices of explication, of the interpretation of 
texts.” Instead, he wants us to see that hermeneutics is “the enactment of answerable understanding, of 
active apprehension.”” ’ He is critical of the “secondary,” of studies, commentaries, histories, accounts 
after the fact, which devalue and weaken that which is gained through immediate experiences. The 
hermeneutical strategy of the secondary distances us from the power of the original experience, the real
presence, and even, Steiner suggests, has the power to remove us from an experience of transcendence, ijincluding God. He contends “that the wage on the meaning of meaning, on the potential of insight and |
response when one human voice addresses another, when we come face to face with the text and work |
or art or music, which is to say when we encounter the other in its condition of freedom, is a wager on j
Itranscendence.””® He calls for a renewed reliance upon the primary because the methodologies of |
criticism, including biblical criticism and historical criticism, have not offered generative, life-giving |Iexperiences. They have only yielded a false-immediacy that bears with it the “pulse of the distant 1
source.””  ^ j
Steiner’ s call for an immediate experience parallels exactly what Loder’s theology provides for 1
Ithe church. People are searching for immediate experiences, direct personal encounters, real presences |
that mediate the power of God.’®’’ For both church members and the religious seeker alike, through the |
proclamation of the Gospel in worship, sacraments, prayer and service we have an obligation to point |
to the active presence of Christ in the world. We must be conscious of whether or not our ministry seeks j
to bring people into relationship with God, creating a context for encounter, instead of merely offering i
second-hand knowledge about God. In this sense, Steiner has a better handle on the desires of the human j
heart than does the church. We need to pay attention to these imperatives for he, too, describes the I
problems associated with two-dimensionality. “We crave remission from direct encounter with the ‘real j
presence’ or the ‘real absence of that presence’,” declares Steiner, “the two phénoménologies being j
rigorously inseparable, which an answerable experience of the aesthetic must enforce on us. We seek i




’®°Cf. Johan Goethe’s statement, “I hate everything that merely instructs me without increasing 
or directly quickening my activity.” Cited in Nietzche, Thoughts Out o f Season, p. 3. This idea becomes 
the basis for his essay on the “worth and worthlessness of history. I will show in them why instruction 
that does not ‘quicken,’ knowledge that slackens the reign of activity, why in fact history, in Goethe’s 
phrase, must be seriously ‘hated,’ as a costly and superfluous luxury of the understanding.. . .  (p.3)”
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the immunities of indirection.”‘®‘ For book reviews, literary criticism, even histories have only distanced
us from the immediate, original experiences, so that “the infernal machine of questioning vision,” where
“mystery is defused by intermittence.”’®’
Christian faith is, therefore, not a blind trust in a unique historical character, nor merely believing
a story about one who claimed to be the Son of God, as if that is enough to yield ontological change.
Christian faith is birthed in the primal experience when a man, woman, or child, encounters the person
of the Risen Christ here and now. In those moments one’s mind is changed as the Holy Spirit blazes new
paths through the neuronal structure of the brain, causing everything to change within and without. A
new reality is offered that allows one to think, feel, and act in a new way. One is never the same again.
Something radically new has taken place. One is coming to life. The Gospel of Jesus Christ is still the
best news offered to a world locked in continual crisis and subject to decay and ultimately death. The
power of the Gospel to bring about transformation is a present reality and possibility in this world. The
church has the ability to hold out to the world the possibility of transformation, but we cannot offer that
which we do not believe and which we have never experienced. We cannot offer what we do not have.’®®
Unless the church in the West rediscovers this power by opening itself up to the power of the Holy Spirit,
we will remain ineffective.
The power of the Spirit is known in the relationship. Not only is Loder’s theology inherently
personal, it is constitutively relational. In the dialectic of Spirit-to-spirit, Person-to-person, Freedom-to-
freedom we encounter the presence of Christ. Relationality runs through evei*y level of the created order
and has been revealed as the driving force of the Trinity. Loder believed:
[The] ultimacy of relationality resides . . .  in the trinitarian nature of the one God who 
is revealed to us in Jesus Christ. The unity of God’s nature as the Cappadocian 
theologians (4”' c) understood so well is the relationality among the three persons of the 
trinity; the dynamic inner life of God is the relationality among its members, each one 
of which contains the whole. To understand that Jesus Christ is fully God as well as 
fully human is to understand that the perichoretic unity among the members of the 
trinity whereby continual and mutual interpenetration without loss of identity (notably 
a dynamic that also appears among particles at the subatomic level) is already revealed
’®’Steiner, p. 39.
’®’Steiner, p. 28.
’®®Loder makes this point in one of his chapel talks at Princeton Seminary. Speaking to the 
seminarians he asked, “Do you really believe what you are learning? Is what you believe connecting 
with the knowledge we pass on to you? If not, then you make us your oppressors. Moreover, if we 
ignore you and insist on our integration of your leaming, we are in a war against your freedom to let 
[Christ’s] life in and among you give the shape to the material we all deem precious. . . . [W]hen our 
convictional relation to Christ - seen as a growing thing - ceases to be the criterion for educational 
excellence in a theological setting, we will be missing the point, giving way to a sterile academia, or a 
plastic professionalism that will surely betray the cause.” “The Corrective: An Educational Mandate,” 
The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 68 (1976): 77-79. Italics in the text.
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in him. To understand this is to understand that the fundamental work of the Holy Spirit 
of God is to create among his people a koinonia relationality that replicates in creation 
the inner life of God and thereby reveals the communal unity between the Divine and 
the human we first saw in him. This will be a restoration of the image of God and the 
purpose which God is working out in God’s time in, thiough and beyond the history of 
the universe.’®"
By stressing the importance of the relational, Loder has given an inestimable gift to the church. What 
makes the Christian life meaningful is the deepening of one’s relationship with God in Christ and 
strengthening one’s relationships with all people, especially in the community of the church. It is a 
community that is gathered together not to simply preseiwe itself, but to enter together into the intimacy 
of the Spirit thereby deepening intimacy with other human beings. This is why Loder claimed, 
“Relationality is ontologically prior to rationality.”’®®
VIL The Christian Life as the Transfiguring Love of the Creator Spirit
It is important to note that no one lives in a constant four-dimensional existence. We move in 
and out of the dimensions quite freely. God’s intention is that we live four-dimensionally, a life that is 
configured by Holy mediating reality. The work of the Holy Spirit is ongoing. Transformation is 
ongoing. And along the way transformation produces moments of transfiguration, the experience of 
being placed more fully into the world and being led into the truth of the Spirit. Transfiguration plays 
a central role in Loder’s phenomenology because through it we experience the life-changing love of the 
Creator Spirit.
Our theological consideration takes its cue from the biblical reference to Jesus’ mountain top 
experience, most fully recorded in Matthew 17:1-8 (with parallel references in Mark 9:2-8 and Luke 
9:28-36.) Six days after Peter’s confession to Jesus that, “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God,” 
in Caesarea Philippi, Jesus brings Peter, James and John up a mountain (Matthew 16:16). Situated at 
the half-way point in Matthew’s gospel between Jesus’ baptism and his resuiTection, the story of Jesus’
’®"James E. Loder, “The Place of Science in Practical Theology: The Human Factor,” 
International Journal o f Practical Theology, 4 (2000), p. 40. “This priority of relationality over 
rationality, in both developmental sequence and quality of being, is deeply embedded in human 
experience. This make is possible for us to envision and take seriously the probability that, viewed 
through the window of ‘quantum weirdness,’ the whole universe is everywhere and in all its aspects 
deeply interconnected.” LS, p. 8.
’®®George Macleod (1895-1991) beautifully captures Loder’s sentiment, “For Chiist is a Person 
to be trusted, not a principle to be tested. The Church is a Movement, not a meeting house. The Faith 
is an Experience, not an exposition. Chi istians are Explorers, not map makers. And the New Social 
Order [the Kingdom] is not a blueprint which someone must find quickly. It is a present Experience 
made possible at Bethlehem, offered on Calvary, and communicated at Pentecost.” George Macleod, 
Coracle (1942) cited in Ronald Ferguson, George Macleod: Founder o f the Iona Community (London: 
HarperCollins, 1990), p. 195.
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transfiguration is certainly one of the more obscure and mysterious stories found in the gospel. 
Compared to other moments in Jesus’ life, such as his birth, crucifixion, or resurrection, the 
transfiguration is often ov e r lo o k e d . Th i s  is unfortunate, because in this story we are given an 
invaluable clue here as to the pattem in which God, through Jesus Clirist, continually illumines reality 
for us, and drives us deeper into the nature o f Reality itself
The three disciples ascend the mountain holding one conception of Jesus and they descend with 
another. The change in perspective is brought about as a result of literally seeing Jesus in a new light, 
so to speak, and by hearing a word about him that did not originate within them. They have what Loder 
would identify as a four-dimensional, convictional experience - a knowing event. Up until this point 
in Matthew’s text, the disciples have a very difficult time understanding Jesus’ proclamation of the 
Kingdom or Realm of God. They do not fully grasp the radical significance of the message or the unique 
identity of the preacher, Jesus. In Caesarea Philippi, even though Jesus affirms Peter’s confession he 
is quick to scold him, accusing him of being an agent of Satan, because he objects to Jesus’ statement 
that he “must go to Jerusalem and suffer many things from the elders and chief priests and scribes, and 
be killed, and on the third day be raised (Matthew 17:21-22).” The disciples, particularly Peter, seem 
to have J e s u s o u t .  They cast him in a certain image, project particular ideas upon him, impose 
their own subjectivities, hopes, fears, and agendas and then seek to relate to him from out of those 
projections, within the confines of their limited knowledge. They soon realize the limit of their 
loiowledge, however, when their frames of meaning are disclosed for what they are and are then 
shattered by the revelation of God’s light shining through Jesus.
The text says that Jesus was “transfigured before them and his face shone like the sun, and his 
garments became white as light (Matthew 17:2).” In addition to seeing Jesus’ radiating garments and 
face, Moses and Elijah appear to talk with Jesus. From a close reading of the text it is clear that Peter, 
in particular, is so overwhelmed by what he sees before him that he does not know what to say. His 
proposal to erect three booths or tents of meeting for these visitors is the suggestion of one so overcome 
by the trauma of the experience that what he offers is nonsensical gibberish. Note that in verse five Peter
’®^ Many church goers are not familiar with this story. Even though it is recognized and 
sometimes celebrated during the liturgical year on the Sunday before the beginning of Lent (or on 6'*' 
August in some calendars), for all intents and purposes it is ignored by the church.
‘®’Thomas G. Long identifies this text as apocalyptic. The purpose of apocalyptic literature, he 
wi ites, “is to pull back the curtain, to lift the veil, so that what is normally hidden - the action of God, 
the hidden ways of heaven - can be seen. . . . Since God’s activity is hidden from normal sight, 
apocalyptic texts seek to provide extraordinary vision by pulling back the heavenly shroud to reveal, if 
only for an instant, the incognito activity of God, woven undetected into the fabric of human history and 
disguised in the ordinariness of life.” Matthew (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), pp. 
192-193. See also W. F. Albright & C. S. Mann, The Anchor Bible: Matthew, With Introduction, 
Translation, and Notes (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986), pp. 203-207; William Barclay, The Gospel 
o f Matthew (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958), pp.172-179.
259
is still speaking when “a bright cloud overshadowed them, and a voice from the cloud said, ‘This is my 
beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased; listen to him (v.5).” As soon as the disciples heard the voice 
from the cloud, “they fell on their faces, and were filled with fear (v.6).” This experience is a jolt, a death 
blow to their preconceived understandings of Jesus. In fear, they turn their faces from Jesus’ radiating 
face, turning away from the divine light that is pouring thiough Jesus before them. Jesus, seeing their 
fear, refuses to allow their dread to have the last word and speaks into their terror with a word of grace, 
“Rise, and have no fear.” “And when they lifted up their eyes, they saw no one but Jesus only (vs. 7-8).”
If they once regarded Jesus from a strictly human point of view, they could do so no longer (Cf. 
2 Corinthians 5:16). When the thiee descended from the mountain, Jesus commanded them, “Tell no 
one the vision, until the Son of man is raised from the dead (v.9).” The implication here is that while 
the vision gives a glimpse into Jesus’ true nature, as well as an eschatological unveiling of the way they 
would come to see him, they did not have the conceptual framework to apprehend the significance of 
what they just witnessed until after the resurrection. It appears that they received a proleptic 
participation in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ that was established in his resurrection - of God’s 
triumph over death and fear. They had been given an insight who Jesus really was, but the full meaning 
of what they experienced would not be made clear until a later point when they were ready to grasp it.
What became clear to them is that their predeterminedfigurations, their jore-figured conceptions 
of Jesus were themselves fran^-figured when Jesus disclosed his true identity. The Greek here is 
transmorphe, to change form or appearance. It could also be translated, “transformed.” To put it this 
way would suggest that Jesus, “morphed,” that is changed shape, mutating from one form of being to 
another. It is true that Jesus’ appearance did change - his clothes became white as light and his face 
shone like the sun. But the suggestive theological point in this account is that while Jesus’ physical 
qualities (his size, weight, and facial features) did not change in fomi but stayed the same, because they 
still recognized him, his human (fully human) nature remained intact, at the same time his identification 
as “Son” was disclosed to them in the form of light and confirmed by the voice, “This is my beloved Son 
in whom I am well pleased.” Due to this unveiling, the disciples’ frame of reference was forever 
transformed. Their future conceptions and ideations of who and what Jesus was toward them would have 
to be continually re-figured in light of the fra«5-figuration of the knowledge that Jesus provided for 
them. Jesus did not become something new as a result of that luminous display. He opened up for them 
the deeper dimensions of his reality that had been with them all along, but they did not recognize it. The 
limits of their knowing would allow them to see only the Jesus of history. Jesus’ true nature would have 
to be given or revealed to them. Thomas Long interestingly notes that, “Historically speaking, Jesus is 
on a death march, entering the gloomiest season of his life.” When the light of God shines through Jesus, 
everything changes. “The earthly Jesus is headed toward his doom on the cross, but suddenly we see not 
a victim, but a victor; not the one despised and rejected by the world, but the one beloved and well
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pleasing to God.”’®® Their own blindness and darkness hindered them from seeing his hue identity until 
the light cast from the light of God enabled them to truly see him. He showed them who he really was 
and in the light of that knowledge their reality, itself, was hansfigured. In God’s light we see light 
(Psalm 36:9).’®^ The transfiguration is not merely a cognitive, rational experience but occurs within the 
context of a relationship, person to person, grounded in a personal encounter with Clirist and through 
Christ to God.’'’” One level of knowing is hansfigured by another, offering a figure-ground gestalt 
reversal, and giving greater meaning and depth.
Light, therefore, is an indispensable component in the process of hansfiguration. The light 
unveils what before was beyond the possibility of sight and meaning. In that moment with Christ, reality 
will be cast in a new light. “As the lightning flashes and lights up the sky from one side to the other, 
so will the Son of Man be in his day.(Luke 17:24)” In terms of what happened to the disciples, it is as 
if the apparent death march of Jesus’ history is illuminated by the light of God which recasts the 
meaning and purpose of that march for the disciples; the death march is at the same time a life march. 
So, too, the light of God can be seen as continually pouring through Christ, a light that is cast over the 
death march of human history who thereby continues to transfigure reality for everyone who encounters 
him. It is tlirough light, specifically God’s light and the constant of light in the universe that reality is 
formed and secured.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas F, Torrance has developed a theology of light 
informed by his interdisciplinary study of theology and physics. In the shift from the mechanistic, 
Newtonian world to the relational, Einsteinian world, the most important discovery has been “the central 
and unifying role of light across the whole spectium of scientific knowledge.”’®’ The created light of 
the universe is contingent upon the uncreated Light, which is God. For, “God is light. (1 John 1:5)” It
’®®Long, p. 193.
’®®Compare Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), The Cost o f Discipleship (New York: Collier 
Books, (1963), “The call of Jesus teaches us that our relation to the world has been built on an illusion.
 For the Christian the only God-given realities are those he receives from Christ. What is not given
us through the incarnate Son is not given us by God .(pp. 108-109)”
'®”The revelation of God in Jesus Christ, wi ites Brunner, “means that God no longer speaks out 
of us, but to us; we do not know him as being in the world, and therefore do not know him through the 
world, but we know him as the One who comes into the world. For he himself is an other than the world, 
an other than the content of the soul. He is the Other One, the mysterious and unknowable One, who has 
his own proper name and whom we do not know because he is person. Personality is a secret; a mystery 
is hidden in it. Knowledge of a person is possible only through revelation, and he reveals himself 
through his word. Through the word the mystery of the person is communicated. So God reveals 
himself in the world because he is spirit, the only true personal spirit.” The Theology o f Crisis (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1929), p. 32.
’®'Thomas F. Torrance, Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (Belfast: Christian Journals 
Limited, 1980), p. 75.
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is the “uncreated Light” of God that “constitutes the ultimate ground of its intelligibility [of created light] 
and as such establishes it and gives it its true value. Apart from such a basis in uncreated Light all our 
experience and knowledge of things in the universe would finally be meaningless, for they would be 
devoid of any ultimate standards of truth, goodness, or beauty.”’®’ The Light of God is the ground for 
all that is illuminated by the light of creation, the light that illumines all areas of knowledge in the 
universe. This same Jesus as Light of the World continues to extend his “life-giving light” through the 
Holy Spirit participating in his perichoretic relationship with the Son and the Father. Like light itself, 
the Spirit is infinitely swift, moving kinetically, not bound by time or space, and therefore free to be 
present in any age or place, mediating the presence of Christ and illuminating Reality because he is the 
Spirit of ti'uth.
The Christian experience is ultimately defined by transfiguration, whereby reality continually
is illuminated by the light of God through Jesus Clirist. The encounter not only suggests ways in which
God can reveal divine knowledge, it also says something about the very structure of the created order
and the way we come to an apprehension of what is real, what is Reality, through the ongoing mediation
of Clnist.’®® The “exemplary” vision, as Loder sees it, offered in Matthew 17 serves as a paradigm
through which we see the way human reality is constructed by the Spirit of Christ. This is Loder’s
interpretation of the text, a reading that further reinforces the radicalization of spatio-temporal reality
which we discussed in the last chapter:
It is not simply the visage of Jesus, but the ordinary light of day that is transformed in 
juxtaposition with an epiphany of God’s uncreated light. This uncreated light is radiant, 
bright and glorious in splendor, enough to shake Peter and his companions from their 
slumber. This light so relativises space and time that Moses and Elijah appear and are 
talking with Jesus. Perhaps as if to regain ground for culture, Peter suggests building 
fraditional booths to hold the epiphany. But cultural appropriations are inadequate to 
contain the light of God and the voice of God that speaks from the cloud. In the 
uncreated light of God, we can be freed from barriers consfructed by culture, and even 
from so-called natural limitations. In this way, Christian experience can perceive and 
indwell what is beyond our natural eyes.’®"
Loder thus defines transfiguration as “the illumination and divination of an otherwise
’®’Torrance, p. 78.
’®®See Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation ofChrist (Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 
1992), p. 9. “...as the incarnate Word and Tmth of God Jesus Christ in his own personal Being is 
identical with the Revelation which he mediates. But he is at the same time the very Way in which it 
is to be apprehended and inteipreted and the very Life which is the light of men, for it is only through 
the assimilation of our minds to the Mind of God incarnate in Christ that we are given the modes of 
discernment, forms of thought, and the structures of the understanding which we need in order to grasp 
and articulate knowledge of God in a way that is worthy of him. (p. 9)”
’®"James E. Loder, “A Meditation on Evangelism in a Scientific Culture,” The Princeton 
Theological Review, VIII (2001): 9.
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unenlightened or mundane phenomenon. The implication is that the phenomenon as transfigured is the 
fundamental reality; the darkened version is its common appearance.””® This certainly captures what 
Matthew describes. Jesus’ common appearance returned, but the illumination revealed his fundamental 
reality. This is not to say that Jesus’ true reality was light, apart from his human appearance. This would 
lend itself to a docetic view. The fundamental reality is Jesus’ humanity and his divinity. Loder wants
us to see a pattem of transfiguration that, defined by Christ and mediated by his Spirit, yields the |
Îontological transformation of persons and their ideas, and by extension of our personal grasp of the j
structure of reality. i
It is within this context that Loder discusses evangelism (and the only place where he does so) |
as the activity of “opening human eyes to the ultimate light that defines all lesser lights in eternal and I
eschatological perspective.’’”” It is the work of bringing people to the Light, which is Jesus Christ, so |
that they can “see” what God has done and is doing in the world. Evangelism cannot be “reduced to |
technology -  a technique-driven approach to evangelism is reductionistic of human destiny and portrays I
God as a fool trying to save the world by gimmiclay.””’ Even here, Loder’s personalism and j
relationalism are brought to bear upon the way the Christian reaches out to the world with the good news 
that is the Gospel. The Gospel is not an idea that simply has to be believed, nor is it a call to strive after |
some moral idea. The Gospel is truly good news because in it we discover who we really are in the mind i
of God. “The true evangelist dwells day and night in the ultimate paradigm shift where ordinary reality *
is decisively redefined by the living presence of Jesus Christ. Then, and only then, can he or she discern I
what the Spirit or Christ is doing and so enter into doing ‘ the good works, which God prepare beforehand 1
to be our way of life’. (Ephesians 2:10)””® Loder extends a powerful vision of what is possible for î
human life when he/she realizes that one is already participating in the vast, broad, extravagant love of i
God in Christ, “when we apprehend that all creation, including humans, is already comprehended in the ;
mind of God. . . . ” This experience and acknowledgment must be seen as a significant part of the good ;
news of the Gospel because “this insight makes intelligible our place in the universe and our drive to I
comprehend ourselves. ” ”®
We end, therefore, by stressing that for Loder the telos of transfiguration is love. Even though |
”®T7W2, p. 43. In contrast to transfoimation, “which as a process (though not in its outcome) 
may be largely invisible, transfiguration is a visible change of essential form (morphe)C (p. 229, cited 
in G. Kittel, Theological Dictionary o f the New Testament, Volume IV).





conviction begins in conflict and results in ongoing conflictual experiences for the human spirit, the 
movement of the Spirit is directed by the power of God’s love for humanity and the world, a love that 
is poured out into a human life through whom the world is being blessed. Loder was fond of quoting a 
line from Kierkegaard’s monumental text, Works o f Love: “Love believes all things -  and yet is never 
deceived.” Kierkegaard is talking about divine love which has the power to transform human love from 
illusion to truth. Such a love, Loder writes, “has the power to expose deception as a delusion about 
reality. Human integrity based on the love revealed in Christ will not finally be deceived, but will 
deceive deception into the truth.”’”” Because the Spirit is bringing one into all truth (John 16:13), the 
Christian comes to have “full awareness of all that is going on, including the deceits perpetrated against 
[love], but as love, it exposes, as in a harsh white light, that deception is in fact an exercise in nihilism, 
so it comes to nothing.”’”’ This is why conviction begins in conflict because the Spirit exposes the 
deceptions, seductions, and lies of the ego that is bent on self-destruction and isolation.’”’ The Spirit is 
the Tmth Teller. It is as if Jesus is saying through the Spirit, “You think you know how to live, you think 
you know what matters in life, but you don't. And you won’t know until you die to your illusions and live 
in my truth, otherwise you HI live in your illusions and die in your lies. ” It is said that “The truth hurts.” 
It does not have to, but sometimes it does. Maybe the truth has to hurt, has to pierce our lives in order 
to break us free from our self-contained worlds. From the cross we see the pain caused by telling the 
truth, as Jesus was murdered for telling the truth about ourselves, the world and about God. Yet, that 
truth because it is God’s truth, has the potential of being redemptive, of bringing life out of death, 
whereas lies can only distort, destroy, and ultimately kill.
Loder’s contribution to our understanding of the Christian life rests in his insight that the Holy 
Spirit wants to expose the lies we live in and under in order to put us more deeply and truthfully into the 
world. The work of the Spirit transfigures reality and opens us up to the truth of the Gospel and with it
’””James E. Loder and W. Jim Neidhardt, “Barth, Bohr, and Dialectic,” in W. Mark Richardson 
& Wesley J. Wildman, Religion and Science: History, Method, and Dialogue (New York: Routledge, 
1996), p. 287.
’“’ZiS, p. 276. Cf. Willie James Jennings, “Holy Spirit and Human Spirit: Overcoming a 
Deceived Heart,” Fire and Wind: The Holy Spirit in the Church Today, pp. 89ff. Jennings argues that 
the Holy Spirit seeks to free the human spirit from self-deceptions, primarily caused when the self looks 
to define itself through the prison of interiority (which is rooted in the Freudian thought). Even though 
the Holy Spirit might be “‘in us,’ the Spirit is always ‘outside of us,’ before us, yet always at work on 
us.” Despite the title of the essay, Jennings fails to articulate the relationality of the Holy Spirit to the 
human spirit.
’”’“Zyo/(2hon is the development term used to describe self-deceit at the ego level, but isolation 
is more profound when it is alienation from the spiritual truth about oneself. It is well known that there 
is a close connection between personal isolation and the human propensity to violence. The hidden life 
of Judas is the prime example. Intimacy in God’s love is the ultimate answer to violence.” LS, p. 277. 
Italics in the text.
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the truth about ourselves in order for the human spirit to be transformed after the pattem of Christ. God 
desires this for everyone. When we stand before God and gaze into the face of Jesus Christ, as if in a 
miiTor, God’s Spirit will mediate our tiue identities, gently or aggressively -  but always gracefully and 
lovingly -  removing the masks from our faces. God will remove the façades, one by one. God will strip 
away the masks we have developed since infancy, which cover up who we truly are and hinder us from 
love. The Spirit is grieved when we find ourselves trapped behind these masks, enslaved to illusion. The 
God of Jesus Christ is not a God of masks and illusions, but prefers unveiling and tmth. And only tmth 
can set us free. We know this freedom when we gaze into the face of Christ in the intimacy of prayer 
-  without our masks -  and we are seen and loved for who we really are. All of this is the framework of 
Paul’s profound description of the Cliristian experience, of which Loder’s work is a creative variation 
on an old tmth that is always new: “Now the Lord is Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there 
is freedom. And all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a 
mirror, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this comes 
from the Lord, the Spirit. (2 Corinthians 3:18)”
The Holy Spirit moves in love and for love in order for humanity to live in love and for love. 
Conviction is then understood as an extraordinary act of God’s love who longs for human freedom from 
self-deception, so that the human spirit can be free for  God,/or the world, free to be fo r  the Thou met 
in one’s neighbor.’”® Loder sees love as “not merely an ethical norm, nor is it the disposition to do good,
or a work of the human will ” These understandings of love are not profound enough and will never
meet the deepest needs of the human spirit, because the human spirit craves relationships. Instead, the 
love of which Loder speaks “is alive in the person through the spirit of the person in communion with 
the Spirit of God.’””"
The comprehensive framework of Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology is the
generative power of love. “What is a lifetime?” and “Why do I live it?” The answer to these questions
is grounded in what Loder calls “the immense love of God.” It is the only framework to answer these
questions. This is how Loder puts it:
If asked from within the love of God mediated to us by his Spirit through Christ, then 
an answer is forthcoming: My life is an incomplete act of God’s immense love toward 
God’s creation; it is an act that is completed only as I return with my lifetime that same 
love to God and to God’s creation. “Why do I live it?” I live it because this love 
redefines life itself for me; in the koinonia, life becomes love. There, life itself is 
reenvisionsed and redefined as the struggling raw material from which love is fashioned 
by the grace of God.’”®




Throughout Loder’s writings is a passionate desire that women and men come to know themselves as 
loved by God -  even unto death. It is really that simple, and yet so profound -  “that the universe is the 
obverse side of God’s immense love for humanity and for each singular individual.”’””
We are created for intimacy with God and the human spirit will not be satisfied until that longing
is met.
When the longing for that intimacy is satisfied by the Spiritual Presence of Christ, the 
Face of God, then the answers to our basic questions may dawn on us. A lifetime is an 
unfinished act of God’s love; it is intended that we complete that act by returning 
ourselves to God, directly and through others, in love. In this recognition, we discover 
that the fundamental data about us are not merely that we are alive and developing, 
incredible products of a vast expanding universe. Rather, as each life unfolds, gets tom 
open, stripped of its survival techniques and its passing pleasures, and discovers itself 
as spirit, then it appears from under the surface that we have been created for nothing 
less than the pure love of God, whose universe is our home.’”’
Stressing the incompleteness of human life is in keeping with the relational-personalism that we have 
seen throughout his writings. Human life becomes authentically human when it is transparently 
grounded in Holy Spirit. Within the context of encounter, the human spirit is brought to life and in 
freedom (in “letting be”) is allowed and invited to respond to God and creation with one’s life. How 
this is does will be unique for every individual, particular to one’s personality. The result is a creation 
that is marvelously diverse, which God loves with particularity.
In seeking to grasp the significance of his own convictional experiences, Loder’s work conveys 
the important point that what God did in his life is no different from what the Creator Spirit can do and 
is doing with and for every human life willing to risk intimacy with the Holy. Loder believed that what 
he experienced was neither unique nor rare. He holds out the promise that the God he encountered can 
be encountered by any one. He used his life as a framework through which one might come to discern 
the movement of the Spirit of Christ in their own life. The transformational pattem of the Spirit is at 
work in people’s lives -  both in and beyond the church -  whether they know it or not. This is what the 
church needs to releam, so that the church can help individuals discern what God is doing in their lives, 
to help them know that God has reached out to them in Christ and reaches now through Christ’s Spirit 
with extraordinary love.
Finally, the telos of love leads to doxology. This is Loder’s ultimate aim all along - to renew 
a sense of wonder before life itself and the glorification of God. Conviction will result in praise and 




and in his ongoing redemption of the world.” °^* The “aim of all theological writing” is to “inspire
w o r s h i p . G o o d  theology is always doxological. In time, this will also be the ultimate test of Loder’s
theology: will it advance our capacity to worship “in spirit and in truth (John 4: 23-24)”? I believe it
does and it will. Loder’s work is a loud call to worship, a summons to enter into the intimacy of prayer,:
Veni, Creator Spiritus,
Mentes tnorum visita;
Impie snperna gratia 
Quae tu creasti pectora
Qui diceris Paraclitus,
Altissimi, donum Dei,








fill them with grace.
Thou, that didst create them.
Thou, that art called Comforter, 
highest gift o f God, 
living fount, fire, love 
and unction o f the spirit -
Endow our weak flesh 
with perpetual strength, 
kindle our senses with light, 
pour Thy love into our hearts.)
,,210Torrance wrote, "’Come Creator Spirit, is a prayer of open surrender to the absolute creativity of God.
As Loder’s work leads us into prayer, may the Christian be open to the new things the Spirit longs for 
us to know: The creative power of God’s redeeming love in Christ is even now through his Spirit 
renewing humanity and the world. Veni, Creator Spiritus. Come, Creator Spirit. Come.
p. 115.
James E. Loder, Foreword in Cullen I. K. Story, The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose, Pattern, and 
Power (Shippensburg, PA: Ragged Edge Press, 1997), p. viii.
'^“Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (London: SCM Press, 1965), p. 245.
Conclusion
In these chapters I have introduced and examined, explored and deciphered the theology writings 
of James E. Loder. I have shown that the ideas and themes found in his writings form an 
epistemological, psycho-spiritual framework that I characterize as a relational phenomenological 
pneumatology. Grounded in his interdisciplinary work in theology, psychology, and physics, Loder 
seeks to demonstrate how the Holy Spirit is operative in and with the human spirit in establishing new 
perceptions of reality that are Christomorphic. I have argued that his multidimensional phenomenology, 
his identification of the logic of transformation in convictional experiences, and his elevation of the 
importance of relationality in our understanding of the way the Holy Spirit communicates with the 
human spirit offer an enriching vision of what is means to be a disciple of Jesus Christ. Thus, I have 
argued Loder’s relational phenomenological pneumatology contains rich and principally unrecognized 
resources for providing new frameworks for the Christian life.
In these chapters I have provided an overview of his life, explored his writings and their wider 
reception, and identified the key influences upon his thinking. I have examined all the major themes and 
terms that Loder uses throughout his writings. I have argued that Loder’s theology cannot be fathomed 
apart from his own experiences of conviction. Loder’s life models a relationality that is integral to the 
Chiistian life. Making the connection between his life and his thought, in a way that has not been 
previously explored, does not reduce the intellectual sophistication of his thought, but strengthens its 
wider appeal because it emerges from within his own existential struggle before the Holy and thus has 
the power to speak a powerful word to the human condition struggling for meaning and love. The main 
thrust of Loder’s ideas is really very simple, that the vital nerve of the Christian life is living 
transparently in the presence of God. But this is far from simplistic.
The Christian life is preeminently relational, distinguished by a relationship with God constituted 
by Jesus Christ, and sustained by the Holy Spirit. I have demonsfrated that for Loder, one’s relationship 
with God takes place in and through the life of the Holy Spirit who operates within a complementary 
relationship with the human spirit, in what he describes as the analogia spiritus’. an intimate, 
transformational intenelation of the Holy Spirit and the human spirit. When the Holy Spirit relates to 
the human spirit, the pattern of knowing is personal, it is relational. The Holy Spirit, intimately 
connected to the person and work of Clnist, takes up and extends the work begun in the incarnation by 
enfleshing the presence of Christ in the life of an individual in ways that are transformationally 
Chiistomorphic. I have shown that what makes Loder’s work unique is the way he articulates a theology 
of the Holy Spirit that incoiporates a firm grasp of the way the self participates in and conies to have a 
knowledge of itself, the world, and God. It is precisely the logic of this dynamic, I would argue, that has 
extraordinary implications for the way we articulate the Christian experience.
When the Holy Spirit constitutes a four-dimensional reality for an individual, a new world, a new 
reality has come into being. This new reality is a place of profound meaning and love. It is the vast.
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broad, free space of the Spirit’s creation. It is a reality defined by the Presence of Christ, where the Holy 
Spirit continues to speak to the human spirit with a grammar of presence. Through the revelation of God 
in Christ, we come to see that historical existence is a field of encounter, an experience of being fully 
alive in the field of God’s grace in a world that is inherently relational. The Christian life becomes the 
gracious participation in the radically new reality, the New Creation revealed and achieved by Jesus 
Christ through his historical life, death, and resurrection, the same historical person who remains person 
and whose presence is historically mediated by the eschatologically-oriented transforming power of the 
Holy Spirit engaging the human spirit.
Consequently, I have shown that Loder’s theology has the potential of providing new and 
promising frameworks for the Christian life that have significant implications for the ministi*y of the 
church -  a church in a state of crisis. Philip Rieff observed that nowadays “the world is full of tame 
Christians; in consequence the churches are empty of life, if not of people.”' And Sam Keen similarly 
notes that, “The sanctuary is so seldom filled with vitality and enthusiasm.” The language of 
“celebration,” “joy,” “hope,” and even “love” are used quite regularly. “But the music drags, and there 
is no dancing and little radical openness to surprise and change.”  ^Loder’s theology speaks to the present 
condition of the church and has the potential of revitalizing its ministry. His work helps us to discern 
between pathological religion that hinders the human spirit and conviction that liberates the human spirit 
to be engaged with the world in works of love. If the Christian life is constitutively a personal 
transforming event, then what hinders the Christian life is anything that depersonalizes or dehumanizes 
the self, anything that hinders a relational encounter with Christ. The Holy Spirit as the giver of life is 
at work in human lives, renewing, reforming, transforming an alienated creation to its Creator. There is 
power and vitality in the Holy Spirit, always available to the one in Christ, allowing the Christian to be 
as radical and risky as the Gospel itself. But the renewal of the church can take place only when the 
needs of a wider humanity are in mind.
I find it striking that when Loder collapsed and asked for prayer from strangers he was in such 
a public, secular space - a bank. It is true that everything he wrote, he wrote for the church. But I would 
also argue that he had another audience in mind, the wider public of God’s people. He gave his life in 
service to the academy by fashioning a theological framework for pneumatology that expressed the 
“how” of human life revitalized by the Holy Spirit. But I am convinced, and have shown, that his 
ultimate concern was for the life of persons living in an increasingly depersonalized, highly mechanized 
world, for the ordinary woman and man living -  within or beyond the church -  becoming increasingly
‘Philip Rieff, The Triumph o f  the Therapeutic: Uses o f  Faith After Freud  (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1987), p. 99.
^Sam Keen, Apology fo r  Wonder (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 15.
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dehumanized by a materialist culture alienated from its Creator. What institution better represents the 
celebration of materiality than a bank? Yet, it is precisely to the wider cosmos (John 3: 16-17), in 
keeping with Loder’s admiration for the Gospel of John, that the love of Christ must be directed. 1IAs the first dissertation written after Loder’s death and the only one (to the best of my I
1;
knowledge) written with a clear and sustained focus upon his life and thought, I offer my contribution j
to knowledge, a contribution that will hopefully aid others who share the emerging interest in Loder’s I
work. The Templeton Foundation is considering endowing a Loder Lectureship at Princeton Theological 
Seminary. In the 2002-2003 academic year Princeton Seminary will offer for the first time a year-long 
doctoral seminar dedicated to Loder’s writings. President Thomas W. Gillespie of Princeton recently 
acknowledged that Loder was probably the most brilliant member of the Princeton faculty. Yet his 
brilliance hindered many from grasping what he was trying to say, making it difficult to see the 
extraordinary ramifications of his work for the life of the church. This is not to say that what I have 
offered here exhaustively grasps Loder’s thinking (for it does not), but it is a start. Neither is it an 
exercise in hagiography or hero worship. He had no desire to be anyone’s saint or hero. Instead, this 
work is a flickering flame offering just enough light to move us closer to apprehending the “heavenly 
vision” that he saw so clearly. What matters most is not Loder’s vision, but the vision of the One before 
whom Loder stood convicted.
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